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
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EUDEMICS, THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL OR GENERAL WELFARE

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In the preamble of the national constitution, among the purposes for which the constitution was established by the people, is mentioned the promotion of the general welfare. This phrase has quite the same meaning as the familiar Latin phrase *pro bono publico*, or the term commonweal or commonwealth as the translation of *res publica*, all emphasizing not so much the welfare of the corporate state as the welfare of the masses, the people who compose the nation as a whole.

The general welfare of the nation has been promoted in the past by our governments, both federal and local, but perhaps without a clearly defined policy for the attainment of the national welfare. But at this crisis in national history and in this period of world-reconstruction, may it not be worth while to focalize, as it were, into a single word, the many principles and processes that underlie national improvement? In so doing, one may hope that, by emphasizing the existence of such a field of study, the attention of students may be directed to it, and that these in due time will by their united contributions make scientific the study of the welfare of nations.

In employing the word eudemics to convey this thought, I do so with some trepidation, realizing that even now our dictionaries are sadly overworked. But, on the other hand, we already have alliterative and complementary terms in the words eugenics and euthenics,[1] and these sciences, combined, work together admirably into a study of national welfare, since the one emphasizes improvement in heredity and the other in environment.

[1] See article by Lester F. Ward, entitled, "Eugenics, Euthenics, Eudemics," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1913.

Furthermore, the meaning assigned to the word eudemics can be justified from the philological standpoint, since the Greek word δῆμος may be defined (1) as a political area, or (2) as the masses of a nation, or (3) as the body of citizens in their political capacity. The combination of these meanings, together with the prefix εὖ, should readily suggest national or general welfare, so that the word eudemics may properly be used to cover that field of study. If such a study can be developed into a science, a knowledge of its teachings will become essential to the systematic promotion of the welfare of the whole nation, under the guidance, let us hope, of those philosopher-statesmen from whom Plato in his *Republic* expected so much.

National or general welfare is so broad a term, that clearly the subject-matter cannot be approached from a single point of view, but should be sociological or synthetic in kind, so as to give a comprehensive survey of the many factors that enter into a problem of human progress. The word eudemics, therefore, should imply a constructive attitude toward national welfare and the formulation of a national policy, not political only, but broadly social and based on as exact information as can be had. It should not be utopian nor given to panaceas, and in reaching conclusions should make haste slowly and should look long before it leaps far. Unquestionably, as the leading nations become capable of scientific policies for themselves, applications of national principles will experimentally be made on an international scale, and in later centuries eudemics may broaden into a synthesizing world-science, harmonizing and unifying the several policies of the States existing at the time, so as to bring about the ultimate "federation of the world."

Eudemics a subdivision of social progress.—Eudemics should be thought of as a subdivision of the study of social progress, to which much attention has been given in the last fifty years. As a subdivision it should be made definitely concrete and should be related to the study of social progress as the special social sciences are to sociology. It should have also a purposive or directive aspect and, therefore, should be associated in thought with Comte's theory of *prevision* and Ward's theory of *telesis*. Both of these imply that before action be taken conditions must be understood,

that the forces at work be under control, and that there be a fairly clear notion of the social end or goal desired. Relying upon this information, the human intellect, serving as a pilot, should then direct social activity so as to expedite, to some slight degree at least, the progress of mankind toward higher standards of social justice and happiness. Since human society is still in its infancy, not in its old age, it should not be expected that an exact program for human endeavor can yet be definitely made, but empirically at least some notion can be ascertained of the general direction of human progress. Society at present may be compared to a ship in a fog, which is guided onward rather than allowed to drift, since the pilot hopes that through precaution and careful judgment he may avoid hidden dangers and steer the vessel safely toward its destination.

One cannot deny, however, that there are limitations to the possibilities of improvement. The cosmic situation is entirely beyond our control, barring what slight modifications can be made in the planet on which we live. On the other hand our control of nature through such sciences as physics and chemistry is already so powerful that science itself through its destructive ingenuity threatens to become a peril to the progress of civilization. Social programs should be speeded up, so that the energy of nature through eudemic policy may be directed toward constructive ends, building up and strengthening the achievements reared with so great difficulty by past generations. As for our social environment, admittedly it is man-made, and what man has made he can unmake and remake. What social evils there are can be eliminated in due time, and what good there is should be made better through a wise social control over human energy. Action, therefore, is the keynote of eudemics, since progress must be made, not by merely dreaming of past achievement, but by constructive additions to what already exists. In our studies, to be sure, we should seek to comprehend the past as well as to strive to foresee the future, combining the two as were the Titan brothers of ancient mythology. Yet one should never forget that in the legend Prometheus (or Forethought), and not Epimetheus (or Afterthought), was the real benefactor of man.

Order and progress.—Comte, in his teachings, emphasized the notion that order should accompany progress, and this has its counterpart in Spencer's teaching that integration should accompany differentiation. In other words, in a eudemic study progress should not be expected from violent revolutions that shatter the structure or polity of the nation, in the vain hope that a perfect system will arise spontaneously from the ruins. In revolutions every attempt rather should be made to maintain in its fundamentals the national organization, but this should be kept flexible and adjustable, so that it may adapt itself to the changing demands of a public opinion striving to become intelligent. Undue national rigidity means rebellion or decay, but a national order capable of adaptation has within itself the promise of progress through telic evolution. This stress on the maintenance of an orderly existence, this belief in progress and reliance on public opinion are, we trust, axiomatic in the United States. But, unfortunately, in late years our officials have shown a distrust of public discussion and, fearing the entrance of new ideas, have become reactionary in their suppression of free speech. Yet after all there can be no intelligent public opinion nor any real national freedom unless there is open discussion of new issues, whether wise or foolish. As a nation we are not intelligent in proportion to our opportunities, and we can never aspire to world-leadership unless our statesmen acquire the art of mental growth and develop the open mind of the scientific investigator.

Adaptation and readjustment.—Herbert Spencer and his followers taught that the behavior of society depends on the mutual interaction between its population and the conditions under which the population exists. Interaction implies that a nation must adapt itself to its environment and also react on this environment so as to bring about modifications supposedly more favorable to existence. This means that a nation must understand its physical environment in order that it may best adjust itself to nature's demands. This, to be sure, is adaptation but not necessarily progress, for it may be adaptation to a retrograding environment. But when man really comprehends his environment, he sees the possibility of modifying it in the direction of what he considers

environment ought to be. This capacity, first, to comprehend nature's laws and then to utilize its material and its energies for well-defined purposes, has resulted in the achievements of material civilization and hence in material progress.

Too often in the past the nation in its ignorance has, like the prodigal son, wasted its substance in riotous living. It should rather study its resources and methodically conserve and utilize the gifts so abundantly bestowed by nature. Within the soils are potential foods and hidden sources of wealth like the oil shales of the West; these national resources must be conserved and developed, the soil must be made increasingly productive, so as to produce food for our rapidly growing population, land should not be kept from use for the purpose of speculation, and the wealth under the soil should be made national and used to promote general prosperity. All our means of transportation, whether rail, water, or road, should be unified into a national system, and new sources of power should be discovered and aerial navigation mastered. It is even more important that in school and factory should be taught the applications of science and the principles of invention, as to stimulate interest in newer achievements. All this implies that eudemics in one of its aspects should pay especial attention to the intelligent utilization of natural resources, as the foundation for national economic prosperity.

If there is any truth at all in the materialistic or the economic interpretation of history, it is that in a situation like the present, when the world-war has so radically upset previous economic conditions, there must come vigorous readjustments in the great social institutions of the nation. Under the stimulus of the war it seemed for a time as though superhuman energy entered into national life, so that the mass of our citizens in civic and social directions worked hard and long, living above the pettiness of daily existence in an atmosphere of national sacrifice and high attainment. But with the coming of the armistice and the revelations of profiteering-contracts, red tape, and woeful waste, followed by friction over national policy, there came a revulsion of feeling that has seriously weakened the morale of the nation. There is a cynical attitude toward domestic reform and international

situations, and there is a slackening of public confidence, so that few feel within themselves any incentives to do their best. This has brought about discord, friction, and a physical and mental lassitude, all highly dangerous if long continued. A proper eudemic policy would surely aim to restore public confidence, so as to take up again the proper task of national readjustment.

European and Asiatic states are already in the throes of reorganization and the United States cannot escape its turn. Willing or unwilling, it must make radical readjustments, especially in the fields of economics and politics. Already in process one may see the many attempts of labor and capital to readjust their relations on a fairer basis. There is the rise of a merchant marine, the broadening out of our commercial and banking systems, and the perplexities arising from a decidedly fluctuating foreign exchange. International consortiums, unofficial mandataries in the Caribbean region, and new alignments in foreign relations are national issues, forming part of our problem in international readjustment. Henceforth, our national state is in the world and can no longer consider itself as isolated on a segment of the western continent.

Every nation, to be sure, has its own destiny to work out, and should seek to develop right policies for the upbuilding of its population and its national resources. This is fundamental and should remain so for generations. On the other hand, just as a young man may feel the thrill of exaltation when he finds himself to be a man among men, so a nation may rejoice when its leaders cut loose from provincialism and plan to place it as a nation among nations, doing its part in the world's work and adding its voice in the common council of the international world, in behalf of weaker nations and of policies that make for peace rather than for war.

In the same manner other institutions, such as religion, education, and morals, must adapt themselves to newer situations as they arise. The extreme individualism of denominationalism, for example, is passing away and religious confederations, ententes, and joint agreements are in process of formation, so as to meet with united front the apathy and the agnosticism of the century. Can we not hope that a similar movement may show itself in the field of Sociology? Already in this country the humanistic groups

have federated themselves into the American Council of Learned Societies. Is not the time ripe for the formation of a great federation of those organizations concerned with social conduct and social progress? Such a federation, formulating joint policies, and co-operating with governmental agencies, might voice the intelligent social leadership of the nation, teach its conclusions through school, college, and the press, and within a generation might develop a public opinion that would direct national and local policies into into effective, constructive action.

This stress on the modification of public opinion is an important aspect of eudemics. For, a nation must deliberately modify at times its social inheritance of beliefs and opinions, that have been built up by accretions through the ages, solidified through tradition and custom, and yet are constantly changing through innovation and discussion. There is probably no other country on earth where even now the press has so potent and so general an influence in the accomplishment of changes in public opinion as in the United States. As an agency for social control, the press should be kept in close touch with the best social teachings of the time, so as to free itself from the present system of furnishing standardized news, guaranteed not to shock the susceptibilities of the most orthodox conservative.

Our national history furnishes many illustrations of changing opinion. When, for example, the whole continent lay open to our population, and free land and material resources seemed without limit, it was natural enough to favor large families, to breed slave labor systematically, and to encourage ever-increasing waves of immigrants from every nation under heaven. But now land is no longer free, the nation's resources are in need of conservation, and the massing of millions of immigrants into urban centers, and the growing intensity of the struggle for a living wage, all demand mental readjustments, as indicated by the discussion respecting birth control and the demand for the restriction of immigration. In the nineteenth century we lived politically isolated and apart from the world and gloried in our provincialism; now we are plunged into world-politics, send armies to France, join fleets with Great Britain, take a profound interest in the Far East, and make

membership in the League of Nations an issue in a presidential campaign.

A similar demand for mental readjustment arises from the incoming of women's suffrage. This is in a sense revolutionary and means the beginning of the end of male supremacy. Women hereafter will crowd into business and into the professions, they will hold numerous political offices hitherto kept for males, they will demand a large share in the control of education and religion, and will assert their right to fix the standards of sex ethics. Men will not resist the new order of things, but will more or less cheerfully surrender in part their cherished prerogatives to those, whom henceforth in all seriousness we must allude to as "our better halves." Presumably, by the end of the century they will be the dominant sex in national councils, and then there may come organized associations for the protection of men's rights against the encroachments of women, and male sentinels with banners may parade the sidewalks of the White House, seeking to influence the policy of the haughty madam president of the United States.

The factor of population.—In any study of eudemics the factor of population is an important element. Every nation is in duty bound to maintain its racial stock at a high standard. To a nation the virility and mentality of its population are important factors in its personality and these are largely determined by its social inheritance, its type of civilization, the standards of which cannot be lowered without danger. No nation errs, therefore, in seeking to eliminate its racial poisons, such as venereal diseases and the many forms of intemperance; or in fighting against unnecessary accidents, sicknesses, and deaths; or in refusing endorsement to "sweating" industries that can exist only by exploitation and depressed standards of living; or in refusing admission to immigrants whose incorporation into national life would weaken rather than strengthen national standards.

One result of the world-war should be the stoppage henceforth of racial migrations. The time has come when every nation must, hereafter, undertake to care for its own population, and should no more expect to foist its surplus inhabitants on other nations than improvident parents should expect the community to support

all the children they may happen to bring into existence. This should not imply that a nation objecting to promiscuous immigration necessarily considers itself as inherently superior in type to those of other nations. It seems probable that all the great races, compounded as they are through racial admixture, are fairly equal in capacity, and that each in its time has had or may have its world-empire, one following the other like the storms of the tropics. What seems like racial superiority among these must be mainly due to the advantages of a favorable natural environment, to inherited social conditions, and to intelligent leadership developed through leisure and freedom from economic strain.

Yet it cannot be denied that there are inherent differences among nations as among individuals, and that each race on the whole is best in its own habitat, to which it has become adjusted, and in the enjoyment of its own kind of civilization. A nation's type of civilization may change and does change, but changes should be accomplished systematically, under controlled conditions, through an inner development and through mental contact with other nations. But this implies that a nation should grow through contact with the best from its neighbors, not through the amalgamation with and the assimilation of their depressed classes. In the long run every immigrant blends with the native population, and, therefore, adds to or subtracts from its quality, according to his racial and his cultural inheritance.

In the eighteenth century there was, it will be remembered, a vigorous and persistent belief in the equality of man. The human mind at birth was thought to be a *tabula rasa*, and environment to be all powerful in the determination of human character. These beliefs so influenced the mind of the age that philosopher, poet, reformer, and statesman united in the declaration that "all men are created equal." If a nation desires to make progress, it was taught, it must abolish special privileges, banish inequality, and ameliorate conditions; then, it was asserted, human organisms will rapidly respond to so favorable an environment and will hand on their newly acquired characters to their descendants. It was a splendid gospel for democracies; and religion, education, and reformers of all descriptions took up the cry, and proclaimed

should not assume that men are inherently equal, but should assume that the touchstone of opportunity must be applied to every member of the nation, so as to determine who shall lead and who should follow. The use of psychological tests and vocational advisement for the personnel of the army and navy, and the growing use of these in school, college, and industrial establishment, may be the beginnings of a movement that will aim to place every citizen into an occupation best suited to his capacities, and to impart to him, through systematic education, an opportunity to be free from the failures and misery of life.

Group struggle.—In a discussion of eudemics it is natural to think of a nation as a single harmonious group, with a membership united rather closely through common interests. At the same time it would be equally true to think of the nation as a confederation of groups somewhat antagonistic one to the other. The class-struggle theory of Karl Marx, for example, assumes an irreconcilable conflict between the capitalist and the worker, a conflict to end only when the capitalist class is exterminated. This theory of class, or group conflict, along with the race-struggle theory of Gumplowicz, was interwoven with the Darwinian theory of the struggle for survival and has become almost classic in many forms of sociological discussion. Admitting, as one must, the value of this theory in the interpretation of history, it by no means follows that eudemics must assume that group struggle is to be perpetual in society. Properly the groups within a nation should be adapted one to another, so that all may work together harmoniously. In *natural* development antagonism and struggle are uppermost and each group exploits its rival whenever possible; but in *telic* development, as men become wiser, they see the advantage of co-operation, so that differentiated groups tend to become integrated through compromise and joint agreement. Irrational antagonism is due to stupidity, co-operation comes only through wisdom and forethought. Harmony in social relations is not loss of energy, but rather is the intensification of energy through the elimination of waste. The Marxian-Darwinian teaching was all right in its day as an offset to the easy optimism of the eighteenth century, but why should men, in these days, still harp on the

inevitability of class war and proletarian victories, headed presumably by a series of Lenines? Class struggles are not inherent in the nature of things, but are the effects of social maladjustment.

Why not preferably lay stress on the wiser teaching of mutual aid and class co-operation, so well illustrated the world over in co-operative groupings of farmers, and thus substitute fraternal motives for selfish motives based on competition? If men think trouble, talk trouble and plan trouble, there will be trouble, for all have the instinct of combat. On the other hand, if men talk of common interests and common policies, and emphasize their agreements, they will find that conflict is largely a matter of the psychology of suggestion, and that it is rather easy to compromise and co-operate, if only each is willing to think himself in the other's place. The blood feud once had utility, but with advancing civilization a better system took its place. In the same manner group conflicts within the nation should yield to frank discussions and joint policies. We are at the dawn of a new day and differences should be thought out, not fought out.

This notion of the adaptation of group to group has an international aspect also, since the nations may be considered as groups within the world-group of all mankind. Each nation must adapt itself to its neighbors, it should seek to cultivate amicable relationships, and should think peace, not war. It is not necessary for a nation always to be looking for a place in the international sunlight; there are times when a place in the shade, or "in the twilight of the gods," is much more advantageous, since it gives opportunity for meditation. International ethical codes unfortunately still too largely follow the teachings propounded by Machiavelli, and international policies are still based on armaments and on the expectation of war. Thus, whenever a nation sees blood and runs amuck among its neighbors, *they* must be prepared to stop its career by force of arms. A thorough preparation for war, accompanied by equally as strong a determination to keep the peace if possible, is of course the proper attitude of the national mind, awaiting the day when armaments will be limited by joint agreement.

National happiness.—As a final aspect of eudemics, attention will briefly be directed to the field of national happiness. The puritanic ancestry of New England, it is said, took even their pleasures sadly and were never so happy as when miserable. A saner point of view would emphasize a civilization with as little deprivation, physical misery, or mental suffering as possible, and the multiplication in every way of the happiness of life. Society, as Professor Patten puts it, must pass from a pain economy, through the period of transition, into a pleasure economy, where misery will be exceptional and happiness the rule. The medical profession is doing much to alleviate the evils of physical woes and mental disorders, but the pain of economic misery among the poor, and the sting that comes to those who lack opportunity to develop their capacities, are evils that should slowly be removed through eudemic teachings.

A national policy, although based largely on economic considerations, should not be dictated by these only. It is not necessary for a nation to strain every nerve to "get rich quick," or to lead in the world's business. There are some things better than wealth and surely a nation should strive for more generous aims than are found in a system in which the mass of wealth is found in the hands of a few. A eudemic program should emphasize the cultural attainment of the whole people, not of a specialized dominant class merely, and hence its energy should be expended in policies for the development of the masses primarily, with the assurance that the classes will somehow manage to take care of themselves. If the mass of a population are given abundant opportunity through education, and find about them a stimulating economic and cultural environment, calling out their enthusiasm in work through a proper return for their efforts in wage and further opportunity, the classes will develop readily through selective processes, and both mass and class can unitedly co-operate in maintaining a sane and wholesome life.

It is not merely the pleasure arising from a well-filled stomach, or the pleasures of family, friends, and economic gain that need emphasis, but rather the joys of the mind as it seizes hold of opportunities for aesthetic and intellectual attainment, and feels that

inner satisfaction arising from its adaptation to a broadening environment. After all, the chief aspect of the mind is the emotional, and that nation has welfare, whose citizens are most free from anguish and fear, and are most advanced toward the happiness that comes from the satisfaction of their desires.

In early civilization society stressed social cohesion and group safety as the best of possible policies; in these later days of keener conscience it demands justice—legal, economic, and social—but in the coming days a nation must plan for the cultural happiness of its people. Why not, then, argue the possibility of a science of eudemics, so as to aim to bring about the welfare of the people, through the formulation of national policies, based upon an appreciation of the truer interests of the nation?

A THEORY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS

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One of the justices of our highest court, dissenting from the judgment of that court in the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Cases, tells us that there is "menace in the . . . . judgment to all rights, subjecting them unreservedly to conceptions of public policy."[1] Undoubtedly, if certain legal rights are definitely established by the Fourteenth Amendment, there would be a menace to the general security if the court which must ultimately interpret and apply that provision were to suffer a state legislature to infringe those legal rights on mere considerations of political expediency. But it is only the ambiguity of that slippery word "right" and want of clear understanding of what our law seeks to achieve through the obscure conception of "public policy" that make it possible to think of the decision in question in such a way. The "rights" of which Mr. Justice McKenna is speaking are not legal rights in the same sense as my legal right to the intergrity of my physical person or my legal right of ownership in my watch.[2] They are individual wants, individual claims, individual interests, which it is felt ought to be secured by law, through legal rights or through some other legal machinery. The Fourteenth Amendment does not set up these or any other individual interests as absolute legal rights. It imposes a standard upon the legislator.[3] It says to him that if he trenches upon these individual interests, he must not do so arbitrarily. His action must have a basis in reason. And, it is submitted, that basis must be the one upon which the common law has always sought to proceed—the one implied in the

[1] McKenna, J., in *Arizona Copper Co.* v. *Hammer*, 250 U.S. 400, 439.

[2] See Pound, "Legal Rights," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVI, 92.

[3] By standard I mean a legally defined measure of conduct to be applied with reference to the circumstances by, or under the direction of, the tribunal. See my paper, "Juristic Science and Law," *Harvard Law Review*, XXXI, 1047, 1061.

very term "due process of law"—namely, a weighing or balancing of the various interests that overlap or come in conflict and a rational reconciliation or compromise. Thus the "public policy," of which Mr. Justice McKenna speaks, is seen to be something at least on the same plane with the so-called rights. As the latter term refers to individual interests which we feel ought to be secured by law, the former refers to social interests which we feel the law ought to, or which in fact the law does, secure in delimiting individual interests and establishing legal rights. The whole body of the common law is made up of compromises of conflicting individual interests in which we turn to some social interest, frequently under the name of public policy, to determine the limits of a reasonable adjustment. To take but one example, when the common law in a conflict between the individual interest of the adjoining landowner and that of the traveler on an impassable highway, resorted to a "policy" expressing a social interest in the use of the means of public travel as agencies of economic progress, and established the so-called right of deviation,[1] it menaced "rights" by subjecting them to public policy exactly as do the statutes of which Mr. Justice McKenna complains. Our legal terminology blinds us to these compromises and leads us, when the legislature makes new ones, taking account of new interests, to think of them as revolutionary. Obviously it is important to recognize what we are doing in law and how and why we are doing it. And a first step in this direction must be to clarify the conception of public policy; to construct a theory of social interests which courts may use, just as in the past they have used the schemes of individual interests which we call theories of natural rights.

A preliminary question is raised by the contention of one of the leaders of modern juristic thought that we should throw over the whole idea of rights—i.e., of interests to be secured—and think only of functions and of the legal duties by which the performance of those functions is secured. According to Duguit, law is to be deduced from a fundamental fact of social interdependence.[2] This

[1] Blackstone, *Commentaries*, II, 36.

[2] *L'État, le droit objectif et la loi positive*, pp. 23–79; *Les transformations générales du droit privé depuis le Code Napoléon*, pp. 19–22, 23–29. See also *Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'état* (2d ed., 1911).

social interdependence has two forms: interdependence through similarity of interest and interdependence through division of labor.[1] The latter is the paramount fact in modern society and, as he puts it, the steadfast pivot on which the law turns.[2] To use his own words:

> Every man, every group of men, whether the supreme dictator of a country or the plainest of his subjects, whether a government, an all-powerful parliament, or a plain association, has a certain task to perform in the vast workshop of the social body. This function is determined by the position which one in fact occupies in the collectivity. He has no rights; he cannot have them because a right is an abstraction without reality. But by the very fact that he is a member of society he is under a *de facto* obligation to accomplish a certain social function, and the acts which he does with reference to this end have a social value and will be socially protected.[3]

It should be noted, however, that Duguit's proposition may be stated equally in terms of a claim or want or demand of society that these functions be performed. Granting that social interdependence and division of labor are verifiable facts, I suspect that erecting a scheme of natural duties on the basis of these ideas by a method of deduction will prove vulnerable to the same objections that are urged against the schemes of natural rights erected on a formula of individual self-assertion by the same method. Observation and verification need not stop at the fundamental formula. If we may judge from the methods of the natural sciences, they are required equally in the details. Indeed one may well suspect that schemes of natural rights and schemes of positivist natural duties, when we get them, will prove equally to have been derived from the known phenomena of actual legal systems and given a logical basis by a process of deduction. If we take care to understand what we mean by rights, if we give over the idea of inherent moral qualities of the abstract human being,[4] or of logical presuppositions of

[1] Duguit, *L'État, le droit objectif et la loi positive*, pp. 30–52.

[2] Duguit, *Les transformations générales du droit privé*, p. 28.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

[4] "That quality in a person which makes it just or right for him either to possess certain things or to do certain actions."—Rutherforth, *Institutes of Natural Law*, I, 2, sec. 3.

the individual free will,[1] and distinguish interests existing irrespective of law from legal capacities or legal claims by which within certain limits such interests are legally secured, we may make substantial progress while keeping to the course of development which has governed since the seventeenth century. To throw over all that juristic thought has achieved in this connection in the last two centuries is needless, even if we might hope to induce tribunals to follow us in doing so. For the idea of rights, properly understood, is a permanent contribution to theories of the end of law. Primitive law contributed the idea of a peaceable ordering of society. The strict law contributed the idea of certainty and uniformity in this ordering and of rule and form as a means thereto. The stage of equity and natural law added the idea of duty, of good faith and moral conduct to be assured through applying reason to human actions. To these the maturity of law added a thorough working out of the individual interests which the law should secure through working out of individual legal rights.[2] The next step would seem to be to work out in like manner the social interests which the law should secure and to define the resulting legal policies that must govern in the delimitation and securing of individual claims.

Both in the law itself and in philosophical thinking as to the end of law we may perceive a continual broadening of the sphere of recognized and secured interests. Primitive law sought only to keep the peace between organized kindreds or the heads of groups of kinsmen. The Roman strict law knew only the free Roman, a citizen and a paterfamilias. Our own system, in the stage of the strict law, systematically ignored the moral aspect of conduct and

[1] "One has a right if it is his subjective will through which his own or another's act or forbearance becomes a legal demand, in that the law, making that subjective will its own and affirming it, wills the very act or forbearance which the latter wills. Accordingly a right is a dependence of the objective legal will upon a subjective will, which dependence must, of course, be determined with reference to its fundamental principle in determinate cases recognizable by general characteristics. In these cases it lends its authority and power to the subjective will and says 'thou shalt' to him by whom the subjective will would have something done or forborne."—Schuppe, *Begriff des subjektiven Rechts*, p. 49.

[2] See Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines," *Harvard Law Review*, XXVII, 195.

the social interest in good faith and fair dealing. From these simple programs of securing a few obvious and pressing interests by regulating a few definite courses of conduct, it is a far cry to the law of today with its ambitious program of securing a multitude of interests by governing the whole range of human relations. A Greek philosopher of the fifth century B.C. tells us that there are but three subjects of lawsuits—insult, injury, and homicide.[1] In the sixth century Justinian's *Institutes* can see only a social interest in the general morals, individual interests of personality, and individual interests of substance.[2] Bacon in the seventeenth century considers that "the use of the law consisteth principally in these three things: (1) to secure men's persons from death and violence; (2) to dispose of the property of their goods and lands; (3) for preservation of their good names from shame and infamy."[3] On the other hand, Bentham, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, refers the functions of law to four heads: "To provide subsistence; to promote abundance; to favor equality; to maintain security."[4] The three ends of Hippodamus, the three stated by Justinian, and Bacon's three are all embraced in, and less than, the whole content of the last of Bentham's four.

In the common law we have been wont to speak of social interests under the name of "public policy."[5] Thus, when a great judge was called on to balance individual interests with the social interest in the security of political institutions, he said that "a

[1] Hippodamus (*ca.* 408 B.C.) quoted in Aristotle *Politics* ii. 8.

[2] "The precepts of right and law are these: to live honorably, not to injure another and to give to everyone his own."—*Inst.* i. 1. 3. See Savigny's exposition of this, *System des heutigen römischen Rechts*, I, sec. 59 (pp. 407–10). Cf. Kant, *Rechtslehre* (2d ed.), p. xliii.

[3] Bacon, *Use of the Law*, p. 1. But as to the authorship of this book see Spedding, *Bacon's Works*, VII, 453–57.

[4] *Theory of Legislation*, "Principles of the Civil Code," chap. 2 (Hildreth's transl.).

[5] "Public policy . . . . is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good."—Lord Truro in *Egerton* v. *Lord Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, 196. "Whatever is injurious to the interest of the public is void on the ground of public policy."—Tindal, C. J., in *Homer* v. *Graves*, 7 Bing. 735, 743. "Wherever any contract conflicts with the morals of the time and contravenes any established interest of society, it is void, as being against public policy."—Story, *Contracts*, sec. 675.

great and overshadowing public policy" forbade the application to the case of one of the most fundamental principles of the law.[1] Again, when a great teacher of law wished to say that another supposedly fundamental legal doctrine was sometimes limited in its application because of the social interest in the general security, he stated that "except in certain cases based on public policy," the law of today makes liability dependent upon fault.[2] But this limitation of the application of principles or setting-off of exceptions on the grounds of public policy was felt to be something abnormal.[3] For since the seventeenth century juristic theory has sought to state all interests in terms of individual natural rights. Moreover, the nineteenth century, under the influence of Hegel, wrote legal history as the unfolding in human experience of an idea of individual liberty; as an outcome of the clash of individual free wills, leading to the discovery of the invisible bounds within which each might realize a maximum of self-assertion.[4] Thus for a season social interests were pushed into the background. It was said that "public policy was an unruly horse."[5] It was conceived that a court should be slow and cautious in taking it into account, and that if rules of law were to be limited in their application or if exercise of individual rights was to be held down upon such grounds, the matter ought to be left to the legislature.[6] And yet this attitude itself was but the expression of a "public policy."[7] It resulted

[1] Breese, J., in *People* v. *Brown*, 67 Ill. 435, 438.

[2] Ames, "Law and Morals," *Harvard Law Review*, XXII, 27, 29.

[3] "I agree entirely with the authorities . . . . which point out the danger of relying on general notions of public expediency or policy, which vary so much from time to time."—Crompton, J., in *Egerton* v. *Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, 70. "By this public policy will be meant the prevailing opinion, from time to time, of wise men . . . . as to what is for the public good—an excellent principle, no doubt, for legislators to adopt, but a most dangerous one for judges."—Alderson, B., *ibid.*, 106. "[Public policy] is a vague and unsatisfactory term, when applied to the decision of legal rights. . . . . To allow this to be a ground of judicial decision would lead to the greatest uncertainty and confusion."—Parke, B., *ibid.*, 123. See also *Smith* v. *DuBose*, 78 Ga. 413, 435.

[4] Savigny, *System des heutigen römischen Rechts*, I (1840), sec. 52.

[5] Burrough, J., in *Richardson* v. *Mellish*, 2 Bing. 229, 252.

[6] E.g., *McNamara* v. *Gargett*, 68 Mich. 454, 460–61.

[7] Questions of public policy as such came up in three forms: (1) in connection with the validity of contracts or similar legal transactions; (2) in connection with the validity of conditions in conveyances and testamentary gifts; (3) in connection with

from a weighing of the social interest in the general security against other social interests which men had sought to secure through an overwide magisterial discretion in the stage of equity and natural law.[1]

Thus the conception of public policy was never clearly worked out,[2] nor were the several policies of the law defined as were the individual interests to which the juristic thought of the last century gave its whole attention. The books are full of schemes of natural rights. There are no schemes of public policies. Often the weighing of social interests is disguised by reasoning about "causation"[3] or by the drawing of what seem on their face arbitrary distinctions.[4] But the common law authorities appear to have recognized some ten policies of the law as such: (1) a policy against acts promotive of dishonesty; (2) a policy against acts tending to oppression; (3) one against acts promotive of crime or violation of law; (4) one against acts destructive of competition; (5) one against acts offending the general morals; (6) one against acts prejudicially affecting the public service, whether performed by public officers or by individuals professing a public calling; (7) one against acts affecting the security of the domestic relations or in restraint of marriage; (8) one against acts affecting commercial freedom; (9) one against permanent or general restrictions on the free use and transfer of

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the validity of testamentary dispositions. Thus social interests were balanced against a policy in favor of free contract (right of free contract) and a policy in favor of free disposition of property, which was supposed to be involved in the security of acquisitions and to be a corollary of individual interests of substance (rights of property). Accordingly distrust of "public policy" grew out of a feeling that security of acquisitions and security of transactions were paramount policies. "If there is one thing more than another which public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that such contracts shall be enforced by courts of justice."—Jessel, M. R., in *Printing Co.* v. *Sampson*, 19 Eq. 462, 465.

[1] The endeavor to make law and morals coincident was due to overinsistence on the social interest in the general morals. As to its effects in the administration of justice, see Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines," *Harvard Law Review*, XXVII, 195, 217.

[2] "Public policy does not admit of definition and is not easily explained."—Kekewich, J., in *Davies* v. *Davies*, 26 Ch. Div. 359, 364.

[3] See Smith, "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort," *Harvard Law Review*, XXV, 103.

[4] See Shaw, C. J., in *Farwell* v. *Boston R. Co.*, 4 Met. 49.

property; and (10) one against general or extensive restrictions upon individual freedom of action. In one way or another, most of the social interests of which the law must take account today are at least suggested in this list. Yet one social interest, which has governed the ideas of lawyers at all times and has played a controlling part in the thought of the immediate past, is relatively little stressed. The social interest in the general security seems to have been thought of as something apart—as something involved in the very idea of law and entering into every legal situation as a necessary element. This appears clearly in nineteenth-century theories of the end of law and in nineteenth-century juristic method.

In the last century men thought of law as involving restraint on liberty which might only be justified so far as it was necessary to maintain liberty.[1] Hence they conceived that law was to be held down to the minimum which was required to protect the individual against aggression and to secure the harmonious coexistence of the free will of each and the free will of all.[2] But this is only a way of stating a paramount social interest in the general security in traditional terms of individual liberty. Again, men strove zealously in the last century to insure complete security through absolute certainty and uniformity in judicial administration. When the eighteenth-century idea that these things might be achieved through a complete and perfect code broke down, they sought to achieve it through a method of mechanical logical deduction from fixed legal conceptions. As this also breaks down and resort is had to administrative commissions, whose methods are less mechanical, lawyers seek the same ends through universal definitions of absolute rights. But behind the goal of certainty and uniformity is their real end— the social interest in the general security. And these attempts to frame and administer the law with an eye solely to that

[1] "Every rule of law in itself is an evil, for it can only have for its object the regulation of the exercise of rights, and to regulate the exercise of a right is inevitably to limit it."—Beudant, *Le droit individuel et l'état* (1891), p. 148. "Liberty is the supreme object. . . . . Every abridgment of it demands an excuse, and the only good excuse is the necessity of preserving it."—Carter, *Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function*, p. 337. "Law exists for the sake of liberty. . . . . It exists to protect liberty in that it limits arbitrary will."—Arndts, *Juristische Encyklopädie*, sec. 12.

[2] Lioy, *Philosophy of Right* (transl. by Hastie), I, 121.

one social interest have broken down because of the pressure of other social interests, which it has proved impossible to ignore.[1] Exclusive attention to security led jurists to seek abstract, universal, eternal compromises or harmonizings of conflicting interests. We have learned slowly that it is the end, namely, to satisfy human wants, that is constant; not the exact machinery of satisfying them.[2]

Not only did our thinking in the last century deceive itself in supposing that it was proceeding solely on the basis of individual liberty and individual rights deduced therefrom, it deceived itself quite as much in its interpretation of legal history. The conception that pressure of individual interests brought about state and law and fashioned legal institutions has no historical warrant. On the contrary, from the first the controlling factor is the need of the social group to be secure against those forms of action and courses of conduct which threaten its existence. This paramount social interest is the first interest of any sort to be given legal recognition. It is not too much to say that law arose and primitive law existed simply to maintain one narrow phase of this interest—the social interest in peace and order.

It must be borne in mind that our juristic thinking became fixed in the mold of the strict law. And that mold was largely shaped by the circumstance that in its beginnings law was no more

[1] See Pound, "Administrative Application of Legal Standards," *Rep. American Bar Association*, XLIV (1919), 445, 458 ff.

[2] Thus in rural, pioneer, agricultural America, there was no call to limit the contracts a laborer might make as to taking his pay in goods. To have imposed a limitation would have interfered with individual freedom of industry and contract without any corresponding gain in securing some other interest. On the other hand, in industrial America of the end of the nineteenth century, a régime of unlimited free contract between employer and employee in certain enterprises led not to conservation but to destruction of values; it led to sacrifice of the social interest in the human life of the individual worker. Hence we began to put limits upon liberty of contract between employer and employee and to require wages to be paid in money. It was inevitable that the statutes imposing these limits should be bitterly opposed by lawyers who could think of contracts of employment only in terms of individual rights and security of transactions. See *Godcharles* v. *Wigeman*, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886); *State* v. *Goodwill*, 33 W.Va., 179 (1889); *Ex parte Kuback*, 85 Cal. 274 (1890); *Frorer* v. *People*, 141 Ill. 171 (1892); *State* v. *Loomis*, 115 Mo. 307 (1893); *Low* v. *Rees Printing Co.*, 41 Neb. 127 (1894); *Johnson* v. *Goodyear Mining Co.*, 127 Cal. 4 (1899); *In re Morgan*, 26 Col. 415 (1899); *State* v. *Haun*, 61 Kan. 146 (1899).

than a means toward the peaceable ordering of society; a regulative agency by which men were restrained and the general security was maintained. It retains this character of a regulative agency and a means of which the end is a peaceable ordering, although other functions and other ends become manifest as it develops. Thus the interests which were paramount while law was formative left their mark upon it and fixed the lines of legal thought. In the beginning, to establish a peaceable ordering, the law had to undertake two tasks. It had to regulate self-help and ultimately supersede it. It had also to prevent aggression. The simple program of primitive law deals only with assault, homicide, and larceny,[1] which are causes of private war, and impiety,[2] which may cause interposition of the gods in the form of natural calamities. In the last century it was easy to say that the former is private law, the securing of individual interests, while the latter is criminal law, the securing of social interests as such. True, the former grew into private law and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we came to think of it in terms of individual interests only. When self-redress and private war had been put down for centuries men saw only that law prevented aggression; that it prevented or repaired infringements of individual interests. In primitive society, however, the chief significance of aggression on individuals was that it was certain to lead to private war. Where only the interests of the individual were involved we have another story. As such, primitive law ignores him.[3] It is only the freeman, head of a household and able to disturb the peace of society, that has any standing to call upon the law for redress.[4] In a society of groups of kindred, a wrong involves much more than the mere injury to John Doe or Richard Roe.[5] But in the stage of the strict law men have

[1] Compare the statement of Hippodamus, *ante*, p. 20, n. 1.

[2] Girard, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire des Romains*, pp. 33–34. See Jenks, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages*, p. 57.

[3] Numerous examples are cited in my paper, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines," *Harvard Law Review*, XXVII, 195, 198–204.

[4] E.g., in Roman strict law one's legal personality was involved in *libertas*, *ciuitas*, *familia*. See Gaius i. 159–62.

[5] Law of Draco, quoted by Demosthenes *Against Aristocrates* 96; *Salic Law*, tit. 57; *Alfred's Dooms*, sec. 27; *Laws of Edmund*, I, 4; *Laws of Ethelred*, II, 6; IX, 23.

discovered how to secure the paramount social interest in peace and order by means of remedies given to injured individuals. In the stage of equity and natural law the individual human being, the moral unit, becomes the legal unit, and the legal system seeks to transmute his moral duties into legal duties. In the maturity of law legal rights are put behind the duties and remedies and orderings and appear to be the ultimate ends for which law exists. Naturally in that period legal history was written from an individualist standpoint and was interpreted as a development of restrictions on individual aggression to assure individual freedom of action. On the contrary, individual freedom of action as an end is something which came into juristic thinking in modern times as we began to be conscious of a social interest in the individual human life. The social interest in the general security dictated the very beginnings of law, and individual legal rights are but means which were gradually worked out in the endeavor to maintain that social interest.

Thus the forms and remedies of the strict law, the individualist legal philosophy of the nineteenth century, the individualist interpretation of legal history by the historical jurists—in short, the whole training of the lawyer—led him to think of the legal order exclusively in terms of the general security and of the general security exclusively in terms of individual rights. And so when the social interest in the general security is to be weighed in the scale, courts have no difficulty. But when other social interests are involved, recourse is had to a vague conception of "policy," of which courts and lawyers are rightly mistrustful, since the policies are ill defined and in their application may leave too much scope for the personal equation of the particular tribunal. Hence pressure of new social interests gives them pause and sometimes leads them to denounce the very method of dealing with individual interests which the law has always employed. Just now the science of law is taken up with problems resulting from consciousness of new social interests or at least new phases of old ones. In contrast with nineteenth-century attempts to state the end of the legal order in terms of security of acquisitions and security of transactions, attempts are now making to state it in terms of the social interest

in the individual life[1] or to balance that interest against the interest in security on which the last generation insisted exclusively. Nor is this change confined to legal thought. A complete change of attitude throughout the world is putting the law of the twentieth century into a state of fluidity resembling the law of third-century Rome or of seventeenth-century Europe; and this change rests chiefly on conscious recognition of the social interest in the individual life.[2]

An important phase of this interest in the individual life calls for security to free and spontaneous self-assertion, and is connected easily with the juristic thought of the past. But there are many conditions in the life of today in which other phases of this interest must come into account. Thus American legislation restricted the power of Indian allottees to dispose of the tracts allotted them.[3] British legislation limited the *jus disponendi* of Irish tenants, suddenly turned into proprietors and without experience of freedom.[4] Courts of equity avoided sailors' contracts, sales of reversions and expectancies, contracts with heirs and agreements with debtors clogging their equity of redeeming mortgaged property, where there was an economic pressure and no real freedom of contract.[5] Back of these was a dim recognition of a social interest of which we are now fully conscious. Today our statute books have come to be full of such restrictions. We do not ask: What will promote the maximum of abstract freedom of contract, taken as the end

[1] Stammler, *Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte*, pp. 208–11.

[2] Jhering, *Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz* (10th ed., 1909), pp. 408–25; Charmont, *Le droit et l'esprit démocratique*, chap. 2; Duguit, *Les transformations générales du droit privé depuis le Code Napoléon* (1912), transl. in "Continental Legal History Series," Vol. XI, chap 3; Stoner, "The Influence of Social and Economic Ideals on the Law of Malicious Torts," *Michigan Law Review*, VIII, 468; Pound, "Liberty of Contract," *Yale Law Journal*, XVIII, 454; Wambaugh, "Workmen's Compensation Acts," *Harvard Law Review*, XXV, 129; Mack, "The Juvenile Court," *ibid.*, XXIII, 104.

[3] *Pickering* v. *Lomax*, 145 U.S. 310; *Taylor* v. *Brown*, 147 U.S. 640; *Jones* v. *Meehan*, 175 U.S. 1, 21; *U.S.* v. *Rickert*, 188 U.S. 432, 436.

[4] See comments on this from the nineteenth-century standpoint in Miller, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Law*, p. 73.

[5] "Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but to answer a present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them."—Lord Northington in *Vernon* v. *Bethell*, 2 Eden 110, 113.

of law? We ask rather: Does it secure a maximum of interests with a minimum sacrifice of interests[1] to leave such persons free to contract as they choose, or must the legal order, in a wise social engineering, hold down their free self-assertion for a time in certain situations? This mode of thinking does not fit easily into the method of hard-and-fast conceptions on which the last generation relied to maintain the general security. Often it presents itself to the judicial mind as on the one hand a natural right of free contract, guaranteed by the Constitution as a part of liberty, and on the other hand a hard-and-fast conception of the police power of the state in terms of public health, safety, and morals.[2] Thus we are not unlikely to reach an *impasse* and are certain to encounter judicial dissents. The net result is to break down this method of conceptions and to take account of an increasing number of social interests as such. One example will suffice.

In 1902 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin[3] said that the "police power" might be described "as the power of the government to regulate the conduct and property of some for the safety and property of all"; thus defining the police power in terms of the general security, and chiefly in terms of the security of acquisitions. But this "police power" is not a definite, specially limited and specially conferred power, like the power of Congress over interstate commerce. Indeed the significant thing in the "police power" is not power but purpose. Discussions of the police power are discussions of the power of a government to achieve its ends in ways not forbidden by the fundamental law.[4] So that where, as in the case of the federal government, our theory will not admit of a "police power" as such, we recognize the fact that the same phenomenon

[1] "Must not the guiding principle for ethical philosophy . . . . be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can?"—William James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 205.

[2] E.g., Peckham, J., in *Lochner* v. *New York*, 198 U.S. 45, 57.

[3] *State* v. *Kreutzberg*, 114 Wis. 530, 536.

[4] "But what are the police powers of a state? They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions."—Taney, C. J., in *License Cases*, 5 How. 504, 583. "That vast, unclassified residue of legislative authority which is called, not always intelligently, the police power."—Thayer, *Legal Essays*, p. 27. See also *ibid.*, n. 1.

none the less is presented and say that the limited and defined powers that have been conferred may be used for "police purposes."[1] Hence when the police power is defined exclusively in terms of the general security, it comes to nothing less than defining the end of the legal order exclusively in those terms; and such definition is characteristic of the nineteenth century. Compare now the language of a judge of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, speaking for the majority of that court in 1920. In discussing a town-planning statute he says: "It is time that courts recognize the aesthetic as a factor in life; it promotes the general welfare of the dwellers; preserves and enhances values; fosters contentment; creates civic pride; produces better citizens."[2] In other words, all the ends of the legal order are not summed up in security for the maximum of individual self-assertion. The breadth of the later catalogue is as striking as the narrowness of the former. And this is brought out also in the dissenting opinions in the case last quoted. The question was whether a town-planning statute involved a taking of property for a public use. To the dissenting minority, "public" meant narrowly governmental. It meant something having to do with the policing of the community in order to preserve the general security. To the majority it meant "social" and required account to be taken of all social interests.

Perhaps enough has been said to show the need of a theory of social interests in the legal science of today. Next let us ask, Just what do we mean by social interests? How shall we derive them? On what basis and by what method shall we arrive at them and classify them?

Our theory of individual interests gives a sufficient starting-point for the first question. For the purposes of the science of law we may say that an interest is a claim, a want, a demand, of a human being or group of human beings which the human being or group of human beings seeks to satisfy and of which social engineering in civilized society must therefore take

[1] *Wilson* v. *New*, 243 U.S. 232, 348; *Hoke* v. *U.S.* 227 U.S. 308; *Hipolite Egg Co.* v. *U.S.*, 220 U.S. 45; *Louisville R. Co.* v. *Mottley*, 219 U.S. 467; *Lottery Case*, 188 U.S. 321.

[2] Holt, J., in *State* v. *Houghton* (Minn.), 176 N.W. 158, 162.

account. So defined, the interests which the legal order secures may be claims or wants or demands of individual human beings immediately as such (individual interests) of the political organization of a society as such, conceived as a person (public interests) or of the whole social group as such (social interests).[1]

For the second question, for a method of deriving and classifying social interests, a satisfactory starting-point is not found so easily. A generation ago, as a matter of course, we should have relied on logical deduction. Thus the eighteenth century deduced natural rights from the nature of man in the abstract.[2] The nineteenth century deduced them from some metaphysically given fundamental formula of justice[3] or a fundamental metaphysically given datum of being[4] or of liberty.[5] As late as 1891 Spencer gave us a scheme of individual natural rights deduced from a formula of equal freedom.[6] In the same way I could conceive of a jurist deducing individual, public, and social interests respectively by a logical method as presuppositions of individual, political, and social existence.[7] But all schemes of necessary presuppositions of law or of legal institutions seem to me at bottom to be schemes of observed elements in actual legal systems or institutions, systematically arranged, reduced to their lowest terms, and deduced *ex post facto*. Hence I distrust the method by which they purport to have been reached; and even more I distrust the ability of the lawyer to work out deductively the necessary jural presuppositions of society in the abstract.

A more attractive starting-point is to be found in social psychology. No doubt I am on dangerous ground in talking about

[1] Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, VII, 148, 156; Pound, "Interests of Personality," *Harvard Law Review*, XXVIII, 343, 343–46.

[2] Burlamaqui, *Principes du droit de la nature et des gens*, I, 1, 1, sec. 2.

[3] Fichte, *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (1796), p. 104; Kroeger's transl. (Fichte's *Science of Rights*), p. 137.

[4] Lorimer, *Institutes of Law* (2d ed.), pp. 212–44.

[5] "Freedom is the foundation of right, which is the essential principle of all law." —Puchta, *Cursus der Institutionen*, I, sec. 2; Hastie, *Outlines of Jurisprudence*, p. 5. Or, deduction was sometimes made from the idea of personality—that is, of being a free-willing human individual; Herkless, *Jurisprudence*, pp. 82 ff.

[6] *Justice*, chaps. 9–18.

[7] Cf. Lasson, *Rechtsphilosophie*, pp. 174–92.

instincts. But one need only turn to the list of human instincts in any recent social psychology to see that there is an obvious relation between what we call interests, and have been wont to call natural rights or public policies, and the instincts or fundamental tendencies or predispositions there set forth. Thus in the one we find the parental instinct, in the other individual interests in the domestic relations and a social interest in the security of domestic institutions; in the one we find an instinct of repugnance[1] and "predisposition to aesthetic discrimination,"[2] in the other the social interest in aesthetic surroundings which the law has grudgingly begun to recognize; in the one we find the instinct of self-abasement[3] and in the other the so-called right of privacy.[4] Or, to take four instincts with which the law has always had much to do, there is evident relation between the instinct of pugnacity and the law as to self-defense; between the instinct of self-assertion and the anxiety of the law that the will of the individual shall not be trodden upon;[5] between the instinct of acquisition and the individual interests of substance and social interest in the security of acquisitions; between the instinct of gregariousness, and loyalty and veracity as tendencies connected therewith,[6] and the social interest in the security of transactions. But it seems futile for the jurist to attempt to work out and classify social interests on this basis when sociologists are not yet ready to treat social forces in this manner, nor are psychologists so far agreed about fundamental instincts and tendencies as to afford an assured foundation.[7] If we might rely on Marshall's arrangement of instincts in three classes—those which preserve the life of the individual, those which preserve the life of the species, and those which preserve the life of groups or

[1] McDougall, *Social Psychology* (11th ed.), p. 55.

[2] Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, p. 219.

[3] McDougall, *Social Psychology* (11th ed.), p. 62.

[4] In a leading case "privacy" has been declared to be a natural right because founded on a deep-seated human instinct. Cobb, J., in *Pavesich* v. *New England Ins. Co.*, 122 Ga. 190.

[5] "One will must not be subject to the arbitrary will of another."—Stammler, *Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte*, p. 208.

[6] McDougall, *Social Psychology* (11th ed.), pp. 84 ff.; Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, p. 133.

[7] See Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 42, n. 3.

societies[1]—it would not be difficult to fit many, at least, of the observed phenomena of the legal order into a system based thereon. Thus far, however, such classifications have not maintained themselves.

No doubt some will say that this inability, as things are, to state social interests in terms of instincts reinforces their contention that there is no ground for setting off social interests at all. They will say that the group is made up of individuals; that all group claims, group wants, group demands, are put forward or manifested by and through individuals; that individuals and individuals only are the agencies of all the functions which sociologists attribute to the group. But this criticism, which we hear frequently of late, proceeds on the assumption that the individual is "something given," is "something ready-made," apart from all the relations with others that shape him and enter into his very constitution. It proceeds after the accepted method of the abstract logic of abstract conceptions by elimination of all the social aspects of the problem as irrelevant and deduction of the unreality of social interests from a conception defined in terms of the result to be reached.[2] Moreover, I do not say that philosophically all social interests are not capable of statement in terms of individual interests. What I do say is that for jurisprudence, for the science that has to do with the machinery of social control or social engineering through the force of politically organized society, it is no less true that individual interests are capable of statement in terms of social interests and get their significance for the science from this fact.[3]

There remains a method, less pretentious in itself, that may yet yield more enduring results. Legal phenomena are social phenomena. Observation and study of them as such may well bear fruit for social science in general as well as for jurisprudence in particular. Why should not the lawyer make a survey of legal systems in order to ascertain just what claims or wants or demands have pressed or are now pressing for recognition and satisfaction

[1] *Instinct and Reason*, chap. 5.

[2] See Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 193–200.

[3] See my paper, "Legislation as a Social Function," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, VII, 148, 158.

and how far they have been or are recognized or secured? This is precisely what has been done in the case of individual interests, although the process has been concealed by a pretentious fabric of logical deduction. The same method may well be applied to social interests; and this should be done consciously and avowedly, as befits the science of today, without any cover of metaphysics or logic. It is true that to a similar suggestion that the sociologists approach instincts from the standpoint of the human institutions with which they are connected, objection has been made because "the same instinct appears in so many institutions and institutions are so frequently based on more than one instinct that it is practically impossible to classify instincts in this way."[1] But surely it is a gain when we have noted that more than one instinct is behind an institution and what these instincts are and how they have contributed. In the same way, the same social interest appears in many legal institutions, and legal institutions and doctrines almost always have behind them, not one social interest or a simple compromise of two, but a complex harmonizing of many.[2] It is of the first importance to perceive this, to note what these interests are, how they are harmonized or compromised, and why it is done in this way rather than in another. The first step in such a program is a mere survey of the legal order and inventory of the social interests of which the law has taken account.

In such a survey and inventory first place must be given to the social interest in the general security; the claim or want or demand of the social group to be secure against those forms of action and courses of conduct that threaten its existence. This paramount social interest takes many forms. In its simplest form it is an interest in the general safety, long recognized by the legal order in the maxim that the safety of the people is the highest law.[3] In another form, quite as obvious today but not so obvious in the past before the nature and causes of disease were understood, it is

[1] Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, p. 211.

[2] Brown, "Judicial Regulation of Wage for Women," *Yale Law Journal*, XXVIII, 236.

[3] Grotius, *De jure belli et pacis*, III, 20, 7; Montesquieu, *L'esprit des lois*, liv. 26, chap. 23; *Governor* v. *Meredith*, 4 T.R. 794, 797. Cf. Noy, *Maxims*, No. 26.

an interest in the general health.[1] In another form, recognized from the very beginnings of law, it is an interest in peace and public order.[2] In an economically developed society it takes two other closely related forms—an interest in the security of acquisitions[3] and an interest in the security of transactions.[4] The two last came to be well understood in the nineteenth century, in which they were more or less identified with individual interests of substance and individual interests in freedom of contract. Yet a characteristic difference between the law of the eighteenth and that of the nineteenth century brings out their true nature. Eighteenth-century courts, taking a purely individualist view, regarded the statute of limitations as something they were to hold down as much as possible and to evade in every way. Lord Mansfield in particular, thinking of it only as an individual plea which enables the individual interest of the plaintiff to be deprived of legal security, sought out numerous astute contrivances to evade its most obvious provisions. If one said, "I am ready to account, but nothing is due you," if he made provision in his will for payment of his "just debts," if his executors advertised, notifying those who had "just debts" owing them to present their claims, it was held that there was an acknowledgment sufficing to take a barred debt out of the statute.[5] Modern courts have come to see that there is something more here than the individual interests of plaintiff and defend-

[1] *Slaughter House Cases*, 16 Wall. 36, 61–62; cf. Spencer, *Social Statics*, 197–216.

[2] ". . . . a maine maxime of law, *inprimis interest reipublicae ut pax in regno conservetur*."—Coke, *Second Institute*, p. 158. See Blackstone, *Commentaries*, I, 349–54; IV, 142–53.

[3] Gaius ii. 44; Pufendorf, *De jure naturae et gentium*, IV, 12, 1–3; Colin et Capitant, *Droit civil français*, I, 875–76; Broom, *Maxims* (8th ed.), pp. 737 ff.; *Bell* v. *Morrison*, 1 Pet. 351, 360; *Institutes of Justinian* ii. 7. 2; *French Civil Code*, art. 931; *German Civil Code*, sec. 518; Stat. 29, Car. 2, chap. 3 (Statute of Frauds).

[4] "The inviolability of contracts and the duty of performing them, as made, are foundations of all well-ordered society, and to prevent the removal or disturbance of these foundations was one of the great objects for which the Constitution was framed."—Strong, J., in *Murray* v. *Charleston*, 96 U.S. 432, 449. See also *Federalist*, No. 44; Parsons, *Contracts*, I, *1–*5.

[5] *Trueman* v. *Fenton*, Cowp. 548; *Quantock* v. *England*, 5 Burr. 2630; *Gofton* v. *Mill*, 2 Vern. 141; *Lewis* v. *Bacon*, 3 Hen. & Mun. 109.

ant; that the basis of the statute is a social interest in the security of acquisitions, which demands that titles shall not be insecure indefinitely, and a social interest in the security of transactions, which demands that the transactions of the past shall not be subject to inquiry long afterward so as to unsettle credit and disturb business and trade.[1] If we compare the French rule, *possession vaut titre*,[2] with the Roman doctrine that no one can transfer a greater title than he has,[3] if we note the growth of the idea of negotiability in our law, both in judicial decision and in legislation,[4] we may see something of how far the recognition of these interests has gone in the maturity of law.

Second we may put the social interest in the security of social institutions, the claim or want or demand of civilized society that its fundamental institutions be secure from those forms of action and courses of conduct which threaten their existence or impair their efficient functioning. Looking at them in chronological order, this interest appears in three forms. The first is an interest in the security of domestic institutions, long recognized in the form of a

[1] *Bell* v. *Morrison*, 1 Pet. 351, 360; *Pritchard* v. *Howell*, 1 Wis. 131. Hence the policy against use of courts to assert stale claims that involve too much risk of fraud and imposition, expressed in the doctrine of equity as to laches. *Smith* v. *Clay*, 3 Bro. Ch. 638. This comes down to the social interest in the general security which is endangered not only by fraud and imposition but by the unsettling of titles after the lapse of time.

[2] *French Civil Code*, arts. 2279–80; *German Civil Code*, sec. 931. Compare *Case of Market Overt*, 5 Coke, 83*b*.

[3] "No one can transfer a greater right to another than he has himself."—*Digest of Justinian* l. 17. 54. "It is a complete mistake to assume that the Roman principle, according to which no one can transfer more rights than he himself has, is a universally applicable one, rooted in the nature of the matter. That can only be asserted by a superficial legal view. On the contrary, it is very easily possible that the successor may acquire more rights than his predecessor had; and just in this lies that peculiarity on which the security of commerce is based."—Kohler, *Philosophy of Law* (Albrecht's transl.), p. 131.

[4] *Goodwin* v. *Robarts*, L.R. 10 Ex. 337, 346; *White* v. *Vermont*, 21 How. 575; *Mercer County* v. *Hackett*, 1 Wall. 83; Uniform Sales Act, secs. 27–40; Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, secs. 37–49; Uniform Bills of Lading Act, secs. 5, 14, 15, 28, 29, 38, 39, 47, 48; Uniform Stock Transfer Act, sec. 6.

See Thaller, *Traité élémentaire de droit commercial* (5th ed.), secs. 900–917; Cosack, *Lehrbuch des Handelsrechts* (7th ed.), sec. 28 (II); Huston, *Enforcement of Decrees in Equity*, pp. 124–31.

policy against acts affecting the security of domestic relations[1] or in restraint of marriage.[2] Today this social interest is weighed heavily against individual interests in most divorce legislation[3] It still weighs heavily against individual interests in the law as to illegitimate children. At times this has been carried so far that considerable disabilities have attached to such children lest recognitions of their individual interests should weaken a fundamental social institution.[4] The second form is an interest in the security of religious institutions. In the beginning this is closely connected with the general security. A chief point of origin of the criminal law—of that part of the law by which social interests as such are directly and immediately secured—is in religion. Sacrifice of the impious offender who has affronted the gods and excommunication of the impious offender whose presence threatens to bring upon his fellows the wrath of the gods are in part at least the originals of capital punishment and of outlawry.[5] For religious organization was long a stronger and more effective agency of social control than political organization. One of the great English statutes of the thirteenth century recites that Parliament had met to make laws "for the common profit of holy church and of the realm."[6] It is only in relatively recent times that we have come to think of blasphemy as involving no more than infringement of the social interest

[1] *Rogers* v. *Rogers*, 4 Paige, 516; *Speck* v. *Dansman*, 7 Mo. App. 165; *Noice* v. *Brown*, 39 N.J. Law, 133; *Hamilton* v. *Hamilton*, 89 Ill. 349; *Comstock* v. *Adams*, 23 Kan. 513; *Hope* v. *Hope*, 8 DeG. M. & G. 731; *People* v. *Mitchell*, 35 N.Y. 251, illustrate various phases of this policy. See also Story, *Equity Jurisprudence*, II, secs. 1427–28; *Institutes of Justinian* i. 10. 12–13; *Code of Justinian* v. 27. 11. 3; Schuster, *German Civil Law*, secs. 425–27; *Watts* v. *Owens*, 62 Wis. 512.

[2] Story, *Equity Jurisprudence*, I, secs. 274–91. Cf. Muirhead, *Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome* (3d ed.), pp. 274–76.

[3] Bishop, *New Commentaries of Marriage, Divorce, and Separation*, II, secs. 249–66; Haynes, *Divorce Problems of Today* (1912).

[4] Blackstone, *Commentaries*, I, 446, 454–58. See also *In re DeLaveaga's Estate*, 142 Cal. 158; *Pederson* v. *Christofferson*, 97 Minn. 491.

[5] Mommsen, *Römisches Strafrecht*, 902, 918; Girard, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire des Romains*, pp. 33–34; Hermann, *Griechische Rechtsaltertümer* (4th ed. by Thalheim), p. 49; Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, II, 175–77; Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, II, sec. 61; Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law*, I, 8–9.

[6] *Stat. Westminster*, I (1275), preamble.

in the general morals,[1] of Sunday laws only in terms of a social interest in the general health,[2] or of heresy as less dangerous socially than radical views upon economics or politics.[3] In its third form the interest is one in the security of political institutions. This interest is weighing heavily in recent legislation too familiar to require more than mention.[4] When the public called for such legislation for the security of social institutions, constitutional guaranties of free speech and natural rights of individual self-assertion, which in other times moved courts to refuse to enjoin repeated and undoubted libels, lest liberty be infringed,[5] were not suffered to stand in the way.[6] If the individual interests involved had been conceived less absolutely and had been seen in another light, as identified with important social interests, they might have fared better.

Third we may put the social interest in the general morals: the claim or want or demand of society to be secured against acts or courses of conduct offensive to the moral sentiments of the general body of individuals therein for the time being. This interest is recognized in Roman law in the protection of *boni mores* and in our

[1] "The eternal principles of natural religion are part of the common law: The essential principles of revealed religion are part of the common law; so that any person reviling, subverting or ridiculing them may be prosecuted at common law." —Lord Mansfield in *Chamberlain of London* v. *Evans*, Appendix to American 1772 edition of Blackstone, app. 5, p. 145. See also *State* v. *Chandler*, 2 Har. (Del.) 553; *People* v. *Ruggles*, 8 Johns (N.Y.) 225; *Updegraph* v. *Commonwealth*, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 374. Compare *Com.* v. *Kneeland*, *Thacher Crim. Cas.*, 346, 377; Coleridge, C. J., in *Reg.* v. *Bradlaugh*, 15 Cox C.C. 217.

[2] See *Specht* v. *Commonwealth*, 8 Pa. St. 312, 323; *Judefind* v. *State*, 78 Md. 510, 513; *Lindermuller* v. *People*, 33 Barb. 548, 563; *Swann* v. *Swann*, 21 Fed. 299, 303.

[3] See the remarks of Duncan, J., as to a debating club in which the authority of the Scriptures was debated. *Updegraph* v. *Commonwealth*, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) 394, 399. See also note, "The Legality of Atheism," *Harvard Law Review*, XXXI, 289.

[4] See Chafee, *Freedom of Speech*, chaps. 2–5, Appendix V, and bibliography on p. 383; note in *Columbia Law Review*, XX, 232; Donogh, *History and Law of Sedition and Cognate Offences; People* v. *Haffer*, 94 Wash. 136.

[5] See Pound, "Equitable Relief against Defamation," *Harvard Law Review*, XXIX, 640. But while defamatory writing may not be enjoined ordinarily, *Francis* v. *Flinn*, 118 U.S. 385, it is otherwise when incidental to an unlawful boycott, *Gompers* v. *Bucks Stove & Range Co.*, 221 U.S. 418.

[6] *Abrams* v. *United States*, 250 U.S. 616; *Schaefer* v. *United States*, 251 U.S. 468; *Pierce* v. *United States*, 252 U.S. 239.

law by policies against dishonesty, corruption, gambling, and things of immoral tendency,[1] by treating continuing menaces to the general morals as nuisances,[2] and by the common law as to misdemeanors.[3]

Fourth is the social interest in conservation of social resources; the claim or want or demand of society that the goods of existence shall not be wasted, that where all human wants may not be satisfied, in view of infinite individual desires and limited natural means of satisfying them, the latter be made to go as far as possible, and to that end that acts or courses of conduct which tend needlessly to impair these goods shall be restrained. In its simplest form this is an interest in the use and conservation of natural resources and is recognized in the doctrines as to *res communes*, which may be used but not owned,[4] by modern game laws,[5] by the recent doctrines as to percolating water and surface water,[6] and by laws as to waste of natural gas and oil.[7] There has been a progressive tendency to restrict the *jus abutendi* which the old law attributed to owners;[8] and a hungry world may yet balance this interest against individual claims to free action still further by preventing destruction of commodities in order to keep up prices or even by cutting off the common-law liberty of the owner of land to sow it to salt if he so desires.[9]

[1] See Greenhood, *Public Policy*, pp. 136–77, 222–38, 357–68.

[2] Bishop, *New Criminal Law*, I, secs. 500–506.

[3] *Ibid.*, secs. 1085, 1106, 1113, 1125, 1135.

[4] *Institutes of Justinian* ii. 1. 1; *Digest of Justinian* i. 8. 4; xliii. 12. 1. pr.; xliii. 14. 1. pr. 1–6; Bell, *Principles of the Law of Scotland*, sec. 1100; *French Civil Code*, art. 538.

[5] *Geer* v. *Connecticut*, 161 U.S. 519; *American Express Co.* v. *People*, 133 Ill. 649; *Haggerty* v. *Storage Co.*, 243 Mo. 238; *State* v. *Dow*, 70 N.H. 286.

[6] See Huffcut, "Percolating Waters," *Yale Law Journal*, XIII, 222; *Dickey* v. *Maddox*, 48 Wash. 411; Swain, *Conservation of Water by Storage*, chaps. 3–5.

[7] *Ohio Oil Co.* v. *Indiana*, 177 U.S. 190; *Walls* v. *Midland Carbon Co.*, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 13, 1920); *Manufacturers Gas Co.* v. *Indiana Natural Gas Co.*, 155 Ind. 461, 468–74.

[8] See the Analysis of ownership in Hearn, *Theory of Legal Duties and Rights*, chap. 10, sec. 1.

[9] E.g., pending English legislation empowering the Minister of Agriculture to appoint a receiver of agricultural land which is cultivated or managed by the owner "in such a manner as to prejudice materially the production of food thereon," *Solicitor's Journal*, LXV, 54. See Duguit in *Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century*, "Continental Legal History Series," XI, 135, 136.

A closely related interest is one in protection and training of dependents and defectives—as it were an interest in conservation of the human resources or human assets of society. This interest is also related on the one hand to the general morals and on the other to the interest in the individual life. In different forms, as an interest in protection and education of dependents and defectives, as an interest in reformation of delinquents, as an interest in the rehabilitation of the maimed,[1] or as an interest in the protection of the economically dependent, it is behind a great mass of modern legislation. Much of this legislation runs counter to the juristic theory of the last century and has often been pronounced arbitrary, unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional by courts whose dogmatic scheme could admit no social interest other than the general security.[2] Yet this interest too was long ago recognized in our law in the jurisdiction of the chancellor, representing the king as *parens patriae*, over idiots, lunatics, and infants.[3]

Fifth there is the social interest in general progress; the claim or want or demand of society that the development of human powers and of human control over nature for the satisfaction of human wants go forward; the demand that social engineering be increasingly and continually improved; as it were, the self-assertion of the group toward higher and more complete development of human powers. This interest appears in three main forms, an interest in economic progress, an interest in political progress, and an interest in cultural progress. The social interest in economic progress has long been recognized in law and has been protected in many ways. Legally it is expressed in four policies: the policy as to freedom of property from restrictions upon sale or use,[4] the policy as to free trade and

[1] "An Act to Create a Commission for the Rehabilitation of Physically Handicapped Persons," *Laws of New Jersey*, 1919, chap. 74, p. 138.

[2] *Godcharles* v. *Wigeman*, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886); *Millet* v. *People*, 117 Ill. 294 (1886); *State* v. *Goodwill*, 33 W.Va. 179 (1889); *Commonwealth* v. *Perry*, 155 Mass. 117 (1891); *Frorer* v. *People*, 141 Ill. 171 (1892); *Ramsey*, v. *People*, 142, Ill. 380 (1892); *In re House Bill 203*, 21 Col. 27 (1895); *Braceville Coal Co.* v. *People*, 147 Ill. 66 (1893); *State* v. *Loomis*, 115 Mo. 307 (1893); *Ritchie* v. *People*, 155 Ill. 99 (1895); *Johnson* v. *Goodyear Mining Co.*, 127 Cal. 4 (1899); *In re Morgan*, 26 Col. 415 (1899); *State* v. *Haun*, 61 Kan. 146 (1899).

[3] Spence, *History of the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery*, I, 618–20.

[4] Blackstone, *Commentaries*, II, 269–74; *Digest of Justinian*, viii. 1. 8. pr.; viii. 1. 15. 1; *International Tea Stores Co.* v. *Hobbes* [1903], 2 Ch. 165, 172; Gray, *Restraints on Alienation* (2d ed.), sec. 4; *Dr. Miles Medical Co.* v. *Park*, 220 U.S. 373.

consequent policy against monopoly,[1] the policy as to free industry,[2] and the policy as to encouragement of invention which is behind patent legislation and there comes in conflict with the policy as to free trade.[3] All of these policies have important illustrations and important consequences in everyday law. Likewise the law has long recognized the social interest in political progress. In American bills of rights and in written constitutions generally a policy of free criticism of public men, public acts, and public affairs and a policy of free formation, free holding, and free expression of political opinion are guaranteed as identified with individual rights.[4] Moreover, at common law the privilege of fair comment upon public men and public affairs recognizes and secures the same interest.[5] But the third form, the social interest in cultural progress, has not been recognized so clearly. It may be said to involve a policy of free science, of free letters, of encouragement of arts and letters, and of encouragement of higher education. The last two have been recognized to some extent in copyright laws and in American constitutional provisions for the promotion of higher learning.[6] The first two have made their way more slowly because of conflict or supposed conflict with the security of religious and political institutions.[7]

Closely connected with the foregoing is a social interest in aesthetic surroundings which recently has been pressing for legal

[1] Coke, *Second Institute*, p. 47; *Darcy* v. *Allen*, Moore 671; *Mitchell* v. *Reynolds*, 1 P. Wms. 181.

[2] *Jacobs* v. *Cohen*, 183 N.Y. 207, 219; Erle, *Law Relating to Trade Unions*, chap. 1, sec. 3.

[3] *Bauer* v. *O'Donnell*, 229 U.S. 1; *Motion Picture Patents Co.* v. *Universal Film M'f'g Co.*, 243 U.S. 502; Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U.S. 405, 424.

[4] Bill of Rights (1689), Declarations 5, 9; Const. Argentina, Part I, art. 14; Belgium, Tit. I, arts. 14, 18; Brazil, art. 72, secs. 8, 9, 12; Chile, art. 10, secs. 6, 7; Denmark, art. 86; Italy, arts. 28, 32; Mexico, arts. 6–8; Netherlands, arts. 6–8; Norway, art. 100; Spain, art. 13; Switzerland, arts. 49, 50, 55.

[5] *Wason* v. *Walker*, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, 93–94. Cf. Fox's Libel Act and analogous legislation in the United States. Schofield, "Freedom of the Press in the United States," *Publications of American Sociological Society*, IX, 67.

[6] E.g., Const. Mass. (1780), chap. 5, sec. 1, art. 1.

[7] Compare the conflict between the policy of free science and the social interest in the general morals involved in "antivivisection" laws. See Goff and Levy, *Politics and Disease* (1907).

recognition. A generation ago Sir Frederick Pollock could say with assurance that our law ignored aesthetic relations,[1] and comparing the English with the French in this respect[2] could quote Hood's lines:

> Nature which gave them the goût
> Only gave us the gout.

In the United States, courts and legislatures have been engaged in a sharp struggle over billboard laws and laws against hideous forms of outdoor advertising.[3] Within a year the crucial test has come in connection with town-planning legislation, and it is significant that two American state courts are now ready to admit a policy in favor of the aesthetic as reasonable and constitutionally admissible.[4]

Last and in some ways most important of all there is the social interest in the individual life; the claim or want or demand of society that each individual be able to live a human life according to the standards of the society; that if all individual wants may not be satisfied, they be satisfied at least so far as is reasonably possible and to the extent of a human minimum. This interest takes many forms. Two of these forms have become especially important in modern law: (1) a claim or interest or resulting policy that the individual will shall not be subjected arbitrarily to the will of another; (2) a claim or interest or resulting policy that all legal restraint and legal enforcement of the claims of others shall yet leave secured to the individual the possibility of a human existence.[5]

[1] *Law Quarterly Review*, XIII, 337–38.

[2] See the provisions in the *French Town Planning Law of 1919* (transl. by Pound, published by the National Civic Federation, 1919).

[3] Jenks, *Governmental Action for Social Welfare*, p. 81; Advertisements Regulations Act [1907], 7 Edw. 7, chap. 27; Terry, "Constitutionality of Statutes Forbidding Advertising Signs on Property," *Yale Law Journal*, XXIV, 1; "Billboard and Other Forms of Outdoor Advertising," *Chicago City Club Bulletin*, V, No. 24; *St. Louis Advertisement Co.* v. *City*, 235 Mo. 99, 249 U.S. 269, 274; *People* v. *Oak Park*, 266 Ill. 365; *Bill Posting Co.* v. *Atlantic City*, 71 N.J. Law 72; *Bryan* v. *City*, 212 Pa. St. 259.

[4] *Windsor* v. *Whitney* (Conn., 1920), 111 Atl. 354; *State* v. *Houghton* (Minn., 1920), 174 N.W. 158, 176 N.W. 885.

[5] See Stammler's "fundamental principles of just law": (1) "One will must not be subject to the arbitrary will of another"; (2) "Every legal demand can exist only in the sense that the person obliged can also exist as a fellow-creature"; (3) "No one

The first is recognized in an old common-law policy which is declared in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If one will is to be subjected to the will of another through the force of politically organized society, it is not to be done arbitrarily but upon some rational basis which the person coerced, if reasonable, could appreciate —upon a reasoned weighing of the interests involved and a reasoned attempt to reconcile or to compromise them. This policy obviously expresses political and juristic experience of what modern psychology has discovered as to the ill effects of repression. It is more and more recognized today in our penal legislation and in our treatment of offenders.[1] It is beginning to be felt in the law as to employer and employee.[2] It is coming to be recognized also in juristic thought in another connection as sociological theories of property replace metaphysical theories and it is felt in a crowded world that exclusion of all but him whom the law pronounces owner from objects which are the natural media of human existence or means of human activity must be measured and justified by a reasoned weighing of the interests on both sides and a reasoned attempt to harmonize them or to save as many as we may with a sacrifice of as few as possible.[3]

Roman law recognized the second of these policies and it has long been recognized in American legislation. In weighing individual interests in view of the social interest in security of acquisitions

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is to be excluded from the common interest arbitrarily"; (4) "Every power of control conferred by law can be justified only in the sense that the individual subject thereto can yet exist as a fellow-creature."—Stammler, *Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte*, 208–11. Vinogradoff, speaking from the historical standpoint, says: "His [Stammler's] four standards have no value for the advancement of juridical thought" (*Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 146). Whatever this may mean, they are at least a very keen and suggestive statement of the jural ideals which are expressing in recent legislation and current decision.

[1] See Ives, *History of Penal Methods*, chaps. 11, 19; Lewis, *The Offender*, Part I, chap. 8.

[2] See Gompers, *Labor and the Employer*, chap. 9; Marot, *American Labor Unions*, chap. 8; Webb, *History of Trade Unionism* (rev. ed., 1920) 646–49; Goodrich, *The Frontier of Control*, pp. 3–50, 104–25.

[3] Duguit, "The New Conception of Property as a Social Function," in *Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century*, "Continental Legal History Series," XI, 129–46.

and security of transactions, we must also take account of the social interest in the human life of each individual, and so must restrict the legal enforcement of demands to what is consistent with a human existence on the part of the person subjected thereto. The Roman law imposed such a limitation in several cases under the name of the *beneficium competentiae*.[1] In the United States and recently in continental Europe this policy is given effect in homestead laws and in exemptions from execution.[2] In the latter the social interest in the family as a social institution may also come into account. But nineteenth-century opposition to homestead and exemption laws,[3] and in Europe to the Roman *beneficium competentiae*,[4] is significant. The nineteenth century sought to treat such cases as if they involved nothing more than individual interests of the parties to the debtor-creditor relation, or, if a social interest was considered, to think only of the general security, which here takes the form of security of transactions.[5]

Again, when the law confers or exercises a power of control, as we recognize the social interest in the individual life, we see that the legal order should safeguard the human existence of the person controlled.[6] Thus the old-time sea law, with its absolute power of the master over the sailor,[7] the old-time ignominious punishments that treated the human offender like a brute,[8] that did not save his

[1] *Digest of Justinian* xlii. 1. 16. 17, 19. 1; xlii. 3. 4. pr.; l. 17. 173; *Code of Justinian* ii. 11. 11; vii. 71. 1. Klingemann, *Inhalt, rechtliche Natur und Anwendungsgebiet des Beneficium Competentiae* (1904).

[2] Thompson, *Homesteads and Exemptions*, secs. 40, 379; Bureau, *Le Homestead;* Charmont in *Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century*, "Continental Legal History Series," XI, 162–64; *German Civil Code*, secs. 528–29, 829; *German Code of Civil Procedure*, sec. 850.

[3] In *Gunn* v. *Barry* (1873), 15 Wall. 610, Swayne, J., said of a provision for homestead exemption in a state constitution: "It is in effect taking one person's property and giving it to another. This is contrary to reason and justice, and to the fundamental principles of the social compact." See also Washington, J., in *Mason* v. *Haile*, 12 Wheat. 370, 381; *Homestead Cases*, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 266, 296 ff.

[4] Baudry-Lacantinerie, *Précis de droit civil* (10th ed.), I, sec. 529.

[5] See Warner, J., in *Maxey* v. *Loyal*, 38 Ga. 531, 541; Pearson, C. J., dissenting in *Hill* v. *Kessler*, 63 N.C. 437, 448.

[6] See Stammler's fourth proposition, *supra*, p. 41, n. 5.

[7] See Dana, *Two Years before the Mast*, chap. 15.

[8] Ives, *History of Penal Methods*, pp. 147 ff.; Wines, *Punishment and Reformation*, pp. 70–87; Pike, *History of Crime in England*, II, 574 ff.

human dignity—all such things are disappearing as the circle of recognized interests widens and we come to take account of the social interest in the individual human life and to weigh that interest against the social interest in the general security on which the last century insisted so exclusively.

Such in outline are the social interests which are recognized or are coming to be recognized by modern law. Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to reconcile, to harmonize, to compromise these overlapping or conflicting interests, either through securing them directly and immediately, or through securing certain individual interests or delimitations or compromises of individual interests, so as to give effect to the greatest number of interests or to the interests that weigh most in our civilization, with the least sacrifice of other interests. And so, as in the past men thought of social control and of the legal order in terms of theology, as a human reflection of the "reason of the divine wisdom governing the universe,"[1] or in terms of jurisprudence as the outcome of a legal transaction, a social compact, whose provisions were to be interpreted and developed in laws,[2] or in terms of metaphysics as a logical unfolding of a fundamentally given datum of free will,[3] or in terms of physics as something determined by inexorable laws which we may discover by observation but whose operations produce results as beyond our influence as the phases of the moon,[4] or in terms of biology as the functional activities of a huge superorganism[5]—instead of these I venture an engineering interpretation. I venture to think of problems of eliminating friction and precluding waste in human enjoyment of the goods of existence and of the legal order as a system of social engineering whereby those ends are achieved. If we think of it in this way we shall not fail to see that no legal institution or legal doctrine may stand fast forever as the final thing in juristic achievement any more than the products

[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, i–ii, qu. 91, art. 1.

[2] Rutherforth, *Institutes of Natural Law*, II, 6, 7.

[3] Herkless, *Jurisprudence*, pp. 1–3. Cf. Ahrens, *Naturrecht* (6th ed.), p. 3.

[4] "What you have, as a scientific fact, is an automatic conflict of forces, reaching, along the paths of least resistance, a result favorable to the dominant energy."—Brooks Adams in *Centralization and the Law*, p. 35.

[5] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, secs. 5, 228–33.

of mechanical ingenuity and engineering skill may stand for all time as the ultimate of which man is capable. New wants and new forms of old wants speedily make the best products of social engineering no less than of mechanical engineering insufficient and obsolete, and our instincts of curiosity and construction lead us to new devices by which to satisfy a greater number of wants. What we may do is to discover, to survey these wants, to perceive when and where they conflict or overlap, to observe how as a result there is friction and waste, and to study how the existing social and legal machinery may be improved or new machinery may be devised whereby to obviate the friction, preclude the waste, and insure the best social engineering of which in the time and place we are capable.

THE COMMUNITY IDEA IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

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The individualism of the American has been nowhere more in evidence than in his rural life. It is true that before the Revolution, New England farmers lived in and migrated by communities, but the winning of the West was mainly a movement of families to family-size farms. Occasionally whole neighborhoods moved, rarely entire communities. It was the individual farmer and his family that became the unit of rural life.

Of course the pioneer farmers at once took on the simpler forms of social organization, but the groupings followed special interests and were rarely coterminous. The political groupings were wholly arbitrary, as, for example, the school district and the highway district. Indeed the typical surveyor's township, which only theoretically established a strong local political unit, had no relation whatever to social organization. Even voluntary societies, such as churches, farmers' clubs, granges were motivated chiefly by the desire either to gain personal advantage through segregation or to secure more intensive social life. That is to say, the farmers through these groupings did not consciously make an effort to organize a complete community or to serve an entire community. The groups were essentially cliques.

During the last decade, however, there has been a distinct and rapid development of the community idea in its applications to rural areas. The desire for collective action has been very strong among the farmers for half a century, but there have been many failures in its application. It is now growing apace, as illustrated in the recent marvelously rapid increase in the number of business co-operative agencies, both local farmers' exchanges and large overhead organizations. Not only in the field of business co-operation has the community idea arisen but there is a growing conviction of the possibility of farmers doing nearly everything

together. Consequently we have a new approach to the problems of the farmer—an approach from the standpoint of the local unit—that is, of the community.

But what is the community idea? It will suffice for our present purpose to say that it means the co-operation of all the people living within a given area for all of the common interests of life, economic, political, social. This implies the existence of a relatively small area in which people have so united that they maintain their own industrial, social, and political institutions and agencies. The group is in a restricted sense, nevertheless in a real sense, self-sufficing. It has individuality, personality, unity. It is not a mere number of people who happen to live near together, but it is essentially a strong, social unit just as the family is a unit, or as a local church is a unit.

Those acquainted with farm life in America will immediately mention the many difficulties that rise in the way of applying the community idea—difficulties historical, geographical, industrial, racial. There are those who doubt the practicability and even the wisdom of efforts to build distinct rural communities. Nevertheless, the movement goes on largely perhaps because it appeals to the strong common sense of the farmers, who have come to realize the individual farmer's helplessness and who have also learned by sad experience that great overhead organizations must fail unless built on the solid rock of successful local co-operating groups.

We must guard ourselves against the idea that the community movement is primarily a welfare or farm life movement. The activities of certain agencies on behalf of rural community centers, community buildings, community welfare, have given the impression that the main element in community building is the amelioration of living conditions, such as improvement of health, encouragement of recreation, stimulus to education. But we miss the whole point if we accept this narrow application of the community idea. The foundation of a permanent rural civilization and a continuously satisfactory farm life is reasonable economic prosperity; hence, in the local community, the co-operative idea must be applied to the betterment of production and distribution, as well as of conditions of living.

We find that institutions for co-operative buying, co-operative selling, co-operative credit are increasing very rapidly. There are tens of thousands of local co-operative enterprises of this sort. The collective method promises soon to be the characteristic method of doing farm business.

In the field of production the problem of co-operation is somewhat unique. There is no effort looking toward strictly co-operative farming. Instances of this occur in Europe, but so far as I know none in this country. With us the problem of applying the community idea to farm production is one of securing the intelligent co-operation of individual farm owners or workers on behalf of localizing products, standardizing farm practice, and developing essential skills. All this is more important than perhaps it seems at first thought. Localizing of production is already taken care of in many regions through the obvious adaptability of the entire local area to wheat or to corn or to cotton; but it has not been so obvious that it would pay all the cotton-growers in a certain locality to grow a certain variety of cotton; for the apple-growers of a local area to unite on a few leading varieties of apples; for the stock-growers to breed the same breed and if possible the same strain of stock. And so on through the list. But the farmers are coming to see that this standardization in production not only enables them to increase production, but is the prime factor in successful co-operative marketing. The local community must be able to furnish not only a sufficient quantity of products, but the more nearly uniform those products in quality the more readily they are standardized into distinct grades, the easier to secure prompt sales and to get the best prices.

In the country-life field, that is, in those aspects of agriculture that have to do with the way the people live, such as education, recreation, health, morals, and religion, the efforts still lean somewhat toward the glorification of social agencies themselves rather than the common effort of all the people of the community on behalf of the common welfare, though there are many public and private agencies attempting honestly and intelligently to apply the community idea to their special service. Indeed,

one of the most significant by-products of the effort to apply the community idea to rural development is the changed attitude of social institutions. Take, for example, the church. The moment that the people in a given local church cease to think of themselves as a specially selected group, supporting certain activities headed by a preacher paid by themselves and largely for their own satisfaction—I say, the moment that concept of a church is dissipated and there is substituted for it the idea that a church is a working group of people seeking to apply the religious idea, not only to their own lives but to the lives of all about them, they find themselves eager to draw into their ranks as many people as possible and to be of constant service to as many people as possible whether or not they are inside of the church. A complete revolution takes place not only within the church itself but in the entire community served by the church.

The school, perhaps to a less degree, is ultimately affected in the same way. For the school ceases to be merely an agency for the discipline of individual children; its whole purpose and policy and teaching and atmosphere come to be governed by the consciousness that these individuals are getting ready for service and that co-operation among them is essential to the best service. Not only that, but the possibilities of the school as a center of continuing adult education soon transform the school. So it is with other social agencies.

Just as the community idea can be applied to all the main aspects of rural development, so there are a number of ways by which the plan of a complete community may be established.

The first of these is the fully organized community, perhaps more appropriately the farm colony, developed either under state aid or under private auspices. The earliest and most persistent type is that of the religious community—Friends, Shakers, Mormons. The best example of state aid is that furnished by the community in Durham, Cal., under the direction of Dr. Elwood Mead acting on behalf of the state. Perhaps the most successful farm colony in recent years organized under private individual initiative is in North Carolina, under the persistent and intelligent leadership of

Mr. Hugh MacRae. In this type of community organization either an area not heretofore farmed is taken over and replanned or whole farms are bought and redivided on some new basis.

A suggestion which is nowhere yet a reality is that of "the farm city." The idea is to build a farm colony or rural community large enough so that it can maintain not only all necessary distinctly rural institutions, but can also become nearly self-contained industrially. It is expected to support those industries that are needed in order to process the products of the farm, and even to a large extent those that can furnish to the community its other necessary supplies.

In America the discussion concerning what in England are called "garden cities" is beginning to take on considerable importance, although as yet there is no distinct movement on behalf of this type of colony. The housing problem will not down, and sooner or later we shall insist that people be permitted to live under conditions that allow of separate or semi-detached houses and the attached garden. These communities will not be agricultural, but they will be tremendously important to the whole social structure and are mentioned here because they utilize the community idea applied to the land.

It may be asked, "How does the individual farmer adapt himself to the community idea?" Well, of course, very slowly. Often he simply does not understand it and it does not interest him. More often, perhaps, when he becomes interested it is put before him in such a way that he thinks of it as an uplift movement originating in the city or with the idealistic college professor. But he is clear on the point that he must co-operate with his fellows if his class is to be efficient and if he himself as an individual is to be saved. And so more and more he comes into local enterprises that have for their basis correlated activities looking toward the building-up or development of the entire community.

The community idea has had so far very little influence upon the family. The isolated farm family is a very powerful institution. Indeed the family rather than the individual is responsible for the extreme individualism of our farmers. Until rather recent years the farm family was almost self-sufficing, so that the prob-

lem of community building possibly hinges more upon the attitude of the family toward the community idea than upon any other factor. Of course the grange and church have prepared the way in many regions for the co-operation of families. Improvements in methods of communication have also assisted in bringing families together and making co-operation easier, yet there remains the very interesting problem of the extent to which the family may consciously assist in community building. It probably means an effort to secure the co-operation of parents in the school life of the children, in their religious education, in securing for them a normal play life. In other words, the family loyalty to the community will probably center first of all around its loyalty to the children of the community.

The social machinery most effective for applying fully the community idea is still to be determined. Community committees, community clubs, and other groupings of leaders to plan community development are multiplying in all parts of the United States. What may be regarded as "standard" community machinery may be listed as follows:

A Community Council, composed of the natural leaders and of the representatives of existing agencies, or at least the leaders of certain definite projects for community development, such as the leader of health affairs, the leader of the play life of the children, etc.

The Community Inventory, which is a study of the needs and resources of the community—industrial and social.

A Community Program, which maps out the steps to be taken in order to utilize the resources and meet the needs of the community.

The Community Meeting, which brings together several times a year all the people of the community to discuss the larger policies of common interest.

A Community Center, which is not necessarily one building, but which may be a group of buildings, each housing some major interest of the community, as, for example, the church housing religious affairs; the school housing all of the strictly educational enterprises, both for children and for adults; the community house giving room for the more distinctly social life of the community

not otherwise cared for. In some communities there will be other buildings such as a community store, a community elevator, a community creamery, and so on.

The main problem in applying the community idea to rural development consists virtually in making rural communities where none existed before. How may we develop our complete community, or at least approximate it, in a sufficient number of cases so that it becomes the typical method of working and living in our countryside?

The key to this problem is really not so much the appreciation of the community idea as it is the ability practically to define a local community geographically. As already indicated, our farm people have centers of interest, but these centers do not coincide. Dr. C. J. Galpin, as well as some other recent students, shows that an educational center, a trading center, a church center, even a social center, may exist some distance from the other centers of activity, ostensibly serving the same community, but really each one the focus of a group of its own. The result is simply a tangle of social foci, with consequent intermingling of separate interests, but no real community.

This difficulty is being met in various ways. The simplest is the organization of the consolidated school, because that at once establishes a semi-political and an educational unit. The schoolhouse may be so planned that it also becomes the social center. Again, if it is placed in a village it is at the center of the economic and perhaps of the religious community. In many places this one reform has immediately defined the community and made possible great advances in community development. In North Carolina there is a law on the statute books permitting the people of a local area to set themselves up as a community. It is really a transplantation of the old New England town scheme. Various states are passing laws relative to the establishment of rural health districts. We find, therefore, that many devices are being utilized for the purpose of defining and permanently establishing the community area. A gradual process of rebuilding the countryside is on, in which the dominant purpose is the application of the community idea to rural development.

The most democratic political institution in America is the New England town, governed by the town meeting. In the old days the town not only raised taxes and built roads and eventually schools, but it managed the church, paid the preacher, and in fact did about everything it wanted to do. There was no sharp distinction between the political function of the town and functions that were afterward turned over to voluntary agencies. The present community movement is virtually a return to the old idea, although it does not necessarily invoke the political power of the community for new purposes nor seek the support of public taxation for new enterprises. But it is essentially a democratic movement, having in it all the elements of true democracy, the ideas of equal opportunity for all, the common good of all, the co-operation of all for the common good, public discussion of common problems, local initiative and leadership.

The ultimate possibilities of applying the community idea to rural development no man knoweth. The complete community may never exist, but the goal, let us always remember, is an American rural civilization made up of thousands of true rural communities, each to a large extent governing itself, making its living in its own most effective way, learning not only in school but all through life, worshiping and serving through its own church, maintaining a wholesome play life for old and young.

Therefore it may be said with perfect truth, I think, that the present movement to apply the community idea to American rural development is not only the key to the rural civilization of the future, but is the most promising rural contribution to a larger and truer democracy.

DISCUSSION

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President Butterfield has very properly called attention to the fact that a complete community is one in which all its varied interests are reconciled and co-ordinated, and has further laid down the principle that of these interests to be co-ordinated, the economic is by no means the least important.

I desire to take up the last thought and develop it in relation to a particular class of rural communities.

Probably the most numerous sort of rural community in this country is the town-country, or "rurban," community, to use an apt term coined by Dr. Galpin. I have tried to make a rough estimate as to what part of the rural population have easy access to village centers for community purposes. The estimate runs thiswise: There are about 15,000 incorporated cities and villages in the nation and probably an additional 2,000 or 3,000 unincorporated villages and hamlets; making a total, let us say, of some 17,000 such nuclei. Further, we find that considerably less than half of the 3,000,000 square miles of territory is fit for agriculture and we may suppose that the agricultural population is chiefly confined to this area. Should we divide the agricultural area of say 1,500,000 square miles by 17,000, it is found that there is a village or hamlet center for every ninety square miles or for each area of about nine or ten miles square. Were the village in the center of each such area, no farm home need be more than some six or seven miles removed from such center. But of course this equal distribution of villages does not obtain, so that there are many farm homes quite remote from semiurban centers.

Since the potential town-country community is undoubtedly the more frequent class of rural communities, it is fit to inquire as to its capacity for realizing the complete community of which President Butterfield speaks. It is obvious that the farm and village populations have a number of common interests and that they may readily establish a more or less effectively working scheme of co-ordination. There is not much difficulty in agreeing, with a minimum of friction, on matters of church, school, lodge, and kindred affairs; although there is great hesitancy about entering into complete consolidation and merging of schools. But when we come to the economic item, we have located a factor that not only does not lead to smooth co-operation between town and country but one that often provokes the most violent and bitter discords.

It is easy to say that the economic interests of farmer and village merchant, banker, and so on are identical; for, as it is often stated, are not the business men of the village more interested in, and dependent on, agriculture than on anything else because they live so close to the soil? The identity of interest between the farmers and the nearby town in economic matters is generally assumed and is stated platitudinously. But there is good reason for recognizing the lack of identity and of the actual dividing lines that are being drawn.

In the seventies of last century, when the granges and grangers were seeking to alleviate the conditions of farmers by various co-operative enterprises as well as by political action, great bitterness and animosity was engendered in towns and cities against the organized farmers. Again in the nineties, in the time of the Alliance and Populist movements, townsmen generally were in arms against the farmers and the press was full of fulminations and objurgations against the foolish and impractical proposals those organizations made for rectifying the abuses in the field of agricultural marketing, finance, and taxation. No one who has not lived in the area of intensity of the Non-

partisan League movement could convive the acrimonious hostility which that organization of farmers has called forth from the townsmen. The opposition between the two sides is as bitter and intense as that between French and German in the recent war area and civil government is not always sufficient to prevent resort to physical demonstrations. Canadian papers make it evident that the concerted action of farmers there for political action has evoked from the urban press charges of radicalism, bolshevism, and sedition. In several of the countries of Europe the deep-seated cleft between the economic interests of the agricultural interest and the commercial and industrial interests of the towns is manifesting itself; and the same is to be noted respecting the situation in Australasia and Japan.

It is evident that farmers have been awakening to the belief that their interests and those of the business element of the towns are not identical and have set about taking such action, whether of the co-operative or political sort, as will, in their judgment, bring them a larger measure of economic justice. And wherever and whenever this action has been taken, whether on a large general scale or in small localities, it has been resented by the business elements among the urbanites. And it is to be remembered that as the occurrence manifests itself in a locality, the country and town are not only thrown into opposing hostile camps on economic concerns but that this antagonism tends to be carried over into other matters. Since the various kinds of agencies and organizations having their homes in the towns are practically always dominated by townsmen and the social psychology of the town group is made up and controlled by the same element, it comes about that any rural member of the opposing economic movement who seeks to go on making use of the agency or organization is likely to be made to feel the odium in which his movement is held and to be socially ostracized.

This attitude of hostility on the part of urban people arises from one or two sets of facts. First, the local business man thinks his business profits are being threatened by the co-operative or political action of the farmers. He accordingly incites his colleagues to organize for opposition and retaliatory purposes and also to mold the agencies of press, church, and the minds of the professional men of the place for his support. Second, while it may be that it is the profits of the ultimate and big business men which is threatened instead of that of the local small business men, the latter are so accustomed to take their cue from the former and so prone to identify their small interests with the large ulterior interests that they follow the lead of the big interests of large cities in their opposition to the movement of farmers for self-betterment. Business men are unduly sensitive over perfectly legitimate efforts on the part of the agriculturalists to improve their lot and are too unwilling to admit that the charges to the consumer and agricultural producer on business as conducted by middlemen are often excessive and duplicative.

It is somewhat evident that so long as the middleman of the town stands for his unqualified profit and control of the marketing and credit system and the

farmers organize and work for some voice in the control of farm prices and credits, the situation is charged with high explosives which at any time may be discharged to the disruption of the town-country community. What is the remedy no one knows. Political and co-operative effort alike on the part of farmers provoke resentment and opposition. It may be that the ultimate solution is to lie in the making of a society that is all of one kind, that is, that is either wholly capitalistic and profit-taking, or, on the other hand, completely co-operative. Or it may be that business in general will evolve an intelligence that is willing to admit the farmer's right to organize for his own benefit, and that it will cease to oppose his co-operative efforts. It is certain that could the business of small places be conducted on the co-operative basis exclusively, the causes of friction between town and country would be greatly reduced.

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I believe that President Butterfield is essentially correct when he defines the community idea as the co-operation of all the people living within a given area for all the common interests of life, economic, political, religious, social. I also believe that he is essentially correct in saying that the main problem in applying the community idea to rural development consists in endeavoring to make communities where none existed before. I believe that in rural life as well as in urban life the development of the community point of view and community co-operation is one of the fundamental social needs of the national life. There are few pieces of social endeavor which equal in importance this fundamental need.

I do not know, however, that I agree entirely with him when he says that the key to the problem is really not so much the appreciation of the community idea as it is the ability practically to define geographically a local community. It is true that the local community will never function properly until such a definition is secured. There must be an actual physical location of the various centers at one geographical point in order to secure a real unification of the community life.

It seems to me, however, that back of this lies a much more fundamental thing, namely, the development of a community point of view in the minds of the rural people. I believe that it is still true that out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaketh. Society is essentially a psychical fact and social improvements rest primarily not upon mechanism but upon a change in the mental and spiritual life of the people out of which mechanism may be constructed. The geographical definition of the community will come when the people have a community point of view.

There are three approaches to this cultivation of the community idea in the minds of the rural people. The first is through the public schools. We have said a very great deal and done something toward the teaching of technical agriculture in the rural schools. No one can doubt the exceeding impor-

tance of this move. But is it not equally important that we should ask for an introduction into the curricula of the public schools of such social studies as shall bring to the mind of the pupils an understanding of the social aspects of their community life? It is very important that we do not fail to see that rural education will always be very incomplete so long as it does not help the pupil to think of his community life as a whole and to develop an interest in the institutions and agencies of his community. This change of curriculum of the rural public schools lies, I believe, at the basis of any development of the community idea.

A second approach is through a training of the leaders that are going into rural communities. These are school teachers, ministers, county agricultural agents especially. At present there is no adequate training of these leaders in the social conception of their work. If the teacher and the minister and the agricultural agent can be made to see that their task is essentially a social task, they can do a very great deal toward making the school, the church, and the farm bureau function as co-operative community projects. The colleges have an essential responsibility in this training and can contribute a very great deal to the development of the community idea in rural life by emphasizing it in the preparation of these leaders.

The third approach is through the professional social worker who should be able to go into a rural community as a community organizer. President Butterfield mentions the community council as an important and necessary piece of machinery for developing the community idea. I believe he is entirely right in so doing, but no community council will live long enough to justify its organization unless it has some person to give his time to seeing that it actually functions. Co-operation is not something that is picked from the bushes or along the roadside. It is an achievement that comes only after careful thinking, planning, and negotiating. Unless there is some person to make the work of co-operation in a community essentially his professional task, I believe we will never secure it in the country any more than we have in the cities. As anyone that has any experience with social and educational agencies knows, the working-out of a co-operative program between them involves a considerable amount of diplomacy and mediation. Every agency must be interested in promoting and developing its own work. The workers connected with each agency are entirely incapable of thinking out their relations to other agencies in an impartial manner. It must be a separate task to think of the community as a whole and of the agencies in it as parts of that whole. It does not seem to me that it is utopian to expect that rural communities may provide for such community organizers, in much the same way as at present the county agricultural agent is provided. It is certainly as large and important a task to develop co-operative relations along the line of educational, social, recreational, and religious activities as it is to secure the advice of a man on the technique of agriculture, and I am convinced that we will never have a very large development of the community idea in rural life until we provide some trained community organizers.

PAUL L. VOGT, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Dr. Butterfield has called attention to the growth and influence of the community idea in modern rural development. The present discussion is intended to supplement his able presentation by a further analysis of the concept "community" and to note some of the practical implications of the term.

It is now generally recognized that a "community" is not a physical but a psychical phenomenon. In the last analysis the only community is that group of two or more persons who are bound together by a single common interest. Thus we may have in a given geographical area human beings belonging to several communities, as religious, social, political, industrial. The membership in these respective single-interest communities may be in part the same for all. But to have all those living in a given geographical area members of all the communities finding their existence within that area and excluding all those not in the area is beyond present possibilities. By a looser use of the term it is now applied to groups of people who live within a given geographical area of indefinite boundaries and who belong generally to several of the interest or pure community groups within that area. The larger the number of people who belong to all the interest groups in the area, the stronger will be the community spirit, as the term is used in the larger sense.

Among the objectives of the community idea in modern rural life as thus defined appear to be:

1. The bringing together at one common geographical center of as many as possible of the focal points of group interest. It is believed that that community will be the stronger which has its industrial, recreational, educational, religious, and other group interests centered at one common meeting place.

2. The determination, as nearly as possible, of the boundaries of group interests at that line where the maximum number of those who are bound by interests to this center will be included.

3. The unifying, as far as possible, of the essential interests into one organization for each. As one school system, one religious organization, one social and recreational community center.

4. The socialization of the population within the given geographical area so that there will be a maximum number responding to the normal stimuli of group life.

5. The co-ordination of the essential organized forces or group interests so that all may function with a minimum of intergroup friction and all may co-operate in the achievement of common objectives of community progress.

One distinction sometimes made that appears to be erroneous is that between "community" and "neighborhood." The "neighborhood" is simply a smaller community. Its characteristics are the same as other types of communities, and it varies only in degree and in the relative strength of the different bonds holding the group together.

It is believed that by far the larger part of rural America economic and other conditions have now become sufficiently well established to enable students of rural life to determine with a high degree of accuracy what are likely to be for a long time to come the normal centers for bringing together the focal points of group interests. The determination of such centers is of more importance than the determination of boundaries. Could a study such as that attempted by the Interchurch World Missionary Movement be carried through to success, a basis would be provided for a well-ordered readjustment of interest centers, political, educational, religious, social, and industrial. This readjustment would undoubtedly in the course of years go far toward making possible the realization of that ideal of community progress which is the working faith of those actively engaged in the rural-life movement.

FURTHER INQUIRIES OF SOCIOLOGY

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS
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In the same large sense in which economics is the science of the production and distribution of wealth, *for* man, sociology is the science of the production and distribution of adequacy, *of* man and *in* man. Economics tells us how, as far as it is possible, we can *get* the things that we desire to *have;* sociology tells us how, as far as it is possible, we can *become* what we desire to *be*. It tells us by what gropings and fumblings, through what relations with one another, and through what experiments in mutual aid mankind has acquired power to survive under varied and changing conditions, power to achieve, and capacity for happiness. Adequacy comprises endurance, health, reproductive vigor, intelligence, self control, ability to make adjustments with others and to get on helpfully with others in co-operation. Society produces these factors of adequacy in the same sense in which the breeder produces desired qualities in animals, namely, by selecting them and providing the conditions under which they can survive. The practical manifestations of adequacy are: individual initiative, individual responsibility, and an individual participation that is efficient and helpful in collective endeavor.

It will not surprise my co-workers in sociology that I as an individual so conceive of our science, because in all my writings for twenty-five years I have insisted, perhaps tiresomely, that society is comprehensible only if we know what it does, and that what it does is to convert a biological survival of the fit for the jungle into a historical survival of the better for human purposes. In other words, as I argued in *The Principles of Sociology* and have since maintained, the function of society is to develop and to safeguard the higher types of human personality.

If I can be said to have a system of sociology it is briefly this:

1. A situation or stimulus is reacted to by more than one individual; there is pluralistic as well as singularistic behavior. Plu-

ralistic behavior develops into rivalries, competitions, and conflicts, and also, into agreements, contracts, and collective enterprises. Therefore social phenomena are products of two variables, namely, situation (in the psychologist's definition of the word) and pluralistic behavior.

2. When the individuals who participate in pluralistic behavior have become differentiated into behavioristic kinds or types, a consciousness of kind, liking or disliking, approving or disapproving one kind after another, converts gregariousness into a consciously discriminative association, herd habit into society; and society, by a social pressure which sometimes is conscious but more often, perhaps, is unconscious, makes life relatively hard for kinds of character and conduct that are disapproved.

3. Society organizes itself for collective endeavor and achievement if fundamental similarities of behavior and an awareness of them are extensive enough to maintain social cohesion, while differences of behavior and awareness of them in matters of detail are sufficient to create a division of labor.

4. In the long run organized society by its approvals and disapprovals, its pressures and achievements, selects and perpetuates the types of mind and character that are relatively intelligent, tolerant, and helpful, that exhibit initiative, that bear their share of responsibility and that effectively play their part in collective enterprise. It selects and perpetuates the adequate.

This I think is an intelligible and rather straightforward way of explaining society. But society is the most intricate tangle of happenings and relationships that the scientific mind can investigate. It can be approached in many ways. It has been described in many formulas, not obviously identical. It is therefore quite in order to ask whether the definition of sociology that I have submitted is anything more than a personal reaction. Can it be found elsewhere? Are other definitions substantially identical, or at least consistent, with it?

I am glad to answer this question, or, rather, to bring forward an answer that other men have made. It is interesting and inspiring. Without explicitly telling us so the founders of sociology have, in fact, it would seem, without exception conceived of the science

of society as a systematic study of the increase and distribution of human adequacy to exist and achieve.

How otherwise can we interpret Comte's major contention that social dynamics is an account of the advance, or progress, that mankind has made from theological through metaphysical to positive thinking, and that positive thinking has put him in command of his destiny? How otherwise can we interpret Spencer's insistence that mankind has begun to go right after having tried all the possible ways of going wrong, chief of which has been militarism, which has selected authority-revering types of character; and that only under a voluntaristic, co-operative industrialism which selects peace-loving and self-reliant natures, can our race become humane; inasmuch as, until then, we shall not be able to educe golden conduct from leaden human natures. Certainly no other interpretation can be put upon Lester F. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* as it is expounded in the volumes bearing that title and in later writings. Its thesis is that society not only grows but also is made, consciously and for a purpose. It is a product of tellic effort. And to what end is it made? What is the purpose? I do not know that Ward anywhere uses the word, but he unmistakably indentifies and describes the thing; society is made to the end that it may produce human adequacy, and, above all, increase the ratio of adequate individuals to the inadequate. Therefore, he contends, it is the supreme duty of society to disseminate existing knowledge and to educate everybody. Finally (and I say finally because I limit my survey to four writers, one French, one English, and two American who are no longer living), no other interpretation can be put upon the teaching of William Graham Sumner whom, now that he is gone, we are beginning to recognize as perhaps the most consistently sociological if not the greatest of sociologists. In folkways Sumner finds the most characteristic of social reactions and products. They are the primary mechanism of pluralistic control and adjustment. The state is a secondary and far more artificial mechanism. The folkways mediate between individual impulse and the conditions to which life must adapt itself. They discipline the individual and hold him to his obligations. He in turn reacts upon them by innovating experiment and occasional rebellion.

Products of trial and error, by trial and error they are changed. In such ceaseless conflict between individual impulse and pluralistic habit individual adequacy discovers itself and is discovered. It is tried and tempered. The unsuccessful innovator is eliminated. His idea may have been true and valuable but untimely born or ineffectively presented. The successful innovator survives, and with him adequacy.

If, looking further, we could compare all known systems of sociology we should discover, I am confident, that their fundamental agreement lies precisely in this matter, namely, that, like their ancient prototypes the Republic of Plato and the Politics of Aristotle, they view society as functioning to produce human adequacy. Their disagreements arise out of their differing assumptions as to means or method. Systems that have taken for granted a Lamarkian biology have laid emphasis on environment and education. Systems that have anticipated or accepted a later biology (built upon facts of mutation and predictable heredity) lay emphasis on a social selection that is continuous with natural selection and supplementary to it. At the present moment sociology like psychology is quietly abandoning errors that it took over from a biology now discredited. We are beginning to discriminate between heredity, a physiological transmission of traits to offspring, and heritage, a sum total of knowledge, pattern, technique, and property handed on by teaching and surrender, and we shall cease to confuse habits, which each generation must acquire, with original or instinctive nature which is the equipment that we are born with. Having made these corrections in our thinking we shall probably stop kicking against the pricks, forget that we once believed in the inheritance of acquired traits, and no longer feel obliged to deny that character and intelligence are facts of original nature, while behavior and knowledge are facts of habit. Character cannot fundamentally be made over after birth any more than bodily constitution can be, but behavior, including moral conduct, can be improved until old age just as health can be. Intelligence regarded as mental power cannot be increased after birth, but its functioning can be speeded up and knowledge can be increased indefinitely.

These elementary teachings of the new biology to which sociology will have to adapt itself, if it has not already done so, throw a clear light upon adequacy. Plainly we now see, adequacy is partly a fact of original nature or equipment; that is to say, it is partly a fact of ability; but also, it is partly a fact of acquisition or habit; that is to say, it is partly a fact of morale.

In so factorizing adequacy we have, I now suggest, the starting-point from which certain further inquiries in sociology apparently should and probably will proceed. In my own mind they take form and arrangement somewhat like this:

1. What situations and what pluralistic reactions to them acting selectively increase (1) the absolute number, (2) the relative number, (3) both the absolute and the relative number of able men and women in the community, a standard of ability being taken, and the limits of the community being defined.

2. What situations and pluralistic reactions to them both increase the amount of ability in the community and, by discipline, or education, or otherwise, improve the morale of an increasing proportion of the population?

3. What situations and pluralistic reactions to them improve morale only?

4. What situations and pluralistic reactions to them diminish or destroy ability?

5. What situations and pluralistic reactions to them both diminish ability and impair morale?

6. What situations and pluralistic reactions to them impair morale only?

7. Are the reactions of ability upon pluralistic behavior (*a*) more profound, (*b*) more dependable and enduring, than the reactions of morale?

8. What are the reactions upon pluralistic behavior of improved morale when there is no increase of ability?

9. What are the reactions upon pluralistic behavior of more ability, when morale is not improved?

10. How does the relative numerical increase of adequate men and women react upon the drives, the mechanisms, and the achievements of collective endeavor?

If time permitted I should be glad to present these inquiries more concretely. I must be content to indicate the concrete aspect of two of them.

Number seven is the question that everybody asked when the European war began in 1914. The civilized world was stunned. It had believed that science, communication, commerce, acquaintance, humane feeling, and reasonableness had made a general war impossible. Therefore "when the thing that couldn't" happen had occurred we asked whether civilization was more than a veneer of habit laid upon a character of savagery. Is it more? Has it ever been more than a morale which at any moment might break down? Has it ever selected or does it now select for survival trustworthy characters and the far-seeing intelligences that can be relied on to weather political storms of envy and hate? This question has not been answered. Should we not try to find the answer?

Number ten is the question that the world at present is asking about Russia. Since prehistoric times the inadequate have said "Let George do it, 'we should worry,'" and George, accepting the commission, has made himself a boss, a capitalist, a ruler, and exploiter. Now, the inadequate having learned how by sabotage and violence to bully are saying: "Make George do it. Make those who have been adequate enough to acquire wealth divide with us who have not been. Make the expert take orders from us the non-expert." Dictation by the incompetent is no more democracy, however, than monarchy is, and it tends to work out as despotism. Society is democratic only when men, saying neither "Let George do it," nor "Make George do it," say, rather, "We will do it," and proceed to make good. But this saying and this doing presuppose a diffusion or distribution of adequacy. How extensive must the distribution be? To what extent do the intellectually inferior spontaneously trust and follow, to what extent do they obstinately distrust, the intellectually superior? Can we alter the ratio, or might one as well attempt by taking thought to add a cubit to his stature? These questions have not been answered. Should we not try to find the answers?

These inquiries sharpen the distinction between sociology and economics, with which we set forth. Studies of actual or possible betterment of the conditions under which and by which people live are economic investigations in substance, if not in form. Studies of actual or possible improvement of the people themselves are sociological investigations. It would conduce to efficient co-operation between economists and sociologists if this discrimination were made in teaching and in the organization of university departments. Studies of housing, cost of living, family budgets, wages, hours and conditions of labor, insurance, and pensions can be well taught only by economists. Studies of folkways, social pressure by taboo and bullying, social selection, organization, and morale can best be taught by sociologists. The sociologist should know his economics well enough to avoid making a fool of himself when he talks about economic problems. A more technical knowledge of the subject he does not need unless, besides being a sociologist he is also professionally an economist. As a sociologist he must be technically trained and proficient in the behavioristic psychology and in statistics; and he must keep in touch with the workers in eugenics who inquire how the human race can be improved in heredity, and with the workers in religion, in ethics, and in education, who are the technicians of morale.

How shall the further inquiries of sociology be made? What method or methods can be used and relied on?

The method must be inductive and there is only one inductive method that sociology can use. It consists of three steps. First, accurate first-hand observations must be made in great number and carefully checked up. The second-hand observation of the interviewer has been overworked; it can yield us nothing but a journalistic sociology. Second, observations must painstakingly be recorded and intelligently classified. Third, the data so obtained and prepared must be subjected to statistical analysis for the purpose of discovering ratios, modalities, coefficients of variation, and correlations.

What facts shall be observed? Not static conditions only or chiefly. The survey has its place and its value, but it can never

give us the laws of social change. To discover these we must observe and analyze social experiments. Social evolution has proceeded by trial and error. Mankind has made more experiments on and in society than on or in any other medium. They have been imperfect, errant, often erratic, and there is not much ground for hope that in the future they will become scientifically more satisfactory, because the sociologist cannot, like the physicist or the biologist, isolate one factor of a situation after another either by changing it while all other factors are kept unchanged, or by keeping it unchanged while all other factors are changed. Discouraged by this difficulty Mill in his *Logic* mistakenly tells us that the social sciences cannot successfully employ induction to any great extent, and must rely on the deductive reasoning used by the classical political economy. Mill apparently knew nothing of statistical theory or practice. Happily it is often possible statistically, to isolate a factor and measure its value even when, from a laboratory viewpoint experimentation has been inconclusive. Scientifically imperfect social experimentation, bewilderingly varied and quantitatively enormous, is going on at present in every part of the world. It is the duty of the sociologist to observe and analyze it.

DISCUSSION

U. G. Weatherly, Indiana University

A paper so compact and comprehensive as that of Professor Giddings cannot be fairly discussed within the assigned limits. To deal with it point by point would be to cover the main features of present sociological thought. Indeed, almost the only specific criticism that I can offer is that it is too compact in content. With Professor Giddings' contention that the field of sociological investigation should be limited to what is specifically sociological and that it should exclude the economic subjects named I am in hearty accord. Differentiation and intensification of the social sciences has made necessary a clearly marked area for each, and sociology need no longer encroach on its neighbors. I should go farther and assert that the time has also come for a careful demarcation of the spheres of sociology and psychology. Our current sociological thought is constantly bemuddled by a confusion as to what is distinctly sociological and what is properly psychological in character. The fact that there are border provinces which are common to both makes this need all the greater, even though, as is doubtless the case, the center of interest and the

matter for emphasis is different for each science. Sociology must learn to hold other sciences responsible for their own particular results and then take those results for granted, using them as it finds necessary for its own problems. And the chief problem of sociology, as Professor Giddings has so compactly stated it in the explanation of his term "adequacy," is the making of social programs. H. G. Wells, whose semi-serious prophesyings are by some people taken as pontifical utterances, once told an assembly of sociologists that their business was "making utopias." As usual he was half right. Not the constructing of visionary utopian schemes, but the working out of scientific lines which society may follow, the surveying of roads for future progress, is surely a task fit for a science even so ambitious as ours.

Professor Giddings has emphasized certain newer developments and terms with which it behooves us to become familiar. Whether the universe is indeed a pluralistic one, as James contended, or whether it has an ultimate unity, we ought in any case to have learned in the experience of the past two decades that social forces are so complex that we must, in practice, take them as many and not as one. And we must also, in the face of our scholastic tendency toward schematic arrangement, recognize that our only hope of understanding the phenomena of group life lies in a study of men's behavior. I am not sure that I would accept the statistical method quite so unreservedly as does Professor Giddings, but it is at least one, and one of the best, of the methods for such a study. The present outlook in social life, characterized as it is chiefly by unrest and dislocation, is not exactly encouraging, but a resolute facing of its problems and a rigid determination to treat them scientifically is certainly more promising than either shivering terror or emotional acquiescence.

GROVE SAMUEL DOW, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

I have found it exceedingly difficult to critically discuss this able and interesting paper of Professor Giddings. I have nothing but the highest praise to offer for his interesting exposition of sociology as the science of human adequacy and the able summary of his own system of sociology, and because of this I feel that any further discussion on my part would be superfluous and a waste of time. There are, however, toward the close of the paper two lines of thought with which I find myself not in agreement and I shall therefore confine my discussion to them.

Professor Giddings acknowledges his surrender to the science of economics of such topics as "housing, cost of living, family budgets, wages, hours and conditions of labor, insurance, and pensions." Not so much for myself but as a representative of a group of younger sociologists who are now coming on to the stage I wish to put in a protest against this surrender. I frankly recognize that all these topics are on or near the border line between the two sciences but I contend that they are within the domain of sociology. Not only these studies but others similar to them must be included in any

comprehensive program for the shaping of human adequacy; they are all means of selection of the adequate. Housing affects standards of living and influences not only the morality but even the stability of the family as an institution itself; housing also helps to determine the health, organization, and morale of the group. Cost of living determines the very survival of the adequate, for it determines whether the standards of the group shall rise, remain stationary, or decline. Family budgets and wages are methods of determining standards of living; of determining whether the family is able to function as it should, or whether it is destined to fail in its purpose. Hours and conditions of labor determine whether the worker is able to take the place in society that he should; not only whether he will be able to act his part successfully but even whether society itself will be able to function as it should. Social insurance is the protection of the family against disaster, and the assurance that society will be successful in the future as well as the present. Such topics as these are studies of the means by which we are able to become what we would desire to become. Sociology cannot limit itself to the consideration of results or ends; it must include the means to those ends. Part of the means to those ends is the investigations of such topics as housing, budgets, standards of living, cost of living, hours and conditions of work, and social insurance. Not only do I believe that these topics should be included in sociology but I am convinced that problems of population, such as birth-rates, death-rates, immigration, emigration, urban migration, and race friction belong there also. I also maintain that not only such studies should be included within the realm of sociology but that they should not be postponed as topics only for advanced discussion but should be taken up early in the study of the science of sociology. It is about such topics that the masses of our population should be informed in order to be able to work out programs of human adequacy. If because of the lack of time some subjects must be postponed for advanced discussion they should be questions of social theory and problems of social psychology, in which most people are naturally less interested.

In the very last paragraph of his paper Professor Giddings suggests that the work of the sociologist should be similar to that of the judge; that he should observe and analyze the material presented and from it form social laws. I wish to urge that the duty of the sociologist is not merely to sit back, weigh in the balance, and pass judgment upon, the acts of others, as important and necessary as that work is, but that it is also his duty to get out into the world in order to help mold and shape the changes which are coming about. The policy of the sociologist should not be laissez faire but telic; not merely to observe how such institutions as the state, religion, and education are shaping and controlling society but to help shape and direct the work of such institutions. Instead of being passive sociology should be an active and energetic science. The world is beginning to look to the sociologist for advice and guidance and instead of only being able to offer a few dry, unintelligible social laws, sociology ought to be able to give some practical information and advice.

Instead of merely stating what the end of society should be, it ought to be able to give some of the means of acquiring that end. Instead of merely approving of housing reform, for illustration, it ought to be able to give practical advice in regard to housing programs. Instead of merely giving a blanket approval or disapproval of social insurance, the sociologist ought to be able to advise in regard to what forms of social insurance are needed and the best methods of bringing these about. In the same way he ought to be depended upon for sound advice in regard to immigration, city planning, the establishment of social centers, and programs for the checking of the present rush to our cities. I do not mean that all sociologists should turn reformers by any means, but instead of merely being a group of social philosophers who sit in their studies and meditate about what society has done and is apt to do in the future, the sociologists should occasionally get away from their books and mingle with the masses, learn society as it is, know its ills, weaknesses, and failures, also its points of strength and successes. We should not leave social legislation to a group of politicians who know little and care less about the needs of society, but who study rather the best methods of obtaining and controlling votes. We should put the results of our studies at the disposal of our lawmakers, who should in turn be elected by the best-informed public that it is possible to produce. Instead of leaving the direction of our religious institutions entirely in the hands of groups of theologians, who know little of society and its needs, we should do our utmost to help train the ministers and religious leaders of the future, in order that our religious institutions should be better able to grapple with their problems. Instead of leaving the shaping of the policies of our educational institutions to trustees and school boards of varying degrees of inefficiency, we should do our best to help make education more effective and efficient. Instead of philosophizing in regard to the functions and purposes of capital and labor, the sociologist should do his best to help make our industrial organization more efficient in not only being able to produce more and better goods but in producing a better and happier society.

Not only should sociology study the interests that control our institutions but it should endeavor to help promote those interests that further the welfare of society and help make this world a better place in which to live. It should also discourage and help hold in check those interests that tend to injure society, to cripple its institutions, and decrease human happiness. Not only should the sociologist philosophize about the organization of society but he should help make that organization more efficient and help it function for the best interests of humanity. In conclusion I contend that sociology should not be made merely a dry, lifeless study of social philosophy or even of social psychology, but it should be made a warm, live, interesting study of society itself; a science which will be practical and useful to our future generations in the living of loftier and happier lives.

MILTON FAIRCHILD, WASHINGTON, D.C.[1]

I am particularly interested in the remarks made by Professor Giddings, because of his reference to what he called "muddled thinking." The report made by Dr. Gillin relative to sociological research seems to me very important indeed, because a reliable sociology will constitute the background for important decisions in the field of practical work for human welfare. But the sociology which can be useful in this way cannot be in the stage of "muddled thinking."

Let me urge that the professional sociologists devote themselves to the development of their thinking as a "pure science," and bring their generalizations to the stage of proved truth. In any and every pure science there are four essential elements in the determination of truth. (1) There has to be collection of data, and this has to be pushed to the point of adequacy. Insufficient data do not justify procedure to generalizations. (2) The data must be classified and arranged as a preliminary for understanding. Unorganized data do not relinquish truth to the human mind. It is meditation over the significance of organized data that produces general laws of explanation. (3) The third essential of pure science is generalization, the formulation of laws. This is the interesting stage of the procedure, interesting to the scientist and also to the general public. But mere speculative generalization does not result in a reliable body of scientific knowledge, for the generalizations are hypotheses, which may or may not be true. (4) The fourth essential of science is verification. This labor of verification is drudgery compared to the exciting and exalting search for a generalization which will explain a mass of known detail facts. And yet without the verification there is no result from collection of data, classification, and hypotheses which can be considered worthy of human intelligence, because the speculative generalizations lack proof of trustworthiness.

It seems to me that sociologists have jumped with both feet into the middle of the field of hypothetical, speculative generalizations without taking the trouble to do the drudgery involved in the collection of data, classification, and verification. They have developed no thorough procedure in the gathering of the facts relative to human society; they have made no extensive collection of results of observation of human life; they have produced very interesting college and university lectures and published many very suggestive books and articles, but they have not produced a body of verified generalizations, because this result is an impossibility from the incompleteness of their work. They have produced an important body of social theory, which will be very useful in the construction of a pure science of sociology, but they have been giving their energy to the comparison of these "points of view," to the defense

[1] By special arrangements with President Dealey, five minutes were allowed to Milton Fairchild, chairman of the National Institution for Moral Instruction, Washington, D.C., to explain the use of photography in observation of human life.

of beliefs and convictions which have been arrived at as a result of incidental observation, newspaper reading, and the research which consists in the reading of many books. They have been interested in the application of sociology to human well-being, but have overlooked the truth that they have had no right to advise as specialists in human affairs since they have created no pure science of society.

I am very much interested in the development of this movement for research in sociology, because it is impossible to create a pure science of human society without the collection of immense quantities of information, which is the objective of this movement for research in sociology. The same is true of other social sciences and of education. The movement for a pure science of education is now recognizable, and our leading educators are including plans for educational research in their visions for future work. We need a pure science of sociology as a background for many educational decisions.

In the field of character education, which is the heart and soul of education in a democracy, it will be impossible to do successful work without a reliable sociology. I am not running down "sociology," but urging that its importance be recognized fully, and that its plans for research be made adequate to the importance of the general truths which are the objective of sociology. The importance of sociology to education lies in the fact that it may become a body of reliable generalizations as to the organization and conduct of human affairs conducive to the welfare of human beings, as President Dealy has well said, and thereby determine the goal toward which education should develop the character of children in a democracy.

We are founding, under the leadership of educators of the nation, an institution for the study of character education as a phase of general education. There is to be a very large endowment, and a start has already been made in its accumulation. We have now before a body of four hundred collaborators a prize of $20,000 for the best method of character education in public schools, returns from which will be due on Washington's Birthday next. A research faculty or group of secretaries will be established, and the institution plans are being drawn and the foundation established so that permanent research extending over several hundred years can be carried through. Character education needs a scientific sociology and a scientific psychology and a scientific ethics, it needs reliable truth in all the sciences of human life as a background for decision as to how the educational system in a democracy shall stimulate and guide the development of the character of the nation's children as a preparation for citizenship among a free people.

Since there is no science possible without the accumulation of vast quantities of data, and this phase of sociology has been neglected, it is important that attention be given to ways and means by which sociological observation can be done most successfully. Newpaper information relative to human affairs is unreliable. Each paper has its "point of view" and reporters are instructed as to the coloring which will be received enthusiastically by its

readers. The objective of reporters in their observation is a "good story" rather than a reality account. Besides, the mind of the reporter is untrained in sociology as a science, and therefore lacks discernment. There is no scientific observation possible by untrained intelligence in sociology any more than in any other field of human knowledge. Sociology needs trained observers, definite methods of observation, and instruments of precision to supplement the human senses.

As an example of the possibilities of instruments of precision in sociological observation I have brought a photographic study of a street-railway strike. It is in typewriting so far as its verbal explanatory parts are concerned, but it has about a hundred photographs, taken with a special camera capable of thirty pictures in one minute, around which the information in the text is grouped. About three months were used in preparing this study. The endeavor was to get photographs of the social situation in the important crises of the strike. The photograph would be a permanent and accurate record, and would contain more than the eyes of the observer could see at the moment of exposure. The eyes and ears and tongue of the observer were constantly active in gathering the data of the strike while the episodes were happening, but in addition the photographic record of situations was taken. This work was done in 1903, when instantaneous photography was not as fully developed as now, and it was necessary to invent and construct a special camera for this observation of human life. But during the war there was extensive use of photography for military observation, and cameras suitable for this sociological scientific work are now available.

After the strike was over, the photographs were printed as lantern slides, and were shown by hand and in the lantern to many persons who had information as to what was going on at the time photographs were taken, and inquiry made of them for explanations of the photographs. The method of the lawyer when cross-questioning a witness had to be used to sift the facts from fiction, but the definiteness of the evidence in the photographs as to the situation to be explained proved a great advantage in the questioning. The witness had to start from an established fact basis, and to recognize the knowledge of the inquirer. This study is crude, because it is a beginning, but it is sufficiently successful to prove the availability of the photographic camera as one of the instruments of precision for a scientific sociology. There are other means of accurate observation which can be used, the dictagraph, the amplifier, the finger prints, stenography, etc. There should be character diagnosis of leading personages, and psychiatric examinations, that the psychology involved in social episodes may be understood. Statistics should be a permeating element in all sociological observation. The gathering of printed matter, documents, and circulars, in original or in photographic copies, should be persistent and thorough. There should be training in the use of these instruments, and the observers should be intellectually qualified to discern the significance of sociological data which they have a chance to observe.

SOCIOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF THE INTERCHURCH MOVEMENT

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In making a sociological evaluation of the Interchurch World Movement at this time I am, by the force of circumstances, put in a position somewhat like that of the old colored man in Virginia who was asked by the court to appraise the value of a borrowed horse that had died while in use by the defendant. Addressing the court the old negro said: "Yo honor, dis yah hoss done been one powful critter in his day—wuff heaps—but now in his present state of mortification aint wuff what it costs to drag him to de buzzards." Nevertheless the man who borrowed the horse had to pay the costs.

When asked some months ago by President Dealy to write a paper on this subject, the Interchurch Movement was then a going concern; today it is in a state of involuntary bankruptcy, surrounded by the regrettable wreckage of a most promising experiment in religious social technology.

In attempting to evaluate a movement of this kind in the light of sociological knowledge we are not surprised by the fact that the movement failed of its original purpose, but we are rather astonished that it came so near succeeding. We must remember that most of the men who organized the movement were out of college and the theological seminaries before sociology as a science—pure or applied—was adequately taught in these institutions. Nevertheless the movement failed not so much for lack of technical social organization, as from a lack of practical social engineering, and the lack of ability to cope with the social psychology of the people following the cessation of war.

In the preface to his *Applied Sociology* written fourteen years ago, that pioneer and pathfinder in the mazes of sociological theories, and honored first president of this society, Professor

Lester F. Ward, gives us the clue to the sociological evaluation of this movement when he states, "Every attempt to take a step forward, with its virtual failure to do so, has only confirmed the view there set forth[1] that ends cannot be attained directly, but only through means, the universal method of science. It has also become more and more apparent that improvement cannot be secured through the increase of knowledge, but only through its socialization, and that therefore the real and practical problem of applied sociology still remains the distribution of the intellectual heritage bequeathed to all equally by the genius of mankind."[2] We can say therefore in a word or two that the Interchurch Movement did not succeed in securing the improvement in the world situation it set out to achieve not so much from lack of knowledge, as from lack of socialization and distribution of its intellectual heritage.

The origin of the movement.—The origin of the Interchurch World Movement was sociologically correct. It originated in the consciousness of a felt need, made known to the participating Protestant groups, and conceived by the intelligent understanding of the leaders of these groups, who had become acquainted with the facts previous to and during the period of the world-war, through surveys made in the home and foreign fields of missionary enterprise.

The intensive studies of the foreign fields by the Edinburgh Continuation Committee; the Foreign and Home Mission surveys of the mission boards of the Methodist Episcopal church preparatory to the centenary celebration of the founding of these societies, the world-activities of the Christian associations, the reconstruction tasks of the various church wartime commissions of the Federal Council of the churches, the united war-activities of the Christian associations, the Knights of Columbus, and the Jewish Welfare Board, and besides a thousand appeals from the countries affected by the devastations of war, all gave conviction to these one hundred and thirty-five representations of the Home and Foreign Mission boards and allied agencies met in New York in

[1] In his *Dynamic Sociology*.

[2] See *Applied Sociology*, p. iv.

December, 1918, a few weeks after the armistice was signed, that a world-confederation movement of the Protestant forces of christendom was necessary and practicable to meet the needs that were then as well as now so pressing.

Organization.—As a result of this first meeting of representative religious leaders of the Protestant missionary and allied agencies a committee of twenty was appointed to outline a plan of organization and report to the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, the Home Missions Council, the Council of Church Boards of Education, the Sunday School Council, the Federation of Women's Boards of Foreign Missions, and the Council of Women for Home Missions. The report of the Committee of Twenty was submitted and included an outline of the purposes, the interests to be included, the methods of organization, and immediate steps to be taken.

These various councils appointed five representatives who, with the Committee of Twenty, formed a new Committee of One Hundred who met in February, 1919, and completed the organization and launched the Interchurch World Movement. Besides the national organization consisting of a general committee of 100 and an executive committee of fifteen, there was organized a state and local organization throughout the country to carry out the work of the movement.

Its purpose.—Its purpose was constructive. Recognizing that the armistice and the declaration of peace would usher in a new era in the world's history, these religious leaders planned to make an immediate survey of the entire world to ascertain the world-task of the Christian churches, and to secure and register as well as train the religious forces to meet the need, and to raise the money to pay for the carrying out of the world-program of actual constructive effort. Acknowledging the world-obligation of evangelical Christianity, these leaders dared to actually plan to carry through that obligation by organizing co-operatively the religious forces necessary to the task. Nearly one hundred missionary boards and interdenominational agencies approved the plan.

The method.—The method of this movement was sociologically correct. It employed the scientific method of the survey, and

called into council the best trained men available, who had had wide experience in survey work to help plan the schedules for the town and country survey, the city survey, the general and religious educational surveys, the home survey, and the survey of industrial relations, all were planned to find out impartially the facts of need and from these facts deductions were to be made as to how the churches could help to meet those needs.

State and regional conferences were held to bring the people in touch with the problems of meeting the needs discovered. County councils were called of representative ministers and laymen of the churches to work out programs of co-operation in serving the community, and especially the neglected areas of the open country and industrial centers.

A department of education and publicity was organized to bring the facts discovered to the people of the churches in every home and foreign field. The two volumes entitled *World Survey*, one for America, the other for the foreign field though only a preliminary survey, contain sociological material of the highest value for the student interested in religious social service.

One can hardly estimate the value of these surveys, when the material is all scientifically tabulated, charted, and mapped, for the departments of city, county, state, and national governments. It is reported that one of the departments of the federal government has already asked for a duplicate set of the maps and charts of the town and county survey, and requests have been made by various organizations interested in Americanization for the results of the survey of foreign groups in America.

The same may be said of the value of the educational survey to the administrative boards of our colleges, universities, theological seminaries, and secondary schools, as well as to the state boards of education. When this knowledge of the religious world-tasks of the churches has become adequately socialized, then, and then only, shall we see improvement as a result of this achievement of the Interchurch Movement.

Opposition to the Interchurch Movement.—The sociologist is not surprised at the opposition aroused against a movement of this sort. In fact all movements for human betterment as well as all

scientific discoveries have been at first opposed by the multitudes, as well as by men in high places, especially the latter.

The first formidable opposition to the movement was from those denominations of the church that had the erroneous notion that it was a movement for church corporate union. One of the largest of the evangelical Protestant groups not only did not approve, but actually took the field against it by its pulpit and press.

It was opposed by many ecclesiastics of the denominations co-operating through their mission boards, because they had not been consulted in their respective areas. One of them said, in addressing a conference of ministers, it was an attempt to Y.M.C.A.-ize the churches.

Another source of acute opposition was from some of the captains of industry, owing to the investigation and report on the steel strike by the Industrial Relations Department of the Interchurch Movement, and also the survey of the housing conditions of Flint, Michigan, the industrial problems of Louisville, Kentucky, and the study of the lead and zinc industrial area around Joplin, Missouri. Under the letterhead of the Ohio Manufacturers' Association an attack was made upon the Interchurch Movement accusing it of bolshevism. This letter was sent to every Rotary Club in America and to other organizations and individuals. When asked to prove the charges, the official responsible for the statement apologized and the Manufacturers' Association disclaimed all responsibility for the attack.

It was claimed by others, and with some degree of justification, that the meeting called by the Industrial Relations Department at the Hotel Pennsylvania, New York City, October 2, 3, 1919, which ordered the investigation of the steel strike to be made was controlled by a majority of radicals representing the church commissions on social service. It is claimed by many on the inside of the movement that the publishing of that report on the steel strike more than any other one thing blocked the financial campaign for funds from "Friendly Citizen," and ultimately wrecked the Interchurch Movement.

Another cause of opposition was the accusation of "plunging" in unnecessary expenses of officers and paid representatives who

were "place hunters" rather than Christian patriots. Undoubtedly some of this criticism was not unmerited, but the whole project when considered in the light of its possible achievements was not unduly overfinanced.

It was opposed also by the rank and file of the clergy who were tired, they said, of being ordered around by overhead organizations outside their own particular field of activity. These were some of the chief sources of opposition that blocked the road to success.

The collapse of the movement.—More than any other cause of the collapse of this great movement was the reaction of the people from the stress of the long war period when they were held at financial tension and loyalty to high ideals for five long years. But aside from this, various other reasons have been given by those who were on the "inside" and claim to know and by those on the "outside" and claim to have observed.

First, the denominational consciousness of the various groups did not admit of sufficient integration to give permanency to the movement. They had not yet learned team-play. Most of them had their "centenary," "New Era," "World-Reconstruction," and other "Advance" movements involving intensive financial drives that made it impossible for their members to respond heartily to another financial campaign so soon following the cessation of war.

Second, it is claimed that "the whole world had grown sensitive to overemphasis upon money," and it was therefore impossible to carry a movement of this kind in addition to the other obligations of the people to the government as well as to their own denominations. Yet in spite of this fact nearly two hundred millions were actually raised by the various denominations and over three millions from "friendly citizens" to finance the organization itself. The chief mistake, it is said, was the decision to do away with a central treasury, and thus throw the whole movement into a kind of "denominational grab-bag." This made it necessary for the denominational boards that had underwritten for the expenses of the movement to pay, and thus was developed a volume of opposition from within those denominations that hitherto had been most friendly.

Third, still another reason advanced is that sufficient time was not given for the completion of the surveys and the formulation of constructive programs that would have appealed to the men of wealth to give for enterprises that count. Seven months were not sufficient time. Of course the expenses were enormous and the interest on borrowed money was an item in itself that required haste in securing funds to cover. Had the movement been financed by private gifts that probably could have been secured on the strength of the preliminary surveys, and after sufficient time had elapsed for education of the public through state and local conferences and for the movement to have become integrated and socialized, there is no doubt but that the financial campaign would have succeeded and the movement today been functioning as a vital organization in world-reconstruction.

Fourth, perhaps one of the chief errors in organization policy that helped to weaken the movement was the decision to leave out all interchurch agencies and allies like the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., The Federal Council of Churches, the International Sunday School Association, etc., on the objection of certain denominations to anything that savored of church federation.

One of the most pathetic news items that the friends of the movement have read during the past six months is this, dated Boston, December 3:

> Not to absorb what was left of the Interchurch World Movement, but to effect a great enlargement of its own work because the Interchurch Movement *has ceased to function*, was the decision taken today by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America which is holding its fourth quadrennial meeting in Ford Hall in this city.

Permanent values for the sociologist.—While the Christian sociologist may deplore the failure of such a movement to function as a permanent organ of the social structure, yet there are certain values that remain which should be utilized by all who endeavor consciously to improve society by intelligent social direction. These are in my judgment the following:

1. The fact that so many denominational leaders could be gotten together and made to see a common religious, ethical, educational, and economic world-task for the churches to tackle in a serious way.

2. The actual survey of every county in America, and a map outlining every community boundary and every parish, and the tabulation of all the essential facts that must be known in order to adequately do the religious and social work in these communities. The survey of about 1,000 of these counties has been completed and the data turned into the offices at headquarters in New York. Preliminary surveys of the foreign fields of missionary enterprise, as well as the cities and industrial centers of the home field have been made, the facts tabulated and charted, and the items of projects and workers needed to meet the world-need actually arrived at in printed figures.

3. The educational surveys of the independent, tax-supported, and denominational colleges and universities and schools of theology as well as secondary schools, as to their standards of work, personnel in teaching staff, equipment, endowment, and future needs, besides the survey of religious education. When all these facts have been arranged, catalogued, and published, they will furnish a rich mine of material for the national and state boards of education, as well as for private foundations.

4. The fact that the Industrial Relations Department in its investigations has published material that has elicited so much attention from the public has given encouragement to the industrial classes throughout the world that the church really cares.

5. The bringing together of more than one-third of the ministers and leaders of the Protestant churches in this country first in state and county leaders' conferences and then in state and county ministers' conferences, and for three days put before these men a world-task for the churches as well as their specific community tasks at their doors was a sociological fact of world-importance, and whatever may become of the Interchurch Movement as an organization, there are thousands of these men and women of the churches who will function sociologically as a result of this wider range of human acquaintanceship. More than twenty states are continuing the movement regardless of what becomes of the Interchurch Movement, so convinced are they of the value of the movement as a great sociological fact in modern times.

6. The financial standards of giving and the practice of stewardship of wealth by the many who were reached through the canvass

have made it forever impossible for the churches represented to go back to the old standards of missionary giving. One denomination alone that paid over to the Interchurch Movement one million and more which it had underwritten had for distribution for the home and foreign fields at its recent annual meeting fifteen million dollars where a little over two years ago it had only about two or three millions. These vast sums are spent not only for the gospel of evangelism, but also for schools and colleges, hospitals and dispensaries, institutional churches, good-will industries, recreational centers, and schools of religious education in home and foreign fields.

7. This movement in its defeat is a challenge to us as sociologists. It should make us reconsider and re-evaluate our sociological courses and find out if we are not in a measure responsible for not having made practicably available to the leaders of the churches as well as to the people who support or reject these worthy movements for human betterment the sociological technique of organization and engineering of human forces that would have assured its success.

8. As a result of the Interchurch World Movement, whether it shall ever be able to function again or not, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, whose personnel is made up of some of the great leaders of the Interchurch Movement and many of the active members of its commissions, have decided at its fourth quadrennial meeting just held in Boston to enlarge the scope of its activities which will enable it to do much of the work left incomplete by the Interchurch Movement, and has made provision for an annual budget to cover the expenses of those new tasks.

In conclusion allow me to say that in this time of social unrest, class conflicts, and social hatreds, and political chaos in many parts of the world, it is no credit to the sociologist to throw "verbal brickbats" at the Interchurch Movement, but rather to encourage the defeated leaders of the movement with the faith of the soldier who looks beyond today's defeat to ultimate victory for the cause.

This expression of social vision was found on the body of an Australian soldier who died at Gallipoli:

Ye that have faith to look with fearless eyes
Beyond the tragedy of a world at strife,
And know that out of death and night shall rise the dawn of ampler life,
Rejoice, whatever anguish rend the heart,
  That God has given you a priceless dower,
To live in these great times and have a part
  In freedom's crowning hour.
That ye may tell your sons who see the light
  High in the heavens their heritage to take,
I saw the powers of darkness put to flight,
  I saw the morning break.[1]

DISCUSSION

ANNA GARLIN SPENCER

I am inclined to place "the error in organization policy" which led to ignoring the existing interdenominational organizations (such as the Y.M. and Y.W.C.A. and the Federation of the Churches of Christ) in the initiation of the Interchurch movement, as the chief cause of its early collapse. I do not think it sociologically sound to try and do anything new without seeking to use for such effort all the existing agencies suitable to the task.

In the second place the Interchurch movement did not die because it tried to be too much a federation of Evangelical Christian churches, but because it did not sufficiently stress the need of such federation. No movement for interdenominational organization for ends of human betterment will succeed unless it squarely fights the cut-throat competition of multitudinous sects, divided by infinitesimal dogmas and unimportant differences in method of work. When the interdenominational movements, whatever their name, really accept as a basis of efficient work the organic union of the religious forces of Protestantism, they will find the common sense of the people with them.

In the third place, the Interchurch movement in some cases disgusted the spiritual idealism, even of people who do not go to church, by the gross materialism of some of its advertisements. People do not sacrifice for a religion that is merely a "good business asset to their town." They can get such financial and commercial backing without paying for churches. What they demand of religion is some unique kindling and educational influence, not furnished by other forms of social leadership.

In the fourth place, to a sociologist a question arises as to the wisdom of undertaking the costly surveys the value of which no one will dispute. There are already several centers for such investigations as were conducted by the Interchurch movement. Would it not have been wiser to have secured support

[1] Reprint in *Everybody's* from English paper.

for these surveys to be made by the various foundations, corporations, and philanthropic and reformatory magazines engaged in the task of finding out what is wrong with the social order; and then have put all the forces of the churches at work for the spread of the knowledge thus gained, and above all for the initiation of work in and through the church membership to better those conditions? What the common sense of the "friendly citizen" demands of people who profess Christianity is *actual service*. By their deeds they shall be known. There was enough already known concerning social and economic wrongs—immorality, greed, and selfishness, secure in places of power—to have justified a "revival" of great and consecrated activity to social ends. In so far as the Interchurch movement drew upon itself the disapproval of the reactionary by the *Survey of Industrial Conditions* it helped to remove the distrust of the churches felt by those who believe that a reconstruction of the economic order is needed. So far, so good. But on general principles the place of the church is in the working field to right wrongs. The place of the social forces outside the church is in the social laboratory and the field of investigation. The church in the United States has not used one tenth part of the social knowledge every intelligent member of the church already has, to give direction to consecrated social service.

It was thought by some of the "liberals" not invited to enter the Interchurch movement that its failure was in part due to the lack of hospitality to those not called "Evangelical." I do not think that the case. There is a natural cleavage between the Roman and Greek Catholics; the Evangelical Protestant sects (and perhaps the Protestant Episcopal church with its distinctive ordination of leadership); the Jews, orthodox and reformed; and the outside liberals, Unitarians, Universalists, Hicksite Friends, and Ethical Culture societies. These may well organize for better team work among themselves. For the thirty odd denominations in the Federation of Churches of Christ or the Interchurch movement, whose ministers can exchange pulpits without a qualm, and who are divided from each other not by a difference in fundamentals of discipleship of Jesus, but by minute differences in interpretation of that discipleship, there is no excuse for division into competing sects if they really mean to "win the world for Christianity." And probably the best thing that could happen to all social movements of reform, of amelioration, and of practical service, would be an organic union of these Evangelical Protestant Christian sects to make this world the Kingdom of God. They have the middle of the road of social progress. They are the agencies to accomplish the "accepted good." The reformers and liberals and radicals in social idealism run ahead and make a footpath. These mighty agencies of religious organization must build the highway for generations to come.

The Interchurch movement failed not because it was too socialized, but because it was not socialized enough. Some federation or union must harness the mighty forces of the church of the common life to the common good.

SAMUEL Z. BATTEN, PHILADELPHIA

In his paper Professor Earp has given a very clear and impartial survey of the Interchurch World Movement in its plans and methods. So far as it goes, the statement is satisfactory; but it does not cover all of the factors in the case. As one who was in sympathy with the movement in its deeper purpose and has known something of its inner workings and processes, I may be able to supplement his statement at a few points.

Some of the ideas that lay at the basis of the movement, its inspiration and justification, were Christian and good.

The churches needed to know the meaning and magnitude of the task before them. So they planned surveys of the whole world-field; these surveys gave special attention to the rural church and rural life, to the city and its needs, to migrant workers and industrial problems, to educational equipment and methods, and especially to the condition and needs of what may be called the foreign-mission fields.

The attempt to unite the forces of good will was most commendable. Religion, which ought to be the great uniter, unfortunately has been the great divider. The churches have been a divided host with a very ragged front, and have never been able to give a united testimony for the divine fatherhood, for human brotherhood, for fellowship and co-operation. The force of a united Christianity is undefeatable; but we have not had such a Christianity.

There was an earnest effort to rally the churches and bring out the reserves to the line. The churches are not more than 10 per cent efficient, for the reason that a small percentage of their membership bears all the burdens.

Finally, there was a campaign for greatly increased funds to carry forward the whole work of the churches. Some of the causes of non-success may be noted.

The Interchurch World Movement was not sufficiently democratic in its plans and methods. It is true that the various denominational boards approved the movement and co-operated with it. But before long the virtual direction had been placed in the hands of a very small group of men. This group ignored the denominational leaders and began to hand down plans to the churches. This group, carried away by its enthusiasm, began to think in millions and billions and to make colossal and impossible plans. Some of those plans might have been realized with ten years of preparation and education. Jonah's gourd, it is true, grew up in a night; but it withered before the day was done. The Interchurch attempted to grow a great movement in a few months. It forgot that great results have adequate causes and that ideas must have time to root themselves and grow through many stages.

There was a fear in many quarters that the movement was a concealed attempt to bring about church union. In all of the churches there is a

widespread desire to end the present overlapping, especially in the small town, to prevent unseemly denominational rivalry, to secure a closer co-operation of religious forces, to unite all religions against no religion. The Protestant idea thus far has emphasized freedom and individuality. Unfortunately it has not emphasized solidarity and team work. Some of the leaders of the movement declared at the outset that the movement was an attempt to scrap all denominational organizations and create a new and united church. This may be most desirable, and it may be an ultimate attainment; but it is not possible today; and frankly I question whether it is desirable for the present. This is certain; that unity if it comes at all must come from the people and not from some outside source; it must be a growth and not a manufacture. The churches must practice co-operation before they can be ready for church union.

Some of the publicity methods were unfortunate and aroused much quiet resentment. Pages of spaces were bought in the daily press at the usual rates. Whole-page advertisements were used in high-priced magazines. Billboards all over the land were decorated with armed knights going out to plant the cross in new lands. The appeals in these advertisements were sometimes unfortunate in their tone. They were often mercenary in their statement and appealed to the lower and not to the higher motives. Employers and financiers were exhorted to support the churches on the plea that religion made contented working men; and that the missionary opened the door for the trader. These results may follow as by-products of Christianity; but such appeals are misleading and may be mischievous. Religion is not here to make men quiet in the face of injustice and wrong; and it is an utter perversion of Christianity to use it in that way. Such appeals are vain in that they do not sound the depths and unveil the heights of life. Christianity, which is the religion of the cross, of justice and brotherhood, must appeal to the sacrificial, the heroic, the unselfish in men; men cannot be moved to the higher planes of life except by the highest ideals and the finest motives.

Closely related to this was another source of weakness: the Interchurch tried to bring on the kingdom by elaborate organization and spectacular appeals. The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation. Men cannot say, Lo, it is here, or Lo, it is there. But behold it is everywhere. The strongest forces are the stillest. The stillest forces are the strongest. The sociologist reminds us that the forces which work in human society are psychic and spiritual forces. They must be such as can inform the mind, arouse men's desires, and stir their wills; they must be such forces as can purify the insight, cleanse the affections, and warm the heart; they must be such influences as can persuade men to live loving, sacrificial lives.

The movement expected social results without honoring social causes. I cannot discuss the failure of our educational system in the past; but there is a colossal failure, and all of our educational agencies are implicated. Our education has been too individualistic, too theoretical. It has not created

social mindedness in the people; it has not developed an impulse to serve and to help; people have not been trained to put truth into practice.

Beyond this were other influences that must be noted. It is admitted by all that the Kingdom of God is the central theme of Christianity. It was the master-thought of Jesus' life and the inspiring idea of his teaching. It would seem that by this time the churches would have some clear ideas concerning this central Christian ideal. But unfortunately this is not the case today; in fact it is not too much to say that the churches are wholly confused at this point. The past few years have been a time of unrest and agitation. The world has just passed through the horrors of a world-war and the nations are in confusion and despair. Within the church from the start there has been a little group who emphasize the apocalyptic and eschatological words of the scriptures. Such interpreters have always been active in a time of war and confusion. The events of the past few years have given these people a great opportunity for propagating their notions. They say frankly that they do not expect the salvation of the world but the return of Christ. Many of them are opposed to social study and service on the ground that these things are vain as the world cannot be made any better than it is. One of these leaders in answer to a question of mine admitted that the surest way to hasten on the coming of the Lord was "to give the world a push down hill." The Interchurch had much to say about saving society and building a more Christian civilization, and this was as smoke in the eyes and as vinegar to the teeth of the extremest of this apocalyptic school. One of the spokesmen of this group gave the widest possible publicity to such statements as these in objecting to the movement.

"It is socialistic, educational and ethical.

"It preaches a social rather than a personal Gospel.

"It seeks to save society rather than the individual.

"It holds out the hope that the world is growing better; while the Son of God declares it will grow worse and worse and become as it was in the days of Noah.

"It teaches that the Golden Rule intelligently applied, instead of the personal and second coming of Christ, will give the world peace."

This sounds like a caricature, but these are literal quotations. The people of this idea believe that the world is growing worse; and they practice their faith.

The followers of this group did not co-operate in the Interchurch World Movement. Some of their leaders opposed it at every turn. This opposition, like a division in war time, broke the morale of the movement and greatly weakened it.

Another thing that awakened much criticism was the prominence given to financial leaders. The movement was to be commended for its effort to enlist all groups of men in its plans. But it made much of the support of a few outstanding financial men; it placed them in the forefront and

traded upon their names. There is a very deep sentiment in our land in opposition to this. There is the feeling that the great capitalists have exploited the people. There is the feeling also that the support of those men may have a tendency to cause the churches to soft pedal in their demand for righteousness and brotherhood. In one city, a great manufacturing and commercial center, a meeting of prominent churchmen and financial leaders was held. One of the outstanding financial leaders of the world was sent to that city to address this meeting. Now mark this: in no city in the country did there develop such a strong and outspoken opposition to the movement. And strangely enough the strongest opposition came from two groups—the captains of industry and the organized industrial workers. The Interchurch forgot its simplicity; it forgot that it knew no man after the flesh. When it gave men prominence because of their wealth, it awakened a subtle opposition. And I am ready to say that there was a deep spiritual reason for that opposition.

The Interchurch World Movement is a thing of the past. It is probable that it will be salvaged in part at least, by other agencies, notably by the Federal Council of Churches. But there are some values which must be noted and conserved.

The churches have a better understanding of the condition and needs of the world than ever before. The surveys, except in a few cases, are incomplete, and many of them may never be finished. But with it all, much valuable information is at hand and some of it is most effectively presented.

The Interchurch has strengthened the impulse toward church federation and co-operation. Organic church union is probably far in the future. But church federation is possible now and should be promoted and practiced to the full. There will be less denominational rivalry in the days to come and vastly more co-operation.

The Interchurch movement has vindicated the right and the duty of the church to speak on industrial issues. When it was proposed to investigate acute industrial situations and to give the facts to the people, opposition began. A sinister and bitter attack on the leaders in this work was promoted. Attempts were made to discredit these men. Several journals opened a bitter and unfair campaign against them. Efforts were made to discredit the denominational workers in the field of social service and to secure their discharge. A widespread campaign was conducted by some interests to arouse the opposition of financial leaders and to induce them to withhold their subscriptions. It was even proposed to discipline colleges that have chairs of sociology; where these dangerous men, the teachers of sociology, are permitted to remain, they must be watched and their teaching supervised! In short, an effort was made to discredit social study and service, to drive the church out of the field of industrial investigations, to make it dangerous for church leaders to meddle with social and industrial matters and to limit the churches to what may be called the spiritual concerns of the church. A

prominent financial leader said to a friend of mine: "You preachers take your life in your hand when you meddle with industrial affairs."

The Interchurch braved the lightnings and published the report of the steel strike. I shall not discuss the merits and defects of that report. But this I do say with all possible emphasis: this report marks an epoch in the life of the churches. For the churches to have shown timidity and played safe and withheld the report, would have convicted them of cowardice. It would have shown that the churches can be cowed and controlled by the money power. And to have refused to publish the report when once the facts were gathered, would have alienated the mass of working people and would have lost the confidence of all men. The publication of the report of the steel strike proves several things. The churches recognize their obligation to know the facts, to make the facts public, to show the human and moral values that are at stake in a social and industrial situation, to affirm that Christian principles apply to the whole range of life and to suggest ways whereby the social and industrial order can be made more Christian. The temptation came to the churches and they refused to be turned aside. In the final test they followed the clear path of right and dared to make public some most damaging facts against an almost omnipotent industrial autocracy. All this has saved the day for a moral, a social, an honest Christianity. And this has proved that the churches are not afraid to give a prophetic witness against our modern industrial sins.

THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING

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In the heyday of the Diaz régime, a cross-section of Mexican society presented the following social stratifications:

An upper class made up of men of great wealth and large incomes living in a princely style, a style developed through the contact of Spanish grandezza with modern industrial inventions in comfort and luxury.

A bureaucratic class living with its eyes trained on the upper class, despising manual labor and always anxious to improve its position by legitimate or illegitimate means so as to be able to live in greater security and greater luxury.

A group of idealists, chiefly young men, who in the course of events expected to find their way into the bureaucracy, but in the meantime chafing, with the noble spiritedness of youth and illusion, against the restraints imposed by the nature of the Diaz dictatorship.

An upper middle class made up chiefly of foreigners, "Mexican foreigners," foreign-born business men and manufacturers, with a sprinkling of native Mexicans. With a very few exceptions, this class does not interest us here. In this class we may also include the clergy.

A rural population divided into two uneven groups, the first being the large mass of agricultural laborers, chiefly Indian and mestizo; and the second, a small class of independent small farmers (*rancheros*), foremen and supervisors of the big estates, local political overseers, and high-and low-class personal servants.

From the economic standpoint, the large landed aristocracy (*hacendados*), the mine-owners, the upper bureaucracy, and the upper business class enjoyed incomes, or were able to command resources which enabled them to live in style becoming their exalted

position in the land. The rest of the bureaucracy lived in constant fear of a rainy day. The lower middle class barely made both ends meet. The city proletariat lived from hand to mouth. The ranchero lived in dread of the large landowner's machinations to deprive him of his land while he himself was constantly scheming how to deprive the Indian who happened to possess a patch of ground. The large mass of argricultural laborers were either managing to eke out a miserable existence by means of that very patch of ground with the additional labor on the land of the large landowner (*peon eventual*), or living under a modified serfdom (*peon acasillado*) on the land of the hacendado, fed on nothing but corn cakes spiced with chile, a semioccasional allowance of beans, an occasional allowance of meat, but a reasonably steady flow of pulque.

This society was kept in peace for thirty years by the iron hand of Porfirio Diaz. Yet the very methods which kept the peace were also responsible for the breakdown of that peace. The methods were two, one employed by Diaz and one by Limantour. Diaz' method was a quick, direct, and immediately effective one. It consisted in using a devoted bureaucracy for the purpose of meting out death and destruction to any opposition whatsoever, in gagging the press, and in otherwise effectively stifling any attempt at the expression of an independent opinion which might be interpreted as subversive of the existing order of things. Another form of the same method consisted in incorporating the dissenter into the ranks of the beneficiaries of the existing régime and so swelling the size of the bureaucracy.

The second method employed by Diaz' chief advisers, the so-called exponents of science in politics (*cientificos*), whose captain was Limantour, Diaz' famous minister of finance, was a more roundabout method. It proceeded on the assumption that so far as the large mass of the Indian and mestizo agricultural population was concerned nothing could be done, since by racial predispositions it is incapable of any higher culture and is destined to remain the semislave of the white man. Its lot can be ameliorated but never changed. Besides, the agricultural population never revolts unless it is led to by the city dwellers who begin the revolt. A

Frenchman born in Mexico, soaked in French history and French culture, Limantour had before him the example of the home of his fathers: 1789, 1830, 1848, 1870—all pointed to the fact that peace is to be maintained by keeping the city masses contented, by giving them bread and the circus. His business was to supply bread, and bread he thought to supply by inviting foreign capital under the most liberal and flattering terms to come and invest in Mexico's mineral riches. He would thereby create work for the city dwellers; he would also create a large and continually increasing income for the state through taxes and through import and export duties, all of which could be used to maintain the continually increasing army of bureaucrats made necessary by the system of Porfirio Diaz.

The two systems worked hand in hand. The first guaranteed the peace necessary for capital known traditionally to be timid; the second guaranteed the capital for the maintenance of that peace of suppression and incorporation. A working class that was cowed and afraid, a bureaucratic class standing under the cornucopia shower of the treasury, and an upper class sharing with foreign capital the blessings of investments and dividends in mines and public utilities—why could not the peace be kept, and the *status quo* prolonged indefinitely?

It was because the keepers of the peace had not reckoned with the fact that Mexican ideals of life are European, or specifically Spanish, ideals of life; that a bureaucracy is aristocratic in its ideals; that an aristocratic state living in an ostensibly democratic age must pretend to play the democratic game of education; that the rapid creation of great fortunes by means of modern commercial and industrial ventures also creates an unreasonable desire for such fortunes in improper quarters; and that finally these rapidly created fortunes also create a lessened respect for them, since they visualize dramatically to the common man the question of "How did he make it?" which question is ordinarily lost in the case of fortunes consisting of large landed estates transmitted down from forgotten days of antiquity.

European-Spanish ideals imply an extravagant contempt for manual labor and petty commercial enterprise, and an extravagant admiration for the position and paraphernalia of official and govern-

mental life. They also imply a preference for a guaranteed income and the safety that goes with it, to the adventures of gaining one; the energy that goes into such adventures being preferably employed in the pursuit of other adventures imminent in a social life whose pleasures and amenities have made living a fine art. All Mexican classes, save the one which actually does the manual labor and the work of the community, hold manual labor and consequently the working class in utter contempt. It is inconceivable to any scion of the middle or bureaucratic class that there is anything else for him to do in life but to become a bureaucrat. He cannot go into business because that also is tabooed, according to the standards of respectability of his class. Assuming that he were brave enough to overcome these, his family is ordinarily not possessed of the necessary investment capital to go into business, it being notorious that the bureaucratic class usually lives beyond its income. As to the numerous foreign enterprises on Mexican soil, here also there was little to hope for, because the foreigner usually preferred to employ his own compatriots, first, because he naturally preferred to do so, second, because they understood his business methods better, and the two could get along together with greater ease. In minor positions there was some opportunity for the natives, but these positions usually paid so poorly, as compared with even the poorly paid government positions, that they held out no allurements to the budding bureaucrat. Besides, there were the elements of prestige. Anyone who has had the slightest opportunity to come in contact with the atmosphere of deference, not to say flunkeyness, which characterizes any hierarchic bureaucracy, will realize the tremendous power of attraction which lies in occupying a position in the community where one is constantly the center of attention at public gatherings; where things are done and business dispatched by the standing and ranking of the man who sponsors the business; where servile respect and assiduous adulation are the lot of the one who happens at the time and place to be the chief officer in command. As over against this, the impersonal routine of a business office is apt to seem colorless and drab. In the last analysis, however, this bureaucratic mania (*empleomania*) is to be ascribed to the circumscribed field of occupational opportunities in a community where

the land is in the hands of a few landholders, and the capital in the hands of foreigners and a handful of upper-class bureaucrats.

But that was not enough. Education came in to complicate matters. By descent and affirmation, the Diaz régime was a "liberal" régime. It presented itself before its own people, as before the world at large, in the garb of a democratic régime, where the president himself is called "citizen" and every other official down the line professes in public the same belief in liberty, fraternity, and equality. One of the consequences of this affirmation of liberalism and democracy was the establishing, at least for the sake of symmetry, of a system of education. Of far greater importance in originating this system of education than the Platonic affirmations of democracy was the necessity of impressing the world abroad. It is evident to anyone who looks into the doings of the Diaz régime that it was possessed with a passion for showing off. As over against the callousness of the American attitude toward opinions held about us by foreigners, the Mexican intellectual is pathologically sensitive to the opinion of the outsider. Being a community where 85 per cent of the population is steeped in the innocence of ignorance of education, and addicted to the primitive habits and customs of a poor and primitive community, the intellectual and bureaucratic Mexican is feverishly eager to cover this up with a brave show that something is being done, that a great deal is being done to gain the esteem of a world theoretically yet tenaciously addicted to the democratic passion. And so the Diaz régime had to "go in" for education. Taking its example from France, this education appeared in the shape of a highly centralized system directed from above by men highly trained in the arts and philosophy of France of the last half of the nineteenth century. The French system was organized to serve the purpose of the central government, that is, to train for bureaucracy. That it led to such results in France is familiar. Transported to Mexico it worked true to form. Although it touched only a small percentage of the population, that is, only the upper classes, it also touched a small number of the lower classes and it resulted in selecting, from that small percentage of the working population, those elements which had the native intelligence or skill or shrewdness to take to it. This group, although

absolutely small, yet was relatively large enough to count in the long run in the assault on the budget. The son of the day laborer who was infected with that education was immediately hailed as the hope of the family, and every effort was put forth to enable him to go on and ascend the steeper hills of a *licenciado*, or university graduate, with the hope that ultimately he would land among those who inherit the kingdom of the treasury. The net result of all this was to increase the ranks of the bureaucracy, but what also increased was the number of those outside who did not manage to get in. A government which had done so much was expected to do everything, and when the individual failed there was nothing simpler than to blame the government. And yet no other education would have been of any greater use; for what need does the serf have of education? And the son of a serf who has no other hope or outlook in life than to continue literally in the footsteps of his father can certainly find little of any worth in any sort of an education which can do nothing for him except to make him dissatisfied with his lot.

Within the ranks of the aristocracy and the bureaucracy a similar phenomenon of dissatisfaction was taking place. The Mexican bureaucracy was far from being a group of satisfied holders-on like the petty bourgeoisie. The hierarchical peace which ordinarily reigns where social stratifications are rigid, received a terrible blow through the introduction of foreign capital. When foreign capital began the exploitation of Mexico's mineral resources it produced the complete demoralization of Mexico's bureaucracy from the standpoint of hierarchical peace. This phenomenon deserves a closer scrutiny.

A bureaucracy is primarily a body of consumers. As consumers its ideal of life is apt to be the ideal of the consuming class par excellence, namely, the leisure aristocratic class. Such a leisure aristocratic class, the transplanted Spanish aristocracy, has existed in Mexico for a long time. Its standard of living and expenditure was notoriously extravagant and absorbing. And yet, as compared with the standards of expenditure of today, those standards were quite meager. The reason for this is to be found in the sources of income of the Spanish, and all landed, aristocracy as compared with the sources of income of our modern business and industrial

class. Incomes from land, and even primitively worked mines, are quite unimportant when compared with the income from industrial and financial enterprises. The introduction of foreign capital into Mexico suddenly created a group of very rich beneficiaries, partly native Mexicans, partly naturalized foreigners, who saw themselves the possessors of fortunes whose incomes and expenditures, compared to those of the most extravagant hacendados, were such as to make the latter feel that they were being left behind in the race for respectability. If they were to keep their place in the group, particularly the younger generation, who, educated abroad, felt little of the love for the soil which the older generation felt, they had to strain every financial nerve to stand the pace set by these newly rich bureaucrats. Two main lines of procedure followed. One was to make debts and mortgage the family property to such an extent that it soon passed out of their hands. Having arrived at the stage of genteel penuriousness, there was but one road open to them, and that was state service, which meant an assault on the treasury and admittance into the fortified places of the bureaucracy. The second line of procedure was to increase their incomes by increasing their holdings. These holdings could only be increased at the expense of the holdings of some other man, and since this other man could not be one of their own kind, that is, one just as strong as they were, it had to be a weaker man. The small farmer (*ranchero*) and the lands belonging to the Indians were fair game, and they proceeded to acquire them. In a community where the bureaucracy and the aristocracy work hand in hand, this was a simple and easy matter.

It is not known on what scale such a spoliation of the small farmer and the Indian went on, but there was enough of it to start a war with the Yaquis in Sonora, to turn Zapata into a hero, and to furnish a large contingent of dispossessed small farmers eager to get revenge; and yet perhaps not enough to greatly benefit the large landowners in their fight to keep up with the new standards of respectable expenditures. This is seen in the fact that the Diaz régime reckoned with many and powerful enemies among the rich landed class. What made matters worse for the old aristocracy was that this newly rich bureaucracy was imbued with the stand-

ards of respectability of this same older aristocracy, standards which were based on landownership. To live up to them the newly rich entered into the market as purchasers of estates which the old aristocracy could not hold, or could not acquire. The last comfort and element of visible satisfaction which the old had over the new was, therefore, gradually taken away from them.

As to the bureaucracy, the effect of the introduction of foreign capital worked in a more complicated but a similar fashion. The upper bureaucracy was the immediate beneficiary of this large-scale investing. Either in the capacity of government officials or as that of legal advisers to foreign investing concerns, the upper bureaucrats found themselves in a strategic position. The earning of the investors ordinarily exceeding greatly what might be termed good profits, they could afford to pay for services which would put them in a position to gain such profits or even better ones. In order to do that, they were willing to pay for services rendered, and payment was not ungenerous, seeing that the returns were not ungenerous. True to the European-Spanish ideals of life, the beneficiaries of this new régime were not slow in letting the world know of their good fortune. Residences more akin to the palaces of the nobles of eighteenth-century France than to the scions of a liberal democracy which fought to keep out the splendor of an imperial nobility, made their appearance on the streets of Mexico City and in the other residence centers of Mexico, as well as on the more remote haciendas. One can hardly appreciate the magnificence of these establishments until one sees them at close range. Together with that conspicuous magnificence there also went the traditional Spanish arrogance toward the one below, the counterpart of servility to the one above. All the rest of the bureaucracy which might have tolerated all this display and contempt on the part of the old landholding families could not be expected to tolerate it on the part of those who only a few years ago were known to be wearing out their sleeves on a desk. In addition, the upper bureaucracy tended to form a closed circle, entrance into which was not vouchsafed except to those who came highly recommended, or had the privilege of being kin to the generals in control. The constantly rising standard of expenditure of this upper bureaucracy made life

increasingly hard for all the classes below it, because it made it increasingly hard to keep up one's self-respect. It appeared more and more evident to the rest of the bureaucracy that they were actually controlled by a financial-bureaucractic oligarchy, which was determined to keep everything for itself and its friends.

I wish to make it very clear that I do not intend it to be understood that this upper-class bureaucracy consciously went to work to acquire all the economic control, and then exclude everyone from sharing in its benefits. Sociologists know well enough that group action is never of the type of consciously planned action. What I say simply amounts to the fact that when one is once in power it is the most natural thing to want to stay in power, and to allow admittance to those only who mean something to those who are in power. Outsiders are kept out, not because they are outsiders, but because they are not insiders. A consciously planned form of behavior would have done precisely the opposite, namely, divide the spoils among the "ins" and the "outs" on a reasonably fair basis, as is done, for example, in some South American or some Balkan countries where the bureaucracy is able to keep the social peace, and dominate in comfort. Not having done so, the Mexican upper bureaucracy was only adding more fuel to the already large pile by creating a large element of discontented and active lower bureaucrats and petty politicians. It is to be noted in this connection that the tendency of that financial oligarchy was to keep out precisely the younger, more restless, more able, and more enterprising elements, elements which could not be expected to do only the bidding of the older bureaucractic patriarchs, and were therefore apt, because of the recalcitrance of youth and ability, to be considered as disturbers and undersirables by these bureaucratic patriarchs.

If we observe now the effects of the same phenomenon upon the working population of Mexican society, we find that they were of a similar nature. The introduction of foreign capital meant a great stimulus applied to industry, particularly mining, and the creation of a city working population. The peons engaged as mine workers enjoyed an income greater than the ones working upon the estates of the hacendado. The rate of pay for a day laborer in a mining

state like Sonora, for example, is almost three times as much as that in the purely agricultural state of Mexico. Life was probably very much harder, but for purposes under discussion the point is that we see the creation of an elastic and gradually increasing standard of living among the lower classes, and we notice, for the first time perhaps in Mexican history, the break between the upper and the lower class as far as standards of expenditure are concerned. It is certain now that the industrial and mining operator who has tasted of meat and wheat bread will not willingly go back to a diet of tortillas and chile as before.

The ranks of the city proletariat were greatly enlarged by the increase in the number of personal servants, who in Mexico form what one is justified in calling a distressingly large percentage of the population. This increase was due to the continual enlargement of the bonds of the bureaucratic, the business, and investing classes. The lot of these personal servants was, speaking materially, very much better than the lot of the peon in the agricultural districts, and since both the industrial and mining operator and the personal servant originally from the rural district had more or less contact with the agricultural peon, the improvements in the lot of the former percolated to the agricultural laborers and tended along with certain other factors, of both a general and a special character, to increase the spirit of unrest there.

The factors of a general character were the generally miserable state of the rural population from days immemorial. The special factor was the further operation of this introduction of foreign capital and its consequences. Coincident with this was the change in the relationship between the landowner and the peon, from the earlier relationship of responsiblilty of the hacendado toward the peon, to one of payment in money for services received. At the same time the increase of population, with no marked improvement in the manner of production, made agricultural products scarce and high. It was, therefore, to the advantage of the landowner to pay in money rather than in kind as he was used to do before. The result was a tremendous increase in prices and cost of living for the articles of prime necessity. When he lived under the patriarchal form of a feudal landowner, the hacendado had always more

than enough to supply all his wants, but when he moved to the city, and there had to compete with the man who made a fortune in a copper mine, or a concession, or the construction of a railroad, he lost sight of the peon on the hacienda, and his contact with the soil consisted in constantly urging his manager to send him more money this year than last. As far as the peon was concerned, all this meant that his life became harder while the lot of his city brother became easier, and he knew it. He ran away from the hacienda to the city as a worker, or to the United States as a laborer where he stayed long enough to save money and go back home to spend it and then repeat the process. All this tended to break down the already precarious equilibrium of the social organization of Mexico.

But the end was not yet. The introduction of foreign capital gave a tremendous impetus to banking operations of all kinds. Of course, banks made money much more plentiful than it ever was before. This benefited the people who had use for money for business or speculative purposes, but for the working population it simply resulted in an increase of prices and a further reduction in the purchasing power of wages, because in Mexico, as everywhere else, an increase in prices is not followed by a corresponding increase in wages. And so we see that whereas maize was reckoned at 1 peso 75 centavos a hectoliter in 1792 it sold for 2 pesos 50 centavos in 1891, and for 4 pesos 89 centavos in 1908. Frijol went up from 1.63 through 6.61 to 10.84. Chile from 26, through 27, to 57. Rice per hundred kilograms from 7.60 through 12.87 to 13.32.[1] It will be noticed that the greatest increases are seen around 1908, two years before the Revolution broke out.

And so the fates were gradually accumulating the fuel for the final conflagration. The spark was struck by the idealists, by those who were high-minded enough to refuse to be incorporated as the beneficiaries of a régime which an education fostered by that same régime taught them to despise. The disaffected rancheros, particularly of the two states where the landowners were few and their holdings were many, Chihuahua and Morelos, joined the idealists.

[1] T. Esquivel Obregon, *Influencia de España y los Estados Unidos sobre Mexico* (Madrid, 1918), p. 340.

When they saw the tyrant shaking, the timid bureaucracy joined in. When the first aspect of the Revolution came to an end with the death of Madero, the landed aristocracy, under the name of a Catholic Party, gained control, later to be thrown over by the city proletariat in what a brilliant Mexican writer called a *revolución de gananes*, "a revolution of day laborers." But the details of this process belong in a different place.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MENTAL LEVELS

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THEORY OF MENTAL LEVELS

The theory of mental levels, established first in the measurement of intelligence in the feeble-minded and confirmed by experience with army mental tests, possesses now a degree of validity which requires recognition in the field of social interpretation. Published facts are sufficiently abundant and accessible to create a presumption of familiarity with them and they need not be reproduced here. A few postulates of the theory, however, may be stated:

1. The mechanism of intelligence is the brain and nervous system. There is, therefore, a normal, symmetrical development of intelligence corresponding to physical growth.

2. There are deviations from this norm in the form of both accelerations and retardations, and further there is a symmetrical distribution of these variants.[1]

3. It is now possible to detect and to measure through the use of intelligence tests the degree of mental development attained by the individual irrespective of chronological age or acquired knowledge and without waste and loss incident to its discovery through the method of trial and error.

4. The classification of the population on the basis of the degree of intelligence results in the establishment of mental levels.

The army mental tests applied to 1,726,966 men provides a basis sufficiently large to make the results applicable to the whole population or any specific unselected group.

[1] Compare Terman, "Distribution of I Q's of 905 Unselected School Children," *The Measurement of Intelligence*, p. 66; and Goddard, "The Distribution of Intelligence in 1,700,000 Recruits to the United States Army," *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*, p. 24.

OBJECTIONS AND CRITICISMS

Attention is directed to certain criticisms and objections which have been made to the acceptance or to the application of the theory:

1. First of all is the surprise and doubt created in the minds of many at what appears to be the low average mentality of the population. The difficulty here seems to result from two causes:

a) Failure to grasp or to accept the physical basis of intelligence, namely, that the brain and nervous structure determine mental ability and that their growth synchronizes with that of the skeletal and muscular development. Few persons grow much beyond the stature acquired by the age of sixteen. "In computing the I Q of an adult subject, years of chronological age in excess of sixteen are disregarded, as the development of native intelligence seems practically to cease not far from this age."[1]

The mental mechanism is more nearly matured at even fourteen or fifteen than we may have been aware. This is evidenced by the practical difficulty experienced in the beginning, by Binet and others, of devising scales for testing beyond the age of twelve, and which led to the popular conception of twelve as the age-level which separated the normal from the subnormal.

b) Failure to distinguish between intelligence, the term now used by clinical psychologists to describe native mental ability, from knowledge. Education continues indefinitely regardless of the degree of intelligence, but this must be conceived in terms of brain specialization or of the formation of neuron patterns within the given mechanism of the brain and not in an increase of the size or structure of the brain itself. The high-grade moron, if he possesses a retentive memory, may acquire in the course of time a considerable fund of knowledge. but lacking a high degree of intelligence he is unable to utilize his knowledge in adapting himself to new situations. A function of intelligence is to use knowledge advantageously. The acquisition of knowledge in no way increases mental capacity or raises the intelligence level.

2. Again, it is objected, that intelligence is not the only test of social efficiency, that emotion, temperament, volition, etc., are of

[1] Terman, *The Intelligence of School Children*, p. 8.

equal importance. No one recognized this more fully than the psychologists engaged in this enterprise. In the pamphlet, *Army Mental Tests*, issued by the Surgeon-General's office, (p. 6) the first item under "Directions for the Use of the Intelligence Ratings," reads:

> The mental tests are not intended to replace other methods of judging a man's value to the service. It would be a mistake to assume that they tell us infallibly what kind of a soldier a man will make. They merely help to do this by measuring one important element in a soldier's equipment, namely, intelligence. They do not measure loyalty, bravery, or power to command, or the emotional traits that make a man "carry on." However, in the long run, these qualities are far more likely to be found in men of superior intelligence than in men who are intellectually inferior. Intelligence is perhaps the most important single factor in military efficiency apart from physical fitness.

It would seem almost superfluous to add that loyalty, bravery, and even power to command, without sufficiently high intelligence may result in foolhardiness. They are forces of character, and we should devise methods of evaluating them, but, like all forces, organic and inorganic, they are valuable to the extent to which they are disciplined and controlled.

The case is somewhat similar with respect to the emotions. It is now well understood that their mechanism is the sympathetic nervous system and the ductless glands; that they express themselves in visceral or bodily changes connected with instinctive processes. Stimulated by induction from the central nervous system, they constitute one of the chief dynamic elements in behavior. Probably it will not be long until we shall have some method of measuring the quality of emotional disturbances, and this will increase the accuracy of our judgments, but to whatever degree of independence the emotions may be assigned, their utility is determined by the discipline of intelligence. Emotional control is weak in those of low mental level. The higher the level, the greater the possibility of rational control.

The term "temperament" while less clearly understood, both as to origin and function, is nevertheless applied to those fundamental inherited differences which condition mental life. The factors of temperament are grouped by McDougal[1] in two principal

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 121.

classes: (1) "the influences exerted on the nervous system and, through it, on mental process by the functioning of the bodily organs; and (2) the general functional peculiarities of the nervous tissue." Temperament, then, like emotion is probably organic and produces in behavior certain idiosyncrasies, but not by any means independent of intellectual control. While we may not escape the effects of temperamental peculiarities, it is certain that the higher the intelligence, the greater the possibility of circumventing or of utilizing them in the interest of rational conduct. Their measurement would be of value but supplementary to intelligence measurements.

Since will is now recognized as an abstraction combining as its chief factors "ideas, habits of attention, and habits of action," to quote Professor James[1] and "that the absence or weakness of any of these elements results in lack or weakness of will," its consideration falls within the same categories. Beginnings have already been made in the measurement of what Professor Downey calls the "will profile," in which he reports sufficient success in measuring temperamental volitional traits to warrant further effort in this field.[2]

That there are discrepancies between intelligence levels and academic, military, citizenship, or other performance, no one familiar with the facts has any disposition to deny. We turn. therefore, to sample criticisms, such as those offered by Professor Patten and Dr. Fernald, to discover what other factors are to be measured if we are to provide real explanations for these character deviations. Professor Patten argues[3] that mental tests measure only the sensory elements of behavior and leave out of account the motor forces which are equally important. He pictures behavior as the result of a perpetual struggle between the sensory factors located in the cerebral cortex and the emotional centers connected with glandular excitement. Sensory dominance is secured at the expense of bodily development producing the static conventional

[1] See Goddard, *Psychology of the Normal and Subnormal*, p. 201.

[2] See *The Will Profile, a Tentative Scale for Measurement of the Volitional Pattern*, Department of Psychology Bulletin No. 3, University of Wyoming.

[3] See "Backsliding in Social Work," *Survey*, June 5, 1920.

disposition. Motor dominance results from suppression of sensory control producing the emotional aggressive type.

This is, after all, but another way of stressing the importance of the emotional factor, which we have admitted should be measured. But civilization is a type of social organization created through an evolutionary process in which the principle of selection has been that of sensory domination. Motor virility is a valuable asset in the struggle for existence, but savagery is converted into civilization through its subordination to the forces of intellect.

Dr. Fernald regards behavior[1] as the resultant of the two integral functions of the mind, namely, intelligence "which may be conceived as the thinking, inventing, selecting, combining, planning, deciding function of mentality," while character is "the emotivating, feeling, sentimental, instinctive, sustaining, energizing, executing, or vetoing function of mentality." . . . . "Volition and inhibition, though under the direction of intelligence, owe their force to character. Sentiment, emotion, and conscience are related to character rather than to intelligence, and both the latter are inseparable parts of one whole—mentality." This statement differs from Professor Patten's only in terminology. Without raising the question as to whether character as defined is "an integral mentality function," it is safe to say that character-structure cannot be erected upon a basis of inferior intelligence.

These and similar analyses are extremely valuable in emphasizing the other than intelligence factors and serve to stimulate research in order to provide adequate measurements, in such factors as can be isolated, but that they are nevertheless secondary in comparison to intelligence ought equally to be clear.

3. Another objection to the doctrine of mental levels is to the effect that the concept itself is misleading, due to the fact of differentiation of ability within each individual, that is, certain specific abilities may be developed in advance or even at the expenses of others, as in the case of mathematical or musical prodigies. No one would deny the existence of such peculiarities, although their frequency may raise the question as to whether they are generally characteristic or exceptional.

[1] See Dr. Guy D. Fernald, *Character as an Integral Mentality Function*, National Committee for Mental Hygiene, New York.

In this connection Terman[1] cites the experiment of Dickson in the correlation between intelligence and other traits. It was based upon teachers' ratings on twenty-four mental and moral traits in addition to intelligence and school work. While the method was not sufficiently accurate to afford a safe basis for scientific conclusions, the results were nevertheless illuminating. No negative correlations between the I Q and desirable qualities were found. Sense of humor, power to give sustained attention, persistence, initiative, etc., showed the highest degree of correlation with intelligence. The prevalent idea that the bright child is likely to be queer was disproved by the high correlation of social adaptability with intelligence. The inference from these facts seems to be that as a rule exceptional abilities are correlates of intelligence.

Granted the existence of exceptional types, however, it would seem that this knowledge supplements rather than detracts from the general theory. While ordinary mental tests may fail to detect the presence of exceptional abilities of a particular nature, we have the equipment in the form of specialized tests to evaluate them and sufficient collective intelligence to profit by them wherever found. It still remains true that exceptional abilities unaccompanied by a high general level of intelligence may be and often are of little use to their possessors unless that general lack is supplied by the social group, or by other individuals who have sufficient intelligence to perceive or to utilize them.

We believe, therefore, that the theory of mental levels is sustained (1) by the facts accumulated in the grading of defectives; (2) by the further experience obtained through the instrumentality of the army mental tests; and (3) by the analysis and criticism of results. Additional experience in the use, in the refinement, and in the perfection of mental tests may be expected to result in some correction of classification, and in greater accuracy of rating on an intelligence basis. Greater weight may come to be assigned to other than intelligence factors in the determination of human efficiency and better instruments for measuring them may be provided. But the discovery of the fact of different levels of intelligence in the human race is not, we believe, likely in the future to be called in question. Moreover, it is probable, if this prediction

[1] *The Intelligence of School Children*, pp. 56 ff.

is sustained, that the significance of this discovery in its application to the problems of civilization is destined to be recognized as one of the most important contributions to the science of human welfare.

APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

What then are some of the implications of the theory of mental levels for social interpretation? Assuming a population of 100,000,000 we have 10,000,000 of very inferior intelligence, 15,000,000 of inferior intelligence, 20,000,000 of low average intelligence, 25,000,000 of average intelligence, 16,500,000 of high average intelligence, 9,000,000 of superior intelligence and 4,500,000 of very superior intelligence. There is now reason to assume that this is an approximation of the actual situation. The figures stagger the imagination, but their significance may not be ignored. With respect to any aspect or enterprise of society whatsoever any interpretation in the future which leaves these factors out of account is likely to be inadequate and incomplete.

Their significance is best comprehended in concrete form. We have, therefore, selected a few sample specific social problems in order to apply the theory of mental levels to their interpretation. Caution must be exercised against any assumption of finality or the exclusion of other factors.

I. *Industry:*

Two questions may be raised: (1) Does modern industrial civilization require for its enterprises just this distribution of intelligence? (2) Are all men employed in those occupations or activities which correspond to their capabilities?

The first question cannot now be answered with any degree of accuracy. The multiform activities of modern industry have not been graded on the basis of the degree of intelligence necessary to their performance, for the very obvious reason that we have not thought in terms of mental levels. A beginning, however, has been made. There is available already a study of occupational intelligence standards in the case of 36,500 men on the basis of occupational data furnished by their qualification cards.[1] Proctor[2]

[1] Cf. pamphlet *Army Mental Tests*, p. 23.

[2] See article *Journal of Educational Research*, September, 1920, p. 537.

classifies the occupations and shows the median score as well as the range of scores of the middle 50 per cent in the various groups as follows:

APPROXIMATE OCCUPATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TESTS

	Median	Middle 50 per Cent
1. Unskilled labor	35	21–63
2. Semi-skilled labor	42	23–70
3. Skilled labor	61	26–95
4. Business and clerical	96	58–145
5. Professional	140	98–184

Terman also reports numerous studies in which the median I Q has been determined in different occupational groups with a view to their possible use in vocational guidance.[1]

The second question requires nothing beyond empirical knowledge for its answer. We observe on the one hand the enormous number of misfits and failures of men because of intelligence inadequate to the tasks and responsibilities they have assumed, and on the other hand the dissatisfaction, the lack of interest, the loss of effort when men are forced into activities or occupations which are beneath their capabilities.

These questions seem to throw some light upon two specific problems of employment and wages. One of the incidents of production cost is the enormous labor turnover. Among many causes assigned for labor unrest expressed in this phenomenon we may note the maladjustment arising from present methods of placement. With the exception of jobs requiring technical skill, workmen are usually assigned on the basis of priority of application in a hit-and-miss method of tryout. "A" men assigned to "C" jobs degenerate and learn to loaf or else become dissatisfied and quit. "D" men assigned to "B" jobs fail and must be tried out elsewhere or are fired. Union methods of standardizing downward toward the "D" level produce social effects far more serious than that of limiting output and increasing cost. They violate the principle of equality of opportunity on the basis of ability and stultify effort; they negative the principle of adjusting income to service rendered and thus become a prolific cause of dissatisfaction

[1] *Intelligence of School Children*, chap. xii.

and unrest. Wise employers, because of increasing knowledge of the uses of intelligence ratings, through their personnel departments, are instituting tests and devising methods of placement that yield success in proportion to the scientific effort expended.

On the basis of pre-war wages 9 per cent of the people industrially employed earned $150 to $250 per year; 12 per cent earned $250 to $300; 16 per cent earned $350 to $400; 31 per cent earned $450 to $600; 67 per cent earned less than $15.00 per week.[1] Granted that there are social and economic barriers to natural achievement, the parallelism between these figures and intelligence ratings are sufficiently striking to raise the question of causal relationship. Given a condition of absolutely free competition, and regardless of whether wages are high or low, there would result, we now have reason to conjecture, a gradation from those receiving the lowest up to those receiving the highest on the basis of ability that would differ only in details of classification from that which now exists.

II. *Education:*

Much interest in the atypical child has already developed in educational circles. At first it was concerned chiefly with retardates. Backward classes were organized and separate schools were devoted to their training, as in Newark, New Jersey, where children were classified on the basis of mental age. These are admirable undertakings. Today, however, the emphasis has shifted to accelerates. It has been discovered that educational retardation is not characteristic of the subnormal child, who is often pushed on account of physical age classification into grades which require intelligence beyond his capacity. It is the exceptionally brilliant child who is educationally retarded because of the "educational lockstep" of the standardized grades. The social loss that results from misfit training of the subnormal whose low intelligence disqualifies them for leadership is slight in comparison with that which society must suffer when those of exceptional ability who are destined because of superior ability to occupy important positions are denied the training necessary to the highest utilization of their powers. A new system of mental-age classification through-

[1] *Industrial Art a National Asset*, p. 22.

out the entire school must replace the one now in use if education is to be adapted to the needs of the children. Again, on the basis of the army tests, 10 per cent of the children of the United States cannot complete successfully the fourth grade of the public school, and 70 per cent are incapable of acquiring a high-school education. The National Bureau of Education finds that 13 per cent actually do not complete the fourth grade and 69 per cent do not complete the eighth grade.[1] The inference is clear. The best interests of civilization demand that those who are qualified should be afforded the opportunity to secure an education; that every child should be trained in accordance with its specific endowments; that some form of manual training should be provided for those incapable of intellectual culture. It is sheer waste of public funds, to say nothing of the cost in terms of teachers' nerves, to attempt to maintain longer a system built upon the assumption of a general equality of intelligence.

III. *Delinquency:*

The classical theory of criminality based upon the assumption of equality of responsibility, for a long time in a state of decline through the influence of the positive school, now suffers its complete overthrow. It is no longer possible to assume equality of social responsibility among men of different intelligence levels. It requires a degree of intelligence above that of a ten-year-old child to comprehend clearly the ethical ideals and moral standards of a cultivated society and to regulate behavior by these criteria. Whatever the specific environmental causes of crime may be, they exert unequal pressure upon men of different mental levels with correspondingly different results.

In a study of 491 disciplinary cases in Camp Dix[2] the intelligence ratings showed approximately 5 per cent of "A" and "B" grades, while the balance were about equally divided between the "C" and "D" groups. The "A" and "B" group furnished much less than its quota, while the "D" group far exceeded its ratio. It is low intelligence which finds greatest difficulty in adjusting itself to new conditions. During a period of nine months ending April 30, 1917, 608 men admitted consecutively to Sing Sing were

[1] *Industrial Art a National Asset*, p. 22. [2] *Army Mental Tests*, p. 10.

examined by the psychological clinic connected with that institution. The results are reported by Dr. Glueck.[1] Fifty-nine per cent were classified in terms of deviation from average normal mentality:

Mentally diseased or deteriorated	12.0 per cent
Intellectually defective	28.1 per cent
Psychopathic or constitutionally inferior	18.9 per cent

Upon the importance of mental age Dr. Glueck makes the following significant comment:

> It will, therefore, be seen that if the mental age is to be taken as a criterion, comparatively few cases might be classed as rather profoundly defective; that is to say, coming within the classification of the low grades of feeblemindedness, while the majority fall within the various grades of moronism. The findings are particularly significant, inasmuch as they demonstrate that it is the higher grade of defective who constitutes the most serious problem in anti-social behavior. It is frequently very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to convince the lay mind, or the jurist, that one is dealing here with mental defect, since many of these cases make good superficial impressions. There seems to be a general tendency to ignore the very natural phenomenon that the more profound the mental defect, the less likely is the individual to lead a totally unsupervised life, in consequence of which there is also less likelihood of conflict with environment. It is largely in these cases where neither the relatives nor acquaintances of the defective appreciate that there is here a serious difficulty which requires attention, that is to say, in the various grades of moronism, that the problem of criminality looms large.[2]

IV. *Dependency:*

So intimately connected is the problem of mental deficiency with making a living that the standard definition of feeble-mindedness adopted by the English Royal Commission is cast in economic mold. "A feebleminded person is one who is incapable because of mental defect existing from birth or from an early age (*a*) of competing on equal terms with his normal fellows; or (*b*) of managing himself or his affairs with ordinary prudence."[3] There has been much discussion of what has commonly been called borderline cases. These we now recognize as persons of low mental levels. One of their chief characteristics is inability to get or keep a job; they drift aimlessly from one position to another. Fernald remarks

[1] *First Annual Report*, p. 8. [2] *First Annual Report*, p. 15.

[3] Terman, *The Measurement of Intelligence*, p. 80.

that "psychological tests of these adolescents or adults show that they have a mental age of only seven or eight or nine years. In fact, they are cases of real feeblemindedness, differing only in degree and not in kind from the more obvious varieties."[1]

We have already noted above the inability of low-mentality groups to earn more than the lowest wages, an amount insufficient to maintain a minimum standard of living and therefore a definite cause of poverty, but we have hardly yet realized the magnitude of the problem. Every feebleminded person, and person of very inferior intelligence, is a potential pauper, and it is out of these classes that our pauper population is recruited out of all proportion to their ratio to the entire population.

In 1910 the Census reported 9,813 feeble-minded in almshouses, and 3,601 were admitted to almshouses during 1910.[2] In the absence of any extensive mental rating of almshouse population, we can only conjecture what the proportion of low mentality is in that portion not designated as feeble-minded. It is safe to predict that it is large. With regard to incurable pauperism which "runs in families" it is probable that inferior intelligence is the greatest single factor.

V. *Racial superiority or inferiority:*

For years the controversy in regard to the problem of racial inferiority or superiority has been waged between those who have stressed biological inequalities on the one hand, and those who have emphasized achievement on the other, to account for the differences in social progress. We suggest, modestly, that the theory of mental levels may have some bearing on this controversy. Is it not possible that the relative proportions of superiority to inferiority in intelligence within the population may provide at least a partial solution? Until we have comparative studies of different racial groups of sufficient magnitude, this question cannot be answered. It would seem fair to assume, however, that those populations in which the proportion of superior intelligence is low would be inefficient in comparison to those where the ratio of superior intelligence is high. This assumption raises a further

[1] Walter E. Fernald, *The Burden of the Feebleminded*, p. 10.

[2] *Bulletin of the Census*, No. 120, pp. 76–77.

serious, if not disquieting, eugenic problem. Do the ratios between the various intelligence groups remain constant in the same proportion? In view of the differential birth rate between high and low intelligence groups, this would seem to be unlikely. If so, then some further questions naturally arise. May not the rise of powerful civilizations have been due in some measure to the selective processes of conquest and migration which resulted in creating original populations in which the ratio of intelligence was high and that their decline may have been due in part to a decreasing ratio of superior intelligence, due to a higher birth rate in the lower-level groups? It certainly would be interesting and even illuminating could we but know what differences in the ratios between the different intelligence groups might have existed in the army of 1776 as compared with that of 1918.

It may well be that there is here a law of decreasing national efficiency based upon a ratio of the various intelligence levels, which if overbalanced in favor of superior intelligence, other things being equal, would tend toward national achievement, but if overbalanced in favor of inferior intelligence would tend toward national decay.

VI. *Democracy:*

Finally, what of democracy? Is democracy safe in the hands of such varied intelligence levels and in such proportions as we have discovered to exist. Dr. Goddard justifies our hope in democracy in view of these facts on the ground that there is ample intelligence "to guide the Ship of State if it is put in command."[1] Experience proves that inferior intelligence is easily led, provided only it is convinced of the integrity of its leaders, and that its well-being is safeguarded. He concludes, therefore, that whenever the four million choose to devote their superior intelligence to understanding the lower mental levels and to the problem of the comfort and happiness of the other ninety-six million, they will be elected "the rulers of the realm, and then will come perfect government—aristocracy in democracy."[2]

[1] See Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*, pp. 95 ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

To this we subjoin a further consideration. The term democracy implies not merely a form of government but a progressive achievement of human liberty in so far as that liberty is compatible with social solidarity. It implies a free society. A caste system, a hereditary ruling class, or any other fixed social stratification, inhibits individual initiative and prevents superior intelligence from attaining that position which it is qualified to assume in the interest of the general welfare. Democracy, therefore, conceived in this broader sense, is the only type of social organization consistent with the needs of a people possessing a diversity of gifts. A system which obstructs the process of adjustment of men upon the basis of their natural abilities is inimical to public welfare and to the achievement of the individual as far as his capabilities will permit, which after all is the highest purpose for which society exists.

DISCUSSION

E. C. Hayes, University of Illinois

Professor Lichtenberger has given us an admirably clear presentation of important considerations upon a fascinating theme. I am heartily in sympathy with the efforts of the psychologists to perfect a system of mental measurements and believe that they are already able to classify the population with sufficient approach to accuracy so that their results are capable of important practical applications.

However, it is well for us to bear in mind that new ideas are dangerous things, especially when they have far-reaching practical bearings. We want them to mean so much that we are likely to make them take on meanings that in the long run will prove to have been erroneous and mischievous. One of the most famous specialists in the appendicitis operation has recently been quoted as saying that great as the services of that operation have been it has been so overworked and misapplied that it is doubtful whether on the whole it has not done as much harm as good. We all know that the recent information with reference to focal infection has been so zealously employed that if a man bumps his elbow the dentists urge him to have his teeth pulled. And now some of the greatest oral surgeons are deploring the needless loss of so many teeth.

In order to emphasize the importance of mental measurements there is a tendency to minimize the importance of the motor-emotional side of man's psychic organization. Professor Lichtenberger tells us that without intelligence the motor-emotional organization is not of much importance. That is

like saying that with the head removed the rest of a man's body would not be of much consequence. It is quite true. But it is equally true that under those conditions the head would not be of much consequence either. We cannot compare absolutes and say that one is more absolute than the other. It is a common fallacy to exaggerate the importance of one absolutely essential part of an organic unity by pointing to the fact that without that part the rest could not function. A man without intelligence would be like a ship without chart, compass, or rudder. And a man without motor-emotional organization would be like a ship without engine or sails, a drifting derelict, however perfect its steering gear. This consideration would be of no importance if the intellectual and the motor-emotional systems were always exact correlates. But they are not. It was said of the inglorious father of a certain famous Englishman that he had every gift except the gift of using his gifts.

Moreover, there are variations within both the intellectual and the motor-emotional systems which are immeasurable by the current tests, but which are of the highest significance for achievement. General Grant was great on the motor-emotional side. Where others lacked the nerve and flinched he seized upon the simple outstanding elements in the situation and with prompt, direct, and indomitable resolution pushed the matter to a successful issue. He was great on the motor-emotional side. So also was Mrs. Elizabeth Barrett Browning, but how different was their greatness! The variations in intellectual greatness are equally important and equally essential to the highest forms of success. The mental tests fail to measure these important variations either in intellectual or in motor-emotional ability. They measure roughly a certain prompt smartness, but it is doubtful whether these little puzzles adequately measure any of the highest forms of ability, such as the power to form and use difficult abstract concepts and to originate hypotheses for the solution of scientific problems.

All this is not intended to discourage the use of mental measurements for the purposes for which they are adapted. The classification of the population which they give may be accepted as having a degree of useful correspondence to the facts. It is reassuring to be informed that 4.5 per cent of the population have superior mental ability, and that 9 per cent are of high average ability. It may be that the right numbers, and in a large majority of cases the right individuals have been assigned to the average and low average classes. But I find it impossible to believe that *the description* given for these classes is correct. When we are told that 45 per cent of the population have the mental age which we have been accustomed to assign to the moron and are incapable of completing the fourth grade in school I think we may fairly say that the statement is disproved by our public-school experience. Before the war some of the best advocates and users of the mental tests held that less than 1 per cent of the population were of so low a grade. It is well known that of those who leave school without completing the first four grades

great numbers do so for other reasons than the lack of natural mental ability. And while the results of personal observation must be regarded with caution we may say with justification that observation of the public schools renders the statement that 70 per cent of the population are incapable of acquiring a high-school education nothing short of preposterous. Last spring I asked the principal of a high school, having an entering class of perhaps one hundred, what was done in his town to encourage those who graduated from the grades to go into high school, and he replied that it was not necessary to do anything, and that all but two of those who graduated from the eighth grade the preceding year were then in high school. Professor L. M. Terman found that of one thousand unselected school children 90 per cent had an IQ above 85.[1] This is sufficient to enable one to acquire a high-school education. In fact W. M. Proctor found that of the high-school graduates whom he examined 5.5 per cent had an IQ of 80–89.[2]

It may be regarded as a social law that those who profit by social inequalities tend to develop a mythology of caste. We as sociologists must recognize all the facts, but must not outrun the facts.

It would be a serious mistake to hold that the results of mental tests justify the present distribution of the nation's income. The highest forms of *non-commercial* work probably are rarely overpaid. But the incomes of men who through the control of organization acquire great bargaining power do present a problem. The practice of labor unions, mentioned in the paper under discussion, by which men are prevented from utilizing for themselves or for society the higher grades of ability is bad, and justified, if justified at all, only as a war measure. But the most serious difficulty in the way of securing the full productivity of labor is not repression of the kind referred to but rather the lack of good will in work. Efficiency may easily be cut in half by lack of good will toward the industry in which men are engaged. And the good will which is essential to high efficiency cannot be expected so long as capital and labor are at war, and men have no confidence that they will receive a just return for their exertions.

In regard to the problem of democracy it is a fact that, other things being equal, leaders who point out the way to public welfare have a decisive advantage in appealing to the masses over leaders who seek to exploit the public in their own selfish interest. But other things are not equal unless these public-spirited leaders have equal access to the public ear. The more highly developed gregarious animals are, the surer they are to move in masses and to follow their leaders with loyalty. And in this man is the most highly developed of all. It is not difficult to lead the public in the direction determined upon by those who have the public ear. Therefore the practical problem of successful democracy lies in control, by those who have at heart the public weal, of the avenues of communication, the school and the press.

[1] *The Intelligence of School Children*, Houghton Mifflin & Co., p. 8.

[2] *Journal of Educational Research*, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 267.

HAROLD C. BINGHAM, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

Questions of mental superiority or inferiority of human races have commanded in various ways more than ordinary attention, but their strictly scientific consideration has scarcely kept pace with recent developments in closely allied fields. Problems of comparative psychology, as related to infra-human races, have been more readily subjected to thoroughgoing scientific scrutiny with the result that methods in recent years have been rapidly developed and a considerable body of comparable results has been collected. Meanwhile the comparative status of human races, despite its importance, has lagged in scientific consideration.

Scientific method and opportunity for undertaking studies of racial intelligence were not easily brought together until group methods of testing intelligence became available. Using individual methods, it was no moderate undertaking to sample representatively the intelligence of even a single race. An occasional racial study was reported in the pre-war days but a few hundred subjects at the most, usually of a restricted group, furnished the material for such investigations.

It was not until the emergency of the world-war that psychologists were confronted with the necessity of devising and using group measurements of intelligence. This requirement forced the development of an adequate method for classifying intelligence on a wholesale basis. The same requirement brought together under one organization a sampling of races which could scarcely have been secured under ordinary conditions of peace, and with the requirement to classify these men, both domestic and foreign-born, there arose a need for methods applicable with justice both to the native and foreign-born literate and illiterate. Out of this need there grew Group Examination Beta and the Performance Scale Examination for use with the non-English-speaking and illiterates. For the English-speaking literates Group Examination Alpha, Stanford-Binet Examination, and Point Scale Examination were developed or adapted. The results obtained from the use of these methods in the army are sufficient to emphasize an old problem for science and to suggest methods which should definitely contribute to modern thought on national and world-relationships.

In the strictly scientific aspects of the problem, the appeal probably goes most directly to the anthropologist and psychologist. Already there is a considerable collection of data on racial structures and products of their behavior. In an indirect way these records reveal the mentalities of the peoples represented. With the extension of modern psychological methods, however, there is furnished an opportunity for more direct appraisal of the racial mind. The importance of promptly developing and utilizing such methods is at once apparent. Many primitive races have already become extinct; others may soon drop out of existence. Delay in classifying these peoples on the basis of standardized methods may result in serious loss to science. After they have become extinct postmortems can be held at leisure

over the products of their behavior, but intelligence surveys by modern psychological methods can only be made while the peoples are living. It is highly desirable that the intelligence of racial stocks be measured in terms of known standards as opportunity appears.

In the practical aspects of this problem, organizations of state are immediately concerned through the pertinent problems of international relations and social adjustments. The support of weak nations by the strong, as a principle replacing subordination, should be tolerated only when a people has outgrown a state of necessary dependence and developed an intellectual capacity adequate to the maintenence of a free and independent government. With mature knowledge of the ratio of superior or inferior intelligence to other levels of intelligence which is necessary for racial independence, an important criterion would be available for deciding whether certain races now clamoring for readjustments are ready for the social arrangements demanded.

The bearings of these considerations on problems of immigration are likewise apparent. It is probable that a nation, race, or community has an absorption limit for the various levels of intelligence; that in the highest civilization there is an optimal but shifting balance of intellectual capacities. Moreover, it is conceivable that there is a variable capacity of peoples to absorb a given level of immigrating intelligence.

In the Hollerith analysis of the psychological records obtained in the United States Army there are suggestive results bearing on these racial problems. The data are incidental to other practical problems and in consequence are incomplete. From the records of 94,000 men of the white draft, which were selected as a representative sample of the army, somewhat more than 13,000 were foreign-born. The records indicate considerable variation in the intellectual capacity of different foreign-born groups. Only those countries have been considered from which the records of one hundred or more men were drawn in the sample group. For some countries the sample includes several thousand records.

The superiority or inferiority of foreign representation is indicated below by percentage of low or inferior levels of intelligence.

England	8.7	Norway	25.6
Holland	9.2	Austria	37.5
Denmark	13.4	Ireland	39.4
Scotland	13.6	Turkey	42.0
Germany	15.0	Greece	43.6
Sweden	19.4	Russia	60.4
Canada	19.5	Italy	63.4
Belgium	24.0	Poland	69.9

The rank order of countries as indicated by percentage of high or superior levels of intelligence in the draft is also given.

England	19.7	Ireland	4.1
Scotland	13.0	Turkey	3.4
Holland	10.7	Austria	3.4
Canada	10.5	Russia	2.7
Germany	8.3	Greece	2.1
Denmark	5.4	Italy	.8
Sweden	4.3	Belgium	.8
Norway	4.1	Poland	.5

As a whole, 4 per cent of the foreign-born appear in the superior category, 50 per cent in the middle range, and 46 per cent in the inferior level. By way of comparison, 12 per cent of the white draft (including the foreign-born) fall in the superior group, 64 per cent in the middle range, and 24 per cent in the inferior classification.

For the negro draft of the country at large, it has been found that approximately 79 per cent are below average and less than 1 per cent are above average, leaving 20 per cent in the middle range. Northern negroes have 45½ per cent below average, 3½ per cent above average, and 51 per cent in the middle range. Southern negroes have 86 per cent below average, less than one-half of 1 per cent above average, and nearly 14 per cent in the middle range.

The results for the negro draft are more satisfactory than those for foreign nativity. In the Hollerith sample there is a representative selection of the negro draft by states in the ratio of 1 for every 250 males, thus giving a sample which is geographically representative of the country at large.

So far as foreign nativity is concerned, the army results are only suggestive of further scientific tasks. A number of disquieting factors enter into the interpretation of these results which serve to emphasize the need of finished investigations in this field. Perhaps the outstanding question pertains to the factor of selection. It is possible that the emigrant may not be representative of his race. Again the draft may not have called into service a proportional representation of resident racial stocks. In all fairness, moreover, it must be admitted that there is a high correlation between the intelligence and the education of the army, but one must not be hasty in deciding whether education is a cause or a result. The practical necessity of using different intelligence scales for English- and non-English-speaking groups is also a factor entering into the interpretation of the results.

Out of the practical difficulties incident to the use of several scales, there has developed within the War Department an appreciation of the need for a single intelligence scale which is applicable without discrimination to all racial groups. To meet this requirement there was developed during the past summer in the Office of the Surgeon General an adaptation and extension in range of Group Examination Beta. A preliminary edition of this scale, which is now ready for publication, may have some contribution to the development of methods for direct studies and comparisons of racial intelligence. It is to be hoped that the sciences of man will neglect neither this kind of method nor its extensive use as opportunity appears.

COLONEL ROBERT I. REES, GENERAL STAFF

I shall confine myself in this discussion to the final paragraph of Professor Lichtenberger's most excellent paper and describe briefly the army's effort to determine the abilities of its soldiers and to assign them both to military duty and to educational work in accordance therewith.

In the development and research service at the Special School at Camp Grant, Illinois, there has been organized a "Division of Testing and Grading" as one of the three principal departments of the new army educational program in order that it may subserve the following general functions:

1. *Classification and assignment*—that is, to examine or test applicants for admission to the courses of training offered in the education and recreation schools, with respect to their qualifications for such training, and to assign them to courses in accordance with those qualifications, to the end that the training may be conducted with the highest possible degree of efficiency.

2. *Measurement of progress*—that is, to set up standards of achievement at various stages of the student's progress through the courses, or so-called hurdles, that he must take satisfactorily before he is passed to an advanced stage of training. A necessary and natural incident of this measurement is the keeping of suitable records of the student's progress that may be available as a basis of assignment of the soldier to the various special services of the army.

3. *Certification*—that is, to provide summarized statements of the student's scholastic attainments and vocational skill and aptitude, in order that when he leaves the military service to return to civil life he may be suitably recommended to prospective employers or certified to institutions for advanced training.

The development of the first of these functions has engaged most of the time of our development specialists although some progress has been made on the other two.

The information concerning the soldier that we regard as necessary to satisfactory classification and assignment is obtained in two ways, first, by the use of certain elementary *standardized tests;* and second, by means of a *personal interview* with the man. By the use of these devices we aim to secure usable information on the following specific points:

1. The soldier's level of *intelligence*, or general mental ability.

2. The extent of his formal school training, or, in other words, his facility in the use of the *tools of learning and expression*. Reduced to simplest forms, these are the *understanding of language* and the *fundamental operations of arithmetic*. Incidental to this is skill in *handwriting*.

3. The extent of his *general experience* under ordinary conditions of life.

4. His general interest in, or aptitude for, *productive industrial employment*, and his specific preference for a particular occupation.

5. Any *special experience or qualifications* that are necessary for a particular vocation, or the possession of which would seem to make it advisable that he be trained for some particular occupation rather than for another.

6. Any *special physical qualifications or handicaps* that may be significant in his choice of a vocation.

This information is secured by means of a personal interview, and the following standardized tests: the literacy test, the intelligence test, the arithmetic test, the reading test, the mechanical-interest test, special tests for particular occupations.

In the use of these tests the fundamental distinction between "intelligence" on the one hand, and "formal training" on the other, is of course recognized.

The literacy test was prepared by the Division of Testing and Grading for specific use in determining whether or not a soldier under consideration should be classed as literate or illiterate. It is given to all recruits whose literacy is in doubt to determine whether the recruit is sufficiently literate to be sent on to the organization for which he enlisted, or whether he should be sent to a recruit educational center for the purpose of overcoming his illiteracy.

The intelligence test is too familiar to you all to need any comment.

In addition to the literacy test and the "army intelligence" test, we are using three other simple tests, for purposes of general classification and assignment, and of such other tests of special qualifications as particular occupations may seem to require. One of these is a test of ability to perform the four fundamental operations of arithmetic, and is a measure of both speed and accuracy. Various trade and technical courses require arithmetical or calculating ability in different degrees, and we are now engaged upon the problem of determining the approximate degree of facility required as a preliminary to entering upon each of these courses.

The second of these elementary tests is a test of ability to read and understand ordinary written English. It is similar in character and purpose to the literacy test previously discussed, but has the following essential points of difference:

1. Whereas the literacy test aims to distinguish between the man who can read a little and the man who cannot read at all, and thus deals only with the lower ranges of reading ability, the reading test, on the other hand, assumes some ability to read and understand, and aims to distinguish between different degrees of that ability, including the higher ranges as well as the lower.

2. While the reading test is not *primarily* a test of *intelligence*, for the reason that there is not necessarily a close correspondence between intelligence and language ability, it nevertheless involves information and intelligence to a far greater extent than the literacy test. Language is not merely an agglomeration of words, but it is of use only as it *conveys ideas*, and ideas are essentially an appreciation of the *relations existing between things*. It follows that one must know *things* and the relations existing between them in order to read intelligently and profitably. But the converse of this proposition is not necessarily

true—namely, that one who knows things and the relations existing between things has a corresponding reading ability.

The reading test is made especially necessary in view of the fact that the plan of instruction in vocational work now adopted—that is, the operation-sheet method—presupposes a certain degree of reading ability, apart from requirements of pure intelligence. The test is also useful in assigning men properly to classes for instruction in general education. This reading test has not yet been developed to the point where it is regarded as entirely satisfactory, and is therefore at present kept in mimeographed form.

Another test that is still in process of development is one that is designed to afford a rough index of the student's interest in, or aptitude for, the more common forms of mechanical work. It is based on the assumption that any young man who has a distinct interest in things mechanical will gradually acquire a fund of information about the more common mechanical operations, even though he may have comparatively few opportunities to perform those operations with his own hands. Satisfactory progress is being made in the development of this test, and we hope soon to have it in a form that will be generally usable.

The four tests described above—the intelligence test, the arithmetic test, the reading test, and the mechanical-interest test—are given to all applicants for admission to vocational courses, and the first three of these to all applicants for the general education courses, exclusive of the vocational courses. In addition, there are certain vocational courses, such as stenography in the business group and oxyacetylene-welding in the mechanical group for which special mental or physical qualifications are regarded as necessary prerequisites. Suitable tests for determining the qualifications of applicants with respect to these special requirements are now in process of development.

Of equal importance with the group tests in the matter of classification and assignment of men, and, in some respects, of *even greater value*, is the so-called personal interview. Although the tests yield significant information concerning the abilities of the men, the *procedure of the testing* is necessarily so formal and so much in the nature of mere routine that it affords no opportunity to get into sympathetic touch with the applicant.

The personal interview, on the other hand, affords exactly this opportunity, and to one who is fortunate enough to be endowed with keen human interest, it is most gratifying to find how ready the average soldier is to "open up" on the subject of his past experiences, his special interests, and his ambitions for the future. The soldier, like most other human beings, likes to talk to someone who shows an interest in his affairs, and I am inclined to suspect that many cases of breach of army discipline and much of the dissatisfaction shown by soldiers may be traced directly to the repression of personality that is a necessary incident of the private's life.

Many of the essential facts of the soldier's life-history—his age, nationality, schooling, home environment, social opportunities, occupational experience, etc.—might readily be secured through the use of the ordinary personnel card, filled out under the direction of a sergeant; but if these facts are brought out in the course of a friendly conversation by a competent interviewer, they afford clues to the personality, intelligence, temperament, and vocational fitness of the applicant that can be secured in no other way.

On October 1, preparatory to the opening of the schools for the year, 52,900 of these tests were given to our soldiers and the work of testing and grading is being continued until every man in the army has been tested.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW PLAN OF ARMY EDUCATION

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INTRODUCTION

Education has always been a part of the United States Army. An officer, training his men, is a teacher. The concern of an officer for the welfare of soldiers under his command is a characteristic of a true teacher. Certain arms of the military service are by their very nature schools of instruction. The Great War produced fundamental changes in our War Department and army as it did in all phases of our national life. We have had much discussion of the problems of reconstruction resulting from the war. Be it said to the credit of our War Department that it was open-minded enough to see that it needed reconstruction and with its characteristic tendency to act, instead of talk, it proceeded at once to adjust itself to the momentous changes wrought by the war.

Even while the army was still in France, after the Armistice, educational classes were started to maintain morale, use leisure time, and increase the military efficiency of the men. Over here, some preliminary meetings were held in Washington and the military authorities decided on an Advisory Civilian Board of Educators to help the General Staff carry on the educational work in the army. Time does not permit giving details of this formative period or mentioning steps in the emergence of the plan adopted. It is sufficient to record that the educational work was started in the camps and posts in November, 1919. The educators called by the War Department were given only general directions as to the plan, and then sent to the camps and posts to work out the details. The system of education evolved. In general, the civilian educators had little advice to give the military authorities except as it was organized and discovered by actual contact with the soldiers, for

they in large part realized that they were facing a problem in adult education which demanded a daring departure from usual educational procedure. I would summarize my point here, by these words: Both the military personnel charged with this work and the civilian advisers realized they were dealing with a research problem in adult education, hence extreme care and caution coupled with open-mindedness were needed. Accordingly, detailed directions were uncalled for—the thing to do, and advice given, were yet to be discovered.

AIMS OF ARMY EDUCATION

There are two aims of the program of education in the army, viz.:

a) To train technicians and mechanics to meet the needs of the army, and to fit the soldier for a definite occupation when he returns to civil life.

b) To raise the general intelligence of the soldier in order to increase his military efficiency, and to fit him for a higher type of citizenship when he returns to civil life.

It will be noted that the education is planned not alone for the soldier but for the soldier when he returns to civil life—for the citizen. The plan is not to keep the man in the army but to get him out—to graduate him. The purpose of college education is not to keep the young man in college but to train him to be a better citizen when he gets out—the same purpose holds for army education. Briefly, the plan aims to make the army so attractive that a young man will see that in return for three of the best years of his life he will get something to make him better able to meet life's problems and responsibilities.

GENERAL PLAN OF EDUCATION

All training of the soldier is vested in a staff officer called G3. This consists of military education, vocational training, general education, moral training, physical training, and recreation training. It will be seen that the training is rounded and coordinated.

GENERAL PLAN OF ADMINISTRATION

The civilian educators have no power or authority. Their function is to advise the military personnel. If the advice given

does not appeal to the judgment of the person advised, it is rejected. Advising the General Staff in Washington is the Advisory Board (which is itself a part of the General Staff) with a chairman and field secretary. In each corps area (the main field division of the army) the commander is advised by a "civilian consultant" and his assistants; in the camp and post is a civilian consultant (or in some cases called "supervisor" or "senior instructor") advising the commanding officer and the education and recreation officer. In each of these relations the civilian educator simply advises. Teaching is done by civilians, commissioned instructors, and enlisted instructors.[1] In education, as in other administrative matters of the army, there is large local freedom and self-government delegated to the post commanders, operating of course within general orders.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY EDUCATION

This being the theme of my paper, for purposes of clearness, I shall group the material under definite headings, as follows:

I. PHYSICAL TRAINING AND BODY CARE

It is generally known that 35 per cent of the drafted army was rejected on account of physical defects.[2] The correction of this condition among our population should concern everybody interested in our social life. The army itself is doing its share by physical examination, dental care, and teaching hygiene. The habits of exercise formed by the setting-up drills, the regularity in eating and sleeping, the discipline in muscular activity, and general interest in sports should have a wholesome effect on our national life. Every soldier must exercise. Athletic teams do not do this for the men as is often done in college activities, where, for some, at least the physical exercise consists of yelling on the grand stand and cheering the team. It is hoped that becoming accustomed to physical examinations, care of body, and habits of

[1] June 1, 1920, there were 542 commissioned instructors, 1,499 enlisted instructors, and 1,498 civilian instructors, both men and women.

[2] Out of a total of 17,593,776 registrants who were classified, a total of 925,873 were found to be physically unfit; this does not include the 6,319,728 registrants who were unclassified.

exercise will be carried by the men many years beyond the day of discharge.

II. USE OF LEISURE TIME—RECREATION

One important thing adults need to learn in the United States is the wholesome use of leisure time. The army is trying to teach the young men under its care proper habits on this subject. It is generally known that the police courts have more cases on Monday mornings than on any other day in the week due to reckless use of time on Sunday when at leisure. The army is trying to teach the proper use of leisure time by offering opportunities such as libraries, educational work, moving pictures, sports, excursions, dances, etc. One thing we learned from the war was the need of proper recreation. The army is trying to crystallize this finding in directed and controlled recreation. The word "soldiering," meaning loafing, it is hoped will soon become obsolete so far as applied to the United States Army. The recreational opportunities are now controlled in camps by the education and recreation officer. Is not recreation a form of education? It seems to me it is. The army so regards it in combining in the same office these activities of education and recreation. Practically all men make use of some form of recreation, but no figures are available to show percentages.

III. RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY

We perhaps all agree that more respect for constituted authority is needed; respect for courts, law, government, policemen charged with law-enforcement, for public officials, etc. The men in uniform are certainly taught respect for constituted authority. It should be noted that an extreme form of submission is to be avoided. Initiative is also desired. That is why freedom of discussion is encouraged in the classroom where current social problems are considered. It is an excellent training, simply the change in atmosphere from the drill ground where respect for authority and discipline are demanded, to the classroom where teacher and taught, civilian and soldier, meet on equal terms to discuss important problems in our social life. This should not be interpreted as meaning that military training does not also teach initiative. It is recognized that one of the results of the war is a

field formation requiring very large initiative on the part of the soldier in open formation. It should also be understood that class work encourages respect for authority.

IV. CAMPS AND POSTS SUGGEST COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

We hear much today of the proper organization of the community. I have for some years concluded my courses in both rural and municipal sociology by insisting that many problems would be more easily adjusted by a proper organization of the community. As I have lived in some of the camps in the past year, I have been impressed with the possibilities of using them for instruction purposes to show the soldiers how communities should be organized. The camps are consciously planned, as modern communities should be. There is concern for cleanliness and health, there are medical inspections, fire departments, provisions for worship, for recreation at moderate expense, libraries and music, no extremes of luxury or poverty, everybody works, violations of regulations are promptly and impartially punished, persons best fitted by experience and service are in control, and all are taught respect for authority. Perhaps the most important social implication, of the camp as a community, is that it is controllable or manageable. Many need to learn that society is made by man and that within certain limits it is controllable. To my mind the learning of this lesson by the soldiers and carrying it to their communities upon their return to civil life is an extremely important social contribution. The army community is in most instances a better type of community than the one from which the soldier came. I recognize that there are some points in which a camp is unlike a democratic community.

V. VOCATIONAL OR TRADE EDUCATION

If the hoe may be used as symbolic of the trades, and the gun of the fighting forces of the United States, then the representation of the colonial settler and later the homesteader as a man carrying a hoe in one hand and a gun in the other is a forrunner of the situation in the army today in teaching the trades part of the time and military science part of the time.

The army called, as advisers, some leaders in industry and some teachers in vocational education to instal and teach the 116 different trades offered in the army. I think it is generally conceded in the United States that trade education has not been productive of anticipated results. The army has pursued the policy of consulting leaders in the various industries in order that the instruction may fit the soldier upon his discharge for direct entrance into industry. The aim is to make the trade education as practicable as possible. The plan insists upon (1) work upon actual jobs; (2) the job-sheet analysis; (3) unit operation; (4) no exploitation of the soldier under instruction. It is believed these are all important features in vocational education.

When the Armistice was signed, machinery experts were employed by the War Department to examine and requisition for the vocational schools the best machines belonging to the army in Europe, in transit, and in our warehouses. The result will be an equipment in many of the camps and posts which will be hard to match in the best trade schools.

In addition to this splendid equipment should be mentioned the co-operation of industry, not only in lending its experts, but in promising to give the soldiers preference in employment upon discharge. In some cities certain industries have given employees leaves of absence, recommending enlistment in the army and promising jobs when the enlistment is ended.

It is of the utmost social significance if these soldiers are returned to society with a trade, prepared to command good wages so they can at least get married, establish homes, and become respected members of their communities. By offering the training which industry wants, the resulting occupational efficiency is of great social significance.

VI. AMERICANIZATION WORK

The need of what is called Americanization work has been made very clear as one war result. The many efforts valuable and useless at this work are not generally known. I little realized the extent of these efforts until the War Department Research Bureau sent me last spring to confer with several persons and organizations known to be working in this field.

I was impressed with the value of the instruction to illiterates (both English and non-English speaking) who were taught in certain army camps such as Camp Upton and Camp Grant. In each of these camps unique methods were worked out; special textbooks or manuals, charts, and diagrams were evolved and printed. Today the illiterates are sent to the recruit educational centers of which there are six in continental America. It requires about four or five months for the average man to complete the course. In these classes the foreign non-English-speaking recruits mingle with the English-speaking native-born boys from the mountains of some southern states. The result socially is incalculable. From reveille until taps the men live in an American atmosphere; they soon forget racial antipathies and acquire the American viewpoint.[1]

When we recall that 167,000 illiterates went to France as American soldiers and that many lost their lives because of inability to use the English language we have some conception of the value of this phase of army education not only to army life but to industry and citizenship as well.

It is a privilege to have read some of the letters written to their mothers and sweethearts by soldiers who have just learned to write and to read in the army schools. To help in the work of making it possible for full-grown men to write their first letters to their mothers is an opportunity to make educators richer who give this assistance.

VII. CITIZENSHIP TRAINING

Last spring, for the War Department Research Bureau at Camp Grant, I made a trip to study citizenship training with a view of profiting by the experience of other organizations, individuals, and associations. This study revealed the great number of methods, lack of unity of aim, and especially the need of adequate training in this field. I was encouraged to learn of the intense interest of business and industry and their willingness to co-operate on anything which seemed sound and able to help their adult employees to be better citizens.

[1] November 1, 1920, there were about 3,800 illiterates in all the recruit educational centers and sixty-two nationalities at the Camp Dix, N.J., Recruit Educational Center.

I believe the army has made a valuable contribution at this point to American education, which is of special interest to sociologists. There has been worked out and tried on real live soldiers, over a period of six months, a course which is really a combination of all the social sciences. The problem (or, as the War Department calls it, the applicatory) method is used. Only as much of the history and geography of Greece and Rome and other countries is used as is needed to solve the problems. The *object* is to secure on the part of the men, as soldiers and citizens of a democracy, sane attitudes and hence intelligent social conduct. The *means* is a series of problems, conspicuous in our modern life, based upon the interests and experience of the soldiers under instruction. The *method* is to bring the men face to face with the facts in their own experience by arousing interest, challenging attention, and establishing a perplexity. Running through the course are certain recurrent themes, e.g., necessity for work; satisfaction in workmanship; difficulties of impersonal relations; faith in evolution in contrast with revolution; the value of radicalism; necessity of social control; etc.

I believe this course (called Second Course in General Education) is based upon sound pedogogy and sound sociology. It considers the essential thing about a person to be his point of view—his attitude. This course attempts to establish sane attitudes on social, neighborhood, and business relations. It is active citizenship propaganda against the dangerous radical doctrines which we hear so much of today. It is indirect military strategy, because we can resist the invasion of any army, but not the invasion of an idea except by establishing sane attitudes to counteract these ideas. The manuals are so written that they are adaptable to different intelligence levels.

VIII. THE DUTY OF ARMED DEFENSE

I am convinced that as a part of citizenship training our schoolbooks on civics should contain chapters on the army and the navy which would make clear the right and basis of defense. Along with chapters on the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches of our government should be those on the army and navy. It needs to be made clear that the function of these parts of our government is to protect and preserve life and property, not

destroy it. This knowledge might help us all to get the attitude toward the army and the navy that they are social servants and that the men who wear the uniform are worthy of respect. Such an attitude will make the men in uniform respect it, and perhaps the civilians will come to respect these social servants who stand ready to protect life and property, quell riots, suppress insurrections, and protect from invasions. It is a shock to many soldiers to learn that civilians sometimes look down on the uniform when the wearers of the uniform thought they were doing a patriotic act and a public good by enlisting in the army or navy. I believe that this plan will do much to reduce the number of conscientious objectors in case of war.

IX. A POTENTIAL ARMY

In addition to getting this idea of the duty of armed defense to permeate the civilian population, another social result will be a potential army among our citizens. The army will every year turn back into civilian life a large number of trained soldiers, who, in case of emergency, have the preparation for warfare in its various phases. These men will also have the proper mental attitude toward warfare. This plan is a substitute for compulsory military training. I believe it will be impossible to secure the passage in this country of a law requiring universal military training—it would be unwise to try it if there are sufficient young men who will enlist for three years to gain these educational advantages and then after discharge are willing to use their training and knowledge of the military arts by reinlistment in case of emergency.

X. RESEARCH IN EDUCATION

I think the army education is socially significant because of the educational research it is conducting. The educators, called to advise the department, were given a free hand. Here was an opportunity. The manuals written are significant; the methods of teaching the trades a departure; the use of moving pictures as an adjunct in social-science teaching proved; the rating of a man not by the time spent but by accomplishments, the classification of a soldier upon the basis of the tests applied by the test-and-grading psychologist, and the promotion of a man as fast as his work

warrants without being held back by his class are suggestive; training in Americanization and citizenship and the elimination of unessentials in education are advances. Heretofore it has been necessary for a young man to go to a trade school to learn his trade, to an engineering school to learn the general principles of his trade, and to college to learn of his social relationships. The army has combined all these three in one school. This is a contribution to education worthy of high rating. Having a specific object in all this training is a wholesome example in American educational practice.

XI. SOME OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESULTS THUS FAR NOTED

Many young men in the army continue or complete their education. Many are becoming acquainted with good literature. Some soldiers read a book a day. Conversation around the barracks instead of being on trivial or harmful subjects, is on the trades, the immigration problem, the relations of labor and capital, the function of risk in industry, and other current topics. The soldiers have told teachers that they always wanted to dicuss social questions mentioned in the newspapers but had had no chance to do so with adults in whom they had confidence. The men learn a trade, get a good physical set-up, are taught dental and medical care. The big, husky fellow is not made ashamed by being with girls and smaller boys as he is in the public schools. There is a positive effort to make the education individual in character instead of mass instruction.

A young man recently discharged from Camp Grant, Illinois, said that he was going home to run a farm tractor at a wage of nine dollars a day. He learned this in the army. He promised to send ten men from his home town to enlist in the army. This man was a better soldier because he was more intelligent. He will certainly be a better citizen because he is able to earn an honest living. He carries back to civil life his military ability, ready for an emergency. He is the best kind of an exhibit of what the army can do for American young men.

XII. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY EDUCATION

I would summarize the social significance of the army plan of education by saying that these men are built up in body and

taught habits of body care; they are taught how to use leisure time and to respect authority. Community organization and social interdependence are made clearer. Men learn trades by which they can make an honest living. They are vocationally guided. Illiteracy is reduced. Citizenship training is fostered and social relations better understood. Warfare is learned and the right of defense is understood. Military science becomes more generally diffused among the population, a potential army is secured, and a substitute for compulsory military training is found. Education is extended to large numbers who might not otherwise enjoy its benefits. Many of the boys and young men who run away from the public schools and home are kept from becoming vagrant and antisocial. Education, moral training, recreation, and military training are combined to the same worthy end of making a complete soldier and turning him back to civil life a better citizen. In doing this work the army does not become a competitor of the civilian schools but supplements their efforts.[1] Very often it trains adults who have not been able to take advantage of schools and if they did not get the army education would be unequipped for life's work. In addition, the contributions to the science of education are very important.

A large percentage of the recent recruits are entering the army to secure the benefits of education. It is thus producing a full-strength peace-time army of serious-minded youth, and it is hoped in five years that it will be unnecessary to try to persuade men to enter the army because the value of enlistment will by that time have proved itself. As soon as most recruits are housed the question they ask is, "When do we go to school?"[2] It has been estimated that 80 per cent of the recent recruits came into the army for the educational work. I think that is too high; perhaps a conservative estimate is 55 or 60 per cent.

A result of the new army plan of education will doubtless be the better understanding of the army by the civilians and vice versa.

[1] Arrangements are made whereby soldiers may be selected for West Point or for patriotic scholarships in colleges and universities of which there are about thirty available at present.

[2] The authorized peace strength of the army under the Army Reorganization Bill is 280,000. The enlisted strength of November 30 was 205,959—the enrolment in the school on October 31 was 48,361 or a 24.85 per cent enrolment.

In addition to overcoming, in part at least, the natural hostility toward armed forces which many have, the educators are imbibing some of the directness and definiteness of army men and some of the "he-vigor," which it is hoped will be carried back to our educational system. I should also mention the fine friendships between these two widely separated professions which heretofore have had little association.

It is perhaps unnecessary to observe that the plan has not yet been in operation long enough to find its defects.

We tried to take the army into the school by the R.O.T.C. Now we are attempting to take the school into the army. A plan of this magnitude cannot be put into full operation in less than five years. I believe when that time will have passed that educators will see in this work one of the most important advances in the history of education.

DISCUSSION

Colonel R. I. Rees, General Staff

For years we have confidently relied upon our traditions, our wealth, our strength, as bulwarks of defense against national perils, and have cherished so healthy an optimism concerning the stability and growth of our civic ideals and practices, that we have paid scant attention to specific means of education for effective patriotism among either native Americans or the foreign-born. Of late, however, there has been a growing conviction that, however superior we may be, no country is rich enough, or strong enough, to rely upon untrained citizenship. Patriotism is good citizenship. The fundamental idea upon which it is based is that of service; and service to be effective necessarily requires training; and the child or the man can be trained in sound conceptions of citizenship, in capacities for effective service, as well as in other things. It is equally true, though not so well recognized, that an education which does not also develop a disposition or desire to serve the community as a good citizen is fundamentally defective. Hence, if democracy is to fulfil the destiny that has been claimed for it, it is imperative that every citizen have proper education for citizenship.

Having this conception in view, the army, with the able assistance of civilian educators, has recently engaged in the development of a system of education which has as its objective to cultivate:

1. Civic capacities necessary to enable the individual to work creatively in society and to contribute productively to the economic, social, political, and intellectual life of his community.

2. Civic intelligence, which includes the information and knowledge which must be acquired in the process of developing his civic capacities in order to make them effective in conduct.

3. Civic attitudes and habits of mind and heart, which express themselves in a disposition to serve the community and the nation for the best interests of all.

The conviction that general and vocational education are essential elements in the training of an army was formed long before the war. It was formally expressed in Section 27 of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, which states: "In addition to military training, soldiers while in the active service shall hereafter be given the opportunity to study and receive instruction upon educational lines of such character as to increase their military efficiency and enable them to return to civil life better equipped for industrial, commercial, and general business occupations."

The wisdom of this provision was amply demonstrated by the war experience. While little difficulty was encountered in finding enough well-educated and technically trained men to officer and equip an army of 500,000 men, troubles multiplied in geometric ratio as the size of the army increased. In its efforts to cope with this unprecedented situation, the War Department was compelled, before it could organize the authorized military forces, to give an enormous amount of intensive general education and vocational training. Schools were established at army camps. Development battalions were organized. And when these agencies proved inadequate, the colleges and technical schools were drafted in the service.

In addition the national welfare societies were called in, and, supported by liberal gifts from a united people, did priceless work in supplying clean and healthy recreation, and in ministering to the moral and spiritual life of the soldiers. When the Armistice was signed, it was education and recreation which supplied the means of maintaining the morale of the army in the painful period of waiting for the boat home.

Because education, recreation, and moral training were thus found to be indispensable elements in mobilizing an efficient fighting army, they have now been incorporated into the regular training program of the army. A definite organization has been set up for conducting the work, and Congress is supporting it with annually increasing appropriations. During the past year it has proved to be the most effective means of maintaining the enlisted strength of the army both in quantity and in quality. More than 60 per cent of the new recruits enter the service because of the opportunities now offered for personal development and growth.

During the war the army had a very definite single objective for all its varied training activities; namely, to develop the best possible soldiers in the least possible time. Under the impelling pressure of the situation there was quickly evolved a training system which differs in many important respects from that now generally practiced in civilian schools. The essential difference

between the two can best be made clear by a concrete case, taken for simplicity and vividness, from the field of physical culture.

The old setting-up exercises were designed to develop fine physique. To this end the men were required to execute repeatedly the same motions all together. By this physical drill they acquired strong muscles and physical endurance, which enabled them to stand ordinary wear and tear well. But when confronted suddenly by unusual conditions, they were unable to cope with them. Physical strength alone did not make them masters of the situation. Hence the time devoted to setting-up exercises was materially reduced and quickening games were introduced to supplement the exercises. The effort in the quickening game is to confront the men suddenly with an unexpected situation requiring prompt and vigorous action in a definite direction. Success in meeting the situation quickly brings high scores and failure brings mild punishment.

Everyone recognizes that the superiority of the quickening games over the setting-up exercises lies in the fact that games appeal to the sporting instinct and keep the man's attention on what he is doing, while the exercises can be done mechanically while the mind goes wool-gathering. The games, therefore, not only develop physical strength but also attention, quickness, reason, good co-ordination, and many other valuable attitudes and abilities. They thus exercise both mind and body simultaneously and build up not muscle alone, but the entire man.

The same principle was applied by the army to technical training and to general education during the war. The old manual training was designed to develop manipulative skill. To this end the mechanic arts were analyzed into types of skill, like filing, chipping, drilling, turning; and each student was put through a series of exercises designed to develop these generalized skills one by one. Such training undoubtedly does increase skill; but it contributes little to the development of that prime requisite of a soldier, ability to make a quick estimate of a new situation and to determine promptly what action is needed to insure a favorable result.

In order to overcome this defect, the several technical occupations required in the army were analyzed into the specific operations a soldier would be required to perform. Training, then, consists in giving the man a series of real jobs each of which involves several fundamental operations of the trade. He is required to analyze the job, to make a bill of materials needed, and to plan how he will proceed to complete it. Army manuals and other reference books supply the standard information concerning the manipulative processes involved. Progress is individual in that each soldier advances as rapidly as he demonstrates proficiency by doing his job well and by answering numerous questions concerning the methods and means employed.

The jobs given involve, as far as practicable, productive work that must be done to improve living conditions at the camp. Exploitation of the men by assigning them to repair-work that has for them no educational value is,

however, strictly prohibited. Necessary repetition and drill are secured by so selecting the jobs assigned that each operation requiring practice is met a number of times in various combinations during the course. No fixed list of jobs is prescribed, but each teacher must make up his own list to fit his local conditions and opportunities.

This type of vocational training undoubtedly has high value as citizenship training. Not only does it train the soldier for a gainful occupation by which he can earn his living, but it offers him an opportunity for creative work, it impresses upon him an attitude toward productive work and a pride in achievement, and it tends to develop appreciation of an orderly and well-done job. Attention is also paid to the artistic side of the job with the idea of fostering the desire for clean and attractive surroundings and for good living conditions.

The physical and vocational training methods just described are based on the same educational principles. Each begins by confronting the student with a situation which appeals to some one of his fundamental instincts—his creative instinct, his sporting instinct, his instinct for self-preservation, his instinct for co-operation. When some instinct has been thus aroused, the student himself applies his energy to achieve the immediate desired end. It is then the function of the teacher to direct this discharge of energy into channels, which will result in successful achievement. As this process is repeated, the channels in which the energy discharges gradually become more marked, and habits are formed which ultimately develop the man into a competent workman. The measurement of progress by achievement is an added incentive to good work, since the man knows that his advancement depends upon the success of his own individual efforts, and is not limited by weakness or failure of his less gifted classmates.

The present army course in general education consists of a series of discussions of vital problems. These problems are selected to appeal to one or more of the soldier's fundamental instincts, and each one depicts a specific situation which calls for action directed toward improvement. The discussion consists of an analysis of the situation both from the point of view of the facts and experiences involved, and also from the point of view of its moral import. Information additional to that already possessed by the class is supplied by reading-matter and references for study, which have been selected so as to increase the student's knowledge of the subject, and to define the moral issues involved. The discussion is guided by the teacher so that the class is eventually led to a conclusion which is agreed to be the best solution from the point of view of a square deal and of more liberal opportunities for growth in social, economic, and industrial life.

The work in general education in the army is given two consecutive periods each day. The first is devoted to the discussion just outlined and the second is used for training in written and oral expression. In the latter the soldiers write or state orally their conclusions concerning the problems of the previous hour. Their work is criticized from the point of view of clear expression

and they are drilled in spelling, in penmanship, in punctuation, and in composition. The two periods contain all the instruction given the elementary students in the basic subjects in general education, such as reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, geography, history, and civics. Special courses in algebra, geometry, science, economics, and history are offered for more advanced students after they have completed the general course.

In planning work of this type it is important to note that in all army courses the subject-matter is organized about real jobs or real situations rather than according to the customary departments of school instruction. Thus a job in plumbing may involve physics, chemistry, and mathematics; and if so, the needed instruction in these subjects is given as part of the study of the job. Similarly, the discussion of a problem in general education may involve history, economics, geography, science, literature, and art. If so, the required elements of these several subjects are included when needed. Review periods are used to classify in logical form ideas that need such classification. This type of organization is the converse of the one in ordinary use, in which subjects are presented in logical or chronological order first and then specific jobs or situations cited as applications.

To repeat the army's objective: A good soldier must be a good citizen. Our training for citizenship aims to make independent, creative, interested, informed, and responsible citizens who have developed the disposition to act justly and the ability to see clearly and think straight.

RELATION OF WOMEN TO INDUSTRY

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At recent hearings before the Anthracite Commission "one of the miners put this question: 'Living in common comfort and decency, as a decent American workingman, do you think that $3.34 a day is enough for an adult day laborer to receive, and maintain a family in comfort and decency?' Whereupon an operator answered: 'I not only believe it, but I know it, because I see them doing it.'"

The technical adviser to the commission, Dr. Hammond, had stated in support of his estimate of $1,600 a year as the minimum cost of living in the anthracite region: "We doubt very much whether there could be very much of a reduction in any item and yet provide for the legitimate needs of the family in any way which the moral sense of our people would consider legitimate."[1]

Defective reasoning on the part of the employer and incomplete discussion on the part of the student has resulted in a similar misconception. On the one hand, the employer has known what wages were paid to the chief wage-earner and has too frequently claimed that the family lived upon that sum and hence that it needed no increase. On the other hand, budgetary studies have made clear the sum needed to support the entire family and have then argued that the wages of chief wage-earners should be equal to that amount. But neither one has sufficiently recognized that others than the father of the family contribute to the family budget.

What are the facts? Does the income of the chief wage-earner represent the sole resource of the family? Or is this a part only of its income? Is the family joined to industry as a group through its head only? Or do the several members of the family hold each his or her own place in industry? If others than the father are wage-earners, who are they? Or if other income is secured

[1] *New Republic*, November 17, 1920, p. 290.

by the family, how is it done? If this new order has been established, what effect on the group life has resulted, what effect on the individual? Have wife or children been sacrificed or family solidarity impaired? In other words, if wage is to be considered in relation to standards of living, budgets, expenditures, is it to be a group wage or an individual wage? Must the amount or the minimum (we are not here concerned with this proper controversy) be set according to the cost of living of a *family* of five or according to the cost of living of an *individual* in a family of five or more or less members?

No standards of living investigations, except brief results published in *Mothers Who Must Earn*, attempt to analyze the budget in relation to its sources. The study by Little and Cotton[1] shows the number of wage-earners in the families investigated. Kennedy[2] and More[3] each indicate the average per cent paid in by the husband, wife, children, lodgers, and other sources. Beyer[4] and Chapin[5] each simply identify the contributors to the family budget. Other studies do not tell us the relation of breadwinners to family groups or of the component parts of the family to industry. The accompanying figures, then, may aid in solving or eliminating the question which so frequently confounds the public—namely, how to pay a wage sufficient to support a family, and not give to unattached individuals a disproportionate sum; how the principle of equal wage for equal work can possibly be applied to women without diminishing men's wages and overthrowing the family; in fact all of those questions which circle about minimum-wage discussions, and hover over wage settlements, and now intentionally, now unconsciously avoid the real issue of wage for service, or wage as a fair proportion of production in a competitive economic

[1] Esther Louise Little and William Joseph Henry Cotton, *Budgets of Families and Individuals of Kensington, Philadelphia* (1920).

[2] J. C. Kennedy, *Wages and Family Budgets in the Chicago Stock Yard District* (1914).

[3] Louise Bolard More, *Wage-Earners' Budgets* (1907).

[4] William C. Beyer and others, *Workingmen's Standard of Living in Philadelphia* (1919).

[5] Robert Coit Chapin, *The Standard of Living among Workingmen's Families in New York City* (1909).

system. If the world is advancing to a co-operative plane, then these questions will indeed be justly pertinent.

In the year 1917–18 a swift house-to-house canvass was made of 11,073 families[1] in six distinct industrial sections of Philadelphia. The survey was conducted by Seybert Institution of Philadelphia and the Department of Social Economy of Bryn Mawr College for the purpose of locating the mothers in industry; but data giving the family composition and the wage-earners in family groups were secured which may help to establish the facts necessary to answer these questions, especially when studied in connection with two reports which are about to be published: one by Miss Gwendolyn Hughes,[2] portraying the causes and the effects

TABLE I

SUPPORT OF FAMILIES BY HUSBANDS IN INDUSTRIAL SECTIONS OF PHILADELPHIA

Families Considered	Number	Percentage
Total	11,073	100.0
Families supported by husband alone	5,025	45.4
Families in which the husband's income is supplemented by that of other members	3,990	36.0
Families in which the husband is not working	353	3.2
Families in which there is no husband	1,705	15.4

of the entry into industry by the mothers of young children; the other by Miss Agnes Byrnes, picturing the Pennsylvania families in which industry is carried into the home.

Two distinct classes evolved from the Philadelphia study: that in which the father was the sole wage-earner, and that in which wages of wife or children and income from lodgers seemed to supplement or be substituted for the father's contribution.

The father is solely responsible for support of his family in less than one-half of the groups interviewed. That is, 55 per cent have sources of income other than the father's wage or receive nothing

[1] See Table I. Families in which there was no mother, households made up of individual men and women, and no information cases were omitted from the analysis.

[2] Miss Ada Kuhn aided in the analysis of the material which deals with the effect of wage-earning on the home. Miss Hughes has also assisted largely in preparation of the figures which are here analyzed by the writer and presented by courtesy of Seybert Institution.

at all from the father.[1] If we base our budgetary discussions on a household sustained by the father alone and composed of father, mother, and three children, we are assuming the ideal, since only 788 families, less than 9 per cent of the total of 9,015, are actually of this type.[2] When the fathers do support their families unaided, Table III shows that only 16 per cent have three children, 34 per cent have three or more, 57 per cent have two or more, and 20 per

TABLE II

EXTENT TO WHICH THE HUSBAND'S WAGE IS SUPPLEMENTED IN INDUSTRIAL SECTIONS OF PHILADELPHIA

Source of Supplementary Income	Families	
	Number	Percentage
Total	9,015	100.0
No supplementary income*	5,025	55.7
Wages of children†	1,317	14.6
Wages of wife	1,087	12.1
Revenue from lodgers‡	1,089	12.1
Wages of children and wife	153	1.7
Wages of children and revenue from lodgers	186	2.1
Wages of wife and revenue from lodgers	139	1.5
Wages of children, wife, and revenue from lodgers	19	.2

* Includes 323 cases where there are relatives who are not wage-earners and presumably not contributing to the money income of the family. See Table III.

† Includes 105 cases where there are relatives in the household who are not at work.

‡ Wage-earning relatives living in household included under lodgers.

cent have no children. The outstanding facts are that less than half of our family groups are supported by the father without assistance from other members of the families; if there are less than six children, the children are practically always under 16 years of age (85–92 per cent).[3] It should noted be that the families are somewhat larger in the group where the father is aided than where he alone supports the family and the children are also a little older.[4] If the chief wage-earner was ever the sole support of

[1] See Tables I and II. We should note that the questionnaire secured information only as to the occupation of the members of the family, and therefore, throughout this discussion, the terms support, contribution, or maintenance are used as presupposing that the members of the family who are wage-earners contribute to the family support —a matter of common knowledge.

[2] See Tables I and III.

[3] See Table III.

[4] Compare Tables III and IV.

the family, that situation is fast disappearing and individualism in wage-earning is taking its place, but the units co-operate as a group in consumption.

Let us eliminate on the one hand the class in which the father is not a wage-earner at all, that is, 19 per cent (2,058) of the entire group of 11,073; and on the other, the class in which he is the sole support, that is, 45 per cent (5,025), and we have isolated the 3,990 families which are maintained by the father in co-operation with other members. It is this class which we wish to consider especially today. Here the wife, the children, lodgers, and boarders constitute the sources of financial aid, and they contribute in almost

TABLE III

CHILDREN IN FAMILIES SUPPORTED ENTIRELY BY THE HUSBAND'S WAGE*

Number of Children in the Household	Total		Families Which Consist of							
			Children All 16 Years or Over		Children All under 16 Years		Children Both over and under 16 Years		No Children	
	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage
Total.....	5,025	100.0	194	3.9	3,556	71.0	289	5.3	986	19.7
None.....	986	19.7	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.. 986	.....
One.....	1,151	23.0	111	9.6	1,040	90.4	.....	.....	.....	.....
Two.....	1,150	23.0	43	3.8	1,056	91.8	51	4.4	.....	.....
Three.....	788	15.7	22	2.8	683	86.7	83	10.5	.....	.....
Four.....	466	9.3	11	2.4	397	85.2	58	12.4	.....	.....
Five.....	260	5.2	2	.8	226	86.9	32	12.3	.....	.....
Six.....	145	2.8	5	3.4	104	71.8	36	24.8	.....	.....
Seven.....	49	.9	.....	.....	32	65.3	17	34.7	.....	.....
Eight.....	18	.3	.....	.....	10	5.6	8	4.4	.....	.....
Nine.....	10	.1	.....	.....	7	70.0	3	30.0	.....	.....
Ten or more	2	.0	.....	.....	1	50.0	1	50.0	.....	.....

* Includes 323 households which contain relatives who are not working.

equal numbers, respectively 1,398, 1,675, and 1,433.[1] It is striking that each affords the only supplementary revenue in about three-fourths of the homes in which it figures. That is, on the whole the families seem to add to the father's wage in one way only. The children are likely to be called upon more frequently for wage-earning than is the wife, but the wife supplements the income through the care of lodgers about as frequently as she does by

[1] Compare Tables V, VI, and VII.

entering industry, and thus in one way or the other about twice as often as do the children.

The wife, then, renders by far the most important assistance. She alone aids her husband in 27 per cent of the families and she with others takes part in outside production in 35 per cent (1,398 families). But she does not usually leave home for work when there are younger children or if a revenue is available from lodgers or from older children, or when the family is large, unless older

TABLE IV

NUMBER AND AGE GROUPS OF CHILDREN IN FAMILIES WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY HUSBANDS ALONE

Number of Children in the Family	Total		Families Which Consist of							
			Children All 16 Years or Over		Children All under 16 Years		Children Both over and under 16 Years		No Children	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total	3,990	100.0	682	17.1	1,415	35.5	1,129	28.3	764	19.1
None	764	19.1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	764	.....
One	793	19.9	315	39.7	478	60.3	.....	.....	.....	.....
Two	801	20.1	210	26.2	403	50.4	188	23.4	.....	.....
Three	547	13.7	96	17.6	249	45.5	202	36.9	.....	.....
Four	441	11.1	37	8.4	145	32.9	259	58.7	.....	.....
Five	277	6.9	17	6.1	83	30.0	177	63.9	.....	.....
Six	175	4.4	4	2.3	36	20.6	135	77.1	.....	.....
Seven	107	2.7	3	2.8	14	84.1	90	13.1	.....	.....
Eight	53	1.3	.....	.....	7	13.2	46	86.8	.....	.....
Nine	16	.4	.....	.....	.....	.....	16	.....	.....	.....
Ten or more	16	.4	.....	.....	.....	.....	16	.....	.....	.....

children can help care for the younger ones. She may be a wage-earner until the birth of her first child. She may return to industry as the children grow older, but when the children are all grown, she again withdraws into her home. Considering that the income from lodgers should be credited to her account, she aids the common purse by this means in 1,433 families, 36 per cent. This means that through lodgers or wage-earning alone or with others she is a money resource in 2,831 of the homes, 71 per cent of the 3,990. But if she takes lodgers, generally her children do not work nor does she leave home for wages. Nor does she welcome to her

home, on the whole, a large number of men and women for gain. In 53 per cent of the cases there was but one lodger; in 27 per cent, but two.

The children alone form the largest single source of income (33 per cent of the families, and in conjunction with other sources,

TABLE V

EXTENT TO WHICH CHILDREN ASSIST THE FATHER IN FAMILY SUPPORT

Other Supplementary Sources of Income	Total		Families in Which There Are at Work					
			Children All 16 Years or Over		Children All under 16 Years		Children Both over and under 16 Years	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total	1,675	100.0	1,446	86.3	132	7.9	97	5.8
None*	1,317	78.6	1,165	88.5	85	6.4	67	5.1
Revenue from lodgers	186	11.1	136	73.1	31	16.7	19	10.2
Wages of wife	153	9.2	131	85.6	12	7.9	10	6.5
Wages of wife and revenue from lodgers	19	1.1	14	73.7	4	21.1	1	5.2

* Includes 105 cases where there are relatives in the household who are not at work.

TABLE VI

EXTENT TO WHICH THE WIFE ASSISTS THE HUSBAND IN FAMILY SUPPORT

Other Supplementary Sources of Income	Total		Families Which Consist of							
			Children All 16 Years or Over		Children All under 16 Years		Children Both over and under 16 Years		No Children	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total	1,398	100.0	128	9.2	609	43.6	191	13.7	469	33.5
None	1,087	77.8	57	5.2	522	48.2	91	8.3	417	38.3
Wages of children	153	10.9	59	38.6	12	7.8	82	53.6	.....	.....
Revenue from lodgers	139	9.9	6	4.3	72	51.8	9	6.5	52	37.4
Wages of children and revenue from lodgers	19	1.4	6	31.6	4	21.0	9	47.4	.....	.....

42 per cent). But very few of these families are encouraging young child labor (children under sixteen years of age work in but 14 per cent of the homes). In 86 per cent no child under sixteen works.

The causes for wage-earning by wives cannot be told from this brief survey, but Miss Hughes's discussion of *Mothers in Industry* affords some light. Her questionnaire put to mothers sought reasons why the mother *entered* industry, and as practically all were employed before the birth of the first child, we may rightly quote her returns. Only 11 per cent became wage-earners from preference, 29 per cent from inadequate wages of the husband, and all the rest because of lack of assistance from the husband (death of husband, 22 per cent; illness, 14 per cent; desertion,

TABLE VII

EXTENT TO WHICH THE HUSBAND IS ASSISTED IN FAMILY SUPPORT BY REVENUE FROM LODGERS*

Other Supplementary Sources of Income	Total		Families in Which the Number of Lodgers Is							
			One		Two		Three		Four or More	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total	1,433	100.0	757	52.8	393	27.4	154	10.7	129	9.1
None	1,089	76.0	526	48.3	319	29.3	129	11.8	115	10.6
Wages of children	186	13.0	132	71.0	36	19.3	15	8.1	3	1.6
Wage of wife	139	9.7	87	62.6	34	24.4	9	6.5	9	6.5
Wages of wife and children	19	1.3	12	63.2	4	21.0	1	5.3	2	10.5

* Lodgers include wage-earning relatives.

13 per cent; non-support, 11 per cent).[1] On the other hand, Miss Byrnes tells us that women undertake industrial home work for two reasons—because "the income of the family is inadequate for the necessaries of life" and in order to "earn to maintain a standard of living considerably beyond a mere subsistence." "Thirty-eight per cent actually claim that they work to provide pocket money."[2]

[1] Gwendolyn Hughes, *Mothers in Industry*. Submitted for degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College, not yet published.

[2] Agnes M. H. Byrnes, *Industrial Home Work in Pennsylvania*. Submitted for degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College, prepared through co-operation of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, the Consumers' League of Eastern Pennsylvania, and the Carola Woerishoffer Graduate Department of Social Economy and Social Research, Bryn Mawr College, to be published by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry early in the year 1921.

The effect on the home is indeed the most significant phase of our discussion. Time will permit of a brief statement only. The Seybert study of earning mothers establishes two facts which alone condition our conclusions. *First*, 68 per cent of 287 mothers whose husbands were working average eight hours or more a day in

TABLE VIII

THE WIFE'S WORK WEEK IN INDUSTRY

Hours of Work	Total		Women Who Work					
			Full Week		More than Three Days		Three Days or Less	
	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage	Number	Per-centage
Total*	289	100.0	248	86.0	20	7.0	21	7.0
Eight hours and over	197	68.2	177	89.9	15	7.6	5	2.5
Over four hours and under eight	83	28.7	65	78.3	6	7.2	12	14.5
Four hours and under	9	3.1	6	66.7	.....	.....	3	33.3

* Nine of the 298 women who maintain homes did not furnish information about their hours of work.

TABLE IX

WHO COOKS BREAKFAST WHEN THE WIFE WORKS AWAY FROM HOME

Cooking Done by	Total		Families in Which the Wife Works		
	Number	Percentage	Eight Hours and Over	Over Four and under Eight Hours	Four Hours and Under
Total*	289	100.0	193	77	19
Wife alone	212	73.4	142	56	14
Wife and children	20	7.0	10	7	3
Wife and adult	35	12.1	30	5	.....
Children	8	2.7	5	3	.....
Adult	7	2.4	1	4	2
Paid helper	7	2.4	5	2	.....

* Nine of the 298 women interviewed did not give complete information on this point.

industry, and 90 per cent of the eight-hour group work a full week.[1] That is, for a very large majority the work is a full day's work every day in the week. *Second*, from 56 to 76 per cent of the mothers are *alone* doing every phase of the household work (cooking, cleaning, marketing, sewing) except cooking the noon meal, and

[1] See Table VIII. This table includes only mothers who are maintaining independent homes.

even then in over one-third of the families they alone provide that service.[1] It cannot be contended that today the working mother is substituting her day in industry for labor in the household. Even when the mother is not industrially occupied a full day she

TABLE X

WHO COOKS DINNER WHEN THE WIFE WORKS AWAY FROM HOME

Cooking Done by	Total		Families in Which the Wife Works		
	Number	Percentage	Eight Hours and Over	Over Four and under Eight Hours	Four Hours and Under
Total*	285	100.0	190	76	19
Wife alone	103	36.1	60	37	6
Wife and children	29	10.2	21	4	4
Wife and adult	11	3.8	7	.....	4
Children	29	10.2	14	13	2
Adult	47	16.5	40	7	.....
Paid helper	8	2.8	5	3	.....
Meal not served	58	20.4	43	12	3

* Thirteen of the 298 women interviewed did not furnish complete information on this point.

TABLE XI

WHO COOKS SUPPER WHEN THE WIFE WORKS AWAY FROM HOME

Cooking Done by	Total		Families in Which the Wife Works		
	Number	Percentage	Eight Hours and Over	Over Four and under Eight Hours	Four Hours and Under
Total*	289	100.0	194	76	19
Wife alone	168	58.0	104	50	14
Wife and children	30	10.3	17	12	1
Wife and adult	21	7.2	17	2	2
Children	24	8.3	20	3	1
Adult	38	13.0	32	5	1
Paid helper	8	2.6	5	3	.....
Meal not served	2	.6	1	1	.....

* Nine of the 298 women interviewed did not give complete information on this point.

is engaged five to eight hours except in nine cases. And 78 per cent work every day of the week. Part day work or part week work is not now the prevailing custom.

Details as to performance of housework are illuminating, if distressing and irritating.

[1] See Tables IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XV.

The wife alone prepares the breakfast in 73 per cent of the families, and is herself at work out of the home eight hours or more in 68 per cent of these cases.[1] In 93 per cent of the homes she gets breakfast without help or with the aid of others. She pays

TABLE XII

WHO DOES THE CLEANING WHEN THE WIFE WORKS AWAY FROM HOME

Cleaning Done by	Total		Families in Which the Wife Works		
	Number	Percentage	Eight Hours and Over	Over Four and under Eight Hours	Four Hours and Under
Total*	287	100.0	193	75	19
Wife alone	175	61.0	108	51	16
Wife and children	44	15.3	30	12	2
Wife and adult	26	9.1	22	4	.....
Children	13	4.5	9	3	1
Adult	19	6.6	17	2	.....
Paid helper	10	3.5	7	3	.....

* Eleven of the 298 women interviewed did not furnish complete information on this point.

TABLE XIII

WHO DOES THE LAUNDRY WHEN THE WIFE WORKS AWAY FROM HOME

Laundry Done by	Total		Families in Which the Wife Works		
	Number	Percentage	Eight Hours and Over	Over Four and under Eight Hours	Four Hours and Under
Total*	289	100.0	193	61	35
Wife alone	160	56.36	96	37	27
Wife and children	24	8.3	18	2	4
Wife and adult	19	6.58	15	4	.....
Wife and laundry	12	4.15	8	2	2
Children	11	3.81	4	7	.....
Adult	20	6.92	18	2	.....
Paid helper	12	4.15	10	2	.....
Laundry	31	10.73	24	5	2

* Nine of the 298 women interviewed did not furnish complete information on this point.

for assistance in 2.4 per cent of the families only. She returns from a day's work to prepare supper in three-fourths of the families.

The wife alone does the cleaning (61 per cent of the homes), the laundry (56 per cent), the marketing (64 per cent), and the sewing (76 per cent). With the aid of children or an adult, even

[1] Table IX.

a larger proportion of women are responsible for cleaning and laundry (more than three-fourths) and marketing (85 per cent).

How much of the sewing the wife attempts and how much she avoids through the purchase of made articles it is impossible to tell.

TABLE XIV

WHO DOES THE MARKETING WHEN THE WIFE WORKS AWAY FROM HOME

Marketing Done by	Total		Families in Which the Wife Works		
	Number	Percentage	Eight Hours and Over	Over Four and under Eight Hours	Four Hours and Under
Total*	277	100.0	183	75	19
Wife alone	178	64.3	106	59	13
Wife and children	41	14.8	27	11	3
Wife and adult	17	6.1	13	3	1
Children	16	5.8	14	1	1
Adult	20	7.2	19	.....	1
Paid helper	5	1.8	4	1	.....

* Twenty-one of the 298 women interviewed did not give complete information on this point.

TABLE XV

WHO DOES THE SEWING WHEN THE WIFE WORKS AWAY FROM HOME

Sewing Done by	Total		Families in Which the Wife Works		
	Number	Percentage	Eight Hours and Over	Over Four and under Eight Hours	Four Hours and Under
Total*	279	100.0	187	73	19
Wife alone	213	76.4	135	61	17
Wife and children	17	6.1	12	4	1
Wife and adult	11	3.9	10	1	.....
Children	6	2.1	2	3	1
Adults	10	3.6	9	1	.....
Paid helper	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
No sewing done since working	22	7.9	19	3	.....

* Nineteen of the 298 women interviewed did not furnish complete information on this point.

Reports show that in this duty she has much less assistance from children and adults and no paid help.

Time and space forbid discussion as to the effect upon the care of the children, the health of the children, the health of the family; in other words, on all of those duties which may be considered economic, to say nothing of social obligations to the family or social

solidarity of the family. Nor can we quote from Miss Byrnes's or other descriptions of the disastrous effect on women and on homes of industrial home work. For these questions the reader is referred to the publication of the Seybert Institution and Bryn Mawr College study on *Mothers in Industry* which will be made some time early in the coming year, or to such works as *Mothers Who Must Earn*, *Endowment of Motherhood*, *Women's Work and Wages*. The incontrovertible conclusion is that the wife is carrying the burden of the family and the household as well as the responsibilities of industry.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The family supplements the chief wage-earner's income in a very large proportion of cases, but it supplements it from any sources available and from one source only at a time. Apparently, then, it is not a social cause which impels but an economic force which drives the family to industrial activity outside the home or to introduce industry into the household. In only 27 per cent of the families with *no* children was the wife a wage-earner in industry. It is the wife who is chiefly depended upon. Either she enters industry or she performs industrial processes on factory products in the home or she secures returns from extraneous or even parasitic individuals as lodgers. Children living at home, especially those over sixteen, become wage-earners and add to the family income, but their earnings are uncertain, their contributions irregular,[1] and their position, as they grow older, is that of the boarder, or they withdraw to form new homes. Again boarders and lodgers are doubtful financial assets, quite as often becoming both economic and social liabilities.

The result is shown to be a great burden on the wife. Her workday is a double day. She works a full day in industry. She returns to full responsibility in the home. She manages her household, she cooks the meals, she cleans the house, she attends to the marketing, she is the family seamstress, and she cares for the children. In short, when she goes to the factory she surrenders no part of the

[1] See study of 5,000 children at work made by the writer in 1905 in the *Report of the Massachusetts Commission on Industrial and Technical Education.*

home load which before she carried.[1] In the meantime children are withdrawing from school at too early an age and are entering blind-alley jobs to secure larger supplementary earning than learner's jobs would afford. They and the state are forfeiting their fundamental education and sacrificing their ability to earn a living. And family life is being threatened by incorporating extraneous human elements or by transforming the home into a shop, cluttering it up with masses of undesirable stuffs, introducing dirt, disease, and the nerve-pressure atmosphere of the factory. The study of 728 mothers in industry in Philadelphia and 1,131 industrial home workers in Pennsylvania, together with reiterated testimony from the Cadbury, Matheson, Shan study, *Women's Work and Wages*, and Collett, Anthony, McDowell, and many others corroborate the conclusion that women now perform a double day's work or children co-operate in family support because of income insufficient to maintain a family in minimum health and comfort.

But production has not yet by any means entirely escaped from the home. Production still continues in the home and the life in family groups prevails. All housing movements and plans provide for established individual households. The entire budget is a group budget. It is a co-operative enterprise, the earnings coming from without and within, the entire family endeavoring to maintain a decent home, intending, struggling, to retain itself in the prestige of the earlier social institution.

The family is indeed in a transition stage. The wife will continue to be exploited by earning both outside and inside the home. The children will continue to be defrauded of education and prevented from preparation for their own life and restrained from establishing their own homes. But in time a change will be effected. The home is bound to substitute industrial products from without or introduce mechanical processes within.[2] The state is beginning to interfere by withdrawing older children from industry

[1] See unpublished Seybert material, also see especially Elizabeth Sloan Chesser, *Woman, Marriage and Motherhood*, chap. ix; John B. Leeds, *The Household Budget*.

[2] See John B. Leeds, *The Household Budget*, sec. xxiii; Clementina Black, *The New Way of Housekeeping* (1918), *passim*.

for education and will before long seize upon younger children for care. It cannot much longer look upon the exploited adolescent nor upon the neglected young child with complacency. And if it provides for health care in clinics and hospitals, education in day nurseries and kindergartens, it will, as Professor Patten suggests, insist that the mother repay to society that cost.

Economic employment of *married* women will bring marriage at an earlier age, thus withdrawing support by younger members from the family after the apprenticeship period. Then, too, political changes have brought individualization, and with the advent of equal suffrage, independence of the family on the part of the component units must ensue. The question is, Will the family institution as we know it give way before these economic, political, and social changes? Or is Calhoun correct when he declares that "the family experiences individuation, ceases to be a forced grouping, and develops toward ethical unity and spontaneous democracy"?[1]

George Elliott Howard has so well analyzed the transitional family, has so clearly shown the trend of development, has so forcefully portrayed the hopeful outlook, that one need not pause for fear nor hesitate to follow whither the argument leads. Howard says:

> The liberation of woman in every one of its aspects profoundly involves the destiny of the family. It signifies in all the larger activities of life the relative individualization of one-half of human kind. This means, of course, a weakening of the solidarity of the family group, so far as its cohesion is dependent on the remnants of mediaeval marital authority. Will the ultimate dissolution of the family thus become the price of equality and freedom? Or rather, is it not almost certain that in the more salubrious air of freedom and equality there is being evolved a higher type of the family, knit together by ties—sexual, moral, and spiritual—far more tenacious than those fostered by the régime of subjection?[2]

And again:

> It is within the family itself that the growing economic independence of woman is producing the highest sociological results.[3]

[1] Arthur W. Calhoun, *Social History of the American Family*, III, 158.

[2] George Elliott Howard, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, III, 235 f.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 248; see also Theresa Schmid McMahon, *Women and Economic Evolution*, chap. vii.

One cannot forbear quotation from Professor Patten, one of the earliest students not only to prophesy but to champion the economic liberation of women, even of "Young Wives in Industry":[1]

> The obstacle that stands between, to state it in terms of race instead of national psychology, is our Occidental concept of the seclusion of aristocratic women, borrowed from the Orient and slowly filtering downward to blight the energies and halt the wealth-producing world.

This paper cannot deal further with this much mooted question. It only hopes to indicate what must happen if the family is to survive. The wife, and the wife alone probably, then, will in that future day aid the husband in the economic support of the family either through regular industry out of the home or through industrial makeshifts in the home in the form of home work or by taking boarders and lodgers. Avowedly society should not and will not tolerate home industry, so called; apparently the home will not from choice care for drifting individuals. The wife will be and in fact is partially today in industry to replace the contribution to production formerly made through household processes. She must earn sufficient to substitute prepared foods, ready-made garments, laundered clothing and household linens, care of house and care of children from without, or service with which to provide these necessities from within. And she must earn enough to allow for the "expense of individualism." What she herself must replace is what the family forfeits, or what the new resources and new standards cost by loss of her labor in the home. "For contrasted with the self-sufficient family of the early 19th century the industrial family of the 20th century is dependent largely on money income for its support."[2]

In his analysis of the household budget, based on returns from sixty families in Philadelphia, Leeds claims that in a family having an income of $1,800, the cash value of the wife's services may be estimated at $945 and the cost of service substituted for her time would be about the same. The average time spent was placed at eight and one-half hours on week days and 4.8 on Sundays.[3] But

[1] *Independent*, LVII (1904), 1247.

[2] John B. Leeds, *The Household Budget*, chap. i; Scott Nearing, *Reducing the Cost of Living*, chap. iii.

[3] Other members of the family are supposed to work altogether six and one-half hours a day.

Leeds's study was made in 1914–15 and the families selected represented a higher standard than we contemplate in industry. However, today $1,600 to $1,800 is the estimated minimum comfort level. It requires no imagination and but few figures to see that services of one household worker today, omitting managerial responsibility, would cost at least $10.00 for wage and $10.00 for living, or at least $1,000 per year. But, if working out of the home, the wife must pay this sum for service and in addition must supervise or manage the household. To do this without exhaustion or exploitation, "her *home periods* must be as long as her children's and longer than her husband's and she must have a store of energy left with which to accomplish her home duties."[1] On such a basis she must be on part-time service.

If we allow her thirty hours a week (the hours her children should be in state care), and earnings of $1,000 to substitute for services or costs, she would have to earn then proportionately about as much in money wage as the family demands for its existence today, or $1,600 to $1,800. That is, the husband's earnings would of necessity be sufficient to meet demands equivalent to present-day support and the wife would be compelled to earn approximately as much for her services as would her husband for his. And we arrive at a proper basis—equal wage for equal time and equal service.

If in coming years, during the period of child-bearing,[2] the wife cannot earn out of the home, or industry and living have become so organized that she cannot contribute by production in the home, we are driven to the principle of state endowment of motherhood for the necessary period.[3]

Let us make ourselves clear—the amount necessary to maintain a family in health and at least the minimum of comfort should be regarded the minimum wage for every adult wage-earner, and no allowance should be made for contributions from other family

[1] S. Patten, *Independent*, LXI (1906), 679.

[2] Presupposing that this means until the youngest child is five years of age.

[3] Katherine Anthony, *The Endowment of Motherhood*. The British Committee on Family Endowment has presented a very forceful and complete analysis of the present necessity for such a measure to keep women out of industry and a careful estimate of cost to the state.

members. If the wife remains in the home, she earns an equal amount by her care and by production in the home. If she leaves the home, she should be paid for her services on the same scale as her husband, and this would provide for a substitute if need be.

Time and space prevent consideration of the size of family in relation to wage, or of the wage of unattached adult individuals. Neither question offers serious difficulties. Suffice it to say (1) that the number of single workers will be lessened by earlier marriages; (2) that a very large proportion of single workers are young and should be looked upon, treated, and paid as learners; and (3) that to the single adult worker we shall doubtless continue to look for support of broken families and of aged parents, until such time as the state or industry or the two combined shall provide that savings or insurance should eliminate the need. In that day doubtless the number of single workers will be reduced.

The conclusion may seem idealistic. But let us not forget that if we *do not* insist on wage being sufficient to support the family group, we are either forcing families to live below the subsistence level, *or* we are placing a double burden on the wife, thus penalizing posterity, *or* we are exploiting young children and adolescents, *or* we are defrauding the young adult and placing a mortgage both on industry and on society which the future must pay.

DISCUSSION

HELEN GLENN TYSON, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

The most striking point that Dr. Kingsbury has brought out in her paper is that the so-called "normal family group," with the traditional status of the father and mother clearly defined as breadwinner and home-maker respectively, is in the minority today. In less than half of the 11,073 families canvassed was the father the sole breadwinner. In nearly 10 per cent of the families the father was making no contribution at all to the family support.

This study is simply another analysis of the encroachment of machine industry and urbanization on traditional home life, whether the effect be to draw wife and child out of the home, to introduce work processes on industrial products into the home, or to bring the single industrial worker as boarder or lodger into the family group.

The married woman is in industry to stay. Dr. Kingsbury's study has shown that she is working full time, like the unmarried woman, and at the same time she is trying to maintain a home and carry on her family duties. It needs no statistical proof to make it clear that the individual who is attempting to carry on two full-time jobs is bound to fail at both. One must be given up, or both reduced in hours and effort expended.

That the modern city home is not succeeding even in the elementary task of providing simple physical care of the child is evident. The recent discovery of the prevalence of malnutrition among a high percentage of our school children, to which Dr. Kingsbury calls attention, points not only to actual poverty but to wretched home-making, especially in regard to the choice and preparation of food. Jane Addams declared some fifteen years ago that house work is a "belated industry"—or rather, I should call it, an outworn collection of semiskilled activities. When recent facts about malnutrition begin to sink into the public consciousness, the community must see that the scientific choice and preparation of food cannot be trusted to the individual family, whether or not the mother is working outside the home. The anachronism of the rural family cookstove will vanish, and neighborhood cooking, whether on a co-operative or commercial basis, will evolve. This should mark a distinct gain: in better food for the children and in a potential saving of at least five hours a day for the mother.

On the industrial side there are already certain signs of the times in regard to the adaptation of industry for the purpose of drawing in, and keeping at work, married women with children. Last winter the National Biscuit Company in Pittsburgh advertised: "Mothers! Why not earn money by easy work, on part time, while your husband is away and the children are at school?" This notice ran for months in the daily papers, so the company must have considered the experiment feasible and productive of business results. The famous Heinz Pickle Factory is also employing married women on part time. Some types of work obviously cannot be adjusted to a part-time work schedule; others, involving simple processes requiring little skill, can well be adapted.

Dr. Kingsbury's conclusion that "the economic employment of married women will bring marriage at an early age" would seem to be without statistical foundation, and scarcely a reasonable conjecture. The young woman in industry today knows only too well the effect of accidental maternity on the economic resources of the family, and the strain involved in combining child care with wage-earning. Until the taboo on the scientific dissemination of birth-control information has been lifted, and until some adequate form of maternity insurance—as a first step toward maternity endowment—has been instituted, the precarious opportunity to earn money after marriage, incident to the responsibilities of the home, will not be regarded with enthusiasm by the young women of today.

FRANK D. WATSON, HAVERFORD COLLEGE

The picture of mothers in industry which Dr. Kingsbury has painted is indeed dark and sobering. We are under a real debt of gratitude to those who have made possible the interesting statistical studies on which her paper is based. As to the facts, I shall take no exceptions. It is only too true that the present result of mothers in industry is to place a great burden on the wife and mother in that she works a full day in industry and returns to full responsibility in the home, thus making her workday a "double day." It is also generally recognized, though heretofore statistical proof may have been lacking, that the great majority of mothers who enter industry (89 per cent) do so from economic pressure, and not from choice.

It is only when we come to solutions, to the ways out of the present morass of overwork on the part of mothers in industry and the possible neglect of opportunities as mother and homemaker, that I would part company with Dr. Kingsbury, if I understand her aright.

At least two possible solutions lie before us. Dr. Kingsbury describes one when she quotes Dr. Patten, apparently with approval, as follows:

> The state is beginning to interfere by withdrawing older children from industry for education and will before long seize upon younger children for care. . . . : If it provides for health care in clinics and hospitals, education in day nurseries and kindergartens, it will insist that the mother repay to society that cost.

This solution seems to presuppose that the state can supply the needs of children better or as well as parents, in the normal home, a presupposition which it should be noted is at direct variance with the leading specialists of the country in child welfare.[1]

In my opinion, the solution of the problem before us lies in the other direction. I believe that the mother of young children should be released entirely from the demands of industry. This should be possible today if the group wage for which Dr. Kingsbury contends obtained generally. To me such a wage is not idealistic but just and economically sound. If by the simple hand-tool methods of the eighteenth century and earlier, society supported itself, surely with the unprecedented and undreamed-of increase in production made possible by the industrial revolution, when for the first time nature's titanic forces were harnessed to meet man's needs, mankind should be able to get its nose far enough above the grindstone to make unnecessary the "double-day" for every son and daughter of toil.

With Dr. Kingsbury's demand for equal pay for equal work I have no quarrel, though my reasons for supporting such a position follow along other lines than hers. Theoretically wages should bear no relation to the cost of living for either the single or married worker. Minimum-wage legislation, based on cost-of-living studies, may for some time be necessary in certain

[1] See *Minimum Standards of Child Welfare*, adapted by the Washington and Regional Conferences on Child Welfare, Washington, 1919.

exploited industries and for groups least able to protect themselves by organization, but their staunchest supporters would be the last to contend that the minimum wage should be the standard wage, much less the maximum. In short, were the social surplus of today socialized, not to mention the vast accretions to that surplus which invention and discoveries are daily making, the wage of every able-bodied worker, man or woman, would, I believe, be considerably above the highest legal minimum wage and be sufficient to establish a family. If a man and woman decide to form a partnership in marriage and find self-expression in the home and children, that is their choice. If they decide to find self-expression in other social channels, such as art or music, that is their concern and society would err in preventing such a choice.

If the social surplus were thus distributed through higher wages, the mother would be relieved from entering industry from economic pressure. She should equally be relieved from overwork in the home from economic pressure. Here the need of a bit of "job analysis" of the work of wife and mother is necessary. In the past the mother in the home had three distinct tasks, (1) that of house worker, (2) that of house-manager and home-maker, and (3) the largest part of the care and training of the children, especially during their early years. Because production was in the past carried on in the home and because of the inefficient organization of much if not all housework, the hours consumed in the first two tasks left little time or energy for the third task, namely, that of scientific child-rearing. Children often just brought themselves up and while they may have done pretty good jobs in individual cases, any student of the returns of the army-draft tests must be shocked by the low physical and mental plane of young American manhood. Doubtless a similar sifting of the young womanhood of the country would have revealed equally challenging conditions.

If the new psychology is right, as I believe it is, in stating that the foundations laid during the first three or four years of a child's life are of the utmost significance and that we are just awakening to the social import of the formative years of the pre-school age, then we should welcome every increase of leisure that electric washing-machines and vacuum cleaners bring to mothers for their real job, rather than insisting that they repay society for any service by entering industry. With the new science of child psychology, our imaginations are just glimpsing the extent of these opportunities and the amount of the mother's time that their full realization entails. To do her job well the mother needs time off for recreation. Where shall we find the hours for outside industrial occupation?

Curiously enough, the human resource has been the last resource to be conserved and developed. Boys and girls, because of inefficient parenthood, are swelling the ranks of the inefficient. Often the damage has been done before the school can touch the life of the child and I for one believe the school at best can never be a substitute for the home but only its tool. If workers were as efficient as they could be made through education in its broadest sense,

the social surplus of the next generation would dwarf in comparison that of the present. With efficient training from the first day of life to maturity, but especially during the formative pre-school years, boys and girls might take their places in the work of the world better equipped at eighteen years of age than they often are now at twenty or twenty-two. The parent making possible this saving of time and increased production, is in the real sense a producer.

It may be that before this can be realized to any large extent, we shall need schools for parents more than schools for children, but though this may involve delay, the experience of all specialists in child welfare seems to point out that it is the road affording the greatest possibilities for social progress.

PROCESSES IN RADICALISM

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I

The upbuilding of the social order is a highly complex process that is slow and uncertain. The task of leading hundreds of thousands of persons to feel, think, and judge alike concerning essential social interests, to trust one another and co-operate with one another is performed at the cost of infinite care and with far from perfect outcome. Yet only this process makes social life possible and the degree to which it is carried indicates the quality of social life achieved.

While the social process works toward some kind of unity, provision must be made for antagonism of interests, personal reluctances in surrendering the direction of desire, partial failure of general social purpose, conflicts of philosophy, temperament, and judgment. The social process makes for unity and aspiration calls for it, yet it must provide for, and respect, conflicts conducted with orderly spirit. We see life as a whole, yet deal with it in stubborn fractions. We think toward unity but live in relation to diversified interests, valuations, and standards. All of this is part of the price paid for liberty. We hope that the agents of social control may find their unity and law in ideals, but they remain in large part uncoerced.

Tendencies toward stability and toward change are universal. All ordinary calculations of life assume some kind of continuity and stability. This is so true that successful revolution seeks stability at once by hindering counter revolution. With success, it ceases to believe in revolution. All experience of life shows that change is inevitable, that readjustment is a constant problem, that enlarging purposes modify aims, and command of new knowledge and power raises the standard by which we judge results.

Some interests, temperaments, and forms of conviction lead toward emphasis on what is, on what has been done and keep in mind limitations to which ideals must be subjected. Other types of mind, interest and belief point in the direction of change. They stress the work that remains to be done, seek impulsively the way to greater achievement, and find no sense of rest in what is. The supreme challenge to the wisdom of social authority lies in finding the point at which conservatism begins to err and radicalism ceases to err, and in shaping policies on the conjunction of the two.

Problems are solved only for their time and then they are but partly solved. What might be a solution of an isolated problem may become easily a serious problem in the social whole. Since society is in a state of unstable equilibrium, today's solution of a problem becomes a problem tomorrow. Change is occurring constantly on the planes of thought, organization, process, and relation in society. Movement in each is at different rates of speed. Political institutions are the last to feel and respond to this pressure. Impulses toward change that meet no opposition can but destroy. Resistance to change to the point of suppression prepares disaster. Thus conservatism and radicalism are, to use Emerson's phrase, good halves but impossible wholes.

The terms are relative. Ultra-radicals dislike the American Federation of Labor because it is conservative, alleged to be the tool of capital. Some employers dislike it because it is called radical. The practical social conscience of today has worked out a middle course which is being followed in reform effort. These changes are in the direction of more explicit definition of human rights, organic view of them in their social setting, greater assurance of opportunity to the individual with decreasing interference and increasing assistance from many kinds of social arrangement, provision for social reinforcement to the less competent, increasing democratization of industry, wider diffusion of private property, increasing realization of the civic value of social responsibility with opportunity to exercise it, improved control of the machinery of government, wider diffusion of information and understanding of the structure and functions of government.

Churches, all grades of schools, idealistic practical movements, public leaders, parties and government, press, masses of literature co-operate in their several ways in this process. Here is found the basis of practical confidence in fundamental institutions. Here we meet the efforts of an awakened society to take from conservatism its message and from radicalism its inspiration and impulse and thereby to hasten the day of social justice and moderated social conflict.

This entire range of activity in social reform rests on the assumption that our liberties must be safeguarded, that democracy is a philosophy of life as well as form of government, that qualities are more important than institutions, that movement must be gradual and adjustment careful for the sake of those who have gained least in present conditions. Earnest effort is made to avoid the intemperate energy of uncritical idealism on the one hand and the bold, defiant immobility of conservatism on the other.

Throughout this reform work of the newer social conscience, recognition of certain human facts is found shaping aims and policies to a slower speed than we would theoretically wish. These facts are accompaniments of liberty and as such associated with our practical activities at all times, as they must be reckoned with wherever popular government is found. One is divided council. So long as we must stand on presumptions and be satisfied with partial views of life and parts of life, men will disagree and hold tenaciously to their convictions. Now thought is stimulated in this way and the social conscience pays the price of divided council in order to get assurance of greater wisdom through discussion.

This practical reform movement recognizes the tremendous rôle that human qualities play in the operation of institutions. "Circumstances," says Edmund Burke, "give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil or political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind." "History consists for the greater part of the misery brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal and all the train of disorderly appetites." On this account dependence

is placed on qualities rather than on institutions in practical reform work.

Again it is recognized that as the size of the governmental unit grows and organization becomes more complex, personal qualities become more important to the social order, and the obstructive power of the individual is increased. The general inclination of humanity toward apathy to the general good, the moral tendency to love sociological dividends which are rights and dislike sociological taxes which are obligations, will yield, under free institutions, only to moral and spiritual forces. They cannot be remedied by institutions. "The fault is not in politics." "It is in humanity." The practical reform movement that is attempting the adjustment of life to new ideals, new knowledge, and higher standards, has few axioms and many problems. It works close to the facts of life and appeals to the experience of the race in its methods and aims.

Back of all activity and as a condition to all interpretations, it places a substantial confidence in our basic institutions and permits nothing to invade it. This essential confidence is below the frost line of doubt. Belief in our institutions, belief in their capacity of adaptation to large vision and new needs, belief in the resources still undeveloped in them, is determining in the psychology, the philosophy, and practical methods of the social conscience that guides reform.

I am thinking of this confidence as an assumption, not as a demonstration. It is the starting- and finishing-point in all action. This confidence does not mean satisfaction with conditions. Far from it. It does not mean pride in achievement so much as a heavy sense of unfulfilled duty toward humanity. It does mean intelligent loyalty and it sends its believers into our institutions and principles, not away from them, for remedies for our wrongs.

II

We may sketch some of the traits in radicalism in this background. It is a tendency showing qualities in every degree, showing them in a most marked way in some recent forms. They are kept in mind for purposes of comparison.

Radicalism, so understood, takes a unified view of life into which all partial views are melted by the heat of its emotion. It sees no problems. Our problems are its axioms, to borrow Wagner's phrase. It has little liking for divided council and drifts into an intolerance of opposition that, in last analysis, knows no restraint. It throws excessive emphasis upon institutions and withdraws it from human qualities which condition them. Diverting as it does all sense of personal responsibility away from the individual and centering it upon institutions, its message has an undeniable appeal to all for whom thinking is a difficulty and moral self-discipline is distasteful.

Radicalsim drifts into the habit of formula—of thinking in terms of generalized emotion. It drifts away from detailed inclusive views of life. It requires a dislike for all information that runs counter to its feelings, and gains a perverted sense of proportion. It sees all evils as one aggregate of evil, not as separate phases of many situations in which good and evil are mixed. It interprets all evil in one formula; all reforms in one promise. In this way it falls victim to the fallacy of concentration, envelops the world in the gloom of despair, and ultimately rejects government, religion, property and forgets the experience of the race in the ecstasy of its dream.

It would be wrong to assume that all radicalism is of this type. Far from it. Ultra-radicalism has no more severe critic than is the socialist. But the present moderated forms of economic socialism have ancestors and relatives among more extreme types.

The degree to which one loses confidence in our basic institutions indicates one's susceptibility to the radical propaganda. One may measure every evil with courage and accuracy, but so long as confidence remains in institutions remedy will be sought within them. Once basic confidence is lost, one is prepared for the radical message that would seek relief in overturning basic institutions. Policies, standards, interpretations, measures, and immediate aims depend finally on the quality and degree of confidence that is retained in institutions, and in processes of orderly change provided for under them. The conviction that things are going fairly well and may with effort go better, tends to verify itself

by making them go well. The conviction that things are going badly and cannot go better, tends to verify itself by making them go badly. When one assumes that the present social order is bankrupt one helps it on toward bankruptcy, as one depositor may, by his loss of trust in his bank, precipitate a run that means disaster.

Confidence in our basic institutions then becomes a problem of national concern. If we are spendthrift of it, careless of it, indifferent to its function in our stability, wisdom, and progress, we remove obstacles to extreme radical propaganda without enriching our national life by newer wisdom or clearer thought. If we leave the industry, the ingenuity, the resources of destructive forces unhindered, we leave the confidence which is the foundation of our national life exposed to every danger. Now our protection of this confidence is tedious, difficult, a constant problem while the propaganda for its destruction is easy.

The propaganda of extreme radicalism is directed against this confidence with unabated zeal. The killing of confidence in leaders, in processes of law-making and administration, in political parties, in the labor movement, in social reform, in the resources of our institutions is attempted with constant industry and alertness. It is evident that the propaganda can succeed only as minds lose immunity against it and take on some degree of susceptibility. It is easy enough to locate and characterize the extreme radical propaganda. But a question presents itself as to the degree in which our own ordinary methods help to destroy confidence at certain points and play into the hands of the extreme radical.

The methods of our political parties are very severe on the intelligence, moral integrity, motives, and record of opposition leaders and parties. The breakdown of confidence for the sake of victory is a chief aim. The breakdown of confidence between capital and labor is perhaps the most obstinate feature of the labor question. And yet the labor movement is one of the stoutest defenders of confidence in our basic institutions that we have. The habit of judging our institutions by what they have not accomplished helps too by throwing judgment into negative form instead of insistence on the forward movement of life.

Now in as far as these methods involve untruth or deliberate misrepresentation, we would probably agree in reprobating them. In as far as they represent honest conviction and earnest advocacy of what is right and what seems best, we may not interfere with them. We can perhaps neutralize some of the undesirable effects by much more elaborate care of the teaching of what is now called Americanism. This means civics in a wider sense.

Our institutions have not had a fair chance. We have not brought to them the qualities that condition their success. We have had an uninformed citizenship not alone of alien but also of native birth, not alone of illiterate but also of educated men. We have delegated political thinking to parties, tolerated apathy, developed an indifferent electorate. We may confess to lack of information about our institutions, lack of understanding of their processes, lack of historical insight into their place in historical evolution. The movement now universal—touching universities, labor leaders, churches, organizations of every kind—is aiming to do a belated duty in order to develop the qualities which condition the operation of our institutions. Civics contains many wholesome elements, all of which bear directly on the understanding of our institutions and confidence in them and leads to more active share in the responsibilities of government. Civics as information; civics as understanding of the processes of adaptation of institutions to changed conditions; civics as a force shaping qualities for citizenship; civics as a phase of history; civics as moral philosophy; civics as mental discipline—that is positive, affirmative study of institutions and their limitations, leading to a practical attitude toward ideals. Ross suggests that civics "may find a larger place than we imagine in the adult education of the future."

We need a national drive to raise an enormous fund of confidence in our basic institutions, to awaken the civic sense, to strengthen citizenship, to seek and face the ugly truths in present conditions, and to exploit the moral, spiritual, and social, no less than legal, resources which can, in and under our free institutions, hasten the day of justice.

DISCUSSION

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Dr. Kerby has been unable to furnish me an advance copy of his paper, and has suggested that my treatment of the topic assigned might be in the nature of an independent discussion thereof. This suggestion I am glad to accept, but my discussion will nevertheless have some reference to his own treatment, a provisional sketch of which he has been good enough to supply.

If I understand him aright, Dr. Kerby's position with respect to radicalism might be characterized, in the philsopher's jargon, as rationalistic, or idealistic; for (1) he undertakes to pass a judgment of value on radicalism considered as a type of political behavior; (2) he seeks to determine the means of counteracting radicalism, or of securing that confidence in the social order which he opposes to it; and (3) he assumes that, those means having been determined, they can be so applied as to accomplish the results required of them.

To my way of thinking, such an approach to social and political questions, while it may have a certain value, is apt to mislead us even more than it instructs us. Our first task is one of understanding radicalism, a task which, in my opinion, cannot be achieved if we are preoccupied with the question of how to prevent radicalism. Nor, granting that we shared Dr. Kerby's negative judgment as to the value of radicalism, should we so readily assume that people will generally agree to co-operate in our preventive program.

If, instead of approaching the question in the manner illustrated by Dr. Kerby's paper, we assumed that radicalism and conservatism (for they ought to be considered together) are the *natural* resultants of a certain concatenation of social agents, causes, or conditions, we should have made a beginning in the investigation of these phenomena; and if we then ascertained the characteristic modes of action of these several agents or causes, when linked together in the given manner, we should be well on the road to a dispassionate comprehension of radicalism regarded as a natural phenomenon. We should then be prepared to consider the question whether the agents or causes producing radicalism were or were not likely to predominate over the causes or agents producing conservatism. We might then venture to absolve ourselves of the necessity of forming a judgment as to the value of radicalism, or of conservatism, and devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the task of understanding and explaining these phenomena.

The agents or causes operative in any social situation may be grouped under three general categories: (*a*) geographical conditions, including land, topography, mineral resources, climate, etc.; (*b*) culture (in the technical sense of the term), including social, economic, and political institutions, the industrial arts, media of communication, current social and political ideals, etc.; (*c*) human beings with their characteristic mental and physiological functions. Agents of these general classes co-operate together in supporting, limiting, and modifying social life in all its phases. It is these agents, therefore,

which determine radical or conservative reactions to the social conditions which happen to be prevalent at a given time and place.

Now, the concatenation of the agents or causes of the general classes distinguished is such in the United States, and such over the greater part of Europe and a considerable part of other continental areas, as to have produced powerful radical movements aiming at a fundamental reconstruction of prevailing political and economic institutions. These radical movements have already resulted in revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, and it seems certain that they will soon result in momentous political and economic changes over a great part of Western Europe. A dispassionate survey of conditions in the United States would seem to indicate the probability of similar fundamental changes in our political and economic institutions, though not in the immediate future.

I cannot within the limits of this paper present the analysis of conditions which would support such a forecast. Certain of the factors operating in that direction in the United States may, however, be indicated.

Under the category of geographical conditions I would put the pre-emption of free or cheap agricultural land, concentration of the ownership of other natural resources in a comparatively few hands, and a like concentration in the ownership of capital—in short, the ownership by a fraction of the people of land and other material resources from which sustenance for all the people must be derived. This means that a large proportion of the people have no legal right to these sources of subsistence, and that they must gain access thereto by submitting themselves to the authority of those who exercise this prerogative. Thus is established the subordination of wageworker to capitalist employer, and thus arise our striking contrasts in the distribution of wealth and opportunity.

Under the category of culture we should place the economic system itself, with the legal conceptions of property and of contract that underly it; also our so-called representative political institutions, our popular doctrines of liberty and equality, our press, our churches, and our educational institutions.

Under the third category we would stress certain instinctive tendencies in human nature, particularly the fear, fighting, acquisitive, gregarious, and self-assertive tendencies, the conservative force of habit in political and economic relationships, and the restricted rôle of the intellect in bringing about a rational adjustment of antagonistic social and economic interests.

The factors indicated and others not mentioned have so operated as to bring a large group of propertyless wage-earners under the domination of a smaller group of propertied employers; have brought about a condition of great insecurity for these wage-earners, which makes them fearful of asserting themselves against their employers; have denied or very seriously limited the participation of the wage-earning group in the higher phases of our civilization; and have made possible a conspicuous consumption of wealth, with its offensive self-display, on the part of many in the employing or capitalistic group.

This inequality of wealth and opportunity and this semiservile status of a large proportion of our population seem to many, especially to the wage-earning group itself, a violation of our traditional principles of liberty and equality. Moreover, the conditions indicated represent a repression of many potent instinctive tendencies in the laborer, notably the self-assertive and constructive instincts, and indirectly of the sex and parental instincts. Indeed, it could be shown that all the more potent instincts are in the wage-earner repressed under prevailing industrial conditions. This repression of powerful instincts and this seeming denial of liberty and equality provoke strong fear and fighting reactions on the part of the wage-earning group—fear of what the future may bring, and a struggle against the conditions which frustrate their interests (or repress their instincts). And, increasingly, these fighting reactions are directed against the legal and economic institutions under which the conditions frustrating their interests have arisen. The employing group typically respond to these reactions of the wage-earning group with counter-reactions belonging to the same response-groups of fear and pugnacity. The gregarious instinct enters in to sanction the fighting reactions of both groups.

Now, reason or intellect does not, and apparently cannot, function in situations like this to bring about an amicable adjustment of the contending forces. On the contrary, it functions mainly, in each group, as a search for greater gain or advantage from the situation in question, and for more effective means of prosecuting the struggle against the opposing group.

Moreover, political action seems to offer but little hope of a solution, for both parties look to political instruments only as means of strengthening their respective positions, not as a means of reconciling their differences. Political action is itself mainly determined by habit, by crowd-suggestion, by family, sectional and partisan traditions in politics, and by that economic interest which is powerful enough to appropriate and utilize these forces. These factors taken together operate normally in support of the *status quo*, for the press and other suggestioning agencies are allied through association or economic interest with the capitalistic group, while political habit and tradition are integral parts of the *status quo*. The group whose interests demand a modification of the *status quo* are coming to realize this fact, and are beginning to insist that issues between them and the opposing group be exempted from the jurisdiction of constituted political authorities.

If this is an approximately correct sketch of the genesis of radicalism in this country, it is futile to hope that it can be counteracted by moral and political education, or by any other agency which does not seriously modify the causes or conditions which have combined to produce it. For those conditions will be far more eloquent, so to speak, than any moral or political education could possibly be. If our analysis has not been wholly beside the mark, radicalism will continue and grow unless or until the conditions which generate it have been modified. And that modification of conditions which alone could terminate the radical movement would itself be radicalism victorious.

We seem, then, to be limited to two alternatives—the one a continuation and growth of the radical movement; the other a definitive victory for that movement. And the choice between these alternatives will not lie with those who would apply prophylactics to the radical movement, but with that ensemble of natural social agents or causes which generate both radicalism and conservatism.

THE FUTURE OF SOCIOLOGY

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When I accepted the invitation to submit a paper on this subject I had in mind a line of argument that would keep close to a central thought. Reflection led me to abandon that idea, and to present some snapshots at certain important phases of our situation. I have not tried to organize them into logical relations.

In the first place, there can be no plausible doubt that sociology has a future. The readiest way to assure this conviction is to recall our past and to survey our present. We are often told that the ultimate criterion of science is its power to predict. Whether or not sociology has won a mandate to predict, our past furnishes us almost irresistible stimulus to believe. We are here. We are at work. It is inconceivable that anything short of our own defection can abort our future.

There could scarcely be a sharper contrast than that between the sociological outlook of today and of thirty years ago. At that time a handful of men in this country were challenging fate by declaring their independence of the older social sciences, and by proclaiming their faith in a potential something dormant in the facts of life, which they proposed to quicken under the name sociology. Two time-worn symbols fit our adventure. We early dissenters from the traditions of social science were like Abraham faring forth to seek an unknown country. We were still further like Saul on the errand which started to retrieve his father's asses but ended in founding a kingdom.

Today in hundreds of institutions, from academy to graduate school, sociology is a peer in academic rank of all but the elements, language and mathematics. Nothing but unthinkable failure of sociologists to use their occupied standing ground can nullify this achievement. All the signs are that this gain in a single generation is not a passing spasm, but that it is the beginning of a mighty growth.

Again, sociology has a future not alone because it has won academic recognition. That is merely an external sign of an invisible fact. An underlying reason for this fact and an essential assurance of the future of sociology is that people are insatiably interested in people. Sociology and psychology together have opened up vistas of facts about people which a few decades ago were not within reach of imagination. These facts grade up from the most tangible concreteness to the most comprehensive generalizations that do not go out of bounds among the nebulae of speculative philosophy. To our present outlook these types of fact present inexhaustible varieties of details and combinations. Each of them is cause and effect of situations which make or mar people's fortunes. They range from relations of the milk supply to infant mortality, and from the relations of venereal disease to infant blindness to the most involved problems of social psychology. They are all, however, questions of real people about real people. Their interest is not chiefly academic; it is vital. There is something somewhere in this gamut of questions to pique the curiosity of all sorts and conditions of men. It is incredible that people will place a diminished estimate upon inquiry into these facts which so largely compose the human career. It is as easy to believe that our bodies will outgrow need of water as that our minds will outgrow interest in these realities that are the substance of our larger life.

In the second place, the plainly discernible future of sociology deploys along three routes, viz., (1) teaching in the wide sense, including all sorts of publicity, (2) research, (3) social control.

So far as numbers go, the third of these routes is likely always to be chosen by the vast majority. They may not only call themselves sociologists, but they may have a valid claim to that title, although only a small fraction of them may ever make out more than a dim adumbration of the scope of sociology as a cardinal division of social science. The limits of this paper will not permit discussion of this tendency, although one phase of it will be noticed later. At this outset I merely record my confession that sociologists of my own type of primary interest—the methodological—have not been good pragmatists in our attitude toward the direct-action wing of the sociologists. We have accused that tendency of

making programs without taking thought. Its representatives have accused the methodologists of taking thought without affecting programs. There has been both truth and error in each position. Not merely social practice but sociological theory will tend to stability in part through adjustment of these complementary attitudes. I shall return to this subject.

Next in order of numbers are the sociologists who approach the subject from the teaching side. The indications are almost demonstrative that throughout any future in which children already born can be actors, all along the line, from no one can foretell how early in the grades to institutes of research, the demand for competent teachers of sociology will exceed the supply.

From the academic angle we might rest our assurance to this effect on the fact that the sociologists have already accumulated a body of knowledge which contains educational material of incomparably superior value to much now in our curricula.

At the arbitrarily chosen date 1895 the one common factor in the belief of the small group of American sociologists was conviction that something was lacking in the procedure and findings of the traditional sciences of human affairs, and that we were destined to develop a science that would supply the lack. We were naïve enough not only to confess this creed but to propagate it. Beyond this minimum of formal belief, our outlook pointed in various directions, our conceptions of objectives differed, and our ideas of method were heterogeneous. A divinity seems to have shaped our ends more wisely than any of us could have planned. It preserved us from dispersion, and it determined us into a convergence which has arrived at a common center of orientation. From this center there is prospect of radiating activities which, even in the next generation, must do much to vindicate the pioneering of a generation ago.

We might press the Freudian term "psychoanalysis" into service in a wider than the Freudian sense to indicate the whole field of individual and social psychology. We might find it convenient to indicate the whole range of structural aspects of groups by the companion term "socioanalysis." Psychoanalysis and socioanalysis so understood have already brought to light aspects

of people in comparison with which much that previously passed for knowledge about people already seems casual and trivial. Whether we hold that present findings of psychoanalysis and socioanalysis are precise and final or approximate and provisional, the essential situation is occupied, viz., an advanced interest has been aroused in those types of relations to which the attention of psycho- and socioanalysis has been directed. We have gone beyond that, however. Whereas in our attempts a generation ago to see "society" as it is we succeeded in little more than seeing "men as trees walking," we have meanwhile adjusted our focus so that we see many things more objectively, and so that we realize much better than we did what is more and what is less worth seeing. We have become more distinctly conscious that our primary task is analysis of groups, beginning with their immediately presented factual phases, probing back into their physical and psychical energizings and searching forward toward discovery of norms and means for control.

Claiming unlimited license of mixed metaphor, we may partially indicate the rudiments of our present insight into human experience by saying that we have found it to be a turbulent tide of incessantly re-forming group situations. These vortices of social movement result from the innumerable atomicities of human wants compounded into the infinity of human circumstances. Such beginnings as finite minds may make at all in understanding this incomprehensible will be most promising if they start with analysis of the most obvious and frequent of these reactions and then, to the limit of ability, add acquaintance with the more obscure and rare. In short, almost from the beginning American sociologists have been bound together, wittingly or unwittingly, by an instinctive urge to create an interlocking and concentric apparatus for formulating, interpreting, and controlling group aspects of human processes.

In the course of arrival at this general outlook we have assembled and organized, from somewhat different points of view, masses of facts, and insights into the relations of facts involved in the human lot, which are furnishing forth textbooks each of which tends to make the oldest teachers of sociology for very envy

regret that they cannot start once more and again try to co-ordinate what is known about human groups into a more convincing showing than any one has been able to organize. These accumulations comprise knowledge both of generalized relations and of special conditions. Accordingly our curricula are made up of courses which run the whole scale between such ambitious attempts as Schäffle's *Bau und Leben* and such segments of specialization as Warner's *American Charities*.

This situation reflects tendencies in our society which are bound to become more influential for an indefinite future. There was a time when standards of education were prescribed by the educated classes themselves. For a long time to come the public to be educated will exercise an increasing influence both absolute and relative upon the subject-matter of education. This in part explains why so many schools are already teaching, not in sociology alone, but in other fields, so much which their constituencies demand, instead of things which teachers think the pupils ought to have.

Men of the theorizing, systematizing type tend to despise all sorts of concrete knowledge as mere information, and we tend to exalt all sorts of dealing with principles, the more general the better: because we presume that they qualify for understanding all details which conform to the principles. The broader the scope of our generalizations, therefore, the more are we inclined to respect schemes of education directly as the diameters of the relations which they are supposed to train the mind to control. I am not an exception to this rule. So far as I could influence educational programs, from lowest grade to highest, in public or private institutions, I should always do my utmost toward the adoption of curricula sanctioned by these valuations. I should do so in the belief that training in the understanding of principles will in the end lead the largest number of people soonest to higher planes of intelligence and capacity for co-operation.

At the same time I sympathize with the popular refusal to accept Plato's idea that an oligarchy of philosophers would be the best sort of society. If the world were the kind of world which Platonic philosophy presupposed, Plato might be right. As the

world is not a logical world, according to Plato's notion of logic, an autocracy of logic would be a less progressive situation than a free struggle of all types of interest, each fighting for its place in the sun. For myself, I think that in our own country, rough, raw, and crude as it is, we have reached something better than Plato ever imagined. I think it is better in this respect. When we are not temporarily suffering from shell-shock we believe in allowing each interest to have its proportional say about how the common affairs shall be conducted. Under this scheme there is a hearing, although sometimes a less considerate hearing than we might wish, even for the foolishness of preaching, whether by the clergy or the professors; and then there is a hearing for all the other sorts and conditions of men. According to the logic of evolution, not of the academy, it is right, and will prove in the end to be expedient that these other sorts and conditions of men should prevail—modulated as may be by the clerics and academics till the average comes to rest nearer than at present on a completely objective level.

We may translate all this into terms of our interest in sociological education. No doubt many members of this Society have experienced onsets of panic after glancing at catalogues of schools which schedule courses entitled "Sociology." To some of us the situation looks like outlawry of principles and a dictatorship of details. The thought has, no doubt, frequently occurred: "Would not reversion to any old kind of standardized dogma be better than this anarchy?"

We might well be awed by the different ways in which amateur social consciousness is already demanding its version of the sort of education fit for citizens. A typical case is in the pages of the *Century Magazine* for September, 1920. A writer who does not employ the word sociology and who has apparently been very little influenced, at least consciously, by the historical literature of our subject, quotes John Milton's formula: "I call, therefore, a complete and generous education that which enables a man to perform justly, skilfully and magnanimously all of the offices, public and private, of both peace and war." He then elaborates this idea (p. 654):

All this means that in the midst of modern complexity the achievement of socially right conduct requires more than good intentions; it requires good intelligence that will enable a man to keep up a continuous moral analysis of his political, social and industrial relations. Otherwise it is impossible for a man to assess the rightness or wrongness of his acts and policies in the modern world. No man can be said to be liberally educated until he has achieved a comprehensive and realistic understanding of the tangled network of modern relations, an appreciation of the endless ramifications of every act today. It is not the business of liberal education to determine moral standards in any religious sense, but it is the business of liberal education to give a man full knowledge of the modern stage upon which the play of human conduct is acted and to train his mind to follow his every act to its ultimate social effect. An education that leaves a man cold to the social implications of his professional or craft conduct, or fails to train him to see these implications, is illibera and inadequate.

The sociologist might well exclaim: "Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you!" The sociologist's wiser second thought might better be: "Who then is sufficient unto these things!" For a generation American sociologists have been addressing chiefly their academic colleagues in the endeavor to convince that the most important things for members of human society to know are the things of which the quotation contains a version. Our experience with scholastic coldness on the one hand, and the rising tide of popular interest on the other, might justify us in a further adaptation: He has hid these things from the wise and prudent, and has revealed them unto babes.

The incontinence with which the miscellaneous public has demanded something in the name of sociology in all but the primary grades is less pathetic, however, than the fatuity of a president of the United States. During a long academic career he had used his large influence to inhibit the type of education which we know to be timely, and which an increasing public confusedly demands. Then in a national crisis he issues a proclamation to teachers to convert the schools into nurseries of good citizenship. As though a stamp of the presidential foot could conjure a socially adequate teaching profession any more than it could extemporize military preparedness! Yet here we are, with the public in a state of semi-conscious requisition for socialized and socializing education. For a long time to come this demand is bound to be irregular, often

whimsical and unintelligent. In response to this demand teachers will not be able to work wholly in the lines of their own convictions, but they will have to impart instruction that appeals to their constituencies. Under the circumstances I believe wisdom dictates watchful opportunism. Sociologists should never lose sight of the goal they know it is urgent to reach—principles interpreting particulars—and they should try to make academic curricula do their utmost toward reaching that goal. Meanwhile they should not despise even the most indirect approaches to their ideals, if those approaches are the best that the circumstances permit. They should magnify such opportunities as trustees and school boards allow to teach any sort of social reality. Two considerations should always be heartening: first, it would be hard to find any real facts about real people less important than the accidents of dead languages which had come to be the staple of so-called "higher education," when the academic revolution of the mid-nineteenth century began; second, if we make the most of our opportunities to teach any sort of real social relations, trustees and school boards will presently be recruited from the grandchildren of our pupils. Partly from us and our successors, partly direct from life itself, they will have learned the importance of giving the then rising generation more searching looks into social reality.

I pass to the second of the three routes along which the future of sociology is sure to move, viz., *research.*

Signs are multiplying that before long sociologists must call upon themselves for an accounting with this idea "research." A writer in the October, 1920, *Atlantic* observes: "In academic circles a hobby is called a 'research.'" It would be well for sociologists to take the hint and safeguard their researches against falling into the hobby class. When we talk about "a technique of research" we may use the phrase "advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God." I have grave suspicions, however, that some of us are falling into a mode of using it "unadvisedly or lightly." I seem to see evidence that some sociologists are thinking of "research" as a sort of ritual, a performance of mystical or ceremonial merit, detached from any objective utility. The term "research" seems to me to be taking on a cant use among certain sociologists very much like the cant

sense in which we prostitute such words as "etiquette" or "patriotism." We imply that there is a content for the words isolated from situations in which alone they can have a meaning. "Etiquette" is simply a blanket term for answers to the question covering all conceivable social situations: How is it proper to behave? So with "patriotism" and all conceivable political situations considered on the side of their demands upon citizens. "Research" is merely a blanket name for all the different proprieties of behavior in the course of finding out things. Research in finding out how many people live in a given block is very different from research in finding out whether there is a connection between the death-rate and the water supply of a given town. Research into the connection between high prices and the marketing system is very different from research into the significance of the race factor in American politics. Research into causes of delinquency among boys is very different from research into the connections between theological beliefs and business morals. Each of the topics suggested for investigation by Dr. Gillin's or Dr. Eaves's committee, for instance, invites its special application of the principle.[1] In short, a different technique must be mobilized for each type of fact and each type of situation about which something is to be learned. The differences in technique vary with the differences in the phenomena to be investigated. In another connection, referring to the fact that for the present the majority of social scientists will have to find their opportunities for research in more or less close connection with teaching, I have said:

> It is impossible, therefore, to speak with precision of the entire category "research." In a general discussion we must deal with it only approximately. We may assume that for the present the majority of men trained for research in the humanities will find their vocation somewhere in the teaching profession. We may assume as a minimum formula of the "research type" a man qualified and equipped with ability and impulse to organize or to increase knowledge of his subject, or possibly both to organize and to increase it, in such ways that his expressions to his students, not only of ascertained knowledge, but of visible problems of knowledge, and of methods for getting knowledge along the frontiers of his field, will add something in the way of content or in the way of lucidity to presentations of the subject-matter in extant textbooks.

[1] See *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVI, 353.

Research is not an esoteric liturgy, like the symbolic observances of a secret society. Research is mobilization of those ways and means of discovery which are appropriate to the sort of knowledge desired. The precondition of research is the shaping-up of a problem. The eye must be fixed upon some gap in our knowledge. Resolve must be formed to fill up that gap. Then the question must be answered provisionally: By what processes may knowledge to close up that gap be gained? There must follow procedure according to the answer. This action should test the validity of the answer. It should reach the aim proposed. If it fails, incidental to the failure should be minor discoveries bearing upon the feasibility in principle of the proposed search, and upon more adequate methods of conducting it. Educationally it would pay to film the story of Peary's different preparations for dashes to the Pole, as illustrative of scientific research in general. Peary's problem was not the problem of a canal through the Isthmus, nor of making Havana Harbor sanitary, nor of modeling a Liberty motor, nor of generating a more deadly gas, nor of testing the authenticity of alleged messages from the dead. Peary's technique of research was accordingly not identical with the technique appropriate to either of the other problems. In a word, each sort of problem demands a technique of research after its kind. Research and problem are to each other as the specific combination to each particular lock. There is no such thing as a universal pass-key to knowledge.

These remarks are so trite in themselves that it might seem to be an affront to this Society to call its attention to them. I should not have taken the risk if I did not believe that the caution is timely. Such terms as "scientific" and "research" are still too frequently used as shibboleths no less sterile than the incantations of any ancient superstition.

As to real research by sociologists, it will doubtless develop in two forms. On the one hand the ideal proposed for the physical sciences by the National Council of Research should stimulate social scientists to undertake co-operative inquiries on a large scale. On the other hand, as in the physical sciences, some social investigators will continue to follow out individual inquiries, not

bothering themselves about the chances of absorption of their results by science in general. Wisdom seems to dictate that we sociologists should lend all the encouragement in our power to both tendencies, and that we should avoid anything like coercion of individuals to choose the one method of work rather than the other. Co-operative investigation will accomplish much that would be impossible for segregated workers. On the other hand, abridgment of the freedom of scholars to pick their own problems and work in their own ways would ultimately reduce "science" to mass production of flivvers. There are times and tides in the affairs of men which call for greater mobility of mental labor than mass enterprise alone can assure. Individual watchmen are needed upon the high places, with liberty to follow clues which might not seem significant to the many. Very likely an abstract calculus of social resources would decide that unorganized action is wasteful. Since, however, we have punctured the pious fiction that nature never wastes, we have begun to study the economy of waste as an investment. Conceivably the world might have been wiser today if since the close of the Middle Ages all its *intelligentsia*—the cranks, the colorless "pass men," and the geniuses together—had been organized into co-operative knowledge mills. Conceivably, on the other hand, the incubus of standardization might have rested so heavy on those plants that there would have been less insight in the world than there is now. Possibly it is a higher economy in the long run to forego some of the ideal advantages of organization so that there may be no smothering of an occasional Socrates or Jesus, or Galileo, or Voltaire or Edison. To bring the matter nearer home, how much better off would social science have been today, if a couple of decades ago the Census Bureau had swallowed up that disturbing young man Ross of California?

No! Let us both organize and individualize. And let us hold up to organizations and detached workers alike the constant demand that they shall center their attention not on pedantic interests, but on studies which deserve the right of way because they promise to contribute to the general welfare. I know this is a difficult standard, and I would not interpret it dogmatically. I

would mean by it at least that each worker, individual or collective, should try to choose between alternatives not the one that offers the most to private interest, but the one by which his or its particular kind of equipment might hope to contribute most to general knowledge.

As to the subject-matter of research, it seems to me that Professor Giddings was keenly prophetic yesterday, when he gave us samples of problems he would have investigated. On whatever other levels we may pursue knowledge, we shall have stopped far short of the requirements of our function until we have done our best upon problems of the order which he suggested.

One promotion of research is possible without appreciable increase of our financial resources, and the idea is already in process of incubation.[1] Each of our social science societies might commission a standing committee of outlook, with the duty of surveying its field and reporting on priority of problems calling for research. These committees of the several societies might well arrange for periodical conferences with one another in order to get light on the relative urgency of the same or similar problems from the several points of view, and in order to promote convergence of research forces upon investigations which a single technique cannot cover.

There are areas of knowledge which can be explored only by use of the techniques which the historians have developed for authenticating and evaluating evidence about past situations.

There are areas of knowledge which can be explored only by use of the techniques which the economists have developed for analyzing and interpreting the primarily acquisitive activities of human groups.

There are areas of knowledge which can be explored only by use of the techniques which the political scientists have developed for analyzing and interpreting the machineries for control of civic bodies.

There are areas of knowledge which can be explored only by use of the techniques which are in process of development among

[1] See "The American Council of Learned Societies," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVI, 224.

structural sociologists on the one hand, and psychological or behavioristic sociologists on the other for analyzing and interpreting human group phenomena in general.

Up to the present time we have developed very few consistent technologists of either of these sorts anywhere in the world. A few hundred years from now, if science does not meanwhile pass into eclipse, a consensus among scholars is likely, to the effect that the social scientists of our day, with rare exceptions, held allegiance to specialization only in spots, while for the most part they were irresponsible amateurs. In other words, in most cases, the technique of which we have responsible control would suffice to verify only a small arc of the periphery of our pronouncements. I wish I might take the time to elaborate the proposition that much which passes for specialization throughout the entire range of the social sciences, is not operation of the peculiar competency ostensibly in action; it is merely canny use of library technique.

One does not need to overdraw even the smallest deposit of prophetic reserve to put into circulation the forecast that a clearing-up of our consciousness about the distinctness of the various research functions, and about their reciprocal interdependencies will be a progressive incident in future social science.

I have long since abandoned my earlier belief that sociology was foreordained to be the co-ordinating functionary in social science. If I may even hint at an organic analogy, the early physiologists were more nearly correct when they asserted that the human body is a republic, than if they had tried to express the human body in terms of empire. So of human society and of techniques for explaining human society. They must co-operate as peers, and share as equal partners in responsibility and results. Ultimate correlation of their results will have to come about more through some kind of action comparable with that of the development of public opinion in a state than through action in the form of subjection of citizens to a Grand General Staff.

If there was a mathematical society in Alexandria twenty-two hundred years ago, Professor Euclid and his colleagues doubtless consumed many sessions confirming themselves in their previous conviction that geometry is the master-science. At the same time,

if the engineering association sitting in a hotel near by was made up of members with the same sorts of professional astigmatisms which have been typical since, it was doubtless interspersing its discussions of the decadent art of pyramid-building with demonstrations that geometry is nonsense.

Meanwhile the human race has been obliged to live and move and have its being in space. All its operations have had to be adaptations to space relations. Facilitation of these operations has demanded increasingly precise and rigorous interpretation of the relations. Thus it has come about that geometry has vindicated itself by furnishing basic calculations for engineering, while engineering has realized itself by achieving authentic expressions of geometry.

The same is an allegory which I need not labor.

I return to the third route along which the future of sociology is destined to move, viz., experimentation, or attempts at social control.

Ever since there has been laboratory science it has made the most of every opportunity to exploit its supposed superiority to the pretended sciences of human affairs, in that it can experiment while they cannot. There are certainly differences on the score of experimentation between some of the physical sciences and the social sciences, but they are not precisely the differences most often alleged, and it remains to be seen how decisive are these differences in determining grades of service among sciences.

All life is experimentation. Every spontaneous or voluntary association is an experiment. Every conscious or unconscious acquiescence in a habit is an experiment. Every adoption of a mode of sexual, economic, political, intellectual, or religious conventionality or innovation is an experiment. Every institution of every society developed enough to have institutions is an experiment. Each civilization in the world today, each mode of living side by side within or between the several civilizations is an experiment. Each adoption of a constitution, or amendment, or law, or by-law by each group, from the League of Nations down to a camp of Boy Scouts, is an experiment. Herbert Spencer, having no babies of his own, thought that other people's babies should not be deprived of opportunity to learn empirically that falling downstairs is not

the thing to do. When Great Britain fell downstairs in the course of learning that this, that, or the other was or was not the thing to do, he called it "the sins of legislators." All the laboratories in the world could not carry on enough experiments to measure a thimbleful compared with the world of experimentation open to the observation of social science. The radical difference is that the laboratory scientists can arrange their own experiments while we social scientists for the most part have our experiments arranged for us. It remains to be seen further, to what extent this difference amounts to a disadvantage for the social scientists.

However this may turn out to be, two prospects are open to social scientists of all sorts. Each of these prospects stretches away beyond the range of present vision; viz., first, the prospect of progressively comprehensive, instructive, and constructive interpretation of experiments, past and present, of which we can be only witnesses; second, the prospect of extending our advisory and executive share in organizing and conducting social experiment. Of the former prospect I need not speak further. Of the latter I wish I had the time and the imagination to speak adequately. If the social sciences could furnish a personnel incarnating the wisdom and the discretion which social science is presumed to confer, the world's concrete experimentation would be put in charge of people trained for it at a rate never yet approached. From diet kitchens to premierships—outside of Russia and the Chicago City Hall—there is such a tendency as never was before for jobs to seek persons fitted for the jobs. Much of this tendency may be entered on the credit side of the war. All along the line of actual and desirable social experimentation the demand factor seems to me much more assured than the immediate competence of social scientists to satisfy the demand.

In this connection it would be a serious oversight to omit mention of perhaps the most importunate of all visible social research problems, of the theoretical sort, viz., the rôle, past, present, and future, of the legal factor in group processes. Both on the side of science and on the side of practice the world is ripening for the work which Dean Pound and Dean Wigmore and a few like-minded men have been prospecting. Within the latest

generation American sociologists have emancipated themselves from the conception of human society as an entity. They are now free to get acquainted with the reality hidden under that conception by exploring human activities as an interminable complexity of processes. The challenge is up to men of legal training to liberate themselves, and then the rest of us, from the parent superstition that *the state* is an entity. After we are clear in our minds that the reality behind that symbol is the most complicated mechanism and procedure of social control which design and accident combined have ever produced, we shall thereby for the first time have achieved freedom to adopt an intelligent attitude toward all our problems of control. We shall be at liberty to realize that "the state" is merely a short-cut way of referring to the totality of the co-ordinating activities sustained by the members of that type of civic group which is designated by superstition or courtesy as "sovereign." We shall be free to perceive that "politics" is not a privileged mystery, set apart from all the rest of human behavior by exceptional foreordination and franchise. We shall have become sophisticated enough to see that politics is merely small group connivance writ large. It is merely Mrs. Grundy and the schoolmaster wielding weightier words or a bigger stick. Politics is that aspect of human activities, from leadership of a boys' gang to primacy in a Versailles conference, in which the exercise of power, or the endeavor to exercise power over others is the distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the control phase of every sort of group activity.

Thereupon we shall be in a favorable position to consider our implicit problems of control. Whether in the nation or in less inclusive groups, the perennial need is agreement upon valuations convertible into kinds of control that will make for a minimum of reciprocally nullifying human actions, and toward choices which will turn out to be reciprocally reinforcing. All this of course is algebra. It does not solve problems; it merely states them. It does, however, indicate the one creative attitude. The attainment next in order for civilized peoples is will to realize this through legal control, if voluntary action is inadequate, in preference to lapse into a nervelessness that would end in anarchy.

Three suggestions of a quite different nature may complete my message.

If I had dictated this summary after having heard Professor Giddings' paper of yesterday morning, my next paragraph would have been somewhat differently expressed. I let it go as written, with this interpolation. I most heartily fall into line with the spirit of Professor Giddings' lofty conception of sociology as *the science of human adequacy*. I should want to carry out what seems to be necessary implications of the description in two ways: First, I should want to add that, as to its substance, in our present state of knowledge such a formula must be used rather as a means of inquiry than as the statement of a finality. It is virtually more interrogative than indicative. Human knowledge will have accomplished its most decisive result when it is able to put a precisely itemized content into such a conception of the ultimate goal of life; second, accepting, with that understanding, the term *human adequacy* as the algebraic symbol of the end to be reached, I must confess that, as I have already intimated, in recent years I have found myself less and less inclined to the belief that sociology has an exceptional order of function with reference to that consummation. On the contrary it seems to me that the nearest approach to it which men will ever reach will be through *concerted action of social science as a whole*. In my judgment the other divisions of social science will not fully find themselves until they return from their dissipations among impersonal husks and harlots, and together with sociology resume their duty of developing their proper patrimony—the personal possibilities of people. To my mind there is nothing but frustration and sterility ahead of any division of social science, unless it realizes itself primarily as a hierarchy of techniques, each making toward a common achievement in what I should be glad to join in calling *human adequacy*. With this confession of faith I return to my text.

In the early days most of the sociologists in this country, among other things, made much of the distinction between wealth and welfare as centers of attention, and as criteria of social value. We phrased our ideas of the basis of discrimination between ourselves

and the economists in particular very largely in terms of this distinction. We have all along, and never more confidently than at present, prided ourselves upon being interested in human beings as such, while we have accused other types of social scientists of centering their interest not upon people, but upon certain of the appurtenances and auxiliaries of people—their gear, their chattels, their mental or moral or physical machineries. On the whole, I still believe the claim to have been, and still to be justified in this sense, namely, at the time of the emerging of sociology as a distinct division of knowledge (and it is true even now, though happily in a diminished degree) the persons who were pursuing other divisions of social science as a profession had unconsciously allowed their center of interest to shift from actual people to some of the circumstances, or behaviors, or institutions or products of people. The cardinal interest of the early sociologists, on the other hand, was in the distinctively and essentially human, both actual and potential, and in problems of promoting the intimate fortunes of people as personalities.

As it now appears to me, however, this fact was sheer accident, and I see no assurance that this particular distinction between sociologists and other social scientists will remain a fact. So far as I am aware, there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent historians or economists or political scientists from shifting their emphasis in any generation, so that they might begin to operate their technique with the uppermost aim of making it tributary to personal accomplishment, and with as intensive interest in that aim as we have ever realized.

To put it more generally, an inevitable incident of specialization in social science is a drag toward abstraction as a finality; that is, toward dehumanizing of the specialty. Sociologists have no right to assume that they will prove exceptions to this rule. Indeed, I foresee rather the certainty that in proportion as we sociologists become critically class-conscious and efficient in the application of our technique, the tendency to exalt the immediate end at which our technique should arrive, viz., analysis of group phenomena as such, will show itself overmastering us, as their form of the same temptation overmastered the specialists of whom we took warning.

Groups and their phenomena may be abstracted in thought from vital persons by precisely the same logical or sublogical processes which led to the dehumanizing and desocializing of techniques that made war or diplomacy or administration or economic production or fiscal stability their center of attention. In the long run, whether or not we preserve the balance of our interest oriented chiefly with reference to evolving humanity, or chiefly with reference to some detached aspect or incident or by-product of that evolution, will depend less upon the species of technique which we serve than upon the setting of our vocational peculiarity in our entire antecedent make-up as persons supposedly bigger than our profession.

It is not at all difficult for me to imagine a stage in the growth of social science in which there will be sociologists no more concerned about anything beyond certain abstracted group phenomena, regardless of their meaning for human fortunes in general, than some biologists now are about anything beyond selected freaks of vegetable or animal evolution. In order for sociology to steer a course in the future which will be consistent both with its achieved insight into its instrumental subordination in the methodological aspect to social science as a whole, and with its professed dedication in its substantial aspect to persons in contrast with abstractions, sociologists will do well if they keep danger signals constantly displayed at points where abstraction threatens to lead away from the central human reality.

Second, in proportion as sociology becomes responsibly objective it will leave behind its early ambition for a hegemony over social sciences, and it will realize its destiny of functioning within a federation of scientific activities. With widening and clarifying of social consciousness, it must become progressively evident that a single technique, no matter how penetrating, can at most lay bare only certain constituent aspects of the total social process. While, therefore, sociology is certain to increase absolutely, yet relatively, in comparison with social science as a whole, like each of the other tributary techniques it must and should decrease. I mean that in this sense: So long as men study human experience for means of more intelligently guiding future experience, the demand for sociologists as teachers of rudiments of social

relations, and the distinctness of the function which sociologists must perform, cannot fail to increase. On the other hand, our contributions to available knowledge, and to wisdom in turning knowledge into fortunate social control, must depend at last upon the sagacity of the different divisions of social science in merging their resources.

Finally, we may well congratulate ourselves upon the complete absence from our horizon of signs that the near future of sociology is to be sectarian. Differences of opinion there are among us in plenty. We differ about emphasis, about method, about vocabulary, about choices of immediate programs. All this makes for health. On the other hand, there is nothing among us remotely parallel with the quarrels in the eighteen-eighties between the economists of the "classical," the "historical," and the "Austrian" communions, not to speak of the minor sects. We are not a jangle of party proclamation—"I am of Paul, and I of Apollos, and I of Cephas." Various as our expressions are in outward appearance, we are bound together by common consciousness of a vocation to see that group aspects of human experience receive their dues in all attempts to interpret or to control human affairs.

Probably I might count on your tolerance if for a moment I should revert to type and should revive an adolescent impulse to exhort. I will compromise upon a final reflection which might well be shaped into an appeal: The zeal of the pioneers in American sociology has been more than justified. The particular achievement which was their aim has not been realized, and it should not have been, in its literal form. More questions which people ask about people are unanswered today than when American sociologists began to propound their peculiar problems about people. There is more consciousness now than ever before that people need answers to the kinds of questions which sociologists ask. The day is past for waste of more time over the settled question, Is sociology needed? The question that remains is, How nearly can sociologists qualify themselves to satisfy the demand?

DISCUSSION

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At the outset, I want to say that I am in hearty agreement with the general thesis and the specific sentiments expressed by Dean Small. The remarkable progress of sociology in the last generation may well lead to optimism with respect to its future. I shall confine my remarks to some minor reservations by the way of emphasis rather than dissent.

In the first place, I think that I would stress a little more the seriousness for sociology of the lack of contact which it has actually made with public policy or private charity. With many notable exceptions, even the so-called "expert" positions in governmental bodies and private foundations have been and are still filled with men who received their appointment through political influence or with social workers whose viewpoint on social problems either antedates the English Poor Law of 1834 or is considerably in advance of present Russian policy. Whether sociology is ever to be more than academic gymnastics will depend upon the progress made in the next few generations in assuring that positions of social control are more and more filled with trained sociologists. This alone will make Lester F. Ward's prophecy and aspirations attainable and realized. While I am somewhat out of touch with Washington locals I have not heard of the laying of the cornerstone of the National Academy of Social Science or noted any procession of legislators to sociological headquarters. Nor did the masses in the late presidential election seem more willing to accept the guidance of sociologists. There is a self-protective phase of this need of closer contact between sociologists and the government. Fanatics and reformers are ever on the search for pseudo-scientific shibboleths with which to embellish their program, and are now fond of urging most diverse proposals in the name of "sociology." This cannot but result in the discrediting of sociology and the postponement of its real public recognition. There are doubtless many who lay the Eighteenth Amendment at the door of sociologists. Nor can I share wholly Dean Small's view of the present passion for securing competence in positions of responsibility. This may be true in private business, but it certainly is not in public affairs. He may feel very blue about William Hale Thompson, but his New York colleagues will doubtless tell him that in comparison with their local situation Chicago has made enviable, if not striking, progress in installing talent and fidelity at the City Hall. In short, if "Billy" Sumner were now alive I doubt if he would feel called upon to abate in the slightest that intense contempt for political machinery and achievement which he brought out of his experience with New Haven municipal politics forty-seven years ago. Walter Lippmann has well stated the situation when he said: "The American people have just overwhelmingly elected a president who took pains to put himself on record against excellence. . . . . We have a public opinion that quakes before the word highbrow as if it denoted a secret sin."

As to Dean Small's optimism with respect to the superiority of present-day American democracy to the type of rule proposed in Plato's *Republic* I think that there is considerable cause for qualification. We may admit that this is a mere academic question, that we can never hope for any rule by a few philosophers, and that any sensible discussion must center about some form of popular government Yet all of this need in no way make us feel particularly happy over the present situation. To limit ourselves to American society since the Civil War, one might well hold that we have been governed by about as few individuals as Plato would have gathered in his band of philosopher kings and counsellors and our rulers have scarcely been philosophers or philanthropists. I would accept as wholly valid Dean Small's assertion that it is nothing short of national shell shock which prevents every interest from having its due weight in determining public policy and opinion, but in doing so I should be compelled to suggest that since 1865 we have been suffering not from temporary shell shock but rather have evidenced serious symptoms of a chronic, if not incurable, national psychosis. One does not need to have recourse to Upton Sinclair's *Profits of Religion*, *Brass Check*, and "*100%*" to learn that only one set of interests, namely, those of organized wealth, have enjoyed freedom of expression or secured proper recognition in determining public policy. The howl which is still echoing throughout the East against the Non-Partisan League is good evidence of how difficult it is even yet for the agrarian interests to assert their rights or state their case, to say nothing of the impotence of the laboring class in framing opinion or policy. The facts about our economic system which we may glean from government statistics, Professor Ross's *Sin and Society*, Walter Weyl's *New Democracy*, the report of the Interchurch World Movement on the steel strike, and the testimony of Judge Gary and Mr. Grace; what we may learn about our legal system from the writings of Justice Holmes, Professor Freund, and Dean Pound, and from the Carnegie report on "Justice and the Poor"; what Professor Ross and Mr. Lippmann have told us about the control of our press; the relation between religion and the vested interests which has been clearly revealed by Professors Rauschenbusch, Shailer Mathews, A. P. Fitch, and Harry Ward; and the comments upon the defeat of political democracy in America by such writers as Bryce, Ostrogorski, Weyl, Croly, Beard, Haworth, and others will indicate something of the distance which we yet have to go before we can even begin to discuss "democracy in America." If one is still unconvinced he can turn to Dean Small's own work on *Between Eras, from Capitalism to Democracy*, and if he is not then converted we may leave him as unregenerate. Ernst Freund, Roscoe Pound, John H. Wigmore, and George W. Kirchwey may be precious sociological and academic possessions, but it is more significant to note that Supreme Court decisions during the last fifteen years, as measured by the case of *Lochner* versus *New York* and the *Hitchman Coal and Coke Co.* versus *Mitchell*, reveal a change from conservatism to most gloomy reaction. Yet, were we able to secure some real democracy and attain unto the régime

of the common man, the prospect would not be bright. Differential biology and psychology have shown how little intelligence and initiative may be expected from the "common man." Without a proper utilization of the real potential talent in society one may agree with Dr. Trotter that it requires "little imagination to see that the probabilities are very great that after all man will prove but one more of Nature's failures, ignominiously to be swept from her worktable to make way for another venture of her tireless curiosity and patience." One of the most depressing features about the situation today is the startling spiritual mortality of leaders in this country which was produced by the late world-conflict and which is one of the most regrettable of the "costs of the war." Before the war there were a large number of educated leaders who could and dared to point the way to social salvation. Now, though the necrologies do not reveal their physical departure, their voices are no longer detected in the wilderness.

To turn to the more purely academic points involved in the paper I would be inclined to qualify somewhat the sentiment expressed as to the superiority of "principles" to "mere information." One is always in danger of acquiring the Ricardian contempt for mere facts when he is interested in giving forth good theory. It will, of course, be admitted by all that laws, generalizations, and the establishment of principles are the ultimate aim and goal of social science as of all science. It may further be conceded that some preliminary generalization was necessary in the formative period of sociology in order to mark off the subject and distinguish its methodology, but we have now reached a stage where we should proceed with caution in further generalization. We have no longer any need for preliminary generalization and tentative definition, and may well postpone additional systematization and generalization until we can gather and classify the data essential to assurance that the "principles" established in the future will have some high degree of validity and permanence. We need to halt generalization for at least one generation and to devote this time to a careful gathering and classification of data by refined statistical methods, with especial attention to that critical selection of data which Professor Chaddock has long urged. Then the abler and more constructive minds devoted to sociological study will be able to set forth with some assurance *the* principles of sociology. Herbert Spencer gave us the first and most voluminous statement of the principles of sociology and now Professor Cooley tells us that he hesitates to discuss them lest he be accused of joking. Dr. M. M. Knight has shown that Lester F. Ward's whole theory of social evolution based upon the doctrine of "gynaecocracy" does not square with the findings of modern biology. Professor Bristol and Graham Wallas declare Tarde's system of psychological sociology to be brilliant literature rather than psychic or social science. Professor Giddings has worked over and radically altered his own system and is one of the most emphatic of those who now call for more concrete data upon which to base generalization. Dean Small has just told us that he has abandoned what was once the central point in his sociological

system and has asserted the necessity for a continual revision of social theory. One hesitates to say what may become of the older social psychology after the psychological progress of the last ten years has been appropriated by sociology. Finally, while admitting the primary value of scientific generalization, it may be held that there is much valuable sociological material which will be available only as "mere facts" and that purely descriptive and institutional sociology demands a recognition which has not hitherto been accorded to it.

I am in hearty agreement with Dean Small as to the number and variety of crimes committed in the name of social research. Much of the enthusiasm for research can doubtless only be properly comprehended under the Freudian term of "compensation." Not only is there a distressing prevalence of those who are said to be carrying on research but who have no adequate comprehension of what is meant by a "problem" or by the methodology of research, but it may also be safely asserted that more social research is being directed by those who have had no real sociological training than by sociologists of standing. Further, there are great obstacles ahead of those who both have discovered and "sized up" a real problem and have the training and capacity to carry it out to a successful execution. Most important of these is the growing difficulty of securing the publication of the products of research. The profit point of view has inevitably permeated the publishing world as it has the other forms of modern economic endeavor, and the best piece of social research ever produced would receive scant consideration from the publisher in competition with one of Harold MacGrath's novels. Research, if it is to attract the modern publisher, must be adapted to compression and racy statement within about a hundred pages of twelve-point type. It is well-nigh impossible today in this country to get a competent piece of research published unless the author is a person of means or has some connection with an endowed or governmental commission. The better and more comprehensive it is the more hopeless the task of securing publication. This is one of the most alarming situations now facing social science and one which must be met and eliminated if sociology is going to advance through further additions to concrete sociological data.

These are the more important points which have occured to me from the reading of Dean Small's suggestive paper. There are one or two lines of possible improvement which I would suggest of my own initiative. One relates to the utterly scandalous condition of the so-called historical sociology, which is today what biological sociology would be if still based upon Lamarck and Darwin alone. Not only is the conventional historical sociology full of minor errors, and inaccurate in all of its major generalizations, but it is also based upon a fundamentally erroneous methodology and a false major premise. The works of the critical ethnologists, such as Ehrenreich, Marett, and, above all, Franz Boas and his disciples in this country, have, after a long period of careful assembling and classification of concrete data, proved conclusively that the facts furnish no substantiation of the theory of the inevitable unilateral

evolution of successive cultural stages and accompanying types of social institutions, and that cultural and institutional parallelisms may have proceeded from quite different antecedents and may possess a quite different psychic content. Dr. R. H. Lowie's admirable synthesis of the newer data bearing upon social organization in his *Primitive Society* has destroyed forever the historical sociology of the Morgan variety and has shown that there is no succession of maternal and paternal kinship, no correlation of maternal kinship with lower material culture and of paternal with higher civilization, no sharp break between kinship and civil society either in point of time or characteristics, and no such radical differentiation or inseparable gap as was once postulated between primitive and modern society. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that even these few major contributions of the critical ethnologists call for a complete rewriting of the present historical sociology.

Finally, I would call attention to the dangers of discipleship and classicism which is already imparing sociological effort. There are two types of discipleship, one the true discipleship, or a following of the methods and inspiration of a respected teacher and master, and the other the servile but false discipleship which consists in the deferential, if not fawning, repetition of the phraseology of the master and the feigning of a personal injury when his doctrines are questioned by another. In exhibiting some undoubted tendencies toward the latter type of discipleship the sociologists are in danger of getting into the same difficulties which have obstructed the progress of economic science since the days of Adam Smith and Ricardo. The founders of sociology, Comte, Spencer, Ward, Giddings, Small, Sumner, and Ross, were not servile followers of any writers or teachers. If they had been, sociology would not have been "founded" when it was. Rather, they were fearless innovators who literally, as Dean Small has said, "challenged fate" to bring sociology into existence as a determinate and systematic social science, and those of us from a younger generation will be their truest disciples if we do not rest content with a second-hand and necessarily inferior restatement of their views but carry on the subject in keeping with their aspirations.

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The future of sociology, from the standpoint of the present writer, depends on many factors, but only three can be mentioned here. These are: (1) the quality of the persons who are attracted as teachers into the field of sociological thought; (2) the quality of the thinking which sociologists do; and (3) the degree to which sociologists co-operate in working out the perplexing problems of social life.

1. If it is true that the teacher is more important than the subject which is being taught, then the quality and extent of hearing which sociology will receive depends in part upon the type of men and women who become teachers in the field. It is not enough to touch the brightest student on the shoulder,

encourage him to take several years of postgraduate work, and set him to the task of teaching the nature of social processes and of solving social problems, when in truth he has had little opportunity to know about either in a first-hand way.

If the future of sociology is to measure up to expectations, then only those individuals will be encouraged to enter the field as teachers who possess in addition to an ability to do abstract thinking, and a thorough training, a well-balanced personality—a personality which breathes a spirit of wholesomeness and of rational enthusiasm, and which renders unselfish devotion.

2. In the next place, the future of sociology depends upon the quality of thinking which sociologists do. That thinking will be dualistic in the sense it will be both abstract and concrete, the one continuously in harmony with the other. The sociologists are continuously in need of correlating abstract thinking with laboratory activities. The demand upon departments of sociology is increasingly in this direction. One department of sociology has recently reorganized its activities providing for a correlation of sociological thought and social practice. It is organizing its courses of study, not according to the subjects which are taught (as is customary), but according to the types of preparation which these subjects afford. For example: It has a research division, training students for pure investigation work in both social theory and practice. It has a teaching division, offering preliminary training for the teaching of sociology, and the sociological foundation for the teaching of history, English literature, and so forth. It has an Americanization division for the preparation of Americanization workers and home teachers. It has a professional social-work division for the training of case workers and institutional workers. It has a special religious-social-work division for the preparation of social-service workers in the churches and in the the mission fields. It has a cultural division for those students who wish to lay a foundation in sociology before specializing along professional lines.

Sociological thinking of the future will be dualistic in the sense that it will recognize that the social process is characterized by a juxtaposition of both conflict and co-operation forces with neither in absolute dominance, but with the latter possessing a stronger claim to control over life-processes. Sociological thinking will be dualistic in that it will consider life first as process and second as organization. It will be dualistic in that it will treat life as both material and spiritual, the first phase being more subject to scientific inquiry, and the second, to philosophic thought.

Sociological thinking of the future will be dualistic in that it will be primarily objective and yet to a certain extent subjective. It will be objective in so far as life's activities can be measured in terms of behavior. Nevertheless, it will be keenly aware that probably not all about life can be told in terms of objectivity and behavior. Sociological thinking will be dualistic in that no detail of life will be too minute to escape its attention, and in that no issue will be considered too world-wide to be intangible and, hence, to be disregarded.

Without repudiating the values in the terms such as the individual, or the family, but with renewed emphasis upon these, even upon the virtues of nationality, and upon working out a eudemic program of national welfare, the sociologists of the future will be better able, perhaps, than any other group of thinkers to develop the concept of world-community with all its corollary concepts, and to lead the way in the dissemination of these concepts.

The world which has been thinking, and still is thinking, in the main, in local, provincial terms, finds itself face to face with world-problems it cannot understand, with which at present it seemingly is helpless to cope, and which cannot be settled until considered in the light of a clear analysis of the world social process. Neither a League of Nations nor any other form of an association of nations can function well as long as the majority of the people who live wthin the boundaries of these nations are controlled by provincial thinking and by racial prejudice.

To those persons who live on the Pacific Coast, this problem is peculiarly vital. During the past few years we have witnessed the impact, particularly in California, of two civilizations upon each other—that of the West and that of the East, the occidental and the oriental. The result of the impact, in the by and large, has been that each civilization has rebounded upon itself. The visible results seem to be encompassed largely in two impenetrable smoke-screens of misunderstanding and prejudice. Moreover, and peculiarly enough, these smoke-screens do not even commingle. Such an outcome does not presage telic progress. Until the average individual can view the daily items of life in relation to their world-significance, and until the sociologists or some other group of thinkers lead the way in making clear these matters, world-progress is bound to be halting and erratic.

3. In the third place, the future of sociology depends on the degree to which sociologists co-operate. The efforts of the committees such as those which have reported at this meeting of our Society represent a splendid beginning, but after all only a beginning. Sociologists have often belied the implications of their science by working away with a high degree of independence. They have used terminology independently, in fact very independently of the impression such terminology often makes upon the minds of average intelligent citizens, of those citizens whose support must be secured if the future of sociology is to be safeguarded, The ordinary citizen expects the chemist or physicist to use unintelligent terms, but, on the other hand, he asks the sociologist to speak about the profoundest social processes in simple and lucid ways.

A few days ago I heard three university professors of social science discussing the meaning of that highly important term "socialization." Each gave an explanation which apparently was distinctly different from the attitudes of the other two. The discussion was about to enter into meticulous distinctions and perhaps end acrimoniously, when a professor of English literature, a

chemist, and a biologist, who were listeners, burst out simultaneously in laughter, agreeing that the term "socialization" had better be discarded. Is it not time for sociologists to unite upon the meaning of their most useful concepts?

Is it not time, also, that sociologists co-operate in coming to an agreement concerning the sudject-matter of their science? Perhaps that agreement exists, but what percentage of the scholars outside the field of sociology and what precentage of average intelligent laymen would grant to the sociologists that distinction? Our science is young, to be sure, and our pathfinding efforts need to take on new vigor, but, on the other hand, is there not need at this point for extensive and intensive co-operation if the future of sociology is to be made secure?

For many decades we shall have teachers of sociology publishing textbooks for the course of study commonly known as Sociology I in the colleges and universities. Nevertheless, certain lines of demarcation in procedure are becoming evident. In this connection progress will be grearly furthered by co-operative efforts. Another problem for co-operative consideration is this: What is the relation of sociol psychology to sociology? Is it an open gate to sociology or is it one-half of the field? Still another problem is: What are the essentials of behavioristic psychology which all sociologists need to know and to accept at once in order that their work may go forward in unified strength?

Is there not need, therefore, for committees and for round-table discussions in our society on such questions as have been indicated, namely, standardization of terminology, the precise field of Sociology I course in colleges and universities, the relation of social psychology to sociology, behavioristic theories? Moreover, I should like to be at least a listener in a round-table discussion on the deeply fundamental system of sociology that was presented yesterday by Professor Giddings. Furthermore, I for one should like to hear a round-table discussion of some of the chief ideas in Professor Ross's new, unique, and original *Principles of Sociology*. And thus the fields for co-operative effort open up in rapid succession.

I should like to mention one other need for co-operation among sociologists, and that is, in applying their knowledge to the solving of life's problems. Today, for example, the American people are contributing to funds to prevent starvation in Europe and Asia, but, may I ask ,how many sociologists are at work upon the vastly more fundamental problem of how to make the world safe from famine altogether? Must we go on forever contributing to famine funds? In this country the middle classes, as well as the poor, are suffering from a housing problem, but how many sociologists are co-operating in working out programs which will prevent for all time the rise of a literally world-wide housing problem?

In closing, I should say that the future of sociology is pretty largely in the hands of present-day sociologists. They have urged telic programs for society, for cities, for rural communities. Why shouldn't they enter upon a

more telic program for sociology itself? Why shouldn't they, through committees and discussions, summarize from year to year the progress that is being made in each of a few leading phases of sociological thinking? Why shouldn't they in a co-operative way annually chart out the dangers and the problems that are immediately ahead for sociology? Why shouldn't they arrange each year for co-operative effort in the main phases of their subject where co-operative efforts will count most?

ROUND TABLE

SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY

Ernest R. Groves, Boston University, and C. E. Gehlke, Adelbert College, Presiding.

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY

E. R. GROVES, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Psychology and sociology are closely related sciences. Each has accepted the task of bringing an area of human behavior under the interpretation of law, and necessarily the successes of each minister to the progress of the other. The results of psychological investigation have therefore a significance to the sociologist exceeded only by the findings of his own science. In scientific frankness the sociologist must admit that the results of experimental and physiological psychology during the last two decades in their contribution of material of assistance in understanding man's social behavior have been disappointing. This relative poverty of result recently admitted by a vigorous opponent[1] of psychoanalysis, who tells us that orthodox psychology is doing nothing for the solution of our social problems, has retarded sociology as a science and weakened at important points the construction that already has been accomplished. Therefore, it is not with indifference that the sociologist discovers a new and radical force appearing in recent psychology; a school which, whatever else may be its faults, has no reluctance to grapple at close quarters with certain problems of the greatest significance to the sociologist. Indeed, as he watches with sincere neutrality the crash of the opposing schools and groups in the present psychological conflict, he at least gathers confidence that since man's mental life is going through such a searching investigation new and important information regarding social behavior must result.

What is it that psychoanalytic psychology has brought forward which has had so upsetting an influence upon a science formerly so well ordered and self-contented as psychology? First of all, psychoanalytic psychology claims for itself the discovery of a new technique of immense value in psychological investigation. We know it as the psychoanalytic method. It postulates adult conduct and childhood happiness in a causal series, and by a process of analysis draws out the evolutionary history of an individual's psychic character. As a second contribution, by the use of this method the psychoanalyst has come upon material which from now on must be considered seriously by any

[1] Knight Dunlap, *Scientific Monthly*, December, 1920.

student of mental behavior. This material is the evidence which individual behavior discloses of the difficulty of bringing man's instinctive cravings under social discipline. It reveals reactions expressed in various forms against the traditions, customs, and regulations imposed by the social life of the group. This material is not limited, as some erroneously suppose, to matters related to the interest of sex. Although psychoanalysis is fully appreciative of the significance of the foundation work of Freud in his interpretation of sex, it also values Adler's pioneer contribution concerning self-assertion, Parker's concerning hunger, Frink's concerning fear, and Trotter's concerning the gregarious instinct. These studies of instinct-control are of great importance to the sociologist, since it is his science that assumes responsibility for the interpreting of the group products that are the coercing influence upon the individual. The information obtained by the psychoanalytic method furnishes valuable clues for the interpretation of primitive behavior and greatly clarifies the mass of fact reported by the anthropologists and ethnologists. We are enabled to understand savage folk ways more adequately. We discover in these processes of social control the repression of instincts carried to a degree that would not be tolerated in modern life. We are given the key to the social significance of many primitive customs that, except as methods of repression, rooted in fear, appear mere purposeless expressions of an irrational social mind. Psychoanalysis, as a third contribution, also hands over to the sociologist some very practical and serious problems. In revealing the significance of early-childhood events, the costly results of parental or school malpractices of various sorts are uncovered and we see them as serious obstacles to social progress. The precision and detail with which childhood is shown as the social-destiny period of human experience brings into light the means by which social life must be improved if it is in any degree to be advanced by conscious effort.

Psychoanalysis leads the sociologist into the workshop where socialization, including submissive and rebellious attitudes toward group control, is made; and we see in some detail the outstanding stages of our present socializing process, a process which has in popular thought a greater reputation for efficiency than it deserves. Until the sociologist realizes the true state of affairs in this building-up of dominance, and senses the present disturbance that follows as individuality is pushed into the mold of current standards of thought and action, he is less prepared than he needs to be to deal with the coercing influences which are social products and therefore within the field of his science.

In this round table the significance of the collision between the instincts of the individual and the group control that attempts their subjugation and conformity will be made clear by specialists in several fields of social experience. We shall see in mental disorders, delinquency, and industrial unrest disastrous results due to the failure of the individual to achieve a working harmony with the dictates of the social régime.

Running through all such misfortunes will appear an unwillingness or an inherent inability to utilize one's mind in wholesome biological purpose for adjustment to environment, and instead there ensues a self-deceiving flight from reality for the satisfaction of purely subjective demands. Thus is laid bare a general human weakness, the failure to grip with the mind's resources things as they are; a reluctance which concerns the sociologist, since its influence appears everywhere in the social doings of men. Social sentimentality comes from this flight from reality; to it also must be charged certain types of radicalism, obstinate and thin social optimism, the crusading zeal for legislative repressions, and the political fictions that conceal the emptiness of campaign issues.

On the other hand, psychoanalysis presents the origin of the boiling-up and bursting-out of untamed and unadjusted instincts. The mob, certain kinds of crime, the gregarious contagions, and especially national passion and war, all offer release to the chafed and pent-up instincts, and thus permit the enjoyment, for a season, of a primitive freedom of self-expression. While those hungering for the outlawed satisfactions enjoy their mad frolic, havoc is made with the social accumulations that measure the rational progress of the group and furnish such protection as the society enjoys in its contact with nature.

The events of the day compel attention to the morbid experiences that so clearly illuminate the deep-rooted cravings that hamper social well-being. Society itself has become in large measure pathological. A multitude of people are conscious of the processes of social control and for different desires and in different ways are in revolt against social discipline. Social repressions of human instincts have on the whole decreased in modern life. Sublimation also is more easily provided. We have arrived at a time, however, when more people than ever before, out of sympathy with the object of specific repressions, are conscious of the methods of social discipline and therefore are sensitive to what they interpret as unjustified coercion. The weight left us by the war has become grievous and we stagger under the burden. At a time when we especially need social self-control, through the experience of war we have been taught impatience with slow processes and as a society we would rush pell-mell to our objectives. And thus, lacking social morale and indifferent to the restraints of fundamental social and economic laws, we possess the powerful instruments of twentieth-century invention, tools which we may use recklessly to our own hurt. There is certainly need of a clear knowledge of the technique of social sublimation, that the tremendous mass of restless energy brought forth by modern conditions from our basic instincts may be drained by educational processes into channels that sweep toward security and progress.

MENTAL MEDICINE AND SOCIOLOGY

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In thinking of sociology as the science of social relationships, we are led to consider the twofold nature of such relationships: first, the adjustment that the individual makes to society, and second, the adjustment that is made by society to the individual. On the one hand, we observe his psychobiological development as he strives for self-expression and joins in the struggles for self- and race-preservation, and on the other, the general structure of society and the laws of its development as it, in turn, strives to express individual aims through group legislation.

As physicians and as psychiatrists we are particularly interested in the phase of social relationships that centers about the power of the individual to adapt himself to society, and in the physical and mental factors that influence such adaptation. It is in the theories of personality development as described by such men as Freud, Adler, and Jung that the possibilities of personality development from a psychological standpoint have been appreciated. These theories explain perverse human conduct as energy that is being expressed in unconstructive, rather than constructive ways, oftentimes seeking compensation for unrecognized inadequacies and feelings of inferiority or continuing to express itself at childish and egocentric levels instead of finding more mature and socialized ones. While these theories help in explaining and in correcting perverse and anti-social conduct, they are also of use in helping to bring the conduct of each individual to its highest social level.

More recent experimentation in the field of the glands of internal secretion opens up new possibilities of development in the realm of personality from the standpoint of body metabolism and furnishes a physical and nervous explanation for emotional states and social attitudes in general. A correction of certain types of imbalance of these glands has a similar effect in increasing the individual's power for good in the community.

The most important point to keep in mind, however, is the close relationship between the psychological and the physical aspects of the situation. Individual maladjustment, whether it be caused primarily by one or by the other, usually involves, both the mental and the physical. Therefore, in order to prevent maladjustment and its social consequences, the psychobiological development of each individual should be closely observed.

The aim of social propaganda, should be to obtain greater opportunity for the constructive utilization of energy which will increase, rather than diminish, individual responsibility. These principles of mental hygiene have, we believe, great value in the fabric of social relationships from the standpoint of the good of the group as well as of that of the individual.

SOME SUGGESTIONS REGARDING PRACTICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

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Society is composed of individuals and the problem of society is to integrate their activities. In this process it carries on the work which each individual himself has to perform with reference to his own individual activities, so that a common term has come to be applied to both, namely, socialization. The individual in his cultural progress brings his instincts under increasingly better control; he sublimates his instinctive activities to higher and progressively more socially valuable ends. He socializes his instincts, and in turn society in dealing with the individual, so to speak, and in bringing him to act in conformity with the interests of the group, socializes the individual. It can therefore be of no little importance to sociology to understand as fully as possible the inherent nature of the units which compose it and which, as integrated in their reciprocal activities, form society.

There are many points of view from which this relationship might be approached. The following occur to me at the present moment.

A careful analytical study of the character and personality make-up of great men who stamp the impress of their individuality upon history, who have produced great sociological, political, and economic results; such men as Caesar, Napoleon, or in this country, Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton; it would be of great importance to know the nature of the motives which animated such men, to understand the mechanisms according to which these motives worked and to fathom the ways in which they produced their results.

The various subgroups which make up society today and which are found to be so antagonistic, one to the other, such as the laboring class, the capitalists, the socialists, the communists, the wets and drys, etc., etc., must be held together by some common bond, by I should say an emotional or affective cement substance which is the same for all. It should be of immense importance to sociology to understand the nature of this emotional cement substance, not only what it is but how it might be expected to react under given circumstances so that as a component of the body social it would be a known element rather than a vague and uncertain possibility and perhaps danger.

In the above connection I would suggest that it would be of immense practical importance if men who are to occupy positions of leadership—legislators, public speakers, clergymen, writers—were to know enough of the nature and the mechanisms of such components of human nature as to be able with some intelligence to appeal to them with the hope of getting reactions that would be on the whole constructive rather than destructive. The training for leadership would involve a practical knowledge of psychology based upon psychoanalytic principles. I may elaborate a little further the last thought by suggesting that the problem of education from its psychoanalytic and its

sociological angles does not begin and end with the prospective training of public leaders, but it is of immense importance that the principles as laid down by psychoanalysis should be incorporated in the educational program. The psychoanalyst believes that the foundations of character are laid during the period of infancy, namely, within the first four or five years of life, and that the superstructure which is erected upon this foundation has potentialities for good or evil depending upon how well or how poorly that foundation was laid. If this is so certainly the educationalists should take notice of this fact and the sociologists must become at once equally interested, for the principle strikes at the very root of the nature of the units which compose the group in which they are interested.

Finally, I think that if we may consider society as a superorganism in the sense of Spencer, as a still further and more elaborate integration than we find in its individual component members, we may properly consider the applicability of laws worked out in the study of the individual to the social group. One law which I believe to be of great importance in this connection is the law of the resolution of the conflict. It will be noted that the various groups that make up society, and which I mentioned above and which are in continuous conflict one with the other, occupy positions with reference to some specific question that are diametrically opposed to each other. Labor and capital, wets and drys, conservatives and radicals do not simply differ in their opinions, but their differences are as wide as possible, their points of view diametrically opposed. Now this is precisely the situation in an intrapsychic conflict. It is the psychological setting which produces symptoms of the neuroses and the psychoses, and we have learned from studying them that no solution of such a conflict can be reached on the level of the conflict, that the solution can only eventuate when the two diametrically opposed interests are integrated at a higher level and at that higher level both opposing interests are equally satisfied. It seems to me that an appreciation of this law taken over from psychoanalysis to sociology would be of immense importance to the latter.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SOME CONCRETE SOCIAL PROBLEMS

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The value of the psychoanalytic method for the practical sociologist has only recently been recognized. Its first application to concrete social problems was made in the study of the criminal. The pioneers in this work were Healey, with his emphasis on the mental conflict as a cause of juvenile delinquency, and Glueck, with his researches among the prisoners at Sing Sing. Not long after the birth of this new criminology, there was an equally radical departure in the study of labor unrest, when Carleton Parker, followed by Ordway Tead and Leland Ohlds, were led by their investigations to make the statement that industrial unrest had its psychological as well as its economic aspects.

This new psychological explanation of labor unrest is too well known to need more than a passing reference. Its thesis is that the modern economic system is in no way adapted to the satisfaction of such instinctive human needs as the longing for love, the desire for home and children, or personal ambitions. These unsatisfied organic cravings create in the individual a nervous tension which is reinforced by suggestion and imitation—the psychology of the crowd. It is this underlying nervous tension which is the real source of the discontent and restlessness of the laboring mass and is the fundamental impulse back of strikes and other manifestations. This being the case, we must expect the laborer's discontent to continue however often his demands for higher wages and shorter hours are granted. The only final solution is the reconstruction of industry in harmony with the deeper motives of the personality.

In the same way we are coming to understand that the problem of unemployment also has a psychological side to some extent. Dr. Bingham's paper on the maladjusted and another article on the psychopathic employee in the last issue of *Mental Hygiene* are pertinent references in this connection. What we mean by the psychopathic employee may be illustrated by the following case.

A young woman came to the out-patient clinic at Bellevue complaining of headaches which were interfering with her economic efficiency. The physical examination was negative, but an analysis revealed that the young woman was rebellious at her situation in life, that she was tired of supporting herself and baby, and that what she really wanted was pretty clothes, lovers, and a second husband who could give her another home in place of the one she had lost. The baby was proving to be an obstacle to a second marriage, and she would have placed it in an orphan's home but for her sense of duty. With the desire to escape from her responsibilities repressed by her love for the child and her feeling of obligation, she transferred her dislike of her situation to her work which became the symbol of all her unhappiness, and had thus an undue emotional value attached to it. The headaches were simply an excuse to stay away from the work which conscious realization of economic necessity enforced. Just after the young woman came to the clinic she was "laid off" on account of these frequent absences. She needed not only analytic therapy for her nervous symptoms but also a new position, that is, an environmental adjustment.

Just as we find the psychopathic personality of frequent occurrence among the ranks of the unemployed, so, too, it is in evidence in the criminal classes. Besides the defective delinquent, there is a numerous class of criminals whom Glueck describes as characterized by the fact that in every situation calling forth an emotional response they react in a criminal manner. Let me illustrate just what this means.

A young man of nineteen, held on the charge of attempted murder, was classed by the intelligence tests as dull normal. His behavior, while under observation in the ward, pointed to the conclusion that his difficulties were

occasioned by his peculiar anger reactions. Inquiry into his previous history elicited the information that he was an only child whose father had died when he was an infant. His fits of temper had always procured for him anything that he wanted from his mother, and this became his habitual response to any opposition. As he grew older, from striking his mother with his childish fists, he had begun to threaten her with a knife, and once had cut her upon the hand. When his uncle undertook his training, he reacted in his usual manner, by stabbing him. The only difference was that the result was more serious.

An intimate study of the prostitute will reveal the fact that in our search for causes here we must follow the psychoanalytic practice and go far back of the first sex experiences into the childhood shaping of the emotional reactions. Feeble-mindedness is one explanation of the entrance into the profession of prostitution, but it does not apply to all cases. No one who has worked with the prostitute can fail to realize that she is a very human type, actuated by the same motives as the great mass of mankind. In the life of prostitution she has hoped to find the gratification of her sex nature and of her instinct of self-display which the existence of the ordinary working girl seldom offers. Although she may find that she is disappointed in this expectation, yet her career as a prostitute offers her at least freedom from the monotony of manual labor and provides a certain fictitious excitement for which she soon comes to have an habitual craving. Not until we can find some way of providing the same intense and varied stimuli and the same emotional thrills in a different form of life can we reasonably expect to "reform" the prostitutes whom we confine in our institutions. In psychoanalytic terms, the problem is one of vicariates and sublimation; in sociological thought, it is a matter of adjusting the environmental situation.

These transitory glimpses into the relation of psychoanalysis to such concrete problems as unemployment, crime, and prostitution suggest that the functions of the psychoanalyst and sociologist are complementary. The sociologist cannot afford to work out schemes for social reconstruction along any of these lines without the insight into human needs which psychoanalysis alone can give him. On the other hand, the psychoanalyst must depend upon the sociologist to so manipulate the environment that the energy which he has freed from its inhibitions shall find some socially adapted outlet. Once the external situation becomes such that the individual is enabled to find satisfaction for his cravings in the actualities of life there will be less necessity for the "flight from reality," which may be said figuratively to include in its category labor agitations, criminal tendencies, and many other problems of modern civilization.

APPLYING THE NEWER PSYCHOLOGY TO WORK WITH EMPLOYED BOYS

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The theories and experimentation of this newer school of psychology furnish the practical social worker with means, heretofore unattainable or at best dimly sensed, with which he may accomplish something in what is currently termed *the conscious control of human life.*

The social field has lagged far behind that of physical science in learning how to analyze much of its material. Some of us stood the other day in a laboratory with two scientists who have recently become world-famous through their successful cures of the dread disease of leprosy. They did not utilize any new material but they more carefully analyzed a substance known to have had an effect on leprous tissue, chaulmaugra oil, separating it into every possible element and making various combinations until they succeeded in finding one arrangement of its acids powerful enough to check the bacilli of leprosy, and assure successful cures.

In the psychic field this is exactly what Freud and his associates have attempted to do, to make a finer and more profound analysis of human instincts and their expression, and it would now seem to be the duty of the social scientist and the practical social worker to take this analysis of individual craving and social expression and utilize it in such a way as to give us a new control over the movements of human life. Dr. Ellwood says tersely: "Human society is but entering upon the self-conscious phase of its own evolution. Through consciousness of its own condition, it can if it will, control its own destiny."

There is no reason why we should smugly disregard a new psychology. We certainly have little enough understood human reactions and still make a wretched mess of civilization in spite of progress in certain directions.

One social field for such analysis and experimentation, fascinating in its possibilities, is the vast horde of boys who have left school and gone to work for their living. There are 4,640,000 of these youths in the United States between fourteen and twenty years of age. They are engaged in every sort of work from blacking shoes to lucrative positions in famous banking institutions. By reason of their very numbers and variety, these boys present a need and an opportunity for the application of the newer methods of mind control.

Again, because these boys are still in the adolescent period with their future possibilities and flexibility of mind, they make an unusually productive field for effort. In the next fifteen years they will be leaders of labor unions, managers of great industries, editors of leading newspapers, common laborers, and inmates of jails and prisons. The brilliant minds which one discovers occasionally in the mass furnish excellent proof anew of the truth of the assertions of Lester Ward and Alfred Odin with reference to the manner in which

high talent is spread through all classes in society. One eighteen-year-old Hungarian boy, working in a Rochester factory, gave as his list of favorite authors, O. Henry, Jack London, Poe, Kipling, Kant, Darwin, and Humboldt. His life ambition as stated in the blank was to gain a Ph.D. degree and write a treatise on economics.

Three principles of the psychoanalytic method will illustrate its importance in this interesting group.

1. *Extending the field of the known and knowable in our lives.*—Here are a vast number of young persons not under the cultural influences of the schools who can be met in boys' clubs, settlements, institutional churches, community centers, scout troops, and the Y.M.C.A., many of whom may be saved from lives of immorality or inefficiency, or from mental diseases, by friendly methods of work which shall reveal them to themselves.

Obviously enough this principle operates in vocational guidance, where we help boys make a simple analysis of their experience, their interests and capacities. The occasional use of psychological tests such as can be given by the ordinary worker, help also to indicate to the boy his particular type of mind and what in all reason are some of the accomplishments which he may expect of himself.

Another method interesting to the boys is a charting process by which a boy's *present status* with reference to twenty-eight selected standards of excellence in American boyhood may be charted graphically, revealing to the boy his strong and weak points, at the same time showing him how by certain activities in connection with his home, work, play, and worship he may bring himself up to reasonable standards of effectiveness for his particular type and kind.

A third illustration is the wide acceptance on the part of boys of the physical fitness charts issued by the United States Public Health Service, something like 1,000,000 boys having examined those forty-eight charts which give probably the best statement that has yet been graphically produced with reference to health, clean living, and the single standard of morals. Every boy who has examined those attractive charts has *extended the field of the known* in his life with reference to both hygiene and the sex emotions.

2. *The so-called inferiority complex.*—One cannot mingle with employed boys many days before he becomes conscious of illustrations among his boy friends of complicated states of mind which can rather easily be traced to the sense of inferiority—fear of not getting ahead in the world rapidly enough, or perhaps of being thwarted in a possible career by economic pressure in the home. Sometimes another type of complication arising in the boy's home is discovered. The boy himself has a consciousness of ability to progress but finds his parents not interested in the larger future for which he longs.

And we may expect more complex mental situations among working boys and girls if the material contained in Dr. Goddard's *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence* is circulated among them. Without making any

comment upon Dr. Goddard's deductions from the records of the army tests, we must be prepared for some serious cases of depression, if, for example, some clever editor of Sunday supplements should publish these charts with the type of comment which they know only too well how to make. Many a boy of real possibilities, momentarily in a struggling situation, might easily accept the idea that because he was having difficulties he must be of a C or C— mental level, and consequently adopts the perfectly obvious attitude, viz., *what's the use.*

The three reactions so often noted are discovered in these boys, *the subservient, the vigorous struggle* to rise above difficulties, and *the fictitious.* With the first we are all familiar, the labor unions always having to reckon with a subservient group who can never be roused to group action. The employer complains equally about such boys, saying they have no ambition and do not take advantage of the opportunities he offers. The vigorous or masculine protest may, I presume, take either the constructive path toward personal achievement, or social effort, or may turn to a strong note of antagonism toward the present order of things and come out constructively or destructively according to one's particular mental make-up and the buffeting of circumstance.

That it is possible by knowledge already available to lead these boys to a more thorough understanding of themselves and of the cravings and desires of other individuals and groups, is certainly reasonable and borne out by experience. It is also possible to clear these boys' minds of many complexes and help them to avoid unfortunate distractions, and to attain gradua\\ y wha has been called *united personality.* It is not necessary for the leader of a boys' club to be a trained student of psychoanalysis to be able to utilize many of these principles in helping boys understand themselves and rise above morbid and self-depreciating reactions, or again, to cleanse themselves from over-assertiveness.

3. *Sublimating the natural cravings.*—Ordway Tead, after discussing instincts and their various forms of operation in the individual life and in social movements, exclaims:

> If it is true that three alternatives are present in the working-out of all natural tendencies; namely, expression, suppression, or sublimation—this opens up an extraordinary field for social experimentation. The possibilities in the direction of sublimation of those traits for which civilization seems to have comparatively little use, appear to be infinite. In one sense the central problem of progress hinges upon this very question.

It is evident that the various instincts of the individual can be sublimated, raised to a level where they operate with satisfaction to the individual, and at the same time are not offensive or injurious to society. Studies such as those of Tead's and Carleton Parker's would indicate that group instincts and desires can similarly be raised to healthful and constructive levels. But how much greater is the possibility of success when we deal with *boys* and *girls* in industry than when we attempt such work with those of mature minds.

This adolescent flexibility gives a ray of hope to those working with the out-of-school mass of youth in our population. Whatever success the scientist is attaining in his closer analysis of the human mind and spirit is eagerly scanned by the practical social worker who sees therein powerful levers by which he may raise the youth of the masses to higher thinking and more healthful social behavior.

Moreover, the boys themselves catch these principles with readiness. I remember talking one day to a group of twenty-five colored boys in one of our larger cities on the subject of the sublimation of the sex instinct. Naturally that was not my announced subject, but the boys seemed interested and so far as I could ascertain, grasped the meaning of my principles and illustrations as readily as they do when we talk about success or the value of education, or any such conventional topic.

Take the instinct just mentioned. If a boy knows that society recognizes and sympathizes with his struggle—that we know his body is ready for marriage and its relationships, so far as desire is concerned, in the late teens or even earlier, that his body has remained much the same as that of his primitive ancestors although civilization has deferred later and later the satisfaction of his desires. If he can know these things, he takes up the fight against temptation with an entirely new heart. It often comes as a new idea to the boy that he can find varied methods of expression and avenues of release for this pent-up surging power. This most insistent craving yields so constructively to the sublimation process that it gives confidence as to what can be done with other primary instincts when they are subjected to similar study and experimentation. And when knowledge with reference to the sublimation of this one instinct is intelligently diffused, several of our most insistent social problems will disappear from the field.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

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The psychoanalytic hypothesis gives a new approach to a field of investigation admittedly sociological, that of the origin of many of the standardized forms of collective behavior. Modes of reaction found in group life at the beginning of history shape the lives of the folk today so persistently as to point to an origin in psychological processes peculiar to the original nature of man. We find fruitful of results the explanation that the motives controlling such behavior come from psychic levels outside the range of attention but common to all the members of a group; from patterns laid down in the mind at its most receptive period and charged with the energy attached to processes intimately connected with the life of the individual and the continuance of the race.

As President Hall has pointed out in his introduction to the most recent statement of the theory of psychoanalysis by its protagonist, Sigmund Freud,

many impartial students have been unable to agree with all of Freud's conclusions, especially in making sex so all-dominating a factor of the psychic life of past and present. In addition, it has been pointed out by Woodworth that there are motivations from other levels than those to which psychoanalysts apply the term unconscious. Man's native endowments and inherited capacities, ultimately, as we hope, ascertainable by mental and vocational tests, are undoubtedly codeterminants of his interests and activities. Many of these are less interfered with by society and seek so-called normal outlets. But even these may become what Wallas terms "baulked tendencies."

It has been left to the physiological and behavioristic psychologists to supplement the work in psychoanalysis by the study of the conditioned reflexes. These explain the typical or pattern reactions; while the studies of Cannon and Crile point out the glandular activities which furnish the energy back of these unconscious processes. These and other similar studies have thrown light on human nature in its social as well as individual aspects. It was found by Watson that the reflex may be conditioned not alone at the level of the simple physiological reflex, but in the case of emotional reactions. Conditioning in this case would mean that when an emotionally exciting object stimulates the subject simultaneously with one not directly emotionally exciting, the latter may in time arouse the same emotional response as the other. Kempf considers this fact of the utmost importance in determining the selections and aversions of life. It surely throws into bold relief the fact that the environment may exercise a warping effect on native endowment and capacities by means of the early establishment of bad-conditioned reflexes. Such substitute formations are especially common because of the pressure exercised by social life, in which free play of the individual affective life is prevented by its serious interference with other members of the group. The fear of group disapproval, well justified by the resulting punishment in childhood as in primitive groups, is sufficient explanation of the incessant reconditioning which begins at birth, continues through life, and thus from the beginning conventionalizes the methods of gratification.

It is possible that studies now being made of the drive back of the patterns or motor sets of which we are speaking may show that the tendency of emotions inhibited at one outlet to seek other outlets may be too complex to be completely explained as conditioned reflexes. All that can be said at present is that emotional pressure is drained off through channels made possible by environment and hereditary factors. The interesting and significant thing to the sociologist is that these vicariate activities do become socialized and standardized, and that the process takes place outside of consciousness in the sense that it takes place at a period when its significance and implications are not understood by the subject. The most fundamental of these standardization processes are the impressions and associations of the infancy period. It has long been understood by child psychologists that the persistent reactions of the child are conditioned by the home environment in which the formative

years are passed. The social forms and prescriptions there prevailing long remain the "right" forms. It should be no matter of surprise that those best loved in infancy should leave their impress on later loves; nor that the conflicts which there prevailed should give patterns to later thought-activities. Such socially conditioned reactions may coincide with folkways or social habits conducive to group and individual welfare. But there are other forces at work in our institutional life, outworn systems of control which society has retained through force of habit and has continued to use as a means of regulating the activities of its members; arbitrary ideals to which conformance is demanded under pain of forfeiture of social esteem. In America the frontier and the rapid development of our industrial life have hitherto served as vents from social pressure for personalities which find the mode-making process difficult. If collectivism and the disappearance of the frontier should do away with these typically American vicariates we look with some foreboding toward the possible substitute formations. The psychoanalytic hypothesis would lead us to expect (in the absence of rationalization) increasing conflict with recrudescence of ancient race and class hatreds, and a reinforcement of the collective emotion of crowds, all molded by the pattern conflicts of past generations.

THE ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL SURVEY

Harold S. Buchlin, Brown University, and Shelby M. Harrison, Russell Sage Foundation

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QUALITATIVE SOCIAL ANALYSIS

ALLEN T. BURNS, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION

Past social surveys have dealt largely with the quantities of the factors or ingredients in a social situation or social complex. Future surveys will study the influence, persistence, and dynamics of these factors; not only how much, but how potent; besides what and how, questions of why and whence will be asked.

Such qualitative analysis will progress by comparisons and contrasts of social conditions and by inquiry into the causes of these differences. A thorough setting forth of all significant facts will show certain situations to be similar in many respects quantitatively but their differences and the antecedents of these differences will disclose the qualitative factors.

An illustration may make clear the greater importance of such qualitative as compared with quantitative analysis:

In the Connecticut valley are two towns of almost exactly the same size. In both two-thirds of the population are Poles. The towns are of the same age and the Polish invasion has been going on for an equal number of years in each. Their latitude and longitude are alike, for they are only 10 miles apart.

Both have the same access to flowing water and are served by two branches of the same railroad and are equidistant from the same important larger centers of trade and population. Even the occupations and industries are the same in both.

But town A surpasses town B in trade activity, social recreation, community solidarity, collective effectiveness, religious and moral earnestness. Why?

From earliest days the church has been the unit or organ of community spirit and action in these towns. Town B has found no way of bringing the Poles into a church which in turn takes the same part in community life as did the Congregationalist churches traditionally.

Town A became concerned when the Poles did not take part in either the Congregational or English-speaking Catholic church and so were not united to the town life. Some Poles were also concerned with the demoralization resulting from such social isolation and irresponsibility. The Poles moved for an organ of participation of their own, i.e., a church. The native-born, Protestant and Catholic, instead of frowning on this move as further promoter of separateness, helped by counsel and contribution to make possible a Polish church. Produced in this way the new church became for the Poles their organ or link in community life, as the other churches were.

So differences in behavior and practices traced to differences in developments and history reveal the social forces or dynamics of various combinations of social factors. This is qualitative social analysis.

ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL SURVEY

MISS EMMA DUKE, AMERICAN RED CROSS

In surveys local interest and co-operation are essential and local financial support will strengthen that interest. The use of local people in gathering material is, however, of doubtful value, owing to pressure from political and other interests that the survey may touch.

Differences in method and scope for rural areas in contrast to urban and suburban areas must be appreciated. A comprehensive community survey is more satisfactory, but a survey of one problem or condition is legitimate, as of industrial conditions, infant mortality, health, and so on. But in the latter type of study the possible relation of all other social and economic conditions must be considered.

The planning of the questionnaire is of prime importance, and the great advance in survey methods in the future is to be made here—in the elimination of such inquiries as do not directly contribute to the attainment of the purpose of a survey, which is to measure the relative importance of the various factors which have created the pathosocial conditions in the area studied. Social ills do not happen; they are caused.

Sloppy workers succumb to the easy method of adding as many questions as possible on all phases of life and living. This lack of discrimination between important and unimportant detail produces what most of us can confess to, namely, that expensive waste in the form of "unused material on the schedules."

But the one essential is that every bit of the planning be done in advance of the field work. With adequate planning not a single item on the questionnaire need be changed. The schedule should not call for a single item the relation of which to other phases of the problem has not been considered in advance and the use of which has not been provided for.

It goes without saying that findings should be presented clearly and steps taken to secure action recommended in the survey or other thoughtful action to remedy adverse conditions.

Many surveys yield sensational news items, and even statistical tables of a sort, but unless a survey can legitimately be used as an instrument in the scientific diagnosis of the causes of a community's ills it has failed.

ESSENTIALS OF A SURVEY PLAN

SHELBY M. HARRISON, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

When I first began to jot down notes on this subject I soon found that I had listed something more than the proverbial fourteen points. Many of them I am sure are quite obvious, and possibly matters of considerable detail; but rather than select two or three for special discussion, I have preferred to present most of the list, even though in the ten minutes available they can be indicated only in barest outline. They are put not so much in order of importance, as in order of sequence in planning a survey.

1. *Definition of purpose.*—A first essential to a survey plan is a clear definition of purpose. Why is it to be undertaken? To what end is information to be collected? I do not mean deciding in advance upon something to go out and prove; but what in its largest terms is it to which an answer is sought, whether the answer is affirmative or negative.

2. *Representative backing.*—The survey is made in the interest of the community, city, county, or other unit of population, and should find its support in the locality. A town meeting cannot be called and delegates elected, but it is nevertheless possible to secure a survey committee or board which is truly representative of all the important group interests of the community. Outside co-operation and assistance may be secured, but unless the project has its roots in local soil, it is not on a sound basis.

3. *Defining the survey to the community.*—Once the project is clearly defined in the minds of those first and most interested and has enough backing to assure its going forward, it should be defined, through the press and other channels, to the whole community—to the people ultimately concerned. To most citizens the survey is something vague and abstract. It needs repeated

definition and illustration. This is an important step in securing the community's participation in the project. It may moreover be the first step in leading citizens to think in terms of the whole community also.

4. *Preliminary reconnoiter or pathfinder survey.*—Assuming that a director or experienced adviser has been secured, a preliminary study of the local conditions should be made by him or under his direction, the purpose being to secure the information necessary in laying subsequent plans. On the basis of the facts secured it should be possible to determine upon the main lines of investigation to be taken up—the divisions into which the subject-matter of the survey would fall.

5. *Organization of survey staff and co-operation.*—With the subject divisions of the survey determined, it will then be possible to decide upon the types of expert assistance needed. In organizing this assistance due attention should be paid to the possibility of using workers from national, state, and other organizations, whose field of work includes the given community, who therefore feel a responsibility to it, and whose co-operation in carrying out survey recommendations will not only be expected but greatly desired. Also the possibility of securing assistance from educational institutions should be thoroughly canvassed. Committees or subcommittees made up of other volunteer workers may be organized; but it should be added that all volunteer assistance should be planned with careful appreciation of what volunteer workers can and cannot do.

6. *Outlining of investigations.*—Each division of the survey should be carefully outlined with a view to determining the kind of data to be collected, the critical omission of facts which may be interesting but irrelevant to the survey, the division of fact-gathering as between fields which are closely related, etc.

7. *Determination of methods of securing desired data.*—Decision needs to be made next as to what facts will be secured through observation by the investigators, what through personal interviews, what through blanks or schedules filled out by others, what through questionnaires, what can be gotten from documents and published reports, and so on. Decision also must be made as to the units to be covered—whether the whole community in some cases or whether typical situations will be relied upon.

8. *Drafting of blanks and schedules.*—Wherever possible these should be drafted tentatively and tried out before finally printed.

9. *Fact-gathering.*—Facts are basic in the survey. Opinion has its place; but here we are dealing with something else. Evidence is the legal tender which the investigator must bring back in exchange for the opportunity to be of service in the survey organization.

10. *Attention to graphic material.*—Early in the survey investigators should begin to be on the watch for graphic material which will be of use later in presenting simply and accurately the pertinent facts of the survey. Maps are important, also photographs and illustrative incidents.

11. *Tabulation and analysis of the facts.*—The project calls for sound statistical methods in putting the facts together so that they can be made the basis of inductive reasoning.

12. *Formulation of recommendations.*—The survey aims at action. It is diagnosis to the end that prescription may be written. Results often follow the mere turning on of the light; but the surveyor's responsibility does not always end there. He should know standards and methods sufficiently to see the constructive measures to which his organized facts point.

13. *Submission of report for criticism.*—Reporting to the public on conditions in the community and recommending action aimed at "control of the forces of the hour" are serious matters. Before going to the public with the survey's facts and recommendations, they should be checked and criticized by those with special knowledge in the fields touched, whose co-operation can be secured. Believing in the greater soundness of group judgment, the value of this kind of assistance must be recognized.

14. *Presenting or reporting the survey findings.*—First and last the survey is an educational measure. It is a means to better democracy by informing the community upon community matters, and thereby providing the raw materials for intelligent public opinion and a basis for considered action. It utilizes as many channels of education as it finds open to it: among them being the daily press, the graphic exhibit, the illustrated periodical, the public address and entertainment, lantern-slides, motion pictures, as well as the printed pamphlet and book report.

15. *Keeping up current interest in the survey.*—Once the survey has enlisted the interest of the community, that interest should not be allowed to die, but should be given something to subsist upon from time to time. Attention should thus be given to the news of the survey, and to all other material acceptable to the press which at the same time does not anticipate the full reporting of findings at the strategic time planned.

16. *Circulation of survey reports beyond the borders of the community surveyed.*—The responsibility of the surveyor is not discharged, it seems to me, until he has gone as far as he can in putting the experience and information gained in his survey before those interested in endeavors of this kind and desirous of profiting by each new venture.

ESSENTIALS OF A PLAN OF SURVEY

C. J. Galpin, United States Department of Agriculture

Preface

Comparable in some respects with a diagnosis, a survey, to be fertile, requires at almost every point a peculiar cast of directive mind, approaching genius for discernment. With this preliminary statement, however, the

following factors are presented as essentials in a standard plan: (1) a general subject of study; (2) a specific subject of study; (3) management; (4) a field of survey; (5) a schedule of inquiry; (6) investigation; (7) a summary of schedules; (8) interpretation; (9) utilization.

1. *A General Subject of Study*—

A *survey* is usually a part of a general subject of study in connection with which other methods than the survey method (which is so largely statistical) are presumably employed. The survey is thus intended to throw light on the general subject.

2. *A Specific Subject of Study*—

A specific subject related to the general subject and adapted peculiarly to the survey method of study is the aim of the survey inquiry.

3. *Management*—

An organizer or manager of the survey is essential to a convincing survey plan. The harmonious working together of all the factors in a survey depends upon effective management and unified control from the outset. Explorations of a preliminary character and preparatory field tactics paving the way for the survey belong to management.

4. *A Field of Survey*—

A particular territorial area, conditioning the subject of the survey, is geographically defined in a true survey, either at the outset or later in the study.

5. *A Relevant Schedule of Inquiry*—

A *set of questions* whose answers are distinctly relevant to the specific subject of study characterizes a true survey. A pseudo-survey is marked by irrelevant or futile questions. The best type of true survey schedule is framed about simple, significant key inquiries. A relevant schedule is a critical factor in a plan of survey.

6. *Investigation*—

Skilled investigators know the difference between a fact, an opinion, and a statement colored with bias. A completely answered schedule is the ideal. The seeing eye of the investigator supplements the schedules.

7. *A Summary of Schedules*—

Such a tabulation of schedules is necessary as will reveal to the interpreter significant correlations of the survey answers. Mechanical aids to correlation, such as the strip system, are valuable.

8. *Interpretation*—

An interpretation of the tabulated results of a survey is very essential to a survey plan. Visual methods (graphs, charts, maps) enhance literary interpretation. The interpreter, although of course acquainted with the field of survey, will be aided by continual conference with the investigator. The investigator may be the interpreter.

9. *Utilization*—

A true survey is made for utilization in a general scheme of inquiry. At this point the specific subject of study finds its connection with the general subject of study mentioned at the beginning. Delay to utilize the survey impairs its value.

ESSENTIALS OF A PLAN OF SURVEY

ERNEST C. MEYER, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

By the term "survey," as here used, is understood the collection of information from the printed page, and through correspondence, personal conference, and observation; and the interpretation of these data from the point of view of the object aimed at. It is understood to be a single undertaking for one definite purpose, on the completion of which the entire machinery is done away with. With this definition in mind the essentials of a plan of survey are thought to include:

Call for survey—

The call should set forth: why information is needed; what information is needed; and when information is needed, particularly the latter.

Organization of machinery—

This means the provision of a plant—headquarters, equipment, adequate funds, and schedules; of personnel; and of business procedure—budgeting, appropriating, accounting, and reporting.

Administration of work—

Funds: Funds adequate for the completion of the survey must be provided. Estimates are often difficult. This makes the matter of funds all the more important, so that the work need not be dropped before the fruits of the investment, already made, can be realized.

Avoidance of duplication: The first step should be a careful scrutiny of all possible sources to see whether the information sought has not already been wholly, or partially, collected elsewhere.

Gradual development of plant and personnel: Begin with a minimum of organization. With the unveiling of useful sources of information, gradually expand. Keep the organization a bit beneath requirements.

Adjustment of speed: The speed with which the work must be done is determined by (1) the time when information is needed, and (2) the promptness with which information gets out of date once it is collected. These two must have close attention.

Checking of cost: There should be intermittent checking up of accumulated cost to prevent a collapse of the undertaking under its own weight, and to stimulate the elimination of unproductive leads of study.

Report—

The report should include: a summary; the report proper presenting facts collected; deductions and conclusions from these facts; and supporting exhibits containing details for the elaboration of points brought out in the report.

ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL SURVEY

W. H. SLINGERLAND, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

Surveys of organized and systematic types began about twenty-five years ago. Later the survey idea passed into social service, and was applied to the study of agencies and institutions.

The term "survey" is one of large and inclusive meaning. It should be applied to the most extended and scientific inquiries. Minor surveys are called "studies."

I

According to Paul Kellogg, in a technical sense surveys have a character peculiarly their own. In them appear five elements:

1. The study of a unit, a group, a class, or a locality.
2. A diagnosis based upon accepted standards of experience.
3. Definitions of the relationships between different social items.
4. The "case work" method of expressing problems in terms of humanity.
5. The journalistic idea of graphic portrayal of accumulated information.

II

The essentials of a good survey plan can best be outlined by taking as an example the "study" of a child-caring institution.

1. *Board.*—Secure accurate information concerning method of appointment, personnel, influence, and definite interest in institution. Are the members selfish, narrow, prejudiced, or altruistic, broad, progressive?

2. *Plant.*—The plant is the physical instrument for the work. Note its three elements.

a) Location: Is it sightly and sanitary, easily reached by highways and street cars, grounds limited or commodious, connection with sewers and water supply, heating and lighting systems?

b) Buildings: Study type, materials, architecture, heating, lighting, plumbing, ventilation, fire escapes, stairways, dining-rooms, dormitories, smells, and evidences of vermin.

c) Furnishings: Note ranges, cooking utensils, dishes, cutlery, napery, table linen, chairs, tables, bedsteads, springs, bedding, and general equipment.

3. *Staff.*—"Soul of the institution." Study the character, training, ability, spirit, and experience of the working force.

4. *Inmates.*—Study numbers, class, types, sex, ages, health, clothing, food, care, education, recreation, training, and religious privileges.

III

The three chief essentials for success as a social surveyor are: (1) character; (2) training; (3) tactfulness.

SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TEACHING OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE GRADE AND HIGH SCHOOLS OF AMERICA

I. PROGRESS OF SOCIAL-SCIENCE TEACHING

Very encouraging progress is being made in the teaching of social science. Numerous agencies are promoting the cause. The American Bankers' Association has a committee that is actively furthering the teaching of those phases of economics in which bankers are especially interested. The American Red Cross, through its junior societies, has developed a plan for citizenship training through service. The North Central Association of Secondary Schools through its secretary, Professor C. O. Davis, of the University of Michigan, made in 1920 an elaborate survey of social-science teaching in the eighteen states comprised within the association. His report shows that the schools of these states are "alive to the need for providing for training in citizenship, and that they are employing, possibly as fully as could be expected, all the available means to attain that end"; that "courses of study . . . . in citizenship are for the most part deferred to the last two years of school work"; that "courses in elementary sociology, in occupations, and in morals, manners and life problems are not yet finding any conspicuous place in school programs. . . . ."

The interest of educators is thoroughly aroused. Social-science teaching is now a very usual subject on the programs of educational associations. Professor Judd, as secretary of the National Association of Secondary School Principals, contended in his report "for a recognition of social studies as the major train or thread of studies, others finding relation to them as possible. . . . . Social studies should be magnified at the expense of English, mathematics, languages and even natural science." The *School Review* for April, 1920, in which both of these reports appear, is devoted almost entirely to social-science teaching in the public schools, and is now

one of the most useful sources of information on the subject. Numerous articles have appeared in other pedagogical periodicals during the year.

Perhaps the most encouraging event of the year was the resolution adopted by the National Education Association Committee on Social Studies at the Cleveland meeting in February. It recommended that a program of social studies, approximately as set forth in our last year's report, be *required* in all schools. This resolution is significant not only because of the radical innovation it recommends, but also because of the close affiliation between this committee of the National Education Association and the Federal Bureau of Education, and also because this program represents, as stated last year, the consensus of opinion of all the committees at work on the problem, including that of the American Historical Association whose program the schools have been following for the last twenty-five years. Reports have come from widely separated states that this program, or something similar to it, has already been approved by several state educational associations and adopted by some state departments of education.

II. THE PROGRAM OF SOCIAL-SCIENCE STUDIES

The program is as follows:

For the elementary school—

Grades I to VI: One full round of elementary general and American history, with emphasis on the economic and social sides.

For the junior high school—

Grades VII and VIII: Geography, American history, and government.

Grade IX: General social science or "community civics."

For the senior high school—

Grade X: European history.

Grade XI: American history.

Grade XII: Sociology, economics, and civics, or "problems of democracy."

While there is general agreement as to the main outlines of this program there are some details that remain unsettled, and with regard to which the sociological point of view ought to be expressed.

III. THE NINTH-GRADE COURSE

This committee has taken some pains to find out what is being taught in the ninth grade. Where the course is offered at all, which is quite unusual, the consensus of opinion and practice among teachers is to put the emphasis upon government. "Community civics" aptly indicates what is being taught. The textbook most frequently used in the ninth grade is Hughes's *Community Civics*. About three-fifths of this book is devoted to government, one-fifth to economics, and less than one-sixth to sociology. This is fairly typical of what most teachers are trying to do, except that in some schools there is an attempt to add "vocational civics" and vocational guidance.

This concept, usual in the minds of teachers, is much too narrow. Unfortunately the social institution that all but monopolizes their attention is the government. True, they are not content to study its mere forms, as they were some years ago. They do give some attention to the everyday interests of life with which the government concerns itself. But what they teach is still civics, nevertheless—not social science. Teachers as a rule do not yet perceive that government is only one in the sisterhood of social institutions, and not the most important at that; that a "socius" is more than a citizen, having many other social interests, activities and relations besides the civic.

From your committee's extensive correspondence with sociologists it is quite as clear that they have a much broader concept of what should be taught in the ninth grade. It is the consensus of their opinions that this still too narrow "community civics" should now be definitely abandoned in favor of general social science. The adoption of this name is itself desirable for several reasons, but chiefly to suggest to the rising generation that there is a real science of society. The course should definitely include sociology, economics, civics, and ethics—although it goes without saying that for pedagogical reasons the material should be elementary, concrete, and descriptive, and that the four subjects should be "fused" after the analogy of general science and unified mathematics as they are not taught in the ninth grade of most progressive schools.

The sociology in this course should be chiefly a local study of the fundamental social groups and institutions, namely, the family, the play group, the neighborhood associations, the school, the church, recreation, etc. In the field of economics it should make the pupil familiar with the chief vocations, industries, and industrial institutions of his immediate environment. In the field of civics it should acquaint him with the local civic machinery and teach him how to use it. But while the point of departure in all these fields should be the local environment, the study should not stop there, but should be supplemented with a nation-wide description of social, economic, and political phenomena, with the relations of local phenomena thereto. And while the study should be chiefly concrete, it should not fail to proceed from the concrete to the abstract, in so far as general principles can be assimilated by early adolescents. And throughout the whole the ethical import of sociological, economic, and civic relations should be incidentally but insistently suggested. The course should develop the concept of co-operation, and reveal the *raison d'être* for the essential ideals and virtues of life, while the most approved pedagogical devices should be utilized for motivating and emotionalizing the same.

While this course is recommended for the ninth grade, that recommendation is based on the assumption of the Junior High School organization. Where the eight-four system is still in use it is probably advisable to introduce this course, in part at least, into the eighth grade.

IV. THE TENTH-GRADE HISTORY COURSE

In its last year's report this committee stated that the tenth-grade history course should consist of an outline survey of social evolution, including prehistoric times, that it should emphasize the social and economic sides, trace the historic development of ideals and institutions, and reveal the solidarity of modern nations. This position requires repetition with emphasis.

To confine the study of European history to the period since 1648 would be a serious mistake for two reasons. In the first place it would fail to impart the historic perspective necessary to an understanding of our own times. One can no more understand

the present crisis in world-affairs from a study of recent events only than he can understand a butterfly by watching it emerge from its cocoon. It is as necessary in the one case to get the whole perspective of social evolution as it is in the other to study the whole life-history of the insect. A study of our own times alone tends to indorse the obsessions of the time spirit—from which the times most needs to escape. In the second place, the study of recent history alone commits the same fallacy as "community civics" does, it exaggerates the relative significance of the political institution. Such an unbalanced study of society would tend to throw society itself out of balance. Sociologists are committed to a philosophy of history and of education which insists "that history must not be taught in a truncated fashion—cutting off the lower three-fourths of it"; and the committee has letters from numerous leading educators stating that they are in full accord with this view. This is the philosophy that H. G. Wells hinted at in *Joan and Peter* and expounded in *The Undying Fire*, and that has called forth his *Outline of History* in two volumes (Macmillan), which might quite probably prove satisfactory as a high-school textbook. The sociologists' position relative to the tenth-grade course in European history was set forth at some length in the *Historical Outlook* for June, 1920.

V. TEXTBOOKS

High-school teachers are as a rule quite dependent upon textbooks. Good texts are accordingly of vital importance to the teaching of social science in high schools. It is desirable, therefore, that numerous new texts in sociology should presently appear, so that out of the struggle for existence among them something really suitable may eventually survive. It is almost a foregone conclusion, however, that successful high-school textbooks will not be written by college and university professors of sociology, except in collaboration with high-school teachers who are trained both in sociology and the modern science of education.

The following textbooks are available for use in the twelfth grade:

In sociology: Burch and Patterson, *American Social Problems* (Macmillan); Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*

(American Book Company); Towne, *Social Problems* (Macmillan). In economics: Bullock, *Elements of Economics* (Silver Burdett, 1919); Carlton, *Elementary Economics* (Macmillan); Carver, *Elementary Economics* (Ginn, 1920); Ely and Wicker, *Elementary Economics* (Macmillan, 1919); Thompson, *Elementary Economics* (Sanborn). In civics: Ashley, *The New Civics* (Macmillan); Dawson, *Self-Government* (Holt); Magruder, *American Government in 1921* (Allyn and Bacon).

For general social science in the ninth grade there is no text available as yet that conforms to the ideals set forth in section III. The Hughes book is frequently used, as is Dunn's *Community and the Citizen* (Heath, 1907).

VI. UNIVERSAL SECONDARY EDUCATION

Social-science teaching is not simply a matter of getting the subject into the curriculum, but of keeping children in school until sufficient maturity is attained to impart the social principles necessary for effective citizenship. While the movement to introduce social studies and civic training into the elementary grades is, of course, commendable, and quite in harmony with recent tendencies in the natural sciences, the fact remains that any comprehension of the social sciences at all adequate to the needs of democracy requires the maturity of high-school age to say the least. When it is considered that at best only one-third of our children enter high school, and that only one-ninth graduate, this argument seems conclusive. But it is not conclusive at all. The really conclusive argument runs as follows: that general enlightenment relative to economic and social problems is absolutely necessary to the success of democracy; but social problems are too complex for grade pupils to understand, although they may be taught effectively in the upper grades of the high school; and, therefore, practically all children must be retained in school throughout the secondary period. High-school graduation is the minimum essential, so far as training for efficient citizenship is concerned; hence compulsory attendance must be advanced to approximately eighteen. It is very encouraging that great business interests, like the American Bankers' Association, are coming to

realize that for American business as well as for American citizenship the training which only high schools can give is quite necessary for practically all our young people. Universal secondary education is, therefore, the slogan upon which all intelligent, progressive, patriotic interests should unite! Nothing less is adequate to the needs of democracy in our modern complex problematical society.

ROSS L. FINNEY, University of Minnesota, *Chairman*
E. S. BOGARDUS, University of Southern California
C. A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri
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DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University
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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STANDARDIZATION OF RESEARCH OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Sociology began as a social philosophy. It represented an attempt to interpret social phenomena from a different point of view than that either of history or the philosophy of history. With Comte sociology was chiefly philosophy with a citation of historical facts to point his theory. While Spencer used many more facts by way of illustration than Comte, nevertheless his system too was chiefly a philosophy. It is not intended to convey the impression that these men did not share in the scientific spirit which had been developed up to their day. Nevertheless, both of them were essentially philosophers. Such sociology has remained to a considerable extent even to the present. The philosophical method rather than the method of science has characterized the work of most sociologists.

The chief complaint on the part of natural scientists has been that the generalizations of sociology have been based too largely upon the observation of an individual rather than upon a careful gathering of all the facts concerning the particular field of social life of which the sociologist was writing. The complaint of the historian has been that the sociologist is interested in the interpretation of historical data rather than the patient gathering of facts on which to generalize.

However, the observations of both these classes of scholars have been in part due to a misunderstanding of the purpose of social philosophy and partly upon reaction from the claims of extravagant sociologists themselves. In two fields of sociology an attempt has been made to apply scientific methods—both in the gathering of facts and in the interpretation of those facts. These fields are descriptive sociology and so-called practical sociology. While the induction of facts in both these fields has not been as wide as it should be, the attempt has been made to apply the scientific method.

Spencer himself set the example for this inductive study of social phenomena in his *Descriptive Sociology*. From every source available he collected facts concerning primitive societies. Sometimes his sources were in error. That he analyzed this material and treated it as a philosophy is no valid impeachment of his method.

Descriptions of societies, when not merely the result of the casual observations of one who makes a short trip through a strange country but based upon careful research and patient gathering of facts revealing the life of a society, approach the scientific.

In the field of poverty and pauperism, crime, defect, disease, immigration, education, and other special fields of social life something has been done to patiently gather and analyze facts in a study of causation. Moreover, in the attempt to suggest principles of treatment, comparative studies from a wide range of practice have been made in what may be described as a scientific method of study.

Semiscientific methods have been used in the fields of social psychology and social process. The study now being made by Dr. Thomas of the Poles is a good illustration of the application of patient scientific methods in this field. The Americanization studies by the Carnegie Foundation show us the possibilities of developing a scientific technique in the study of immigration which doubtless will throw much light upon social psychology and principles of assimilation. However, until sociologists succeed in bringing under control other fields of the subject and base their generalizations upon careful research, much of their work will be held in contempt by adherents of a strict scientific method.

Two things are necessary in the development of sociology. The one is a determination at all costs to apply the scientific method to social phenomena of all kinds. The other is to standardize research.

Since patient research has proceeded farther in the fields of descriptive and practical sociology and in the general field of social population, for the present it would seem best to center attempts at standardization on those fields. At all costs sociology

must secure a wider basis of facts for its generalizations. Social philosophy must never cease to be—but it must be a social philosophy based upon a careful search for facts. The social survey has proceeded far enough so that a comparison of methods and technique is possible. The department of surveys of the Russell Sage Foundation has performed a great service to social research in devoting itself assiduously to the question of standardization in that particular field.

There is one field in which it seems to the Committee that the sociologists have special responsibility for standardization—that is the field of doctors' dissertations. For some time now universities have been permitting graduate students to write their theses with a major in sociology. As one glances through a number of such dissertations, he finds evidences of all grades of scientific work. Some of them have very little fact basis. Others show the results of patient research with poor analysis and generalizations from the facts gathered. Others, all too few, show thorough research, keen analysis of the results, and skilled interpretation of the facts found. To the Committee it appears that here is a field where definite results can be obtained in an attempt to standardize the research done by graduate students for their dissertations. It would be a valuable study, could a large number of dissertations be carefully studied, the defects in method and in interpretation pointed out, and a standard, even though tentative in nature, wrought out. In some fields possibly, sociology is not ready for standardization. However, certainly here is a field white for the harvest.

Several important questions should be asked with reference to these productions. (1) Has the field of study been carefully delimited? (2) Does the dissertation show a thorough search for facts bearing upon the subject? (3) Has the material been analyzed carefully so as to show the significance of the facts? (4) In the interpretation of the facts, have any generalizations been made which the facts do not warrant, and have all the generalizations been drawn which the facts support? The possibilities are that such a study would reveal that every dissertation passed by departments of sociology would come up to these tests in every particular.

On the other hand, it is quite possible that many would be found which represent vicious methods at every step in the procedure. Supposedly representing contributions to human knowledge, is it not the common observation of sociologists that many times these dissertations have not been subjected to such careful and rigid tests. Would you not all be grateful, even though we might not secure unanimity with regard to the standards to be applied, were some standard for doctor's dissertations carefully worked?

The problems of sociological research, however, are much more complex than the discussion so far would indicate. While the doctors' dissertations may, perhaps, challenge teachers in colleges and universities most sharply, are there not other problems of as great importance to those who are interested in the development of sociology as a science? What of the great gaps in our knowledge about society? Are there not great areas in which so far our social philosophy has been based too largely on armchair research? Are we sociologists so possessed of that passionate desire to see the great unexplored regions of social ignorance opened by the slow but effective methods of patient study of the facts, that, like Xavier before the closed doors of the Flowery Kingdom, we are not only crying out, "O, Rock, Rock, when wilt thou open?" but in the midst of our many duties of teaching and administration we are penetrating with patient, never flagging zeal the vague territories of which now all we know is revealed by the aeroplane-map of the social philosopher? The faith and the hypothesis of the seer we must have, but by patient research we must also ascertain whether our logically possible theories square with the actual facts.

Jevons in that most suggestive chapter which he calls "The Character of the Experimentalist" in his *Principles of Science*, points out two remarkable characteristics of two great physical scientists, Kepler and Faraday. These characteristics were, (1) fertility in hypothesis, and (2) great industry in testing the various theories by patient experiment to ascertain which of them fit the facts. Concerning Kepler he says:

> Did we not learn from his own writings the multitude of errors into which he fell, we might have imagined that he had some special faculty of seizing the truth. But, as is well known, he was full of chimerical notions;

his favourite and long-studied theory was founded on a fanciful analogy between the planetary orbits and the regular solids. His celebrated laws were the outcome of a lifetime of speculation, for the most part vain and groundless. We know this because he had a curious pleasure in dwelling upon erroneous and futile trains of reasoning, which most persons consign to oblivion. But Kepler's name was destined to be immortal, on account of the patience with which he submitted his hypotheses to comparison with observation, the candour with which he acknowledged failure after failure, and the perseverance and ingenuity with which he renewed his attack upon the riddles of nature.

Faraday he describes as follows:

Next after Kepler perhaps Faraday is the physical philosopher who has given us the best insight into the progress of discovery, by recording erroneous as well as successful speculations. The recorded notions, indeed, are probably but a tithe of the fancies which arose in his active brain. As Faraday himself said—"The world little knows how many of the thoughts and theories which have passed through the mind of a scientific investigator, have been crushed in silence and secrecy by his own severe criticism and adverse examination; that in the most successful instances not a tenth of the suggestions, the hopes, the wishes, the preliminary conclusions have been realised."

Nevertheless, in Faraday's researches, published in the *Philosophical Transactions*, in minor papers, in manuscript note-books, or in other materials, made known in his interesting life by Dr. Bence Jones, we find invaluable lessons for the experimentalist. These writings are full of speculations which we must not judge by the light of subsequent discovery. It may perhaps be said that Faraday committed to the printing-press crude ideas which a friend would have counseled him to keep back. There was occasionally even a wildness and vagueness in his notions, which in a less careful experimentalist would have been fatal to the attainment of truth. This is especially apparent in a curious paper concerning Ray-vibrations; but fortunately Faraday was aware of the shadowy character of his speculations, and expressed the feeling in words which must be quoted. "I think it likely," he says, "that I have made many mistakes in the preceding pages, for even to myself my ideas on this point appear only as the shadow of a speculation, or as one of those impressions upon the mind, which are allowable for a time as guides to thought and research. He who labours in experimental inquiries knows how numerous these are, and how often their apparent fitness and beauty vanish before the progress and development of real natural truth."

May we not say, then, as we review the sociological field, that, except in some few fields long cultivated by patient study, *it is not so much standardization of research we need as research?*

Perhaps most of us have done something in the way of theorizing concerning social relations. That was necessary. Have we,

however, done our share in putting our theories to the test of actual facts? The best of us know how little we actually have ascertained the fit of our guesses to social conditions, and mass motives.

Well do we all know the difficulties of verifying hypothesis by patient search for facts! How apparently insuperable are the obstacles to testing theories in some fields of sociology by study of the facts! No one knows that better than he who has attempted to write a book on general sociology, or even on one of its special fields. What gaps stare us in the face at every turn! How inadequate the so-called studies so often made! How elusive are some of the social motives! How complex the processes which enter into a social result! How difficult to delimit a problem so that it will be simple enough to control for purposes of study! Yet, it must be done. The fact that it has not been done constitutes the challenge to sociologists, to whom men are looking for guidance in the practical problems of human betterment. If it is not done by them, to whom can a befuddled world look to do it? It must be done, and it must be done by sociologists.

However, some of the conditions of the problems are favorable. Sociology has some advantages, as well as disadvantages for research. Our material is all about us, not afar off and therefore difficult to reach. We are not studying the relations of far-distant heavenly bodies or a society in some far-off heaven. We are in the midst of it, a part of it. In it we live and move and have our being. Its motives are ours. Its processes are results of the processes we experience. Its institutions we know and have helped, or are helping, to form. While we cannot experiment with society as freely as the physicist with heat and light, or the biologist with frogs and plants, yet, social experiments are being conducted all about us. We may see societies in all stages of development. They are living their lives, moving in certain directions in their development. They are to be found in all geographical and climatic conditions. They differ in their economic development, their educational systems, their government, their religion. One develops in one way dominated by certain motives, another in a different way controlled by other motives.

One has certain ideals, fears, hatreds, and suspicions; another has others.

Moreover, some use one method of social control, while others have quite different methods. How various are the devices by which various societies deal with the dependent, with law-breakers, with defectives! Hence, while we cannot always control the conditions of the experiment, we can search them out and describe them. The number of experiments are great enough to afford almost unlimited variety. And in some cases we can control to some extent the conditions of the experiment. For example, we can try different methods of placing orphan children, of caring for the insane, of treating the criminal. In fact, because social investigators have sought the facts regarding the results of different methods of social treatment, we have some guiding principles "discovered and approved by experience." What we now need is a further application of the comparative method, giving care first to get the facts concerning the conditions and results of each experiment.

Perhaps it would help just at this time if we could have now a careful mapping of the field. Where are the gaps in our knowledge? Which fields offer the most promising results? Which seem to be closed to present methods of social investigation? What methods produce the best results?

At present we can say that social research is confined chiefly to the fields of social population, social institutions, and social control. A beginning has been made in the investigation of the social mind, but very little; something, of social progress. Theories abound as to social processes, but how little thoroughgoing research in those last-named fields has been carried on!

Take, for example, the field of social process. The two most recent books are Professor Cooley's *Social Process* and Professor Ross's *Principles of Sociology*. Each of these men has described vividly social process as he sees it. Both have made us debtors by their brilliant interpretations of the facts they have observed. Long and careful observation, supplemented by the widest reading, analysis of the facts gathered in the ways mentioned and interpretations which amount to inspiration of genius characterize their

pages. Yet the analysis of the one is quite different on the whole from that of the other. The facts cited by the one to support a theory are not those cited by the other. They do not contradict each other, yet they are talking about the same thing, social process. What their work shows is not lack of observation of facts and conditions. Rather, the necessity of more facts. Each has reported what he has seen of the same field. Each gives his own analysis and interpretation of what he saw. Yet, each evidently saw only a part of the field, and each analyzed his material in a different way and arrived at different though not contradictory generalizations. Could there be a clearer demonstration of the need of further research in that field?

Furthermore, it is not difficult to show that sociology has made generalizations with an insufficient basis of facts. Says one:

> In fact from the first religion has always been the most patent of all the means of egoistic exploitation, for while it does not seem to favor any individual or class, it engenders a universal optimism and resignation which are highly favorable to all forms of exploitation.[1]

On the other hand, listen to this statement as to the influence of religion on social development:

> Too often through its well-meaning but benighted representatives, religion has mocked the findings of careful and conscientious scholars, stood with the representatives of arrant wrong against those who in love of the truth have battled for the rights of the people. Nevertheless, such an attitude represents but one side of the work of religion, the conservative side. Even that side is needed in society, as a stabilizing force. One must never forget, moreover, that some of the mightiest revolutions have been inspired by religious innovators. The Hebrew prophets, Jesus and Paul, Mohammed and Buddha—who shall say of them and of the movements they inspired that they did not give the race a great impetus toward progressive development?[2]

Why the discrepancy between these two interpretations of the influence of religion in social process? The answer is simple: the personal bias of two different writers unchecked by thorough research. It is not impossible to determine whether religion has one or the other of these effects, or both, and to a proximate degree

[1] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 487.

[2] Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 266–67.

under what conditions and how often it has been respectively a clog to progress or a spur.

Fortunately progress is being made. Sociologists are becoming more interested in finding out the facts concerning disputed questions in their field than in the endless debates on theory. Here again what we need is light rather than heat.

In addition to the large number of investigations being carried on by such agencies as the Russell Sage Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Cleveland Foundation, the Educational and Industrial Union of Boston, the best charity-organization societies, the Federal Bureau of Labor, the Federal Children's Bureau, the Census, dozens of state boards and commissions of various kinds, university professors and their students, and surveys by various organizations on various practical inquiries, a growing number of sociologists are becoming interested in attempting to study the more abstruse subjects of social interest on a fact basis. A group of those interested in social investigation got together at New Orleans at the National Conference of Social Work and decided to meet annually in connection with that body to discuss methods and endeavor to perfect the technique of social investigation. Professor Elwood has organized an honor society at the University of Missouri to promote social research. Graduate seminaries exist in most universities for social research.

Dr. Eaves kindly consented to ascertain all pieces of research of interest to sociologists which are being carried on in the New England colleges. She received reports on researches conducted by ten different people. Dean Henry W. Holmes, of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, reported five theses in that field. These were on "Co-operation in School Administration," "The Consolidated School," "The Reform of Education in France," "American Education in the Near East," and "The Training of Teachers in Belgium." Professor John M. Brewer, of the same faculty, is conducting a number of studies in the field of vocational education. In the Economics and Social Ethics departments of Harvard, Professor Ripley is directing studies of "The Seamen's Union" and of "Trade Unions in the Textile Industry." Professor Ripley himself is preparing a report on the "Consolidation

of Railroads" for the Interstate Commerce Commission. Professor Day reported a study of "Indices of Unemployment" by William Berridge. Professor Day himself has been making an attempt to develop an index of the physical volume of production, the results of which are appearing in current numbers of the *Economics Statistics*, Professor Foerster reported two Doctors' dissertations, one on the "History of Trade-Unionism in Imperial Germany," by R. S. Meriam, and another on the "History of the Labor Movement in Italy," by Walter B. Kahn. Dr. Niles Carpenter, an instructor in social ethics, is conducting a study on "Guild Socialism." Professor Barnes, of Clark University, is directing three studies by graduate students, one on the industrial, another on the educational, work of the Y.W.C.A., and the other on the treatment of the insane in Massachusetts. He is about to publish two books, one on *The Contributions of Sociology to the History of Political Theory* and the other on *The Evolution of Penology in Pennsylvania*. Professor Chapin, of Smith College, is conducting seven group investigations with undergraduate students on social conditions in Northampton. Acting Dean French, of the New Hampshire College, has a group of advanced students studying rural social conditions. Professor Tucker, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is about to publish a study of *The Evolution of the Co-operative Bank*. Dr. Eaves herself is directing a co-operative investigation which this Committee asked her to undertake. Some of you have probably received a questionnaire from her which will be used in a part of this investigation. The four research fellows of the Women's Educational and Industrial Union have collected data for a report on *Old-Age Provision of Massachusetts School Teachers*. Other studies to be made will be on *Old-Age Provision Made by Women Textile Workers*, *Use for Old-Age Provision by Self-Supporting Women of Commercial Insurance Agencies*, and *The Policies of Large Employers in Dealing with Older Women Employees*. Professors of sociology in the colleges and universities have been appealed to, to assist in this co-operative investigation. It is hoped in this way that a wider research may be made of these subjects.

As to the standardization of research, little is being done except in social case work and social surveys. Efforts are being

made to standardize nomenclature and methods of recording data in family and individual case work. We may be permitted to hope that some day soon a standardization of nomenclature in general sociology may be possible. A movement is also going on to standardize records of case-work agencies. Dr. C. C. Carstens, the general secretary of the newly formed National Committee of Child Helping Agencies, is trying to persuade all agencies engaged in the protection of children to adopt uniform methods of recording their cases. This movement is typical of other efforts at standardization of work in research in many other social agencies.

What we need is the organization of those interested in research in sociology to map the field, discuss methods, work out a plan of co-operation and to secure money to promote research. Perhaps the last is the most important. Teachers are so swamped with teaching and administration that they have little time or energy to devote to promoting careful and intensive study of little known fields. Sociology must finally drive for the appointment of research professors. We must also interest rich men in providing money for the prosecution of research until we have shown niggardly boards and legislatures the importance of finding out the facts bearing upon questions of social theory and social policy. Great foundations like the Russell Sage should be interested in promoting studies, not only of charity and correction, but also of the larger and more fundamental questions of social processes, social organizations, and social ideals. The endowment of research must come if sociology is to be relieved of the charge that it is a pseudo-science. That is as true of applied as of theoretical sociology. As Todd has well said, "It is perfectly apparent by this time that the Promised Land of wholesome social life cannot be seen clearly by eyes dimmed with easy tears; nor can the call to constructive social work be heard above the thumping of a fluttery heart. Social reform of any and every kind must be thought out and carried through in the scientific spirit."[1]

J. L. GILLIN, *Chairman*

[1] *The Scientific Spirit and Social Work*, p. 105.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL ABSTRACTS

Social research is hampered by the lack of indexes of abstracts of periodical literature of social science. At the present time the research worker in the social field is far more handicapped than the chemist or physicist because scientists in these latter subjects have resort to such publications as *Chemical Abstracts* and *Science Abstracts* wherein are found, systematically indexed, careful abstracts covering the whole field. A research scientist in these subjects can do his preliminary reading with convenience and expedition. In contrast, the social scientist who wants to exhaust the periodical literature on some social subject cannot rely upon the existing abstracts published in social and economic journals, however excellent these may be as individual pieces of work, since the existing abstracts do not fully cover the field; consequently he must supplement them by considerable reading from the original articles and run the risk of missing something really important.

In view of this state of affairs, the undersigned introduced the following motion, which was voted at the last annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, in the belief that social scientists might be willing at this time to co-operate in establishing and maintaining a monthly index of abstracts of periodical literature of social science. "'Moved, that the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society, acting through its President, and in consultation with the executives of the other social science associations, appoint a joint committee to investigate and report upon a plan to provide indices of abstracts of periodical literature relating to the subject-matter of social science.' It was understood that the Committee should consist of three persons and the plan should be presented at the next annual meeting."

President Dealey considered it advisable for a committee of this Society to investigate and report before taking the action suggested by the motion and consequently asked the undersigned to act as chairman and to select two others to serve upon the committee. As finally constituted the committee consists of

U. G. Weatherly, of Indiana; A. B. Wolfe, of Texas; and F. S. Chapin, of Smith College. The committee has the following report to make upon its investigation and proposals.

Information was secured about the organization and plans of management of *Chemical Abstracts* and *Science Abstracts*, and in consideration of the opinions of representative social scientists who were consulted, two alternative plans of indexes of abstracts of periodical literature of social science were agreed upon, viz., Plan A, for abstracting social literature; Plan B, for abstracting sociological literature.

First as regards Plan A—for abstracting social literature. Since articles in anthropology, economics, ethics, political science, etc., are often of considerable sociological significance, this plan has much to recommend it. If it should be possible for the President of this Society to take the action suggested in the original motion and resulting in the co-operative founding and maintenance of a general index of abstracts of periodical literature of social science, the position of the social-research student would be much improved and scientific reading of a comprehensive character could be done with much the same facility as it may now be done in chemistry and physics. Your committee has found, however, that the other social-science societies which publish abstracts in their specialized journals or reviews, tend to regard these abstracts as adequate for their purpose and would reluctantly relinquish the right to publish these in favor of some central or general index of abstracts. The present time does not, therefore, seem auspicious for taking the action suggested by the motion. Moreover, it should be said that committees of the American Association of University Professors and of the American Council of Learned Societies Devoted to Humanistic Studies have under consideration a plan to establish a cumulative index to all articles (but not abstracts) in periodical publications in the field of the humanities. Since this society is represented on the American Council of Learned Societies, we shall be able to keep in touch with new developments. Your committee, however, has consulted the chairman of the aforementioned committee of the Council of Learned Societies but finds that his plan has not yet matured.

Under these circumstances your committee recommends that Plan A for abstracting social literature be dropped from consideration at the present time, and submits the following plan:

PLAN B FOR ABSTRACTING SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE

1. This plan would merely expand the scope of the material now presented in the *Journal* under the caption, "Recent Literature, Notes and Abstracts" by creating machinery that would make for a comprehensive indexing of abstracts of all important sociological literature of periodical character to be published in the regular issues of the *Journal* or in an extra issue, as further consideration of the plan may suggest.

2. The committee recognizes the difficulty of selecting the criteria of what constitutes "sociological" as distinct from economic, anthropological, etc., but submits the following distinctions as possibly setting a starting-point for the discussion of criteria which may later on be defined more precisely.

a) Residual problems and principles remaining after the special social sciences of anthropology, economics, ethics, politics, etc., have had their spheres defined.

b) Synthetic problems and principles resulting from the action in combination with the principles of the special social sciences (defined above).

c) Principles common to all the special social sciences but running through and across their spheres and transcending the elements of their area of study.

Material delimited in this way might well consist in part of those products of collective human activity known as customs, traditions, folk ways, mores, usages, traditions, etc.

3. The selection by the Executive Committee of a sociologist to act as editor of an "Index of Abstracts of Sociological Literature" which would be published as a feature of the *American Journal of Sociology*. The committee believes, after considering the organization of *Chemical Abstracts*, that it is absolutely essential to put the responsibility of carrying on this work in the hands of one person on salary who should devote part or full time to the work. The editor of the abstracts should be an additional member of the editorial staff of the *Journal* excused from other editorial responsi-

bilities connected with the *Journal*. It is obvious that the editor would have to be a person of broad scholarly training and located within easy access of the best library facilities.

Assuming that "sociological" is defined with sufficient precision for the use of editors and abstractors, there are still other matters that need to be clarified; such, for example, as the determination of distinctions between scientific contributions and journalistic articles; also distinctions which would help the editor when drawing upon specialized periodicals not distinctly sociological, to select only the definitely social in subject-matter and interest as over against the formal technique of those subjects. These considerations and others that could be mentioned indicate that the task of the editor is no simple one, and have influenced the committee in making the recommendation that a responsible editor on salary be selected. In any event a high plane of selection for articles to be abstracted should be adopted.

4. The editor should select as many assistant editors (without pay) as there seem to be fairly well-defined subdivisions of the field, such as social theory, social evolution, social economy, social technology, etc.

5. Each assistant editor should select several competent scholars to abstract periodical literature in his field and should be responsible to the editor for having his field adequately covered.

6. Abstractors should be paid for their work at the rate of two dollars a printed page.

7. Abstracts should be indexed by subjects and not by words in order to be most useful.

8. Assignments might well be of three kinds (to follow by analogy the practice of *Chemical Abstracts*):

a) Article assignments to assistant editors by the editor, made after examination of the periodical at the office.

b) Journal assignments to assistant editors by the editor; the former being held regularly responsible for a certain journal or journals.

c) Abstract assignments to assistant editors by the editor (that is, abstracts such as appear in the journals or reviews of the other social sciences).

9. Financing the plan will be more difficult than proposing it has been. Professor A. W. Small, the editor of the *Journal*, says in this connection, "It would be necessary for the Society to become entirely responsible both financially and editorially for any material that might be submitted for our present contents," and again, "The University of Chicago Trustees have declined to be further responsible for an increased deficit on the *Journal*." Our proposal for an enlarged abstract service in the *Journal* may be illuminated by considering the experience of the chemists and the physicists.

10. *Chemical Abstracts* is published by a society of 14,000 members paying $10.00 a year dues, and at an estimated cost for 1920 of about $70,000.00. The system is worked out very elaborately. An examination of Volume XIII, for the calendar year 1919, shows that the editorial organization consisted of a paid editor and associate editor, both on full time, 45 assistant editors who served without pay, and 157 abstractors who were paid at the rate of $2.00 per page of abstract. In 1919 the society published 3,338 pages of abstracts classified under 29 main divisions of the science; from 1 to 8 abstracts appearing to the page. The budget for 1920 follows:

Editor's salary	$ 4,000
Associate editor	2,500
Clerical	4,200
Abstractors	7,500
Expense	850
Printing	50,650
Total	$69,700

11. *Science Abstracts* is published in England by the Institution of Electrical Engineers of London in association with the American Physical Society. *Science Abstracts* is published in two sections: A, Physics, and B, Engineering. Annual subscription for one section is $4.50. The American Physical Society has about 1,000 members, or about the same membership as the American Sociological Society. The editorial staff of section A, Physics, for the calendar year 1919 consisted of one editor and sixty-four abstractors. An organization sufficiently smaller than the chemical

publication to be suggestive for us. Some 1,583 abstracts of articles appear in Volume XXII and are classified under seven main headings. There are 662 pages to the volume with from one to seven abstracts to the page.

12. Although the experience of these two older sciences is suggestive, it is really necessary to work out original estimates for sociological abstracts. An examination of Volume XXVI of the *American Journal of Sociology* shows that during the year 1920 some 127 articles were abstracted, and these abstracts occupied the space of 54 pages. The Treasurer of the Society reports expenses of $3,707.68 for the period December 18, 1919—July 31, 1920 (approximately seven months). For this period the *Journal* cost $1,263.13 and the *Proceedings* $1406.16, with incidental expenses totaling $1,038.29. If $500.00 of this latter sum is charged to the *Journal*, then the estimated total cost of the *Journal* for the seven months stated was $1,763.13, or $3,024.00 for the year. This is at the rate of $504.00 per issue, or $3.52 per page for a volume of 858 pages of text. On this basis the cost of 54 pages of abstracts for the year 1920 was about $190.00 in round figures.

13. Your committee presents the following budget estimate of the cost of the proposed enlarged plan of abstracting periodical literature of sociology for the year 1921, based on the foregoing figures. It is estimated that for $3.52 per page some 284 pages of abstracts, as compared with 54 pages, could be published for $1,000.00 additional cost. This would mean that from six hundred to seven hundred articles a year could be abstracted.

Editor's salary (part time)	$ 1,000
Printing 284 pages of abstracts	1,000
Pay at $2.00 per page for abstracting on 284 full pages	568
Total estimated expense	$ 2,568

The sum of about $2,500.00 added to the budget of the Society on account of publishing abstracts would mean an increase of from $2.50 to $3.00 per year in the subscription price of the *Journal* to each of our 1,000 members.

14. The alternative plan of financing the proposed scheme of abstracts would be by appropriation or by the proceeds of an endowment fund which might be secured from one of the large endowments now interested in promoting social research and social investigations. The Committee on Social Abstracts has not approached any of these foundations because it believed that the Society would wish to consider the plan on its own merits before taking this line of action.

15. The following is a partial list of journals and reviews likely to contain valuable sociological material:

American Anthropologist
American Association for Labor Legislation Review
American Economic Review
American Historical Review
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie
Eugenics Review
Geographical Review
Independent
International Journal of Ethics
Journal of the American Folklore Society
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Journal of Heredity
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods
Journal of Political Economy
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
Journal of Sociologic Medicine
Mental Hygiene
Monthly Labor Bulletin
Musée Sociale
Nation (New York)
Natur und Gesellschaft
New Republic
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Quarterly of the American Statistical Association
Political Science Quarterly
Political Science Review
Psychological Bulletin
Psychological Review
Réforme Sociale
Riforma Sociale
Review

Revue Internationale de Sociologie (Paris)
Rivista Italiana di Sociologia
Scientia
Scientific Monthly
Sociological Review (London)
Sozial Praxis
State and Federal Reports
Survey
Zeitschrift für Sosialwissenschaft

Respectfully submitted,
F. S. CHAPIN

PROGRAM OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 27–29, 1920

General Subject: "Some Newer Problems, National and Social"

MONDAY, DECEMBER 27

3:00–5:00 P.M. Registration. Hallroom on Roof, Washington Hotel.

8:15 P.M. PROFESSOR EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Wisconsin, presiding.

Address: "Eudemics, a Science of National Welfare." J. Q. DEALEY, President of the American Sociological Society.

Address: "A Theory of Social Interests." DEAN ROSCOE POUND, Harvard Law School.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28

9:30 A.M. PROFESSOR ALBION W. SMALL, presiding.

Address: "The Community Idea in Rural Development." President KENYON L. BUTTERFIELD, Massachusetts Agricultural College.

Discussion: PROFESSOR JOHN M. GILLETTE, University of North Dakota; PROFESSOR CECIL C. NORTH, Ohio State University; DOCTOR PAUL L. VOGT, Philadelphia, Pa.

Address: "Further Inquiries of Sociology." PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.

Discussion: PROFESSOR U. G. WEATHERLY, Indiana University; PROFESSOR G. S. DOW, Baylor University.

11:00 A.M. Reports of Committees, PROFESSOR J. Q. DEALEY, presiding.

Committee on the Teaching of Social Science in the Public and High Schools. PROFESSOR ROSS L. FINNEY, Chairman, University of Minnesota.

Committee on the Standardization of Research: PROFESSOR J. L. GILLIN, Chairman, University of Wisconsin.

Committee on Social Abstracts: PROFESSOR F. STUART CHAPIN, Chairman, Smith College.

Conferences, PROFESSOR U. G. WEATHERLY, presiding.

2:00 P.M. Round Table:

"Sociological Significance of Psychoanalytic Psychology." In charge of PROFESSORS ERNEST R. GROVES, Boston University, and C. E. GEHLKE, Adelbert College.

Three-minute papers by: DR. EDITH SPAULDING, New York; DR. WILLIAM A. WHITE, Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington; PROFESSOR BERNARD GLUECK, New York School of Philanthropy; DR. PHYLLIS BLANCHARD, Bellevue Hospital, New York; MR. C. C. ROBINSON, International Committee, Y.M.C.A.; DR. IVA L. PETERS, Department of Science, Goucher College.

3:15 P.M. Round Table:

"The Essentials of a Social Survey." In charge of PROFESSOR HAROLD S. BUCKLIN, Brown University, and DR. SHELBY M. HARRISON, Russell Sage Foundation.

Speakers: ALLEN T. BURNS, Carnegie Institution; EMMA DUKE, National Child Labor Committee; M. C. ELMER, University of Minnesota; C. J. GALPIN, United States Department of Agriculture; ERNEST C. MEYER, Rockefeller Foundation; and W. H. SLINGERLAND, Russell Sage Foundation.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:30 A.M. PRESIDENT KENYON L. BUTTERFIELD, presiding.

Address: "Sociological Evaluation of the Interchurch Movement." PROFESSOR EDWIN L. EARP, Drew Theological Seminary.

Discussion: MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER, White Plains, New York; REV. S. Z. BATTEN, Philadelphia, Pa.

Address: "The Mexican Revolution and the Standard of Living." PROFESSOR MAX S. HANDMAN, University of Texas.

Discussion: DR. PORTER R. LEE, New York School of Social Work; PROFESSOR CARL KELSEY, University of Pennsylvania.

11:00 A.M. PROFESSOR F. W. BLACKMAR, presiding.

Address: "The Social Significance of Mental Levels." PROFESSOR J. P. LICHTENBERGER, University of Pennsylvania.

Discussion: PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES, University of Illinois; DOCTOR H. C. BINGHAM, National Research Council, Washington, D.C.; COLONEL R. I. REES.

Address: "The Social Significance of the New Plan of Army Education." PROFESSOR SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, University of Chicago.

Discussion: PROFESSOR E. A. ROSS, University of Wisconsin; COLONEL R. I. REES, General Staff, War Department, Washington, D.C.

2:15 P.M. Business meeting of the Society.

3:00 P.M. PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, presiding.

Address: "The Relation of Women to Industry." PROFESSOR SUSAN M. KINGSBURY, Bryn Mawr College.

Discussion: PROFESSOR FRANCIS TYSON, University of Pittsburgh; PROFESSOR FRANK D. WATSON, Haverford College.

Address: "Processes of Radicalism." PROFESSOR WILLIAM J. KERBY, Catholic University of America.

Discussion: PROFESSOR SEBA ELDRIDGE, Rockford College.

Address: "The Future of Sociology." PROFESSOR ALBION W. SMALL, University of Chicago.

Discussion: PROFESSOR HARRY E. BARNES, Clark University. EMORY S. BOGARDUS, University of Southern California.

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Annual Report of the Secretary for the Fiscal Year, December 19, 1919, to December 14, 1920

Membership Statement

The total membership of the American Sociological Society for the calendar year 1920 numbers 1,021. The membership for 1919 was 870. This latter number has been altered by the following changes in our membership lists:

Membership in 1919				870
Members resigning	52			
Members dropped	105			
Members deceased	6			
Total lost		163		
Members renewing, ex officio			1	
Members renewing, exchange			6	
Members renewing, paid			684	
New members			330	
Total for 1920				1,021

Campaign for New Members

This year it was decided that the American Sociological Society should conduct its campaign early. Therefore letters were prepared and mailed with with the usual inclosures of application blank, circular descriptive of the Society, return envelope, and, in some cases, a program of the annual meeting. Typed letters signed by the Secretary were sent to the following:

Teachers of sociology	193
Former applicants who did not join	70
Persons recommended by members	170
Contributors to *American Journal of Sociology*	29
Total	462
Printed letters sent to the National Council of Social Work	950

Printed letters signed with the name of the President were sent as follows:

Purchasers of *Proceedings*	60
Inquiries re Society and *American Journal of Sociology*	130
Miscellaneous	200

The letters were mailed from November 20, to December 10, 1920, inclusive.

Mailing Duebills

There was this year some delay in mailing duebills to members, which, of course, reduced the amount of money in the treasury at the time the accounts were audited. Renewals have since come in in considerable number.

Membership List to Publishers

As suggested last year, a double post card was sent to each publisher asking if membership lists were wanted. The result is a new, up-to-date list of publishers of material interest to Society members. In most cases the reply received gave the name, or department, to whom list should be sent to insure correct delivery.

Two Items of Interest Which Should Be Reported

Two life memberships were taken out during this year, and one member paid dues five years in advance.

By vote of the Executive Committee the membership dues were advanced from $3.00 to $4.00 per year to meet increased costs of printing and other expenses.

During the year a new list of teachers of sociology was compiled and is now ready for use by members of the Society.

Deaths

The Secretary regrets to report the deaths during the year of the following members: Samuel P. Avery, Hartford, Connecticut, E. A. MacClean, New York City, and Dr. George Nasmyth, New York City.

Invitations for the 1921 Meeting

Invitations have been received for the next year's meeting from the following organizations: Milwaukee Association of Commerce, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, and Buffalo Chamber of Commerce.

Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, *Secretary*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TREASURER FOR THE FISCAL YEAR, DECEMBER 16, 1919, TO DECEMBER 14, 1920

Audit of Accounts

According to the established custom the accounts were audited by a public accountant, the work being done by Ernest Reckitt & Company. Following the suggestion of the auditor a year ago, a change was made in the system employed which simplified the work of the auditor and clarified the Society's records.

STATEMENT OF AUDIT

The following is the Auditor's statement:

DECEMBER 16, 1920

"MR. SCOTT E. BEDFORD,

"*Secretary, The American Sociological Society, Chicago, Illinois.*

"DEAR SIR: In accordance with your instructions we have audited the books of the Society for the year ending December 14, 1920, and now submit our report thereon, together with the schedules attached as follows:

Schedule "A," Balance Sheet as at December 14, 1920.
Schedule "B," Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements for the year ending December 14, 1920.

"*Cash Receipts*

"We have verified the deposit in the Bank of all moneys received as recorded on the Cash Sheets by comparison with the Bank Statements.

"As there is not, at this time, a published list of members in good standing to date, we have no way of verifying the accuracy of the cash record, although we have no reason to believe that those records are not accurate and complete. We have, however, checked the original record of receipts of dues to the Membership Register and file kept by the Society, and find the entries to be correctly made.

"*Cash Disbursements*

"We reconciled the cash balance as shown by attached Balance Sheet with the balance as shown by a Certificate obtained from the Bank, taking into consideration the outstanding checks. The recommendations contained in our last report of December 17, 1919, as to the keeping of accounts, have been carried out, and the Ledger shows the correct cash balance as well as a complete distribution of disbursements and a record of the Society's Capital Assets.

"We have seen proper vouchers or canceled checks for all disbursements from the Society's funds.

"In connection with the Bond of the Northwestern Electric Company, of a par value of $500.00 as shown on the attached Balance Sheet, we found that two coupons of $15.00 each, due in May and November, 1920, respectively, had not been detached at the date of our examination and the $30.00 has not therefore been included in the cash statement.

"The item of $105.24, shown on the attached Balance Sheet as Accounts Payable, is the amount due to the University of Chicago Press up to the date of our examination.

"The amount of $358.00, shown on the attached statement of Cash Receipts as Royalties on Publications, was the total due to the Society from the University of Chicago Press up to July 1, 1920. We find that no statement of Royalties has been prepared since that date, and while we assume there is due to the Society at this time, Royalties on sales by the University of Chicago Press since July 1, 1920, owing to the time required to ascertain the correct amount from the records of the publishers, we have not included it in the statements attached.

"Respectfully submitted,

ERNEST RECKITT & CO.,
Certified Public Accountants"

Schedule "A"

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

BALANCE SHEET AS AT DECEMBER 14, 1920

Assets

Cash in Bank		$190.83
NORTHWESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY		
6 per cent Gold Bond		500.00
OFFICE FURNITURE		118.65
Total assets		$809.48

Liabilities

Surplus, as at December 17, 1919	$1,456.18	
Deduct excess of expenditures over income for year ended December 14, 1920, per Schedule "B"	751.94	
		704.24
Accounts Payable		105.24
Total liabilities		$809.48

Schedule "B"

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

STATEMENT OF CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FROM DECEMBER 18, 1919, TO DECEMBER 14, 1920, INCLUSIVE

Cash Receipts

Dues from members, 1920	$2,328.50		
Dues from members, 1921	216.00		
Dues from life members	100.00		
Dues from members in advance	15.00		
		$2,659.50	
Exchange included in remittance		9.36	
Postage included in remittance		7.10	
Interest on Northwestern Electric Co. Bond		30.00	
Royalties on publications		358.00	
			$3,063.96

Cash Disbursements

Publication expense of the *American Journal of Sociology*	$1,034.80	
Publication expense of Vol. XIV, *Papers and Proceedings*	1,406.16	
Salaries, clerical and stenographic	501.77	
Postage and express	249.92	
Printing	256.59	
Secretary's expense at annual meeting	125.02	
Stationery	119.65	
Society membership in Council	40.00	
Exchange on dues received	25.98	
Auditing	25.00	
Refunds on membership	15.55	
Office expense	14.01	
Insurance on stock	1.45	
		3,815.90
Excess of disbursements over receipts		$ 751.94

Summary

Balance, cash in bank, December 18, 1919		837.53
Total receipts for period ending December, 14, 1920, as above		3,063.96
		$3,901.49
Total disbursements for period ending December 14, 1920, as above	$3,815.90	
Less accounts payable, December 14, 1920	105.24	
		3,710.66
Balance, cash in bank, December 14, 1920		$ 190.83

Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, *Treasurer*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Annual Report of the Managing Editor for the Fiscal Year, December 19, 1919, to December 14, 1920

Cost of Printing Volume XIV

The Treasurer's report will show that the cost of printing Volume XIV of *Papers and Proceedings* was $1,034.80.

"Papers and Proceedings" on Hand

On December 14, the number of the different volumes on hand was as follows:

Vol. I.....	97 copies	Vol. VIII.....	88 copies
Vol. II.....	19 copies	Vol. IX.....	46 copies
Vol. III.....	20 copies	Vol. X.....	202 copies
Vol. IV.....	55 copies	Vol. XI.....	0
Vol. V.....	52 copies	Vol. XII.....	102 copies
Vol. VI.....	12 copies	Vol. XIII.....	47 copies
Vol. VII.....	60 copies	Vol. XIV.....	154 copies

Respectfully Submitted

Scott E. W. Bedford, *Managing Editor*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 28, 1920

The meeting was called to order at 4:30 P.M. by President Dealey, in Room A, Mezzanine Floor, Washington Hotel. In addition to the President there were present Professors Kingsbury, Small, Earp, Kerby, Lichtenberger, Hayes, Chapin, Ross, and Bedford.

The minutes of the last meeting were read and after correction approved. The following correction was made: the words "and books" in the paragraph regarding Professor Chapin's letter were ordered stricken out.

The annual reports of the Treasurer were given members. A verbal report of the Secretary and Managing Editor were given. Moved and carried that they be accepted and approved.

Moved and carried that next fall, if necessity demands, the dues be advanced to $5.00; the necessity to be determined by the Treasurer and President upon reference to the Executive Committee.

Moved and carried that the new contract with our publishers (The University of Chicago Press) be signed.

Moved and carried that the price of all volumes of the *Papers and Proceedings*, those already printed and those to be printed, be advanced from $1.50 each to $2.00 each.

Moved and carried that the practice of giving to writers of papers for the *Proceedings* reprints free be discontinued, but that they be furnished at cost of printing.

Moved and carried that we discontinue the practice of hiring a public auditor to examine the books.

Moved and carried that the settlement of the payment of Mr. Ratcliff's expenses to the Chicago meeting be referred with power to the Treasurer, the President, and one other person appointed by the President. Professor Ross was designated as the third member.

Moved and carried that we approve the spirit of the proposed motion submitted by the President of the American Council of Learned Societies regarding entering into friendly relations of helpfulness with the scholars of the late enemy countries and authorize our delegates to sign such a letter.

Moved and carried that the Committee on Social Abstracts (Professor Chapin, chairman) be continued and two other persons be added to the Committee. Those added were Professors Kingsbury and Park. Those already serving in addition to the chairman were Professors Wolfe and Weatherly.

Moved and carried that Professor F. S. Chapin be Second Delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies.

Moved and carried that the temporary appointment of Professor R. M. Binder on the Committee on Statistics on Marriage and the Family formed by Mr. Kopf of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company be made permanent, thus making Professor Binder the repesentative of our Society on this committee.

After discussion it was understood that no change in policy be made in printing in the annual volume of the *Papers and Proceedings* the following: list of members, annual program, and reports of the Secretary, Treasurer, and Managing Editor.

Adjournment.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, *Secretary*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

SPECIAL MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 29, 1920, 4:30 P.M.

The Executive Committee met at the call of President Dealey.

Moved and carried that the payment of the bill of the Local Joint Committee for dinner and smoker be settled by Dr. William J. Kerby and the Treasurer and the bill agreed to be paid.

Moved and carried that the Ratcliffe matter referred to a special committee be settled as the Labor Legislation Association expected it would be settled and the bill be paid in amount to satisfy them. This was understood to be the report of the committee, Professor Edward A. Ross (chairman). The committee was discharged.

Moved and carried that the resolution of Rev. S. Z. Batten referred to the Executive Committee be acted on by asking Dr. Batten to write out what he wants done and copies of this statement be sent to the Executive Committee for study and suggestions.

Adjournment.

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, *Secretary*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING, WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 29, 1920

The annual business meeting was called to order by President Dealey in the Ball Room, Washington Hotel, at 2:15 P.M., about forty-five members being present.

Because the minutes of the last annual business meeting had been published in the *Papers and Proceedings*, their reading was dispensed with. The Secretary gave a résumé of the minutes of the Executive Committee meeting of December 28, 1920.

The President announced that the reports presented at the regular meeting of December 28 at 11 o'clock by the committees would be accepted and the committees be continued.

The committee on advisability of issuing a new publication for the Society appointed at the last meeting reported through its chairman, Professor Edward C. Hayes. The report, in part, follows:

The appointment of this committee was due to an action taken at the 1919 meeting upon motion of Professor Seba Eldridge.

Investigation made by the committee last spring brought to light the facts that as a result of the inordinate advance in the costs of publication each annual subscription to the *American Journal of Sociology* involved an expense to the publisher of $3.52. The existing contract required the Society to pay the publisher only $1.25 for each subscriber to the *Journal*. On an average, the publisher received from advertising a sum which divided by the number of subscribers gave a quotient of 35c., which added to the amount received from this Society gave a sum of $1.80 per subscriber, which subtracted from $3.50, the cost of publication per subscriber, left a deficit of $1.73 per subscriber incurred by the University of Chicago in publishing the *Journal*. Up to that time the University of Chicago had met deficits amounting in all to $50,000 on account of this publication. Under the existing high costs of publication, the deficit per subscriber had become intolerable.

The same conditions which have thus affected the publication of the *Journal* have also caused the publication of the annual proceedings to become an unprecedented drain on the treasury of the Society. In view of the conditions thus made known to members of the Society and communicated to the Executive Committee, the annual membership fee in this organization was increased to $4.00 in order that the contract with the University of Chicago might be renewed upon terms that would make continued publication of the *Journal* feasible.

In view of such facts the committee finds that it would be impracticable to undertake to furnish additional facilities for publication so long as present conditions continue.

In the opinion of the committee, the American Sociological Society and all who are interested in the advancement of sociological science may fittingly express deep appreciation of the co-operation which has thus far been received from the University of Chicago in the support of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

The report was accepted and the committee discharged.

The Committee on Resolutions (Professor J.P. Lichtenberger, chairman) recommended a vote of thanks to the management of the Washington Hotel for its service and courtesy and to the Local Committee for its co-operation and its excellent work in preparation for the meeting.

Moved and carried that the receipt of the telegram from the Chicago Church Federation be acknowledged by the Secretary and greetings be sent.

Rev. S. Z. Batten presented the following resolution:

In view of the fact that sociology is concerned with human well-being and the progress of society; and in view of the fact that there has accumulated a vast body of knowledge of social facts and progress: *Resolved*, That the American Sociological Society appoint a committee of five to consider ways whereby this body of knowledge may be thoroughly socialized and interpreted to the people in such a way as to lead to necessary changes in our educational system and to bring about conscious social action; this committee to report at the next annual meeting of the Society.

Moved and carried that as a substitute motion this matter be referred to the Executive Committee for action.

Moved and carried that the program of the annual meeting be arranged by members writing to the President suggestions as to what they are interested in for presentation in the next annual program. Moved and carried that the preceding motion be considered by those preparing the program as advisory rather than obligatory.

The Committee on Nominations (Professor Franklin H. Giddings, chairman) named the following persons for the offices indicated for 1921:

President: Edward C. Hayes, University of Illinois; first vice-president: John P. Lichtenberger, University of Pennsylvania; second vice-president: U. G. Weatherly, University of Indiana; secretary-treasurer: Ernest W. Burgess, University of Chicago; new members of the Executive Committee: Emory S. Bogardus, University of Southern California, and John O'Grady, Catholic University.

Moved and carried that the Secretary be instructed to cast the ballot for those indicated for the above offices.

Adjournment.

Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT E. W. BEDFORD, *Secretary*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1921

Abbott, Edith, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Abbott, Grace, Hull House, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill.
Adams, B. Samuel, 205 Gaston St. East, Savanah, Ga.
Adams, James F., 151 Nagle Ave., New York, N.Y.
Addams, Jane, Hull House, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill.
Alling, Elizabeth, 1707 Q St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
Alling, Mortimer H., Box 1232, Providence, R.I.
Amann, Dorothy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.
Andrews, John B., 131 East 23d St., New York, N.Y.
Angier, Roswell P., 140 Edgehill Road, New Haven, Conn.
Anthony, A. W., 156 5th Ave., New York, N.Y.
Armstrong, Rozalia, 206 Prospect Ave., Crafton Beach, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Armstrong, Samuel Treat, Hillbourne Farms, Katonah, N.Y.
Arneill, Mrs. James R., 1055 Pennsylvania Ave., Denver, Colo.
Artman, J. M., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Athey, Mrs. C. N., 100 S. Patterson Park Ave., Baltimore, Md.
Austin, Charles Burgess, 112 Cottage Ave., Mt. Vernon, N.Y.
Ayers, Edward E., 24 Princeton St., Lynchburg, Va.
Babcock, Donald C., New Hampshire College, Durham, N.H.
Baber, J. E., 337 West Mifflin St., Madison, Wis.
Babson, Roger W., Wellesley Hills, Mass.
Badanes, Saul, 547 Hancock St., Brooklyn, N.Y.
Baker, Herbert M., Box 727, Greeley, Colo.
Baker, O. E., 617 Cedar St., Abilene, Tex.
Baker, O. E., 1 Hesketh St., Chevy Chase, Md.
Balch, Emily G., 6 rue du Vieux College, Geneva, Switzerland
Balch, William M., 610 N. 6th St., Baldwin City, Kan.
Baldwin, Simeon W., New Haven, Conn.
Bale, Fred G., Hedding College, Abington, Ill.
Ballard, Lloyd Vernor, 915 Park Ave., Beloit, Wis.
Ballhorn, Gordon C., 308 N. Murray St., Madison, Wis.
Balzer, J. F., Northfield, Minn.
Bamford, E. F., 1139 W. 36th Place, Los Angeles, Cal.
Banks, Col. Charles E., 2036 Indiana Ave., Chicago, Ill.
Barnes, Harry E., Clark University, Worcester, Mass.
Barnes, Mrs. Margeret Fitz, 8 Craigie Circle, Cambridge, Mass.
Bassett, Lucy A., 28 Riverside Drive, Binghamton, N.Y.
Bates, Jeanette, 118 N. LaSalle St., Chicago, Ill.
Batten, S. Z., 1701 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa.
Bauman, LeRoy E., 2635 Sedgwick Ave., New York, N.Y.
Baumgartel, Walter H., 210 E. Roberts St., Crookston, Minn.
Beach, Walter G., Stanford University, Cal.
Bedford, Caroline, 700 Temple Court, Minneapolis, Minn.
Bedford, Scott E. W., Govenor's Island, E. & R. Office, New York, N.Y.
Beer, William, Howard Memorial Library, New Orleans, La.

Belcher, Alice E., Milwaukee College, Milwaukee, Wis.
Beller, William F., 51 E. 123d St., New York, N.Y.
Bengston, Caroline, 6547 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill.
Bentley, Faye O., State Normal School, Mayville, N.D.
Berg, David E., Chamber of Commerce, Philadelphia, Pa.
Berks, Lothar, 69 Delafield Place, West New Brighton, Staten Island, N.Y.
Bernard, L. L., 608 S.E., 7th St., Minneapolis, Minn.
Berolzheimer, Ruth, Jewish Home-Finding Society, 1800 Seldon St., Chicago, Ill.
Best, Harry, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.
Bettman, Alfred, 1514 First National Bank Bldg., Cincinnati, Ohio
Bever, James, 614 Ivy St., Bellingham, Wash.
Bidgood, Lee, P.O. Box 416, University, Ala.
Binder, Rudolph H., New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.
Binzel, Alma L., 110 Stewart St., Ithaca, N.Y.
Bissit, Charles, 325 Thompson Ave., York, Neb.
Bittner, W. S., 822 Hunter Ave., Bloomington, Ind.
Bixby, Brig. Gen. William H., U.S. Army, Retired; 1709 Lanier Place, NW., Washington, D.C.
Bizzell, W. B., Agricultural and Mechanical College, College Station, Tex.
Blachly, Margaret G. B., 231 Willow Ave., Takoma Park, Md.
Blackburn, William J., Star R, Salem, Ohio
Blackmar, F. W., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan.
Blagden, Edward S., 113 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y.
Blaker, Eliza A., 23d and Alabama Sts., Indianapolis, Ind.
Blanchard, Phyllis, Bellevue Hospital, E. 26th St. and 1st Ave., New York, N.Y.
Blazier, George J., Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio
Bodenhafer, Walter B., Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
Boettiger, Louis A., 500 Delaware St., Minneapolis, Minn.
Bogardus, Emory S., University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Cal.
Bond, E. A., 214 N. Murray St., Madison, Wis.
Bonney, Ethelind M., 1213 S. California St., Stockton, Cal.
Boodin, John Elof, 717 E. 2d St., Northfield, Minn.
Bookman, C. M., Council of Social Agencies, 806 Neave Bldg., Cincinnati, Ohio
Bookstaber, Philip D., 3348 Burnet Ave., Cincinnati, Ohio
Borst, G. J., 158 Franklin St., Valparaiso, Ind.
Bossard, James H. S., Logan Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Pa.
Bostick, Arthur E., Public Library, St. Louis, Mo.
Boucke, O. Fred, School of Liberal Arts, State College, Pa.
Bourne, Henry E., College for Women, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio
Bowditch, Mary B., 89 Jewett St., Newton, Mass.
Bowerman, George F., Public Library, Washington, D.C.
Bowman, C. A., Albright College, Myerstown, Pa.
Bowne, J. T., International Y.M.C.A., 287 Hickory St., Springfield, Mass.
Boyer, Edward S., 1006 W. Nevada St., Urbana, Ill.
Boynton, Richard W., 25 Niagara Square, Buffalo, N.Y.
Bramer, John Phillip, 134 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y.
Brandenburg, Earl W., 147 Fourth St., Milwaukee, Wis.
Brandenburg, G. E., 216 Russell St., W. Lafayette, Ind.
Branson, E. C., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

Breckinridge, Sophonisba P., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Brenner, Loraine, 78 Forest Ave., Fon du Lac, Wis.
Bridge, Norman, 718 W. Adams St., Los Angeles, Cal.
Bristol, Lucius Moody, Gainsville, Fla.
Brogan, A. P., University of Texas, Austin, Tex.
Brown, Mary G., Elmira College, Elmira, N.Y.
Brown, Thomas I., Atlanta University, Atlanta, Ga.
Bruce, John M., Berton, Manitoba, Canada
Brunner, Edmund de S., Mountain Lakes, N.J.
Bruno, Frank J., 3653 Hamet Ave., Minneapolis, Minn.
Buchan, Evelyn, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
Bucklin, Harold S., 135 Glenwood Ave., Pawtucket, R.I.
Bullock, Charles E., Canton, Pa.
Burdette, Mrs. Robert J., Hotel Maryland, Pasadena, Cal.
Burger, W. H., 2 W. 45th St., New York, N.Y.
Burgess, Ernest W., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
Burleson, F. E., 60 W. Salome St., Akron, Ohio
Burnet, Philip, Continental Life Insurance Company, Wilmington, Del.
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THE SOCIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

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ABSTRACT

The Sociological Point of View.—A multitude of special researches must be the means of advancing sociology. They must be guided by the sociological point of view. That point of view may itself prove the greatest contribution of sociology to the interpretation of life. It includes the realization that while all values exist in individual experience yet distinctively human life derives its content from society, that biological evolution alone, even at its highest, would leave man a naked and dumb brute. *Social evolution.* The superstructure built upon the foundation supplied by biological evolution is (*a*) a set of acquired biological complexes constituting a "second nature"; (*b*) the conscious opinions, sentiments, and conduct of individuals thus equipped; (*c*) the material wealth and artificial groupings of persons which such activities produce. All values inhere in these conscious activities (designated (*b*)), and these activities are what sociology seeks to explain and so far as possible to control. They are indefinitely modifiable. They show three stages of evolution: that of "instinct," that of "custom," and that of "rational acceptance." The third is now dawning. *Social structure and social function.* It is error to regard institutions as social structure. They are ways of doing things. Doing is function, the groups that do are structure. Doing, activity (mental more than muscular), is the social process, in the most important meaning of that phrase. Even in a static society that which remains static is the "ways of doing." The social reality is human life, and the word society "virtually a verbal noun." *Social causation.* This point of view includes also an analytic idea of social causation, applicable to all divisions of social life and including natural physical, artificial physical, biological, and social causes. "*Association*" is a causal relation between the activities of different individuals. The sociological point of view excludes particularism, explains and so dissolves biases and bigotries, recognizes weal and woe as facts to be explained and the problems of ethics as problems not of speculation but of objective knowledge and practical control.

A book written eleven years ago by a distinguished representative of one of the other social sciences contains these words: "As for sociology, it seems to me a highly important point of view rather than a body of discoveries about mankind."[1]

At the date of that utterance this society had existed only five years. It was hardly to be expected that it should have contributed greatly toward building up "a body of discoveries about mankind." Everyone who really thought about the matter realized that sociology must be a project for a time before it could become an achievement. And if at so early a day it already could

[1] James Harvey Robinson, *The New History*, p. 83.

contribute "a highly important point of view" for the study of mankind, it had done quite as much as could be asked so soon, and had justified the hope that it might in time lead to "a body of discoveries."

If sociology is in fact to reach a body of discoveries, that is to say, of new facts and new principles of explanation, it must do so by the accumulation of a multitude of special researches bearing upon small problems, each by itself incapable either of establishing any sweeping generalization, or of leading to any far-reaching practical application. As I have remarked in another connection, "The greatest danger to sociology is that eagerness for application will divert men from the strictly scientific pursuit upon which both comprehension and application ultimately depend. Preoccupation with practical aims may even obscure the fact that sociology has a distinctive scientific task."[1]

As we are turning our faces more and more resolutely toward the pursuit of specific research, it may be appropriate to occupy this opening address in making sure that we hold clearly in mind the characteristic point of view, which perhaps may still be regarded as the best and biggest thing that sociology has or is, and the chief instrument of progress in research. It may be that sociology may always render its chief service, not by the discovery of new facts, but rather by the interpretation of the facts of history and of the present in the light of its "highly important point of view." It may be that the consistent maintenance of this point of view and the formulation and dissemination of the interpretations which that point of view discloses will do more than any other agency in dispelling the ancient bigotries that have blinded nations and social classes, in revealing both the possibilities and the limitations, as well as the methods, of education and reform, and in revolutionizing the creeds and philosophies which in the past have rendered imperfect guidance to mankind.

The figurative phrase "point of view" refers to something that the *mind* has. The only things the mind can have are ideas and feelings. A point of view then is a set of ideas or feelings—or both—already in the mind, which determine what else can get in.

[1] *Sociology and Ethics*, p. 28.

A point of view opens the mind to some facts, and often closes the mind to other facts. A good point of view enables us to see the facts as they are. A true sociological point of view would be one that would enable us to see human life as it is, to see it broadly and to see it deeply. The sociological point of view is not a single idea or a single feeling or interest, but a set of clear ideas and developed interests, which together constitute a preparation to see human life as it is.

The point of view of sociology has already been voluminously discussed and one who reverts to it can hardly hope to escape from repetitious commonplace. And as we still differ more or less upon fundamentals he is also in danger of falling into what would be an impropriety on this occasion by a somewhat contentious advocacy of his own individual point of view. In seeking to steer a middle course between these two evils, he can hardly escape incurring both of them to some degree.

One element in the sociological point of view is the realization that human life, in so far as it is anything more than the necessary functioning of man's physical organism, is a product of association. If one of us could have grown to maturity in complete isolation from society he would not have become a man, in our sense of the word, but would have been less man than the naked savage. He would have been a dumb brute, leading an existence little distinguishable from that of a champanzee. Naked he would have been; a suit of clothes has a social history that was already far advanced when Sarah stood spinning in the tent door of Abraham. Dumb he would have been: this English which I am speaking is not mine but ours, the property of a society which was already old when the Sanskrit element in our language was a spoken tongue. The rudest savage tribe lives a life which has been socially evolved, which though far less advanced than ours, is nevertheless ancient and such as no individual member of the tribe, living in isolation for a single lifetime, could possibly have brought into being.

Human life is a set of activities made possible by man's animal organism but by no means prescribed by his animal organism. Biologists assure us that there is no reason for imagining any

notable progress in the biological evolution of man since the time of Aristotle or of Moses and Rameses, or for thinking that we have any noteworthy biological superiority to the skin-clad savages who probably held cannibal ceremonies with human sacrifices and druidic rites in the forests of northern Europe four thousand years ago. But we share in a social evolution which is over and above biological evolution, which all this time has been going forward and has given us science, political and economic arts and institutions, a religion, and a moral code which these ancestors of ours did not possess.

Human life not only has been socially evolved, but is socially perpetuated. Now that the biologists well nigh compel us to believe that characteristics acquired during the lifetime of the individual cannot be passed on to his descendants by biological heredity, we are forced to realize that the task of passing on the socially accumulated heritage of ideas, sentiments, and practices will always be a social problem—the problem of educating each new generation into fitness for membership in the advanced society into which it is born.

Although the individual human life is a participation in the age-long social life, yet for the moment individuals are supreme. We as individuals are the trustees of the social heritage; the hope of perpetuating and augmenting this heritage rests with us as individual participants in the social life, and all *values* are realized only in individual experience.

This distinctively human life in which we share exists at three levels: first, as a set of acquired biological complexes; second, as a current of conscious activity; third, as overt behavior.

The ability of the human animal to become man is his ability to form acquired complexes. It has become "natural"[1] to me to call this thing I write on a desk; it is "natural" to the German to call it "ein Pult." It has become "natural to us to call the thing one wears on his head a hat; it is "natural" to the Frenchman to call it "un chapeau." Think of having a whole vocabulary ingrained

[1] That is, it has become as ingrained a tendency as if it were natural. Speaking precisely, nothing "becomes natural" after birth.

in your neuro-muscular system so that it functions as easily as breathing! Similarly the preference for eating potatoes with a fork, the habit of lifting the hat to a lady, the sentiment for the Stars and Stripes, all our acquired tastes, our skills, our moral code, our customs, and our institutions have become parts of us as acquired modifications of our organic structure. Here the miracle of the germ cells, by which all the multitudinous parts of the human organism are provided for by units found in a microscopic cell and each with the specific characteristics of our own particular ancestors, is equaled if not transcended by the miracle of structural plasticity by which after birth we grow into Americans, or Germans, or Frenchmen—into civilized human beings.

At its second level the social life is a current of conscious activity. We are unconscious of our neuro-muscular complexes. We know their functioning as ideas and feelings—as conscious activity. It is this stream of conscious activity that we call "our life." This it is that *contains all the values of human existence.* All else is sociologically important only as the condition or as the manifestation of this stream of conscious experience. It is this second phase of social reality that we want to have accounted for by social science and promoted by social practice.

In addition to the acquired biological complexes, and in addition to the stream of conscious activity, the third aspect of social reality is its manifestation in speech, conduct, artificial groupings of individuals, and material products. By these we know the social activities, as we know electricity by its effects. Thus speech, conduct, artificial groupings, and material products compose a third aspect of social reality which must be included in order to complete the perspective, and it is they which give to the social activities objective manifestation.

But let it be repeated that it is the second phase of the social reality which we recognize as "our life," and which contains all life's values. The collections in an ethnographic museum are important as revealing a social life which has produced them and which lies beneath them. If we collect the religious masks and paraphernalia of a South Sea Island tribe and even learn to imitate their dances and incantations, that does not make their religion

ours. If all the typewriters in America should be shipped to a tribe in central Africa which has no written language, they would not have the typewriter but a pile of junk. And though not one typewriter would remain in America, we should have the typewriter in its essential aspect, ready to embody itself in steel. To burn down all the churches in America, would not destroy Christianity. It still would live in the hearts and minds of Christians. To destroy every courthouse in the land would not abolish the institution of the court; it still would live in the only place where institutions have ever lived, in the hearts and the minds of men. If we were to emigrate to a foreign shore and lose all our baggage on the journey, we should carry with us our civilization wherever we carry our life—for it is our life.

Human life, because it is a process of acquired activity, is indefinitely modifiable. Tastes, moral codes, creeds, customs, institutions, pass through almost unimaginable permutations. Our sentiments approve it when we bury the body of a loved kinsman in the ground to decay and be the prey of worms. Others are revolted by our practice, and their sentiments approve the eating of the body of the honored dead in a solemn feast. Human nature is *second* nature built on the well-nigh immutable foundation of animal nature. The study of comparative sociology makes it clear that what is most repugnant to our second nature may seem wholly natural[1] to other men, that what is most revolting to our sentiments is customary elsewhere. A social science confined to the study of the customs and institutions of our Western civilization is mere provincialism, blinded by the illusion of the near. It is like what zoölogy would be if limited to the study of birds, or what botany would be if limited to the study of the trees of the north temperate zone.

In the permutation of customs and institutions those practices which cause suffering tend ultimately to disappear and those which allow the success of the life-process tend to spread and survive. As the glorified robbery of Vikings and Thugs and the glorified murder of head-hunters, absolutism in government, slavery, duel-

[1] Using the word in the sense defined in footnote 1, page 4.

ling, and polygamy, all of which have been regarded as necessary expressions of human nature, have ceased to be institutionalized and established in the approved sentiments of advanced society, so war will go, and mere acquisition as a socially recognized form of success will go. One who has no faith in progress is like a fly on a Sequoia complaining that the tree does not grow. There is this difference. Unlike the growth of a tree, the evolution of society is cumulative and accelerative and the next century may well see more progress than a thousand years once saw.

In social evolution three stages are discernible; and like a slow dawning the third is now coming on. First came the stage of *instinct* and *biological necessity*. In this stage instinct was appealed to by objects which were perceived and relatively little by ideas which had been invented, so that the simple instinctive patterns of conduct were but little obscured. Moreover, in this stage, death was so active a selective agent that no activities could become prevalent and traditional which seriously violated the conditions favorable to physical survival. Next came the stage of the *vagaries of custom*. In this stage man had learned to defend himself against death so that it became a less active selective agent, and therefore activities could become prevalent and traditional which were more or less unfavorable to physical survival. And the mind reacted to its stimulating natural and artificial environment with ideas and sentiments which overlay the simple, instinctive patterns of response with an elaborate and fantastic embroidery. The third stage is that of *rational acceptance*. By the time this stage is reached, death though working more slowly, has worked over longer periods of time, as an eliminating agency. Moreover, other selective agencies, such as physical and mental discomfort, economic competition, disapprovals enforced by socially created forms of prestige, and finally reason, have eliminated many of the vagaries of custom, and customs are largely replaced by institutions, and wanton vagaries by rational choices.

For brevity, though with some risk of misunderstanding, these three may be called the periods of *instinct*, of *custom*, and of *reason*. The first was mainly prehistoric, but vestiges of it survived into

the age of observable custom. The third is mainly in the future, but its beginnings are already evident.

It is often said that the institutions of society are the social structure. This I am persuaded is an error. Institutions are not structure but function, they are ways of doing things—ways of making laws, ways of choosing officials, ways of trying and punishing criminals, ways of conducting industry, and so forth. The institutions of a society are those parts of its activity which are rationally approved methods of achieving rationally approved ends.

Function is acting—structure is what acts. In society "what acts" is usually a group. A function implies a structure. An institution implies a group. But the criterion of an institution as distinguished from mere fashion or custom is the rational element included in the activity. A group may carry on a given activity as a mere custom—later on the same group may carry on the same activity as an institution because the activity has become rationalized. After that it is capable of rational change and progress as mere custom was not. Social *structures* are composed of groups—such as nations, parties, sects, casts, economic and other functional groups, cultural groups—and also individuals. Individuals considered not as animals, but as persons, as Christians or Mohammedans, as Republicans or Democrats, as carpenters or blacksmiths, are as truly products of social evolution and parts of the social structure as are those groups into which individuals combine. Now these *groups* of *individuals*, which compose the social structure, are of course highly important social facts. But the task of sociological explanation can no more be fulfilled by studying them, except as products and conditions of social activities, than the task of botanical explanation can be fulfilled by studying the structures of plants without reference to the physiological processes which produce these structures. From the point of view of the practical application of science that is an enormous understatement of the case, for practically the forms of plants are more important to man than their life-process, but the social life-process is the life of man itself with all of its distinctive values. The facts of greatest importance to sociology both scientifically and practi-

cally are those activities which compose this social life-process, prevalent activities socially evolved, which give men their social individuality and form them into groups, and which are conditioned by these groupings, very much as biological life first forms and then is conditioned by biological structure.

This idea that the social reality in its most essential aspect is a process of activity is an essential part of the sociological point of view. It entitles us to say that the sociological point of view is functional.

Twenty years ago the idea of "the social process" was elaborated in a discussion which culminated in the assertion that the word "society" is virtually a verbal noun.[1] Since then the phrase "social process" has been growing into general acceptance as a technical term in sociology, but it has taken on a variety of meanings, all justified in that they correspond to facts, but more or less unfortunate in that they refer to different facts, and therefore give to a technical term more or less conflicting meanings. To one the social process is the fact that social activities condition each other through the suggestion of ideas, the sympathetic radiation of sentiments, and the imitation of overt practices. To another "social process" is any change that takes place in a society or a population so that the idea of a multitude of social processes replaces the idea of *the* social process. To all the phrase "social process" at times means social evolution. But the deepest and most useful meaning of the phrase is that *in social evolution that which evolves is itself a process*—not merely a structure but a process. In the most static society the reality which has evolved and remains static is a process. The most rigid custom or the most unchanging institution is a process of activity that is repeated and repeated, a way of doing things, a set of ideas defining conduct of emotions or judgments approving that conduct, of expectations which count upon the prescribed conduct and of activities which embody these ideas, approvals, and expectations in overt deeds. Even the idea of an activity is itself an activity. An idea is not a thing; it is an event in the life-process. And the social process is the life-

[1] E. C. Hayes, "Sociological Construction Lines," *American Journal of Sociology*, X, 623 and 753.

process—the evolving process of human as distinguished from merely animal life—and sociology is the study of human life, in so far as man's life is made up of activities which are not prescribed by his physical nature, but learned by participation in society. The social reality is human life and the word life is virtually a verbal noun.

Another essential element of the sociological point of view is the idea of causation as applicable to social life, including a definite notion about what to look for when attempting a causal explanation of the facts of social life.

In seeking such explanation we must look, for one set of factors, to the *natural physical environment*, the succession of night and day and summer and winter, which condition the work and the play of peoples, the differences in climate, natural resources, accessibility, and other geographic conditions of different population areas.

Second, we must take into account the *artificial physical environment* with which different societies provide themselves: good or bad roads, railroads, water, lighting, and sewer systems, housing, and the like. This "technic" or artificial physical environment is closely related to the geographic conditions and both affect life in the same general way. Waterworks affect life as brooks once did, houses as caves once did, pottery affects life as the presence or absence of horns or cocoanut shells once did, woolen mills affect it as the presence of fur-bearing animals once did, railroads affect it in the same way as rivers and mountain passes. But it is essential both scientifically and practically to distinguish between the geographic and the technic conditions because the geographic environment is fixed by nature while technic conditions, being artificial, are subject to human control and present a large part of the problem of progress.

Another important distinction is between this technic or artificial physical environment and the social activities by which this artificial environment is produced. When analyzing the conditions that mold social life it is essential to make this distinction, because social activities and the physical products of social activities affect life in widely different ways. If a railroad is built through

an area inhabited by pastoral nomads it may engage them in trade and transform their life, yet they may not learn to build railroads, the social activity of building railroads does not spread among them. It is merely the physical thing that affects them. On the other hand, when a social activity spreads by suggestion, radiation, or imitation, and sets up psychic accommodations between the new activity and old activities, we have the kind of causation which is traced by social psychology and a totally different thing from the effects produced by the physical products of social activity as material things. To confuse these two is that "mixing things" which is "the great bad." It is ignoring a discrimination which is essential to thoroughly scientific analysis.

To be sure, a social activity is not complete and cannot be causally important unless it is physically expressed. But when fear written in the face of a terrified man affrights his neighbor and a panic spreads it is not the wrinkling of the skin of his face that is the essential social fact, but the psychic state of one which is affecting the psychic state of another through the medium of facial expression. It is *social activity, in its essential psychic character*, whether expressed by the face, the voice, the pen, or the hand, which is the third and greatest of the types of causes which affect human life. The conditioning of social activities by each other is the Hamlet which plays the dominant rôle in the drama of social causation.

The distinguishing characteristic, the one essential criterion of a social situation, is the conditioning of the psychic activity of one person by the psychic activity of another person. *The most useful definition of the word association is this: "association is a causal relation between the activities of associates."* Association is not a kind of activity; on the contrary any kind of human activity whatsoever may enter into the relation which is association. The blacksmith bending an iron and the apprentice who imitates him or the watching urchin who resolves to become a blacksmith are associating as truly as speaker and listener.

Besides the geographic and technic conditions and the conditioning of social activities by each other our explanations must take into account the *biological traits*, both hereditary and acquired,

of the populations by whom social activities are carried on. But when we learn that decade after decade one county in the British Isles has twice as many illegitimate births to each thousand infants born as another county, and that with equal regularity a third county in the British Isles has ten times as many, we recognize the absurdity of finding our sociological explanations exclusively in the universal instincts or predispositions or interests of mankind. Universal traits of mankind do not account for the variation in human behavior from county to county, from nation to nation, and from age to age. Of course the universal desires, interests, or instincts of mankind are ever present factors entering into the situation, and their identification is a service the importance of which I would be the last to minimize. Nevertheless for purposes of sociological explanation the differences of natural endowment due to differences of heredity or the fluctuations in population quality caused by vice, by occupational deterioration, or by microbes may be more important than those universal interests, desires, or instincts which form the common background of all social life, savage, barbarous, or civilized.

Many sociologists still speak of the native desires, interests, or instincts[1] as the "social forces." While fully recognizing that the biological life of man is in a sense the fountain from which all social activity flows, and that socially evolved activity is in reality a modification of man's instinctive life, we must at the same time recognize that no explanation of the infinite variety of social activity can be found in the universal traits of human nature, whether these traits be called desires, motives, interests, or instincts. If our conception of sociological explanation is to have scientific validity, it must make room for these facts: first, that explanation of this varying and evolving social activity must be sought in variable conditions; second, that these variable conditions are of the four types enumerated, first, geographic; second, technic;

[1] The term instinct has been greatly abused in attempting to account for human action, and some sociologists go to the extreme of avoiding the word altogether, but I am convinced that a comparative study of the biological equipment of man and of the higher gregarious animals compels us to recognize the instinctive equipment of the human species.

third, biological; fourth, social or associative, that is, psychic activities as conditions of the activities of associates.

I must be allowed to reassert my conviction[1] that the scientific conception of social causation is not the operation of forces but the presence of conditions—variable conditions—and that the use of the word "force" as a synonym for "cause" is a metaphysical survival of anthropomorphism. It is anthropomorphic in that it derives its conception of cause from human action regarded as a cause, while we are looking for the causes that affect human action. I am as confident as ever that sociology has no more occasion to speak of any social force than biology has to speak of vital force. It may be that force is omnipresent. But force is far more certain to be apparent in the resulting human activity than in the cause which conditioned it. An Australian settler stumbles upon a nugget of gold—an inert thing. There ensues in the settler a tumult of activity which spreads to other settlers and modifies the activity of the civilized world. Human instincts of course are present in every human activity, but the human instincts do not function in a vacuum; their functioning is always conditioned. And human instincts considered alone do not afford an explanation of any social activity whatsoever. Anyone is at liberty to speak of the inborn instincts as the social forces if he is willing to run the risk involved of obscuring the complex, matter-of-fact nature of social causation.

Association is sometimes spoken of as the social force. But when we mean association, why not say association, and when we mean instincts, why not say instincts, and let the phrase social forces be replaced by more adequate analysis?

As to the developed interests and desires, as distinguished from inborn instincts, far from being the explanation sought, they are themselves social activities to be explained. To speak of socially developed desires as the forces which explain social life is no better than it would be to speak of the beating of the heart as the vital force which explains physical life—it is a part of that physical life

[1] Compare *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, V, 77 and 98; *American Journal of Sociology*, XVI, 613 and 642.

which the biologist seeks to explain, just as socially developed desires are a part of the social life which sociology seeks to explain.

Training in the search for all four of the different types of facts by which the life of society is molded, in all the multiple forms in which these four classes of facts appear and produce their effects, is the best possible defense of the mind against the vice of particularism which besets all social science—the vice, that is, of finding *a* cause and treating it as *the* cause, when the causation of any social situation is never due to a single factor but is always multiple and complicated. Sociology when it is truly scientific is in perpetual protest against the vice of particularism. Very few of those who are but partially trained in sociological method are able to escape this pitfall, and even for the most expert to give just recognition to both physical and psychic factors in social causation is well nigh as hard as for the camel to pass through the eye of a needle. The sociological point of view includes habitual regard for the necessity to observe the causal significance of geographic, technic, biological, and psychic (or social) causes in molding the social life.

The principles of causation which come into perspective from the sociological point of view are applicable to the explanation of social activities of every kind, to the evolution of languages, religions, moral codes, educational systems, arts and ceremonies, economic practices, and political institutions. Especially the application of that type of causal relations to which the word "association" is applicable, namely, the causal relations between the psychic activities of different individuals, which appear in the communication and suggestion of ideas, the sympathetic radiation of sentiments, and the imitation of practices, a type of causation the elucidation of which includes the laws of prestige, and of interference and assimilation or accommodation, is equally essential in the explanation of all the great subdivisions of social life. And it is mainly by virtue of this fact that human life appears from the sociological point of view as a single division of reality and a single field of research, a research which cannot be confined within limits narrower than the range throughout which those principles of causation operate which it is the special business of sociology to investigate.

Another element in the sociological point of view is a keen appreciation of the struggle to be objective and unbiased. This all science aims to be. But it is recognized, especially since Herbert Spencer wrote on *The Study of Sociology*, that to be objective and unbiased in the study of that social life of which we ourselves are a part, is incomparably difficult. One who occupies the sociological point of view is not only aware of the difficulty and necessity of objectivity in this field of study, he is helped toward achieving it as he could be in no other way by his training in the observation of social causation. When one realizes that his own opinions and sentiments are results of causation and that under other conditions he would have held the opposite ideas and sentiments, his bigotries tend to evaporate.[1] There is no other discipline that can be compared with the study of sociological explanation as a means of dispelling partisan conceits and all the manifold bigotries that hitherto go so far toward subjecting human life and social organization to a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Finally the sociological point of view is ethical. We do not blush to affirm it. When the sociologist is told that science deals with what is, and that philosophy alone can deal with what ought to be, he answers that human weal and woe are parts of what is, and that they are as truly subject to causal conditions, and therefore to scientific explanation, as any other facts. He holds that a description of human life which omits the element of values is as incomplete as a description of the animal world would be if it forgot that animals have heads. It would omit essential facts. He has learned that moral codes are as truly products of social evolution as languages, or economic and political institutions. And he holds

[1] Not long ago when visiting a home for the feeble minded, I became interested in a pitiful imbecile. He could not talk much and his few words were accompanied by horrible grimaces. But he was able to say with emphasis that he was a Republican and a Methodist. Of course this does not imply that Republicans and Methodists are more likely to be imbecile than other people, but that the causes which make us Republicans, Methodists, and the like, are causes which can operate upon an imbecile. One who never develops beyond the mental age of seven is an imbecile, and the social causes to which we are exposed settle for most people the question whether they are to be Republicans, or Methodists before they reach the age of seven. Before we are capable of independent, rational decision upon such themes, most of our bigotries, biases, and partisanships have become thoroughly ingrained in our organisms.

that as the study of every other object of knowledge has passed from the realm of metaphysical speculation to the realm of science or objective research, so the study of ethics must make that transition, and that the theoretical and practical problems of ethics can be truly solved in no other way than by the study of the facts of life, as life is lived by men in society.

I trust that even though it require some threshing of straw that I have threshed before, the choice of this theme for the present occasion is justified by the vital importance of a growing agreement among sociologists in a clear conception of the sociological point of view, and that it is not rendered less appropriate by the fact that I have the privilege of speaking in the presence of representatives of the great science of politics. In the opening sentence I quoted a noted historian who eleven years ago was already exhorting his colleagues to avail themselves of the sociological point of view. I see no reason why that point of view should not become the common property of all the social sciences, for while each of the social sciences pursues its characteristic researches, they are all engaged in the upbuilding of a "body of discoveries about mankind," in the development of more adequate comprehension of that current of interrelated activities which gathers momentum and content as generations pass, and is nothing less than the tide of human life. The comprehension and so the guidance and promotion of this tide of human life is the supreme intellectual and practical task of mankind, and it is the necessarily co-operative task of all the social sciences.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

The Development of Historical Sociology.—Down to the opening of the twentieth century historical sociology received more attention from writers than any other phase of the subject. In the last generation, however, interest in the history of society has greatly declined, and historical sociology has been eclipsed by psychological, biological, and statistical sociology, and, above all, by practical or applied sociology. This failure to maintain interest in historical sociology during the last twenty years has been particularly disastrous, for it was during this period that critical anthropology and social history were placing at the disposal of the sociologists, for the first time, a sound method and a reliable technique for exploring social origins and reconstructing the history of society. *Influence of Darwinism upon sociology.* There were many forces operating to create historical sociology from the days of the Greeks to our own, but the most effective influence was the development of the Darwinian hypothesis. While there were many grotesque results of the attempt directly to apply the Darwinian formulas of biological evolution to social processes, yet the evolutionary stimulus was what created historical sociology in its modern form. "Social Darwinism" and the assumption of universality and uniformity in the evolution of social institutions and cultural traits were the chief errors of interpretation introduced into historical sociology as a result of Darwinism. Perhaps the most important phase of the development of historical sociology has been the progress in the method of investigation and synthesis. Either the intuitive method or a priori deduction prevailed down to the Darwinian era, with but rare exceptions. The first important group of historical sociologists followed the extreme comparative method of such anthropologists and ethnologists as Tylor, Morgan, Frazer, Letourneau, and Post. Perhaps the most flagrant and influential offender was Herbert Spencer. This school sorted out facts to suit their particular theory of social or cultural development, but disguised this unscientific procedure by bringing forward a seemingly convincing mass of concrete data and compiling a paralyzing bibliography. *Reaction against the extreme comparative method.* Durkheim rejected *in toto* the comparative method, but his substitute was even more doubtful in its procedure and results. He risked all upon the study of a single institution in one area from data of a highly unreliable nature. Hobhouse clearly revealed the defects of the older comparative method, and attempted to introduce the method of statistical correlation and the theory of cultural adhesion, anticipated over thirty years ago by Tylor. But his results were largely invalidated, due to the defects in his original plan of classification and the selection of units and data for study. *Value to sociology of the historico-analytical method.* The historico-analytical method, introduced by Boas and his disciples, has at last given us a sound method for investigating social and cultural development, but it has been little followed by anthropologists, and scarcely at all by historical sociologists. In spite of the defective method which has thus far prevailed in historical sociology, certain valuable work has been done in sketching out the broad stages of social evolution, in tracing the development of the state, and in making important preliminary and tentative studies of special social institutions. Historical sociology needs to be revived on the basis of the sounder contemporary methods, and earnestly cultivated, for, without a knowledge of the social past, we cannot understand the social present or plan intelligently the social future.

I. INTRODUCTORY

It is not the purpose of this paper to set forth a complete exposition and a bibliographic summary of all the important contributions to every field of historical sociology. Rather, I shall attempt to select the chief typical tendencies and achievements in this branch of sociology, indicating the intellectual environment in which they arose, their significance in the sociological movement, and their defects. Incidentally, it will be a part of my purpose to explain the eclipse of historical sociology in the last fifteen years, and to indicate reasons for expecting its revival on a more extended scale and with a far more reliable and promising method and body of fact and doctrine.

II. SOME ASPECTS OF THE ORIGINS OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

In reviewing the contributions of the typical writers on historical sociology down to the present time, the most striking fact which is likely to come to the attention of the student is the prevalence of a subjective attitude upon the part of the writer and the pursuance of the a priori method, in order to utilize the alleged facts of social development to substantiate some special doctrine of the writer or his school. From Plato until Vico, Hume, and Ferguson, if not to Boas and the critical anthropologists, one rarely discovers a writer on the history of human society and social institutions who looks upon the development of society in an objective manner, with the avowed intention of discovering just what the nature and stages of this process have been.

The beginnings of interest in, and reflection upon, the problems of social genesis go back to the primitive attempts to account for the unique and divine origin of early states. Familiar examples of this type of historical sociology are the Osiris Myth, the Gilgamesh Epic and its Hebrew appropriation in the Book of Genesis, and the numerous myths and epics of national derivation and genesis which flourished among the Greeks and Romans.[1] The primitive foundations from which these tales were constructed have

[1] See J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt;* R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament;* and the easily available Hebrew and classical myths of origin in the Old Testament, Homer, Virgil, etc.

been preserved for us in the creation myths of the uncivilized peoples of the present day.[1]

Perhaps the first group of thinkers who thoughtfully and rationally considered the problem of the origins of organized society were the Greek Sophists of the fifth century B.C. They seem to have believed in an unregulated state of nature, which was ended when civil society was created through a governmental compact.[2] One of the most complete and remarkable accounts of social genesis produced in ancient times was that set forth by Plato in Book III of his *Laws*. He assumed much the chronological measure of Mr. Wells when he stated that "every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but will always be and has been, or that it began an immense while ago."[3] He presented rather a Rousseauean picture of the felicity of the life of primitive people, and traced the gradual break-up of primitive society as it passes through the patriarchal and tribal period into the civil state, which he clearly held to have been founded by means of a governmental contract.[4] Aristotle gave very little attention to the problems of social genesis, and his brief explanation of the matter was analytical rather than historical. He was chiefly concerned with demonstrating the social nature of man and traced the progressive expression and realization of this social instinct in the family, the village, and the state.[5] An approximation to the historical and comparative method is to be seen in his alleged study of 158 constitutions as the basis of his *Constitution of Athens*.[6] One of the most neglected, and yet one of the most striking, of the early discussions of social and political evolution is that contained in the sixth book of Polybius' *History of Rome*, in which he turned aside from his main theme to indicate the basic reasons for the supremacy of the Roman state. He foreshadowed Hume, Ferguson, and Gumplowicz by

[1] See Kroeber and Waterman, *Source-Book in Anthropology*, pp. 516 ff.

[2] E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory—Plato and His Predecessors*, pp. 55 ff.

[3] *Laws* vi. 780 (Jowett edition).

[4] *Laws* iii. 676 ff.; cf. Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 307–11.

[5] *Politics*, i. 2 (Jowett edition).

[6] Aristotle, *On the Constitution of Athens*, translated by Kenyon.

his doctrine that the state originated in force. He was in line with Sumner in his postulate as to the customary basis of morality. Finally, he anticipated Spinoza, Hume, and Adam Smith by his discussion of reflective sympathy as a social force.[1] Infinitely the most modern and satisfactory of classical theories of the history of society was that offered by the great Epicurean poet, Lucretius, in his effort to indicate the evolutionary and naturalistic character of the development of the universe and society independent of any aid or interference by the gods. He traced the origins of life, man, society, and the state, indicating the various stages of cultural and social evolution with astonishing accuracy. His remarkable *De rerum natura* was far the most notable contribution to historical sociology down to the modern period.[2] The Roman Stoic philosopher, Seneca, is significant for having carried still farther than Plato the Rousseauean notion of the idyllic life of early man. He contended that man had originally lived in a golden age without avarice, sin, or crime until the appearance of private property. This produced jealousy, strife, and a general state of war and misery which made necessary the establishment of the state and civil society.[3]

One of the most significant results of the development of this doctrine by Seneca was its adaptation by the Christian Fathers to serve as the accepted Patristic view of the course of social evolution. The fathers identified Seneca's "Golden Age" with the state of man before the "Fall" and held that the subsequent period of misery, confusion, and disorder was none other than that which followed the expulsion from Paradise. The establishment of the state, but more especially the coming of Christianity, served to make mundane existence more tolerable, though but a preparation for the bliss of the elect of the City of God in the world to come.[4]

[1] *The History of Polybius* vi. 5–15 (translated by Shuckburgh).

[2] *De rerum natura* v (translated by Watson); cf. J. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet;* H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin.*

[3] *Epistularum moralium* xiv. 2; cf. A. J. Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*, I, 20–25.

[4] Justin Martyr, "First Apology," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, chap. xvii; Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," *ibid.*, Vol. I, Book V, chap. xxiv, sec. 1; Lactantius, "Divine Institutions," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, Book VI, chap. x; "The Workmanship of

This conception of the history of society prevailed through most of the Middle Ages, through the writers often tended to forget the original felicity and to stress chiefly the miseries of existence before the establishment of the Christian polity.[1]

The most remarkable contribution to historical sociology between Lucretius and Adam Ferguson was embodied in the *Prolegomena to Universal History* of the Arab scholar and statesman Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). He not only produced what is regarded by some as the first real philosophy of history, but also, in his description of Arab society, contributed one of the best studies of primitive society down to the rise of modern anthropology. He also far surpassed Plato and Lucretius in tracing the stages in the evolution of human society and civilization.[2]

In the latter part of the seventeenth century there appeared two important contributions to historical sociology in the writings of the French publicist, Jean Bodin, and of the Spanish Jesuit, Jean de Mariana. Bodin distinguished carefully between society, which he believed to develop naturally out of the social instinct, and the state, which he contended was a product of force and coercion.[3] Mariana's view of social and political development was strangely like that of Seneca and Rousseau. Mankind had originally dwelt in a state of undisturbed happiness, but property brought avarice, crime, and general disorder. It was found necessary to establish a form of superior civil power, which was done by means of a governmental compact.[4]

God," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, chap. iv; Tertullian, "Scorpace," *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. xiv; "Apology," *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. xxiv; Athanasius, "Against the Heathen," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV, sec. 2; Ambrose, "De officiis," *ibid.*, Vol. X, Book I, chap. xxviii; Augustine, "On the Good of Marriage," *ibid.*, Vol. III, sec. 1; "The City of God," *ibid.*, Vol. II, Book V, chap. xix, Book XIX, chaps. v, xv; St. Jerome, letter quoted in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, I, 86–87; Gregory the Great, "Pastoral Rule," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. XII, Book I, chap. iii; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies*, XV, 2; Carlyle, *op. cit.*, chaps. viii–xv.

[1] Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–12.

[2] See R. Flint, *The History of the Philosophy of History in France*, pp. 158 ff.; G. DeGreef, *Le Transformisme social*, pp. 115–18. There is a French translation of the *Prolegomena* by M. S. De Slane.

[3] Jean Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, translated by Knolles, 1606; F. W. Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 230 ff.

[4] *De rege et regis institutione*, chap. i.

The most prevalent type of historical sociology during the seventeenth and eighteenth century was that which traced the evolution of society and the state through a social and governmental compact. The distinction between the social and the governmental compact was first clearly drawn by Aeneas Sylvius in the fifteenth century, and was still further elaborated by Richard Hooker in the sixteenth. While such writers as Hobbes, Sydney, Spinoza, Locke, Pufendorf, Rousseau, and Kant employed the doctrine of the social contract to substantiate quite different propositions in political theory and practice, they were generally agreed that man originally lived in a state of nature, from the miseries of which he escaped through the medium of an agreement of all to live an orderly life in organized society. Civil government was subsequently established through a contract of the people with the ruler or rulers whom they had chosen. It is interesting to note, however, that the specific historicity of this conception was not regarded as a vital point by many of the advocates of the social contract theory. With Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, and, to a lesser degree, with Rousseau, it was chiefly a philosophical proposition.[1] One of the most significant results of this body of doctrine for historical sociology was Rousseau's highly imaginary and poetical eulogy of the "noble savage," living a carefree and paradisiacal existence, from which he had been reduced to misery and chains by the development of culture and the institution of private property and the state.[2]

The historical and psychological weakness of the social contract theory, as presented in its classic form, were attacked by three writers who may be said to have been the first to restore the historical point of view in sociology to the place it had held with Plato, Polybius, and Lucretius. Vico, while not devoting himself particularly to the demolition of the social contract, emphasized the necessity of pursuing an inductive and historical approach to social problems. The possibilities of such procedure he himself demonstrated in the fields of philology and jurisprudence.[3] Hume showed that the

[1] F. Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social.*

[2] *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences; Discourse on the Origin of Inequality; The Social Contract.* These appear in a good English edition in the *Everyman's Library.* The standard critical edition with a French text is that by Vaughn.

[3] *La Scienza nuova.* There is a French translation by Trivulzi. Cf. B. Croce, *The Philosophy of Vico.*

social contract theory was a philosophical monstrosity, a psychological impossibility, and something which was denied by the concrete facts of history. He stressed the importance of sympathy in the development of society, and contended that the state had its origin in force and owed its persistence to the gradual perception of its utility by mankind.[1] Even more modern in viewpoint was Adam Ferguson's *History of Civil Society*. He stated the idea of the origin of the state in conquest and force so clearly that Gumplowicz has claimed him as the first great exponent of this school of sociological thought. Further, he foreshadowed Boas and the critical school of anthropologists by insisting that we must discard preconceived hypotheses as to the nature of primitive man and his institutions, and study primitive society as it actually exists. If we do we shall find the situation far different from that pictured by such writers as Rousseau. Another interesting adumbration was his insistence that the current tendency to regard primitive man as widely different from modern man was highly misleading. While Ferguson may have fallen short of his canons of proper procedure in historical sociology in his own works, which progressively became more conventional, his discussion of method and procedure was of real significance and surprising modernity.[2]

The next impulse to historical sociology came from the philosophy of history and the history of civilization to which Vico was an early contributor. Voltaire's *Essai sur les Moeurs*, Turgot's Sorbonne *Discourses*, Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humaine*, and the works of Saint-Simon represent the more important French contributions to this field, all marked by a greater or less degree of rationalism, skepticism, and optimism.[3] In the works of Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel one finds, along with a gradually fading rationalism, the Romantic trend in the German philosophy of history, with its emphasis on national character, the indwelling of *Geist*, and dis-

[1] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. II, pp. 183, 258–73; *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, Vol. I, Part I, Essay V; Part II, Essay XII.

[2] Ferguson, *op. cit.*, Part I; cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 65–71.

[3] R. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France* (1894), pp. 262–339, 395–421.

tinct mystic tendencies.[1] Yet with all its monstrosities, the Romantic impulse was, as Lord Action has well insisted,[2] remarkable for the scope of the historical interests which it stimulated. In the work of Auguste Comte rationalism and romanticism of a French brand were combined to furnish the historical background of the first formal system of sociological doctrine.[3] While there is little doubt that historical sociology is something far different in method and content from the philosophy of history, yet in its attempt to find some meaning and significance in the flow of events in the past the latter contributed much in the way of both impulse and data to the development of historical sociology.[4]

No little importance must also be assigned to the development of critical historical scholarship in the work of Ranke and his disciples and students in many countries. While there was little of the sociological orientation or interest in the most of the scientific history of the nineteenth century, yet, by improving the mechanism or research, it did much to advance and refine the inductive method of research in historical sociology and it brought forth a vast amount of concrete material which has either been utilized or still awaits exploitation by the historical sociologist.[5]

The last of the pre-Darwinian impulses which may be said to have influenced the development of historical sociology was the initial interest in historical economics and economic history evident in the work of Heeren, Sismondi, Comte, Hildebrand, Roscher, and Knies. The genetic point of view, the breadth of interests, and concern with social reform which characterized the group brought them exceedingly close to the borders of historical sociology.[6]

Unquestionably the most potent influence contributing to the development of historical sociology was the Darwinian theory of organic evolution and its reaction upon social science. It gave concrete and convincing evidence to substantiate the brilliant

[1] R. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), Book II.

[2] *Historical Essays and Studies*, pp. 345–46.

[3] *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, especially Vol. III.

[4] P. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, 1915 edition.

[5] Cf. *Encyclopedia Americana*, XIV, 243–50; G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*.

[6] J. K. Ingram, *History of Political Economy*, chap. vi.

intuition of Lucretius and the ancient evolutionists, and indicated that human society, as well as organic life, was the natural product of evolutionary forces operating over an immense period of time.[1] While many grotesque errors grew out of the attempt to carry biological formulas directly over into sociology, and much effort was wasted in drawing grotesque analogies between biological and social structure and processes,[2] the evolutionary impulse was unquestionably the force that put historical sociology in its contemporary manifestations thoroughly upon its feet.[3] It followed two major lines of development—the social Darwinism of Gumplowicz and his school, and the comparative or classical anthropology of Lubbock, McLennan, Tylor, Lang, Frazer, Westermarck, Letourneau, Post, Lippert, Kovalevsky, and Morgan.[4] Both of these lines of development will be touched upon later in the paper and need not be further described in this place.[5]

What may be narrowly and technically described as the systematic historical sociology of the latter half of the nineteenth century was both created by, and based upon, the comparative anthropology of the writers just mentioned. This is particularly apparent in such special works as those by Westermarck and Howard, and is not entirely absent from the more modernized con-

[1] Cf. L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, pp. 56–102, 162–81.

[2] F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, chap. iv.

[3] F. H. Giddings, "Darwinism in the Theory of Social Evolution," in the *Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1909; A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*.

[4] Cf. Goldenweiser, "Four Phases of Anthropological Thought," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XVI, pp. 50–55. It will probably be desirable to specify just what is meant by the term "comparative" or "classical" anthropology, as used in this article. I mean by that the work of the first great school of modern anthropologists mentioned in the paragraph above. I have severely criticized the work of this school for the reasons indicated. Many writers, who would not dissent from this criticism, complain that it is unfair to condemn the comparative method as a whole because of the errors of the first group extensively to employ it. The problem thus resolves itself into a matter of terminology. I have preferred to reserve the term "comparative method" for a description of the approach of this early group of scholars, and to apply to the newer attitudes of Boas and his school the term "historico-analytical" method. Those who prefer may well distinguish these two widely different methods by such terms as the "older comparative method" and the "new comparative method."

[5] See below, pp. 26 ff.

tributions of Thomas, Webster, and Hobhouse. The most masterly synthesis of historical sociology yet produced, Book III of Professor Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*, was based essentially both upon the method and the data of the comparative school, as, indeed, it had to be when written. While the critical historico-analytical anthropology of Boas and his disciples in this country and of Marett and others in Europe has provided a new and far sounder method for studying social evolution, and has destroyed most of the positive conclusions of both comparative anthropology and the earlier historical sociology, it has been but little appropriated by sociology. The primary reason for this is probably the fact that interest in historical sociology, which was, perhaps, ascendent before 1900, has declined to a surprising degree in the twentieth century, and sociology has provided few who have been interested in reconstructing our knowledge of social evolution on the basis of the newer and more assured methods and results of the critical anthropology. It is not without significance that the first real attempts to indicate the significance of the scientific anthropology for an accurate history of society have been executed by professional anthropologists, Marett, Wissler, Lowie, and Goldenweiser.[1]

III. SOME TYPICAL PHASES OF THE PROGRESS OF METHOD IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

One need not concern himself especially with the history of method in sociology before the entry of the Darwinian concepts, for, with few, if any, exceptions, the method was deductive or intuitive. Even what little study was made of concrete data was usually for the purpose of substantiating some preconceived scheme of social evolution, such as the social contract. In the case of Ibn Khaldun one finds something of a concrete inductive approach, but even in such instances as those of Lucretius the modernity of the generalizations was in large part the product of brilliant intuition.

The first important effect of Darwinism upon historical sociology was the impulse which it gave to the attempt to carry over directly the assumptions and formulas of evolutionary biology

[1] R. R. Marett, *Anthropology;* C. Wissler, *The American Indian;* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society;* A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization.*

into an explanation of social evolution, without the necessary modifications in view of the wide difference in the nature of the data under analysis. This line of approach was usually combined with an extreme acceptance of the comparative method in anthropology and, thus, embodied many major errors in both methods and results. The best-known examples of such works are Gumplowicz's *Der Rassenkampf* and Oppenheimer's *The State.* Though the central thesis of these writers is regarded as one of the most important of the contributions of sociology to social and political theory, yet this must not obscure the monstrous errors in method which have disfigured their efforts in their attempts to substantiate their doctrines through the presentation and organization of concrete data.[1]

Equally influential and characteristic of this period was the contemporary development of the classical or comparative anthropology, and its reaction upon historical sociology. Dr. Goldenweiser will discuss the premises and methods of the comparative school, so that nothing more than the briefest summary will be necessary here. This school assumed that there was an organic law of development in social institutions. The theory of unilateral evolutionary growth was adhered to, along with its implications of gradual and orderly changes, largely the same world over, and, in general, proceeding from simple and confused relations to complex and well-co-ordinated social adjustments. On account of the assumed unity of the human mind and similarities in the geographical environment, it was held that we must expect parallelisms and similarities in culture and institutions among peoples widely separated in their geographic distribution. Finally, it was considered valid, in reconstructing the record of social development, to link together a series of isolated examples of any type of culture, taken from the most diverse regions and periods of time and irrespective of the totality of the cultural complex from which each was taken, in a prearranged scheme of evolution, holding that such was a proof of the natural course of social evolution and cultural growth.[2] Among sociologists who espoused the comparative

[1] Cf. *Journal of Race Development* (April, 1919), pp. 394 ff., and *Journal of International Relations* (October, 1921), pp. 238 ff.

[2] Cf. F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 155 ff.

method Herbert Spencer was, with the possible exception of Letourneau, unquestionably the one who accepted it in its most extreme form and the one whose writings have been most influential. His somewhat naïve description or, perhaps better, confession, of his method of procedure in tracing social evolution is outlined in the following passage from his *Autobiography:*

With the entry of this new division of my work, the marshalling of evidence became a much more extensive and complicated business than it had hitherto been. The facts, so multitudinous in their numbers, so different in their kinds, so varied in their sources, formed a heterogeneous aggregate difficult to bring into the clear and effective order required for carrying on an argument; so that I felt much as might a general of division who had become commander-in-chief; or rather, as one who had to undertake this highest function in addition to the lower functions of all his subordinates of the first, second, and third grades. Only by deliberate method persistently followed, was it possible to avoid confusion. A few words may fitly be said here concerning my materials, and the ways in which I dealt with them.

During the five and twenty preceding years there had been in course of accumulation, extracts and memoranda from time to time made. My reading, though not extensive, and though chiefly devoted to the subjects which occupied me during this long interval, frequently brought under my eyes noteworthy facts bearing on this or that division of Sociology. These, along with the suggested ideas, were jotted down and put away. The resulting mass of manuscript materials remained for years unclassified; but every now and then I took out the contents of the drawer which received these miscellaneous contributions and put them in some degree of order—grouping together the ecclesiastical, the political, the industrial, etc.; so that by the time I began to build, there had been formed several considerable heaps of undressed stones and bricks.

But now I had to utilize the relatively large masses of materials gathered together in the *Descriptive Sociology*. For economization of labor, it was needful still further to classify these; and to save time, as well as to avoid errors in re-transcription, my habit was, with such parts of the work as were printed, to cut up two copies. Suppose the general topic to be dealt with was "Primitive Ideas." Then the process was that of reading through all the groups of extracts concerning the uncivilized and semi-civilized races under the head of "Superstition," as well as those under other heads that were likely to contain allied evidence—"Knowledge," "Ecclesiastical," etc. As I read I marked each statement that had any significant bearing; and these marked statements were cut out by my secretary after he had supplied any references which excision would destroy. The large heap resulting was joined with the kindred heap of materials previously accumulated; and there now came the

business of re-classifying them all in preparation for writing. During a considerable preceding period the subdivisions of the topic of "Primitive Ideas" had been thought about; and various heads of chapters had been settled—"Ideas of Sleep and Dreams," "Ideas of Death and Resurrection," "Ideas of Another Life," "Ideas of Another World," etc., etc. Taking a number of sheets of double foolscap, severally fitted to contain between their two leaves numerous memoranda, I placed these in a semi-circle on the floor round my chair; having indorsed each with the title of a chapter, and having arranged them in something like proper sequence. Then, putting before me the heap of extracts and memoranda, I assigned each as I read it to its appropriate chapter. Occasionally I came upon a fact which indicated to me the need for a chapter I had not thought of. An additional sheet for this was introduced, and other kindred facts were from time to time placed with this initial one. Several sittings were usually required to thus sort the entire heap. Mostly too, as this process was gone through some time in advance of need, there came a repetition, or several repetitions, before the series of chapters had assumed its final order, and the materials had all been distributed.

When about to begin a chapter, I made a further rough classification. On a small table before me I had a large rude desk—a hinged board, covered with green baize, which was capable of being inclined at different angles by a movable prop behind. Here I grouped the collected materials appropriated to the successive sections of the chapter; and those which were to be contained in each section were put into the most convenient sequence. Then, as I dictated, I from time to time handed to my secretary an extract to be incorporated.[1]

Lewis H. Morgan is somewhat difficult to classify as chiefly a comparative anthropologist or a historical sociologist, but it seems best to regard him as primarily a member of the classical school of anthropologists. While much more systematic and thorough in his study of primitive social institutions than Spencer, Professor Lowie has recently shown that Morgan's method was essentially the same and his conclusions no less unreliable.[2] His *Ancient Society* has probably done more both to stimulate and to distort historical sociology than any other work.

The next notable example of method in systematic historical sociology after Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* was Book III of

[1] Herbert Spencer, *An Autobiography*, II, 324–26.

[2] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, *passim*. Morgan was of course a field-worker and descriptive ethnologist of unusual ability, while Spencer knew nothing of primitive people through contact with them. W. H. R. Rivers, in the *Kinship and Social Organization*, deals more charitably with Morgan than Lowie does, but his leniency does not seem warranted.

Professor Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*. While insistent upon the most rigorously scientific methods in sociology as a whole,[1] the important division of his book on historical sociology followed the comparative method in a thoroughgoing way. But it was much less naïve in its assumptions, procedure, and results than the works of Spencer and Morgan, and showed an unusual acquaintance for a sociologist with the best works then available in the fields of anthropology and history. Those who have followed Professor Giddings' lectures on historical sociology since 1896 know that he has made respectable progress in keeping informed regarding the newer developments in anthropological methods and research, though there is no doubt that his fertile intuitive mind tends toward rather more sweeping generalizations than some critical anthropologists would sanction.[2]

The introduction of even greater qualifications in accepting the extreme methods and conclusions of comparative anthropology was evident in the critical introduction and summary comments in W. I. Thomas' *Source Book for Social Origins*. While much of the illustrative material cited was from writers of the comparative school, the editor did not hesitate to point out the limitations of this approach to social evolution and gave some indication of an acquaintance with the earlier critical work of Boas and his school.[3] Other works on historical sociology accepting the comparative method, albeit somewhat gingerly, were Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*[4] and E. C. Hayes's *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*.

The first sociologist of note thoroughly to reject the comparative method in a published work of significance was Émile Durkheim. In his *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*,[5] he rejected the procedure of the comparative school in attempting to derive the

[1] F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Book I, chap. iii.

[2] F. S. Chapin's *Historical Introduction to Social Evolution*, avowedly based on Professor Giddings' more recent views, illustrates the progress of his thinking on historical sociology since 1896.

[3] W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 3–26, 316–17, 530–34, 733–35, 856–58.

[4] Hobhouse accepts the comparative method with many more reservations in the second edition of his work than he did in the first.

[5] There is an English translation by J. W. Swain.

laws of social evolution from the study of many social institutions as they have appeared in most diverse regions and periods of time. He contended that any valid conclusions as to social evolution must rest rather upon an intensive study of but one social institution on the basis of its manifestations in a single and definite cultural area. For his own work he selected the development of religion in Australia. Critics have insisted, however, that Durkheim went to the other extreme from the procedure followed by the comparative school and introduced quite as many methodological errors as he had rejected. Not the intensive study of a single institution in one cultural area, but only the critical comparison and analysis of carefully gathered and sifted data from many different cultural areas can establish any law of institutional or cultural growth. Further, Australian ethnography and ethnology have not been pursued with sufficient critical care to make the available data of sufficient reliability to justify generalization even for that continent alone. As Dr. Goldenweiser has well said of this aspect of Durkheim's work, "the fact itself that the author felt justified in selecting the Australian area for his intensive analysis shows plainly enough how far from realization still is the goal which his own life-work has at least made feasible, the rapprochement of ethnology and of sociology."[1] It seems to be agreed that, as a basis for generalization, Durkheim's study of primitive religion is as unreliable as the results of Frazer's studies on the basis of a far different method. The value of his book must be found in the sociological and psychological acumen and not in the reliability of the method of investigation or of the enthnographic material adduced to substantiate the conclusions.[2]

Perhaps the most interesting innovation in method which has been the work of a historical sociologist was the attempt of Professor L. T. Hobhouse to introduce the method of statistical correlation into an investigation of the evolution of social institutions in their relation to the progress of material culture. In an earlier

[1] *American Anthropologist* (October–December, 1915), p. 723.

[2] See the masterly discussion of the defects in Durkheim's method by A. A. Goldenweiser in *The American Anthropologist* (October–December, 1915), pp. 719–35; and in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* (March 1, 1917), pp. 113–24.

work, *Morals in Evolution*, Professor Hobhouse had relied upon a critical utilization of the comparative method. This excursus may, indeed, have impressed upon him the risks of this method. In his *Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*[1] he proposes to introduce a new method of investigation through the means of the statistical correlation of the stages in the progress of government and justice, the forms of the family, and the nature of war and its reaction upon social structure with the epochs in the development of material culture. This is, in fact, as Professor Hobhouse frankly admits, but an elaboration of the method proposed by Professor Edward Burnet Tylor in 1889 in his famous essay "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions: applied to the Laws of Marriage and Descent."[2] Professor Hobhouse offers the following excellent criticism of the comparative method and indicates the difficulties of establishing valid generalizations concerning social evolution:

> Theories of social evolution are readily formed with the aid of some preconceived ideas and a few judiciously selected corroborative facts. The data offered to the theorist by the voluminous results of anthropological inquiry on the one hand, and by the immense record of the history of civilization on the other, are so vast and so various that it must be an unskilled selector who is unable, by giving prominence to the instances which agree and by ignoring these which conflict with his views, to make out a plausible case in support of some general notion of human progress. On the other hand, its theories are easily made, they are also easily confuted by a less friendly use of the same data. That same variety of which we speak is so great that there is hardly any sociological generalization which does not stumble upon some awkward fact if one takes the trouble to find it. Anyone with a sense for facts soon recognizes that the course of social evolution is not unitary but that different races and different communities of the same race have, in fact, whether they started from the same point or no, diverged early, rapidly, and in many different directions at once. If theorizing is easy when facts are treated arbitrarily, a theory which would really grow out of the facts themselves and express their true significance presents the greatest possible difficulties to the inquirer. The data themselves are vast but chaotic, and at every point incomplete. They fall into two main divisions. On the one hand, there is historical record of the civilizations; upon the other there is the immense field of contemporary anthropology. In both alike the data are equally difficult to ascertain with precision, and when ascertained to reduce to any intelligible order. In the

[1] London, 1915, executed with the collaboration of G. C. Wheeler and M. Ginsberg.

[2] *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XVIII (1889), 245–72.

history of civilization we have full studies of many institutions, and we can learn something, not only of what they were at any one moment, but of their development in time, their genesis, their rise, their maturity, their decay. But even here the information often breaks off short at the most interesting point. Beginnings are frequently matter of conjecture. The nature of institutions, as they appear on paper, may be known to us, while we are left to reconstruct their actual working from casual examples, hints, and references that leave much to the imagination. We find them decaying without intelligible cause, and often enough we are faced with the fact that more thoroughgoing inquiry has completely revolutionized our view of an institution which had been taken as thoroughly explored and fully interpreted by earlier schools of historians. So is it also with the anthropological record. Here indeed we have a handful of monographs made by trained and skilled observers in modern times, which leave nothing to be desired excepting that the work had been carried out three or four generations ago before contact with the white man or with other more civilized races had begun to corrupt the purity of aboriginal institutions. Outside these monographs we have a vast mass of travellers' reports, good, bad, and indifferent, data which it is impossible to ignore and yet which can seldom be taken at their face value. Moreover all anthropological data of this kind, however simple the life of the people with which they deal, are modern: with the exception of the few available references that we have to the peoples that surrounded the Greeks and Romans in Herodotus, Tacitus, and other writers of antiquity, the great bulk of anthropological inquiry dates from the last three or four centuries, and it is sometimes forgotten that the peoples of whom they treat must have lived as long, must in a sense have had an extensive a tradition behind them, and to that extent are as far removed from the true primitive as civilized man himself.[1]

Critics have, however, called attention to certain serious defects in the execution of Professor Hobhouse's project, while admitting the excellence of the method if the data were adequate and the detailed application rigid. They have alleged that, by his arbitrary division of primitive peoples into the lower and higher hunters, etc., he inevitably obtained from his study what he had assumed at the outset in his preliminary classification. Again, his selection of the "tribe" as the statistical unit makes specific accuracy and definiteness impossible, because of the great variation in the nature of the tribe.[2] To me it seems that the most damaging criticism which may be directed against the work is the author's admission that the anthropological data gathered by skilled and critical

[1] *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, pp. 1–2.

[2] See the criticism of Tylor on this point in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XVIII (1889), 270 ff.

investigators are not sufficient to warrant the undertaking of any such enterprise as he has attempted, and his willingness to use the highly unreliable material gathered by missionaries and travelers in the absence of trustworthy information.[1] Further, a survey of the authorities used indicates that, like Durkheim, Professor Hobhouse had not realized the serious methodological errors that had been involved in the procedure of compiling the material for such widely used monographs as Spencer and Gillen's monographs on the Australian data. In other words, not only did he fail to limit himself to reliable anthropological monographs, but also to discriminate critically between the relative reliability of the monographs used.[2]

The accepted scientific method in reconstructing the early history of society—that evolved and elaborated by Boas and his school, Wissler, Lowie, Goldenweiser, Kroeber, and others—has not yet been adopted by any historical sociologist in any work of significance. It may be well that a number are in preparation which will embody these results, but none have yet appeared. The extension of this method into sociology has been the result of the synthetic work of these anthropologists themselves, in such books as Boas' *Mind of Primitive Man;* Wissler's *American Indian;* Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*, and *Primitive Society;* and the forthcoming work of Dr. Goldenweiser on *Early Civilization*. One may well doubt whether many sociologists in America are acquainted with this revolutionary work, and one may be certain that most sociologists abroad know nothing of it, for here even the anthopologists are for the most part ignorant of it and proceed serenely in the excesses of the comparative method of Morgan, Lubbock, Tylor, Frazer, Letourneau, Lippert, Gumplowicz, and Kovalevsky.[3]

[1] Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–44. A comparison of Hobhouse's results with those of R. H. Lowie in his *Primitive Society* is instructive.

[3] The most flagrant contemporary offender is Sir James G. Frazer. See the convincing demolition of Frazer and his methods by Robert H. Lowie in *The Freeman* (March 30, 1921), pp. 67–68. Perhaps the clearest example of the application of this new method is contained in A. A. Goldenweiser's "Totemism: an Analytical Study," in the *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. XXIII. It might also be pointed out that its results are particularly damaging to the basic dogmas of the comparative anthropology concerning totemism.

IV. THE POSITION OF SOCIOLOGISTS IN REGARD TO THEORIES OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION

While the important theories of cultural evolution are, perhaps, more significant for *Kulturgeschichte* than for historical sociology, they cannot be ignored by the latter. It may be quite true that, as Professor Lowie has shown, there is no close correlation between material culture and forms of social organization. Yet, social institutions are a part of the general cultural complex of any group, and their development and changes may be assumed to illustrate certain patterns and, perhaps, laws, of transformation.[1]

There have been advanced by cultural anthropologists some three chief doctrines or explanations of cultural growth and change. The first was that expounded by the comparative school, namely, the theory of independent origins and transformation. They held that cultural and institutional similarities and parallelisms have an independent origin, due to the unity of the human mind and also to environmental similarities. Changes in social institutions are likewise due to causes arising independent of any contiguous cultural group. This doctrine, of course, embodied the apotheosis of human initiative and capacity for invention.[2]

At the opposite pole from this school of writers was that group which accounted for cultural growth and transformation on the basis of contact and diffusion. They held that the instances of invention and independent origins of culture were very few indeed, and that changes in culture were due almost entirely to the introduction of new cultural traits or elements from without. This view of cultural evolution was anticipated by Tylor and Ratzel and was elaborated by Frobenius, Graebner, and Elliot Smith. It has been accepted by Rivers, Foy, Ankermann, and Schmidt. While possessing considerable validity, especially as an explanation of the spread of material culture, it has many weaknesses from psychological and geographical viewpoints.[3]

[1] Cf. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, chap. i.

[2] See Morgan, *Ancient Society;* D. G. Brinton, *The Basis of Social Relations;* E. B. Tylor, *loc. cit.;* E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.*

[3] See F. Graebner, *Methode der Ethnologie;* G. Elliot Smith, *Migrations of Early Culture;* W. H. R. Rivers, *History of Melanesian Society*, Vol. II. See the discussion in A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, chap. xiii.

Recognizing the defects of both of these older theories Ehrenreich in Germany and Boas and his school in America have substituted a critical or historico-analytical procedure. They assign full credit to the theory of independent development and invention as the cause of many cultural origins and changes, and yet, recognize that diffusion is an important principle and factor in accounting for cultural progress and transformations. Particularly significant is the searching analysis of alleged cultural parallelisms from the historical and psychological point of view which has been carried on by this group. They have satisfactorily proved that many alleged parallelisms are similar only in superficial externals and not in their psychic or cultural content or historical development. They have, further, demonstrated that real parallelisms may have developed from quite different origins through the operation of such genetic principles as "convergence" and "limited possibilities in the development of culture." The revolutionary significance of such positions cannot fail to be obvious to any thoughtful historian or sociologist.[1]

Inasmuch as historical sociologists have, almost without exception, adhered to the comparative method of studying social genesis they have, naturally, accepted the basic tenet of this school on the subject of cultural evolution, namely, the theory of independent origins and development. But they have done so for the most part unconsciously and without any deliberate consideration of the problem. They have in no way examined the arguments advanced for these different methods or carefully weighed the merits of each. Aside from a suggestive article by Professor Ellwood[2] there is no evidence that historical sociologists have, as a group, acquainted themselves to any degree with the problems of cultural evolution or these major solutions offered. It is scarcely necessary to urge the need of vigorous, if belated, activity on their part in this direction.

[1] F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, chaps. v–vii; A. A. Goldenweiser, "The Principles of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," in *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. XXVI; R. H. Lowie, "The Principle of Convergence in Culture," *ibid.*, Vol. XXV. It is true, of course, that there are important theoretical points of difference between members of this newer critical group of writers. I have attempted to deal with this point in the *Sociological Review*, October, 1921, pp. 211 ff.

[2] *American Journal of Sociology* (May, 1918), pp. 779 ff.

V. SOME SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF THE WORK OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGISTS

In spite of the fact that we may safely assume that far the greater part of the work in historical sociology has been founded upon a fundamentally erroneous method and that many of even the most dogmatically held results of this method are of very doubtful validity or utterly useless, nevertheless, one cannot discard as worthless the achievements of historical sociology up to the present time. It may be worth while briefly to estimate what significant contributions to the history of society have already been made by sociologists which are of relatively assured accuracy and permanent value.

1. *The stages of social evolution.*—One of the most illuminating and valuable of the phases of historical sociology has been the effort of writers in this field from various points of view to distinguish, characterize, or mark off the major stages in social evolution. The first epoch-making effort along this line was the work of Auguste Comte. Comte did not rest satisfied, as so many have contended, with a purely intellectual theory of social evolution. His famous division of history into the theological, metaphysical, and positive stages applied merely to his notion of intellectual progress. His stages of social evolution were based upon a more comprehensive set of factors.[1] His complete demarcation of stages in the history of society included a theological-military period, a metaphysical-legalistic age, and the modern scientific-industrial era.[2] Herbert Spencer believed that the chief social transformation thus far achieved was that from a society organized primarily for war to one oriented chiefly for industrial purposes, this change being accompanied by a progressive decline in state activity. He risked the generalization that a third period might be attained in which ethical and social considerations would play a dominating part.[3] Walter Bagehot held that the three chief periods of social and cultural evolution had been that of the formation of codes of custom,

[1] *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, Vol. III.

[2] Cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 393–94, with F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 303–4.

[3] *Principles of Sociology*, II, 568 ff.

that of the struggle of local groups dominated by customary codes, with the resulting formation of states, and, finally, that of the dissolution of the domination of custom by the appearance of the age of discussion.[1] Durkheim has viewed social evolution as primarily a passage from a social system based upon the mechanical and constraining solidarity of group repression of individuality to a social system founded upon the organic and voluntary solidarity of the social division of labor and the functional organization of society.[2] DeGreef asserted that the history of society can be most intelligently summed up as the transformation from a régime based upon force to one characterized by voluntary contractual social relationships.[3] Novicow contended that social evolution was a process of substituting progressively higher for lower forms of social conflict. The serial succession of these basic types or periods of social conflict have been from the physiological, through the economic and the political, to the intellectual, or highest form of social conflict.[4] Ratzenhofer and Small have suggested that the vital social transformation has been from a "conquest-state" to a "culture-state," carrying with it the realization of a progressively more adequate range of social interests.[5] Hobhouse states that the stages of social and political evolution have been those in which kinship, authority, and citizenship have been the basis of social cohesion and social organization.[6] By far the most thorough and illuminating scheme for organizing the evolution of society is that which has been suggested by Professor Giddings. He divides social evolution into the following stages: *zoögenic* or animal society, *anthropogenic*, or the society of man in the stage of the transformation from animal to human tribal society, *ethnogenic*, or tribal society, and *demogenic*, or the society of the so-called "historic" period. This last era he further divides in the military-religious period, which roughly corresponds to that of oriental

[1] *Physics and Politics.*

[2] *De la Division de travail social.*

[3] *Introduction à la sociologie.*

[4] *Les Luttes entre sociétés humaines.*

[5] A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 193 ff.

[6] *Morals in Evolution* (1915 edition), pp. 42 ff.; *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, pp. 126 ff.

antiquity, and the early Middle Ages, the liberal-legal period, or that of Greece and Rome and early modern history, and the economic-ethical period, or that since the Industrial Revolution.[1]

While these characterizations of the outstanding ages or periods in social evolution differ somewhat they are not mutually exclusive, but rather reflect varied points of view and widely diverse methods of studying the history of society. They constitute one of the most significant phases, both of the development of historical sociology and of the contribution of sociology to history.

2. *The origins of the state.*—A complete sociological theory of the origin of the state involves a consideration of the following problems—the socio-psychological origins of human association in the most general terms, the sociological and psychological forces involved in the origins of political leadership, the nature and progress of tribal society, and the causes for and nature of the rise of the territorial state.

The sociological doctrines that have been adduced to explain the origins of human association are numerous and varied, but they are rarely contradictory, and the final synthesis of sociological doctrine will, in all probability, accord in a different degree recognition to all of them. It will suffice here to mention some of the more important views of the better-known sociologists. In such a category would belong the theories of sympathy from Adam Smith to Alexander Sutherland, the closely allied doctrine of mutual aid and spontaneous co-operation, set forth by such writers as Kropotkin and Novicow, the notion of a gregarious instinct, as elaborated by McDougall and Trotter, Giddings' emphasis on the "consciousness of kind," the effect of imitation expounded by Hume, Bagehot, Tarde, and Baldwin, the subordination of the individual by the impressive force of the group, as viewed by Durkheim, LeBon, Sighele, Gumplowicz, and Sumner, and John Fiske's theory of the prolongation of human infancy.

The socio-psychological explanations of the rise of political superiority and subordination are closely allied to these interpretations of the orgins of associated life. We have Spencer's doctrine of fear, Bagehot's and Tarde's theory of imitation, DeGreef's and

[1] *Principles of Sociology*, Book III.

Fouillée's modified version of a theory of political origins through self-interest and a voluntary contract, Kropotkin's and Novicow's stressing of co-operative activity, Durkheim and LeBon's insistence upon the influence of impression, Mallock's, Faguet's, and Mumford's exposition of the significance of leadership and dominating personalities, McDougall's theory of an instinct of self-abasement and an emotion of subjection, and the attempt to reach a synthetic interpretation in Giddings' notion of differential response to stimulation and the theory of protocracy, and in the well-balanced studies of Baldwin, Cooley, and Ellwood.

The first modern attempt to trace the historical development of political origins through tribal society rested on the theory, which was supposed to be of biblical origin and sanction and had been confirmed by the generalizations of Aristotle, Bodin, Pufendorf, Locke, and Blackstone, namely, that the patriarchal organization of society had been the earliest form of family, social, and political life. This thesis received its ablest synthesis and defense in the *Ancient Law* and other monumental contributions to historical jurisprudence and politics from the pen of Henry Sumner Maine.[1]

This point of view was attacked by J. J. Bachofen in his *Das Mutterrecht* published in 1860. He maintained the existence of a primordial promiscuity in sexual relations and a subsequent development of a matriarchate, or a polity dominated by females. But he was a follower of the methods of Vico and Wolf rather than those of Darwin and Morgan, for he based his generalizations upon data drawn from a study of classical mythology and tradition. This rather archaic line of approach was soon abandoned for what has come to be known as the "evolutionary" approach to historical sociology. A group of distinguished scholars, most notable among them being Sir John Lubbock, J. F. McLennan, Herbert Spencer, Andrew Lang, W. Robertson Smith, Albert H. Post, Edward B. Tylor, Lewis H. Morgan, James G. Frazer, Charles Letourneau, and Daniel G. Brinton, brought the evolutionary principles of

[1] The following account of the theories of the evolution of the state drawn from anthropological theories has been greatly condensed because it is a special subject of Dr. Goldenweiser's paper.

Darwinian biology to bear upon the reconstruction of the early history of human society and reached results equally disruptive of the position of Maine. While there were important differences of opinion in matters of detail among these writers, they were in general agreement upon essentials of method and results.

Applying these methods and assumptions, described elsewhere, to the study of early society these writers arrived at a series of definite conclusions. The monogamous family shows a slow but distinct development from original promiscuity, and the family of any type is a late product, developing within the older kinship or gentile organization of society. In the development of gentile society certain definite and successive stages can be isolated and their sequence correlated with the development of material culture. The first type of extensive human grouping was found in the endogamous horde, where there were neither fixed family nor other wider relations. This stage was followed by the appearance of definite kinship or gentile society, associated with the exogamous clan which was inseparably connected with a totemic complex.[1] The earliest form of gentile society was the maternal clan, which was in time invariably succeeded by the paternal clan, this transformation in the basis of relationship being definitely correlated with progressive advances in material culture. The paternal clan was gradually strengthened into a patriarchal organization of society, which, through the development of property and the infiltration of foreigners from economic attraction, was in time superseded by the abolition of kinship principles and the establishment of the territorial state and civil society. This orderly synthesis of social and political evolution was most comprehensively organized and most effectively set forth in the famous work on *Ancient Society* by Louis Henry Morgan.[2]

Since Morgan's day new methods of anthropological investigation and synthesis and more thorough studies of existing primitive society have served to discredit the principles of investigation

[1] It should be pointed out that Frazer, in his *Totemism and Exogamy* has admitted that totemism and exogamy are not inseparable.

[2] See also E. B. Tylor, "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions," *Journal of Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XVIII, 1889.

followed by the evolutionary or classical school of anthropologists and to disprove the conclusions which they reached by the employment of these methods. In fact, more careful investigation even according to the old methods enabled Westermarck to prove inaccurate the assumption of a primitive promiscuity.[1] The basis for the newer point of view was laid by very painstaking studies of primitive cultural areas with the attempt to study the data in an objective manner. Space forbids the mention of more than a few representative examples of this type of indispensable anthropological research. In any such enumeration would come the studies of Australian data by Cunow, Brown, and N. W. Thomas; Rivers' great monographs on the *Todas* and the *History of Melanesian Society;* Seligmann's survey of the Veddas; the Torres Straits investigations undertaken by A. C. Haddon and a group of English scholars; the investigation of African data by Roscoe and Pecheul-Loesche; and, particularly, the careful studies of American areas by the participants in the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, and by Boas, Wissler, Lowie, Kroeber, Goldenweiser, Spinden, Dixon, Parker, Goddard, Mooney, Speck, Swanton, and others. This unparalleled data, together with a more objective and scientific attitude toward its interpretation, has brought about, not only more reliable doctrines concerning social evolution, but has also shown that the facts of social development are far different from what was earlier supposed. The more critical school has proved that the assumption of a universal law of evolution from the simple to the complex is not invariably true with respect to culture or social institutions. It has shown that parallelisms in culture and social organization in different areas do not imply identical antecedents or necessitate similar subsequent developments. Similarities may grow out of "cultural convergencies," proceeding from widely varied antecedents or they may be produced by imitation of a common pattern.[2]

[1] *History of Human Marriage.*

[2] Excellent discussions of the newer anthropological methodology are to be found in F. Boas, *Mind of Primitive Man*, chaps. iv–viii; R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology;* and A. A. Goldenweiser, "Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," in *Journal of American Folklore* (1913), pp. 259 ff. Consult further references in Goldenweiser, *loc. cit.* The best sources for these methodological improvements are the critical notes and reviews in the *American Anthropologist.*

The application of this more scientific method to the study of primitive society has been nothing short of revolutionary. The universality of gentile society cannot be proved; many groups have developed to a relatively high stage of culture without any relationship system wider than the family. Where gentile society exists there is no general tendency for relationships to change from a maternal to a paternal basis; in fact it may be doubted if there is one well-authenticated example of an independent change in kinship from maternal to paternal in the whole range of primitive society. Further, there is no evidence that maternal kinship is correlated with lower material culture or paternal with more advanced economic life. Finally, totemism has been totally dissociated from exogamy. It is evident that the whole fabric of the scheme of social evolution provided by the evolutionary school has perished and Professor Lowie has well expressed the obituary notice of this school:

> To sum up. There is no fixed succession of maternal and paternal descent; sibless tribes may pass directly into the matrilineal or the patrilineal condition; if the highest civilizations emphasize the paternal side of the family, so do many of the lowest; and the social history of any particular people cannot be reconstructed from any generally valid scheme of social evolution but only in the light of its known and probable cultural relations with neighboring peoples.[1]

These more critical principles and more assured results in anthropological research have been chiefly an American product and associated with the work of Professor Franz Boas and his pupils.[2]

It is not, of course, to be implied that all sociologists have assimilated the results of the more critical ethnology; indeed, most of them rest their theories of social evolution on the old Morganian ethnology and not a few regard the work of Boas and the critical school as impious if not impish. Yet, they cannot long disregard these epoch-making advances and it can be safely predicted that at no distant date the sociological theory of political origins will rest upon the firm foundations of critical ethnology.

[1] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 185.

[2] The definitive synthesis of the newer views of primitive society is contained in the notable works of Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society;* and A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization.* Another remarkable synthesis for American data is Clark Wissler's *The American Indian.*

The next problem in the sociological theory of political origins centers around the tracing of the origin of the developed territorial state. Older views, following Aristotle, traced it as a natural expansion of grouping from tribal society. Morgan and the evolutionary school accounted for political origins on the basis of the rise of property and the necessity of a more advanced type of political and legal institutions to cope with these more complex economic problems. Gradually, however, the doctrine has gained ground that the territorial state was primarily the product of forcible subjugation through long-continued warfare among primitive groups. Today this may be said to be *the* sociological theory of political origins and development. This view is not a new one; it certainly may be traced back as far as Polybius and has had its exponents in every succeeding age.[1] Hume in his *Essays* and Adam Ferguson in his *History of Civil Society* may be regarded as the founders of the modern version of this doctrine. Spencer and Bagehot worked over the doctrine in the light of evolutionary concepts, but it is with the work of Ludwig Gumplowicz and his theory of the *Rassenkampf* that this important contribution to the sociological theory of the state is usually associated. Gumplowicz forecast this interpretation in his brochure on *Race und Staat* in 1875 and expanded it in two later works, *Der Rassenkampf*, 1883, and *Grundriss der Sociologie*, 1885. It has been taken up and elaborated, among others, by Ratzenhofer in Austria, Oppenheimer and Simmel in Germany, Jenks in England, and Small and Ward in America. Briefly stated, this theory rests upon a doctrine of the group constitution of society, based on the principle of *syngenism* or "the phenomenon which consists in the fact that invariably in associated modes of life, definite groups of men, feeling themselves closely bound together by common interests, endeavor to function as a single element in the struggle for domination." From the earliest days the "process of history" has consisted chiefly in the struggle between social groups for the advancement of their economic interests. The conquest of one group by another led to the sub-

[1] I have tried to summarize briefly the history of this view of political origins, including the theory of Gumplowicz and later writers, in an article in the *Journal of Race Development* (April, 1919).

jection of the conquered and the establishment of the authority of the conquerors. This process went on, continually increasing the territorial scope of the authority of the successful group. Yet, to gain internal strength and unity the rulers of the expanding group were compelled to grant concessions to the conquered, and the process of assimilation began. Gradually, cultural assimilation and physical amalgamation were achieved and the national state was produced. During this process social classes were developed within the state in the shape of conquerors and conquered, religious and economic classes. As political institutions developed, these classes struggled for political power, so that they might use the law-making authority in their own interest. From these crude origins to modern times, this conflict of interest groups within the state has furnished the raw material and the *rationale* of political processes.

Though this view of political development has received the general assent of most sociologists,[1] some have vigorously criticized it as minimizing the element of co-operation and other peaceful agencies, such as industry and trade, which have undoubtedly been a potent factor in the history of the state. Among the better known of such writers have been Sutherland in his *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, Kropotkin in his *Mutual Aid as a Factor in Evolution*, and Novicow in his *La Critique du Darwinism social*.[2] Eclectic writers have tried to work out a synthesis and show that while conflict has played the greater part in political origins, peaceful co-operative elements have not been without great influence in the past and will probably be even more powerful in the future. Such a point of view has characterized the doctrine of Giddings, Hayes, Ludwig Stein, and Tarde.[3]

3. *Special studies of the development of specific social institutions.* —In the matter of studying the growth of such special types of

[1] Cf. Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 204 ff.; *American Journal of Sociology*, VII, 762; XV, 679–80; *Publications of the American Economic Association* (3d series), V, No. 2, 187 f.

[2] Cf. *Journal of International Relations* (October, 1921), pp. 238 ff.

[3] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 316; E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, pp. 538 ff.; L. Stein, *La Question sociale*, pp. 123–24, 352 ff., 450 ff.; G. Tarde, *Les Transformations du pouvoir*, pp. 36, 50, 174–85.

social institutions as those relating to marriage and the family, property, law, morals, and religion one finds that much the same situation prevails as in the analysis of the evolution of the state and society in general. Much the greater part of the anthropological material on these subjects has been compiled through the use of the unreliable and obsolete comparative method, and, with almost negligible exceptions, all the sociological studies of these institutions have been based upon these products of comparative anthropology. In the case of the study of the history of the family and allied practices and institutions the works by Letourneau, Westermarck, Starcke, Hartland, Frazer, Grosse, Howard, and Goodsell, which constitute the more important strictly sociological works on the subject, are all based on the comparative method, in some cases with an utter lack of critical judgment. The same criticism might also be passed upon the works of Letourneau and others on the evolution of property as a social institution; upon the treatment of the development of law by Maine, Letourneau, Ihering, Post, and Frazer; upon the history of moral concepts and practices by Sutherland and Westermarck; and upon the analysis of the history of religion by La Saussaye, Lubbock, Tylor, Frazer, Jevons, and Brinton. Certain laudable improvements in the more crude forms of employing the comparative method are to be seen in the study of the family by Elsie Clews Parsons, in Sumner's remarkable repertory of concrete data illustrating the history of folkways and mores, in Webster's study of the history of "Rest Days," and in the comprehensive work of Hobhouse on *Morals in Evolution*. Thomas sounds a word of caution in using the comparative method in his critical comments on material in his *Source Book* touching upon the evolution of specific social institutions. Durkheim rejects the comparative method in studying the development of religions, but, as we have already seen, accepts in its place as objectionable a type of procedure. We have an excellent critical synthesis of the evolution of the family, property, law, religion, morals, and religion in the works of Marett, Lowie, and Goldenweiser,[1] but these writers are all professional anthropologists whose contributions have

[1] R. R. Marett, *Anthropology;* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society;* A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization.*

scarcely affected the complacency of most of their fellow-anthropologists, to say nothing of sociologists. In short, one may conclude that the work done by sociologists in the field of the history of special institutions is as backward in method and as unreliable in content as their achievements in tracing the evolution of society in general. Yet, one would be supercilious if he were to deny all value to the foregoing work. It has performed the indispensable task of preliminary classification and generalization, upon the basis of which later constructive criticism may proceed.

VI. THE DECLINE OF INTEREST IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the history of historical sociology is the decline in the interest in this field in the last two decades. From Comte to Giddings the historical aspect of social problems interested more sociological writers than any other phase of the subject. Even many comprehensive works on the "principles of sociology" devoted more attention to social evolution than to the analysis of other sociological data. In the last twenty years, however, there has been an extremely marked decline of interest in historical sociology. Not since the publication of Giddings' *Principles of Sociology* in 1896 had there been produced a systematic treatise on the history of human society until the appearance of Professor Chapin's *Introduction to Social Evolution* in 1913, and of Professor Hayes's textbook in 1915. The works on special aspects of historical sociology, such as Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*, Oppenheimer's *The State*, and Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, have been few, indeed, compared with the vast output in the fields of analytical, biological, psychological, statistical, and, above all, applied sociology.[1]

It is not easy to discover a complete explanation for this falling-off of interest in historical sociology, but it seems safe to assert that it was primarily because of the rise of interest in the other fields through which an approach might be made to sociological

[1] Compare the works in Peabody's *A Reader's Guide to Social Ethics* with the scant bibliography which could be compiled of works on historical sociology produced since 1900.

FOUR PHASES OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THOUGHT: AN OUTLINE[1]

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New School of Social Research

ABSTRACT

Four Phases of Anthropological Thought. The Evolutionary School.—Postulates of the evolutionary school include the theories of the psychic unity of mankind, of the general similarity of physical environmental conditions, and of parallelism in historical development. The method of evolutionists, as Spencer, Jevons, Westermarck, and Letourneau, was comparative. Survivals were used as proof of evolution, interest was directed to origins and first origins, and diffusion was treated slightingly. Illustrations of the evolutionary theory were found in economics, social organization, art, and religion. *The diffusionists.* While Bastian and Ratzel recognize the facts of diffusion, Graebner stands out as the first real diffusionist with his rejection of evolution and his interpretation of the spread of culture as a unit through diffusion. W. H. R. Rivers differs from Graebner by his emphasis upon psychological explanations, by his interest in the mechanisms of diffusion, and in his combination of evolution with diffusion. Both Rivers and Graebner, however, use diffusion as a general principle of interpretation, disregarding proof or even historical probability. *Critical ethnology.* The positive contributions of the critical school were in its historical approach and in its psychological standpoint. Its concept of culture area combines objective and psychological features in relation to independent development and diffusion. *Recent tendencies and future outlook.* The limitations of the critical school lies in its absence of synthesis, its neglect of the hypothetical approach, its oversight of the developmental aspect, and its lack of contact with other sciences. Recent tendencies in interpretation are those of neo-evolutionism, of rehabilitation of the comparative method, of convergence versus parallelism, and of a new type of origins. Such contributions of psychoanalysis as racial unconscious, recapitulation theory, etc., must be rejected, but Freud's interpretations of magic taboo, incest, etc., are theoretically acceptable.

THE EVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL

Beginning with very early times man has played with the idea of evolution, although the speculations of primitive folk on this topic have usually referred to matters inorganic and organic, but not social. Social evolution is a relatively recent concept. Adumbrated by Auguste Comte, dialectically developed by Hegel, the idea of an evolutionary development of civilization received its

[1] Anthropological theory and method have undergone such multiform transformations in the course of the last two generations, that a volume would barely suffice to cover the principal phases of these ideologies. This essay represents a somewhat elaborated table of contents of such a volume.

first precise and elaborate formulation at the hands of Herbert Spencer. The astronomical speculations of Laplace and Kant, the geology of Lyell, and von Baer's embryology co-operated in the shaping of Spencer's ideas, while Darwin's *Origin of Species* came in just in time to help him complete his biological scheme.

In approaching the sociological field, Spencer found himself in a quandary. The material had not been elaborated; there was very little of it available, moreover, that could be used to bolster up an evolutionary conception of society. As is well known, Spencer then made a daring excursion into descriptive data, and, with the help of a number of assistants, succeeded in amassing a formidable collection of facts which he put to use in the *Sociology* and the *Ethics*. It is of importance to remember here that the evolutionary conception was in no sense inductively derived from historical material. In astronomy, in geology, in biology, and even in psychology, evolution was at least in part based on observed phenomena in these fields. Not so in sociology or history. Here the evolutionary frame appeared ready-made in advance, and ever after the sagacity of social evolutionists was hard put to it in their attempts to force social phenomena into this frame.

The postulates of the evolutionary conception in its relation to society were these. From a psychological standpoint, Man represents a homogeneous group—there is psychic unity. Physical environmental conditions encountered by Man are everywhere similar, barring details. On this general background of similar physical stimuli and equally similar psychic responses, social evolution proceeds in all places and groups along comparable or even identical lines. This is parallelism. The stages through which civilization proceeds are thus fixed in order, if not in time. A stage, that is, may be precipitated here, delayed there, but come it must, at its proper place and before the next stage can be ushered in. This evolutionary development, moreover, proceeds gradually, through an unceasing accumulation of relatively slight accretions. As a final edge to the theory came the idea of progress, which added a melioristic touch to the entire scheme. Not only did society develop inevitably, uniformly, and steadily, but the general drift of its movement was toward betterment.

In the application of the theory of evolution, some held that civilization as a whole was subject to these regular transformations, but as this conception proved a trifle too grotesque even for the daring of the early evolutionists, a somewhat more discriminating version early took its place. It was taught that the units of evolutionary development were the separate aspects of civilization, such as social or political form, economic conditions, art, religion, and the like.

The principal method utilized by the early evolutionists was comparative. An enormous stock of data gathered from all peoples, times, and places was utilized to fit the pigeonholes of the evolutionary scheme. Those were the days of voluminous compendia and never ending lists of authorities quoted. Spencer's *Sociology*, Hartland's *Legend of Perseus* and *Primitive Paternity*, Westermarck's *The Origin Development of the Moral Ideas*, a later work of similar type, are good illustrations, while Letourneau's prolific pen, by its exaggerations, reduced the entire method to absurdity.

The idea of survivals, which first appeared in E. B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, was used by evolutionists as a methodological tool in the building up of their systems. Thus, realistic meanings of geometrical patterns were interpreted as survivals of originally realistic designs; or, the importance of the maternal uncle was taken as proof of a former prevalence of maternal descent. The postulates at the root of the idea of survival were three: the development of civilization, the persistence of civilization and the different extent to which these two principles were operative in the several aspects of a particular culture. This resulted in cultural lags, some features, once useful or otherwise correlated with the rest of civilization, finding themselves lost in the rear of cultural advance, meaningless, or of changed meaning, and but loosely articulated with their cultural milieu.

To the evolutionist the problem of origins, of ultimate origins, was one wrought with significance. For, if the course of evolution is fixed, then the knowledge of each step brings insight into universal law, and the first step carries within it the potentialities of all that are to follow.

The evolutionist, constructive, enthusiastic, and daring though he was, could not but recognize the presence of certain factors which marred the harmony of his beautifully balanced schemes. Among these factors the diffusion of cultural features was most conspicuous. The evolutionist was aware of the constant contributions received by any particular civilization in the form of things and ideas derived from other civilizations. These foreign importations, from the first, proved resentful of the pressure of the evolutionary frame. In fact, they persistently refused to abide within its limits, and thus spoiled the picture. The evolutionist's weapon against the phenomena of historical contact was contempt. The facts were there, undeniably, but they were disturbing agencies, irregularities, intrusive factors. In theoretical significance they were not to be compared to the facts of "inner growth." To envisage clearly the features of evolution, it was necessary to analyze out and eliminate these intrusive factors.

Follow a few examples of evolutionary schemes: In the domain of economics, pottery was made to play the part of a fixed stage of advance, Lewis H. Morgan having been one of the staunchest supporters of this theory. Then there were the three classical stages of economic progress, the hunting, pastoral, and agricultural stages. In the ownership of property, communal holding was regarded as universally antecedent to individual ownership. In social organization, the first origin was sought in the horde characterized by promiscuous sex intercourse. This was followed by group marriage, then by the clan, the gens, and finally, the family and village. The succession, clan-gens, was particularly insisted upon, Bachofen, McLennan, and Morgan having embraced the theory that maternal descent had everywhere preceded paternal reckoning and that the tracing of descent through the mother was also accompanied by a general pre-eminence of women—a matriarchate. The favorite evolutionary theory in art was the derivation of geometrical designs from realistic ones through a process of gradual conventionalization. In religion, an illustration is provided by Spencer's derivation of religious worship and ceremonialism from fear, the belief in ghosts, and the cult of ancestors.

It is worth noting here that schemes of cultural evolution were but seldom worked out in detail. Here Spencer stands at the head of the list. It is true that Wundt also introduced a carefully argued scheme of evolutionary stages, particularly in religion, but his conception was much more complex than that of Spencer and provided for many alternatives. Other evolutionists, such as Frazer, Hartland, or Westermarck, were satisfied to build on the evolutionary conception as a general background, making only occasional specific applications of it in the course of the systematizing analysis of concrete data.

It is significant that the evolutionary conception of society was ushered in through the halls of prehistory, where there were relatively few accredited facts, many loopholes, and therefore ample space for speculative padding. It must never be forgotten that social evolution is a dynamic scheme of historically successive stages, while the paucity of historically demonstrable stages has always been and will probably remain the sorest spot in the concrete equipment of the student of prehistory.

It is therefore not surprising that the theory of social evolution should have been taken seriously by sociologists to whom history was but a field of application of relatively abstract principles. Historians, on the other hand, whose professional preoccupations had imbued them with a wholesome respect for concretely demonstrable historic successions, were but little impressed by the tenets of cultural evolutionism. Lamprecht might, perhaps, be classed as an evolutionist, but his "eras" are, after all, highly plastic conceptions, leaving room for a multiplicity of specific conditions.[1] Moreover, he never intended to make use of the "eras" as a universal scheme of evolution. Kurt Breysig in his *Die Geschichte der Menschheit* stands even closer to the classical evolutionist. But his major interest lies, again, not in evolution as such, but rather in the concept of historic law.[2]

But, withal, the lure of cultural evolution was manifold. The scheme was simple and definite. It gave promise of final solutions. It was, moreover, flattering to racial pride. At once picturesque

[1] See his *Die Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft.*

[2] Cf. also his later *Der Stufen-Bau und die Gesetze der Welt-Geschichte.*

and impressive in its garb of multicolored facts, it also proved a happy hunting ground for the exercise of the creative imagination.

But now we must turn our attention to a different group of students and to ideas of a strikingly contrasting caste.

THE DIFFUSIONISTS

Important components both of evolutionism and of diffusionism are already contained in the life-work of the philosopher-ethnographer, Bastian, and the geographer-anthropologist, Ratzel. While Bastian's teaching is known to posterity mainly through his insistence on the *Elementargedanken*, certain basic ideas and institutions common to all mankind, he was equally concerned about developing the supplementary concept of *Völkergedanken*. The latter, the folk ideas, represented the concrete cultural creations, built up on the basis of the elementary ideas in specific geographico-historical settings. The territorial homes of such cultures Bastian designated as geographical provinces. These provinces may be regarded as the prototypes of the culture areas of modern American ethnology. Bastian's handling of the concept of cultural diffusion, while verging toward mysticism, has also certain similarities with modern procedure.

For Ratzel, primarily a geographer, the subject of prime concern was the relation of civilization to its physical setting. In fact, he conceived of civilization as the culminating efflorescence of the geologico-geographical process. Later in life, when he faced the problem of diffusion versus independent development of cultural features, Ratzel's theoretical attitude was curiously inconsequential. With reference to the spiritual aspects of culture, in which he was less interested, such as religion, social organization, and, perhaps, art, he was willing to admit the feasibility of the independent development of similarities. In material culture, on the other hand, which was his special domain, he represented a non-compromising diffusionism, for in this way alone, he claimed, could investigation be directed toward the disclosing of further and further historical connections and of the geographical wanderings of cultural features. Ratzel also set concrete examples of studies of the dispersion of objects of material culture in such investiga-

tions as that of the distribution of African bows and a number of others of similar type.

All this left the theory of diffusion in a fairly vague condition.

The problems of diffusion were raised to greater clarity and precision in the works of E. B. Tylor. Even in his *Primitive Culture*, which in the main is oriented according to evolutionary perspectives, he frequently allows for the possibility of similarities in culture arising through historic contact in diffusion. It is true that he usually rejects such possibilities in favor of an interpretation through independent development. But in his *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* and in the *Anthropology*, he faces the problem of diffusion with an open mind. In certain instances, in fact, he adopts an interpretation through diffusion where the modern ethnologist would reject it, as for example, in the cases of the couvade and of the magical cure of disease by means of sucking.

The first real diffusionist of the modern pattern was F. Graebner. He not only succeeded in developing a theory and methodology of ethnology, but became the founder of a school represented by such men as Foy, Ankermann, and more recently, W. Schmidt, and others. Graebner's concrete investigations were ushered in by an essay on the culture of Oceania in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* for 1905, followed by a more detailed investigation of what he called The Melanesian Bow Culture (*Anthropos*, Vol. IV, 1909) and by many subsequent articles, while his theoretical principles are set down in his work *Die Methode der Ethnologie*.

Graebner rejects the evolutionary conception *in toto*.[1] Instead, he proposes to interpret most, if not all, cultural similarities through the historic contact of peoples, resulting in diffusion or borrowing, or through an ultimate common origin followed by dispersion. The purpose of ethnology thus becomes the reconstruction of old contacts and of the wanderings of things and ideas over the surface of the globe.

The analysis of cultural similarities opens the way for Graebner's theoretical system. In this analysis he is guided by two criteria, a qualitative one, referring to the shape or form of

[1] As his arguments are here almost identical with those of the critical school, they will be cited in the next section.

material objects or the structural and functional peculiarities of social systems or ideas; and a quantitative one, which refers to the number of such points of similarity between two cultures or cultural features. The next step in Graebner's reasoning is, perhaps, the most significant one for an understanding of his viewpoint: it is his attitude toward the geographical distance between two tribes or localities in which cultural similarities are discerned. He disregards the distance. If an analysis of similarities, teaches Graebner, has convinced one of their reality, the way is opened forthwith for an interpretation through diffusion. Whether the similarities in question are found in two neighboring tribes, or whether continents and oceans intervene, is of no importance—the interpretation made in one case must hold also for the other.

Operating on this basis, Graebner constructs his cultural waves and strata, using as units for his reconstruction, cultural features found in many tribes and often separated by vast distances.

While the islands of the South Seas and Australia are the areas to which Graebner has applied his theories in greatest detail, he has also extended his analysis to African cultures. Meanwhile, Father Schmidt, a recent convert of the "Culture Historical School," has undertaken an analysis of South American cultures in the spirit of Graebner's method. North America has, so far, been spared, excepting some relatively brief references in Graebner's *Anthropos* article, but it is to be expected that the civilizations of the North American Indians will also soon be categorized and stratified in truly Graebnerian fashion.

A diffusionist of a very different type is W. H. R. Rivers. Like most English anthropologists, Rivers, a psychologist by training, began his anthropological studies from the angle of an evolutionist. However, he soon became interested in specific problems, made some interesting psychological investigations under the auspices of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits, and successfully applied to the study of social organization the so-called genealogical method, for the introduction of which into ethnology Rivers is responsible. The first suggestions of Rivers' speculative tendencies may be found in his admirable monograph on the Todas, where he argues that the ethnologist is

free to operate with historical reconstructions, however speculative, if only the results tend to interpret coherently certain otherwise disconnected facts derived from ethnographic study. While engaged in his somewhat protracted researches in Melanesia, Rivers was greatly impressed with the cultural complexity of these islands. At the same time he became interested in the Graebnerian approach. After this, he rapidly developed into a dogmatic diffusionist. The postulates of his system are set down in three articles: "The Loss of Useful Arts,"[1] "The Sociological Significance of Myths,"[2] and "The Contact of Peoples."[3] Rivers' system of interpretation is applied on a large scale in his work on *The History of Melanesian Society*, the second volume of which consists in an elaborately argued but purely speculative reconstruction of Melanesian cultures. Here the theory of diffusion of cultural features is used as general principle of interpretation, quite apart from the historical demonstrability of diffusion in particular instances.

Both the contrasts and the similarities between Graebner's and Rivers' modes of procedure are instructive. Unlike Graebner, Rivers is not concerned with the detailed analysis of similarities. Instead, he starts out with a set of principles which in themselves are thoroughly acceptable, such as the importance for cultural borrowing of the relative level of two civilizations, the possibility of a profound cultural influence exerted by a relatively small number of immigrants, the frequent loss of even useful arts under certain conditions, and so on. Having established these principles, Rivers operates with them in highly speculative fashion in his attempt to reconstruct the past background of present cultural situations. In the case of Graebner, on the other hand, the main speculative element lies in his basic assumption of interpretation at a distance. With this principle assured, he then proceeds with the accumulation of concrete material, with the innocent air of a purely descriptive ethnologist. Again, Rivers' method is more plastic and his reasoning more discriminating. He makes effective use of psychological factors, which are almost completely disregarded by Graeb-

[1] In an anniversary volume presented to E. Westermarck in 1912.

[2] *Folk-Lore*, XXIII (1912), 307 ff.

[3] *Essays and Studies Presented to William Ridgeway*, 1913.

ner. The fundamental similarity of the two systems consists in the attitude of both authors toward diffusion, which they utilize as a general principle of interpretation, without subjecting the theory to the test of historic demonstrability or even probability in particular instances, or weighing it against the alternative interpretation through independent development.[1]

CRITICAL ETHNOLOGY

While evolutionism was reaping the well-earned harvest of its pioneering efforts, and diffusionism was exposing the sins of evolutionism with one hand while committing similar ones with the other, significant changes were taking place in the field of ethnology. The ethnographic researches of the last two generations have resulted in a tremendous accumulation of first-class descriptive material. Ethnographic museums were established and filled with masses of specimens representing all ranges of primitive industry and art, ready to be examined with all the care and minuteness which their segregation now permitted. Young ethnographers, trained in the many methods of cultural study, cut deep into the native civilizations of Australia, Africa, and America.

As a result of this intensification of the methods of field study, primitive civilizations ceased to represent to the student chaotic conglomerates of curious customs and beliefs and began to appear to him in their historic complexity and the kaleidoscopic variety of their individual forms. He now cared less, for the time being at least, about the processes of the remote past and more for those picturesque as well as instructive transformations which were taking place before his very eyes in the primitive civilizations still available for study. Seeing culture at work could not but exercise a chastising influence on one's historic imagination, for the thought

[1] The sad spectacle of the deterioration of the theory of diffusion into a purely fantastic system of speculation is presented by the work of one of Rivers' followers, Professor Elliot Smith. His eminence as a physical anthropologist contrasts strangely with the wholly uncritical methods which he applies in his attempt to demonstrate certain cultural contracts, world-wide in their sweep. In the hands of Professor Smith, in fact, interpretation through diffusion, which in a sense is opposite to that through evolution, is reduced to a level in no way superior theoretically to that occupied by the older ideology, for in both cases the argument is supported by a voluminous but defective and critically undigested comparative material.

was obvious and irrepressible that what was happening now in living primitive society had to be accepted as a standard and guide in one's estimate of past probabilities.

Presently, the introduction of the statistical method made it possible to reduce to fairly measurable terms the study of even such evasive phenomena as myths, while the development of prehistoric philology opened up undreamed-of vistas into the realm of primitive psychology, in particular of those deeper layers of the unconscious psyche which express themselves in the categorizing of experience as represented in the forms of grammatical structure.

While this was going on, evolutionism was growing topheavy with its over-elaborated and imaginative structures, and its very foundations began to give way under the onslaught of the critical mind. Among students of anthropology, those of North America found themselves in an especially fortunate setting for carrying on the attack on evolution. They had the advantage of well-nigh inexhaustible stores of primitive data at the very doors of their universities. To gather a fresh glimpse of primitive reality it sufficed to take a brief vacation from one's academic duties and delve into prehistory among the Iroquois, Haida, Omaha, or Zuni. The rigor of scientific method, moreover, was forcibly ushered in through the labors and personality primarily of one man, Franz Boas, whose training in exact science, combined with a mercilessly critical mind, fitted him admirably for that muckraking work in the domain of anthropological vagaries, the results of which have at this time born their ripe fruit.

The prime postulate of evolution, the psychic unity of mankind, remained, it is true, unshaken. Not so the other postulates as to the significantly similar physical environment of all early civilizations. It was shown that each similarity could be countered by an equally impressive difference, also that physical environment could in no sense be regarded as a major determinant of the character or development of civilization.[1] It was also made clear that the

[1] See, for example, Wissler's "The Psychological Aspects of the Culture-Environment Relation" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVI, 1914), "Aboriginal Maize Culture," etc. (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXI, 1916), Goldenweiser's "Culture and Environment" (*ibid.*), and the chapter on "Culture and Physical Environment" in Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*.

so-called laws of history were more conspicuous by their exceptions than by their regularities, that the paths followed by different civilizations, however parallel in certain respects, were marked by innumerable individual peculiarities, specific, complex, and unforeseeable.

In the domain of social organization, for example, it was shown that neither the hypothesis of promiscuity nor that of group marriage had any firm foundation in descriptive material, that no valid reasons could be advanced for the universal priority of clans to gentes, that the individual family, instead of being a late product of evolution, was omnipresent even in most primitive society, etc. Criticism was also at work over the evolutionary theories of industry, of art, of religion, with similarly devastating results.

The main target of the critical ethnologist became the favorite method of the classical school, the so-called comparative method. It could now be shown that the all too numerous facts canvassed by the evolutionist could in no sense be regarded as proofs of evolution, for the very possibility of substituting a cultural stage found, for example, in an Indian tribe, into a loophole left by a missing corresponding stage somewhere in Africa, was based on the assumption that the processes were throughout parallel. But parallelism was one of the major assumptions of evolution; hence, the comparative material, as organized by the evolutionists, could only be regarded as illustrative of evolution accepted as a postulate, not as proof of evolution.

A similar fate befell the theory of survivals, for the very designation of a cultural feature as a survival presupposes the assumption of a particular preceding stage, as a proof of which the survival was constituted by the evolutionist. But if doubt is thrown on the reality or identity of this preceding stage, then the first question to be asked is whether the so-called survival actually is one or of *what* it is the survival, or whether it does not represent an incipient stage of a development still to come rather than a survival of a past stage. This was accompanied by an ever decreasing interest in origins, particularly in first origins. If a step in cultural advance does no longer represent a principle, then the first step shares the fate of the others. Their particular individualities may still

preserve their charm, but they lose their significance as revealing facts of general bearing and of theoretical import. Thus reconstructive enthusiasm waned and was replaced by a less imaginative but more solid concentration on the facts, processes, and mechanisms still observable in prehistoric society.

While at one with the upholders of diffusion in their critical attitude toward the theories of evolution, the historically minded ethnologists turned against the diffusionist when they found him overstepping the bounds of critical method and developing a dogmatic system of interpretation not one jot superior to that of his conquered foe.

The ethnologist could not indorse Graebner's optimism with reference to the categorical validity of his criteria of cultural similarity, for it could be easily shown that the qualitative criterion is practically never applicable in a purely objective way, room being always left for subjectivity and point of view.[1] The quantitative criterion, on the other hand, was ultimately resolvable into units whose similarity could be estimated only qualitatively. This being so, Graebner's interpretation at a distance is revealed as theoretically inadmissable. By disregarding the geographical factor, he, *ipso facto*, disregards historical probabilities. Thus, the culture historical school is exposed as inherently unhistorical. The uncertainty in our estimation of similarities, carries with it as a corollary the ever present importance of the historico-geographical factors.

Against Graebner, also, it was urged that culture is not a mechanical but a psychological conglomerate, that the relations even of material objects lie in the psychological level and that a just estimate of cultural reality could never be reached by a purely objective enumeration of objects and features of culture in their co-existence and geographical distribution. What was true of one chronological level was equally applicable to succeeding stages in cultural transformation. The never ceasing operation of psy-

[1] See, for example, the critical discussions of Graebner by Lowie ("On the Principle of Convergence in Ethnology," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. XXV, 1912), Boas ("A Review of Graebner's *Methode der Ethnologie*," *Science*, N.S., Vol. XXXIV, 1911), and Goldenweiser ("The Principle of Limited Possibilities," etc., *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. XXVI, 1913).

chological factors should never be disregarded when one deals with the persistence in time of cultural features. It was insisted, finally, that culture, contrary to Graebner's assumption, does not spread or diffuse as a unit, but that different aspects of culture have their own rates, mechanisms, and conditions of diffusion.

While indorsing Rivers in those particulars of his theory and method in which, by comparison with Graebner, he appeared more discriminating and cognizant of the psychological connotations of civilization, the ethnologist found himself in sharp opposition also to this representative of diffusionism. For Rivers' reckless application of the speculative method had to be condemned as opposed to all the tenets of sound historical reconstruction. It was a case of a curious misapplication of a method admirable in one domain to another to which it was radically unsuited. What could be done in theoretical physics, where the conceptual serviceability of a theory was the test of its validity, could not be done in a historical reconstruction, where the specific probability of a theory with reference to a particular historical setting was the only possible test.[1]

The positive contributions of the critical school of ethnology are closely correlated with its achievements in the directions enumerated above. Among these first place must be assigned to the adoption of the so-called historical point of view. Of this, two special phases may be cited. On the one hand, primitive cultures are examined in the totality of their present interrelations, each tribe being considered both as a unit and in its relations to other tribes. On the other hand, cultural changes which are to be interpreted historically are referred to cultural antecedents, not to racial, environmental, or general psychological ones.

The historical point of view is correlated with and supplemented by the psychological standpoint. By this is meant that not behavior alone, but the psychological setting of behavior is examined. Note is also taken of what people think of themselves and of their own ideas and customs—these are the so-called rationaliza-

[1] Cf. here my review of Rivers' "History of Melanesian Society" (*Science*, Vol. XLV, 1918), also "A New Approach to History" (a review of Teggart's *Processes of History*, in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XXII, 1920).

tions. Again, it is realized that the interrelations of cultural features always lie in the psychological level. Primitive cultures, finally, are expressed and appraised in their own terms. In this also the historico-psychological standpoint contrasts with the evolutionary one, in which primitive civilizations are envisaged as stepping-stones to higher civilizations or *the* civilization, namely, our own.[1]

An important conceptual and methodological contribution of the critical school, the bearing of which lies as much in the future as in the present, is the culture-area concept. The continent of North America is divided by the modern ethnologists into a small number of geographical areas, the differentia of which consist, on the one hand, in the presence or prevalence of certain cultural features, on the other, in the special types of interrelation of such features. The presence of such culture areas does not, however, mitigate against the relatively free distribution of cultural features over the continent. Thus, individual features are seen to behave in their distribution as if they were independent and non-related to other features, while forming relatively permanent associations with such features, in special culture areas. The rationale of this apparently contradictory situation consists in that the tracing of the distribution of individual features is a wholly objective statistical enterprise, whereas the culture-area concept is both objective and psychological. The application of the culture-area concept throws much light on the problems of independent development and diffusion, for new cultural features or variants of old ones are constantly seen arising within such areas, while other features are being diffused across the boundaries of culture areas to other tribes and cultures.

It has been stated that the task in ethnology of the culture-area concept is by no means accomplished, for the theoretical generality of this concept leads one to reject its applicability to North America alone. Approximations to culture areas have, in

[1] See Boas' *Mind of Primitive Man;* the chapter on "Culture and Psychology" in Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology;* and Goldenweiser's "Principle of Limited Possibilities," etc. (*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, XXVI [1913], 282 ff.), and "History, Psychology and Culture," etc. (*Journal of Philosophy*, XV [1918], 8 ff.).

fact, been worked out in Africa. Modern civilization, again, presents an identical phenomenon in its geographico-historical differentiation of national or local cultures. It is thus to be expected that other regions of the primitive world will, with deeper knowledge, also present aspects which the student will succeed in subsummating under the culture-area concept.

RECENT TENDENCIES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

It must not be imagined that the critical school represents the last word in the advance of anthropological thought. It has, on the contrary, conspicuous limitations. One of these is the almost total absence of synthesis among its contributions. Synthesis always involves stepping beyond or rising above the facts. It thus requires not merely knowledge and insight, but also courage and constructive imagination. Absorbed in his work of critical analysis and specific concrete investigation, the critical ethnologist has developed a certain timidity in dealing with ideas, a fact regrettable in itself and which has greatly reduced the serviceability of ethnology for the other social sciences.[1]

Another weakness of the critical ethnologist is his exaggerated skepticism in the face of hypotheses. It must, after all, be remembered that criticism and method are useful in proportion to the presence of constructive ideas to work upon; in the absence of these, method and criticism are doomed to sterility.

Related to the last point is the relative neglect of the developmental aspect of culture. It is clear enough that the rejection of the evolutionary theory as a specific formulation of the developmental process does not imply that there is no development in civilization. It is, in fact, apparent that the very opposite is the case. And, if so, the ethnologist is called upon to continue the task of the interpretative historian below the level of written records into the indefinitely chronologized phases of prehistory. There he will no doubt find less regularity and a greater number of

[1] In most recent years, however, a number of works have appeared which foreshadow the recrudescence of the synthetic spirit. Cf., for example, Wissler's *The American Indian* and Lowie's *Primitive Society*, a book synthetic in form if not in content.

missing links than might be wished for, but the task will not be denied. Certain steps in the direction here indicated are now being made in various quarters. One group of such attempts may be classed as neo-evolutionism.

The universality, the regularity, the gradual character of the evolutionary process, may be rejected. Is there anything that remains of evolution? Yes, if one's aim is less pretentious, if decennia are substituted for centuries and millenia, and if, instead of the whole of civilization or of one broad aspect of it, single cultural features or a few interrelated ones are taken as the point of departure, evolution can still hold its own. There is no longer inevitableness or fixed law, but certain principles or trends of development may well be discerned. In the development of mathematics or philosophy, in the growth of mechanical concepts and inventions, in the division of society into classes or groups of specialized labor, certain fairly regular trends are discernible which stand out amidst the complexities of the historic process and justify a certain degree of foresight and prophecy. These processes may not be in the narrower sense historical, in so far as they do not comprise the historic process in all its complexity, but they are trends, fairly definite lines of development which stiffen the historic process, as it were, and hold it to certain fairly plastic frames or limits.[1]

As one of the phases in the rehabilitation of evolution must be classed the concept of convergence, which takes cognizance of the fact that the development of similarities in cultural features once dissimilar or less similar, can often be observed. Thus, convergence is revealed as a developmental process which must be introduced in place of the older idea of parallelism or, at times, as supplementary to it. As a modern illustration may be cited the development of pragmatism or of behaviorism from various sources and in different fields.[2]

While it was shown that origins and first origins no longer constitute part of the anthropologist's task, a different type of

[1] For further elaboration of this point compare my article on "History, Psychology and Culture," etc., referred to before, particularly section VII, "The Deterministic Historical Category."

[2] See, in this connection, the above-mentioned articles by Lowie on "Convergence," etc., by Boas on "Graebner," etc., and my "Limitations of Possibilities," etc.

reconstruction of origins or early developments is coming to the fore. Such origins are not posited as specific historic happenings placed at the inception of an evolutionary series and fit to explain its nature. No, they are avowedly speculative constructs, based on the knowledge of the present and of the more recent past and projected into remote antiquity in the form of generalized settings, providing room for a considerable variety of specific origins.[1]

With neo-evolutionism, convergence and the rehabilitation of origins, there goes a partial recrudescence of the comparative method. Now that the heat of muckraking enthusiasm has cooled, the critical ethnologist begins to realize that the perspective provided by a comparative command of material constitutes an essential adjunct of the intensive study of specific cultures and areas and that as a guide and check in all interpretative attempts, the comparative outlook cannot be dispensed with. In view of the brilliant results brought by the comparative method in such sciences as, say, anatomy or philology, it would indeed be curious if in social science it should prove inapplicable. The trouble with the comparative method of the evolutionist lay in the uncritical acceptance of material and in the utilization of static units to bolster up a dynamic conception. When buttressed with critical safeguards and applied to purposes which it is fit to serve, the comparative method emerges as one of the most valuable tools of historic and prehistoric research.

Another heuristic concept which seems to hold promise for the future is what may be designated as the idea of relativity in the social sciences. It may be shown that such concepts as accident and determinism in history or the relation of the individual to society or civilization, or even the much-abused concept of progress receive new meaning and can be profitably applied in historic study and interpretation, if the data to which they are applied are limited and definitely circumscribed and the point of view from which they are to be evisaged is clearly defined. Thus shorn of their metaphysical connotations, these concepts, once so sorely

[1] For attempts in this direction, see my "Origin of Totemism" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XIV, 1912) and "Form and Content in Totemism" (*ibid.*, Vol. XX, 1918), Boas' "Origin of Totemism" (*ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, 1916), Lowie's "Family and Sib" (*ibid.*, Vol. XIX, 1919), etc.

overworked, then rejected as empty, artificial, or overabstract, may once more be applied to enhance the systematization and comprehension of social phenomena.[1]

Among the attempts to interpret civilization psychologically, the recent contributions of psychoanalysis deserve a word of warning and commendation. Some of the concepts utilized by psychoanalysis, in this connection, must be categorically rejected, such as the racial unconscious, the recapitulation of racial developments in the lives of individuals, the overzealous identification of the contents of dreams and myth, etc. But, when a psychologist like Freud attempts to interpret magic, taboo, or incest at the hand of a deepened psychological insight and a more definite method, he may still err in particular interpretations, but theoretically his attempts are to be welcomed. It can no longer be doubted that psychoanalysis has stiffened the fiber of psychological method and theory and has opened new avenues of approach to heretofore hidden or merely suspected psychic forces. Of course, the serviceability of these interpretations, as of all attempts to reduce cultural phenomena to the terms of an individual psychology, are useful and permissible in proportion to the generality of the phenomena to be explained. If, on the contrary, the cultural feature analyzed is sporadic in its occurrence, psychological interpretation tends to become speculative and the usefulness of its application in individual instances is reduced by the inevitable intrusion of powerful cultural determinants.[2]

[1] For a somewhat detailed exposition of this standpoint, see my article on "History, Psychology and Culture," etc.

[2] Interesting ideas on this and correlated topics will be found in the following essays: Hocart, "Ethnology and Psychology" (*Folk-Lore*, Vol. LXXV, 1915); "Psychology and Sociology" (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXI, 1915); Wissler, "Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture" (*Science*, Vol. XLIII, 1916); Rivers, "Sociology and Psychology" (*Sociological Review*, Vol. IX, 1916); Haeberlin, "Theoretical Foundations of Wundt's Folk Psychology" (*Psychological Review*, Vol. XXIII, 1916); Kroeber, "The Superorganic" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XIX, 1917); see also discussions by Sapir (*ibid.*, pp. 441–47) and Goldenweiser (*ibid.*, pp. 447–49), "The Possibility of a Social Psychology" (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, 1918) and "The Eighteen Professions" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XIX, 1917); Haeberlin, "Anti-Professions" (*ibid.*); and my "History, Psychology and Culture," etc. Cf. also discussions of this essay by Charles A. Ellwood (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XV, 1918), F. J. Teggart (*ibid.*) and H. D. Sheldon (*ibid.*).

If the curtain upon the future may be lifted for a moment, the desirable as well as the probable outlook for ethnological study seems to lie somewhat as follows. What we want is more synthesis, deeper psychological penetration of material at the hand of linguistic method and psychoanalytic interpretation and further extension of a more critical and relativistic standpoint in historic study. To the historian, ethnology will bring an increasing number of samples of unique civilizations, those of localized primitive groups. To the sociologist, it offers valuable illustrations of a society built on folk-psychological patterns, in which general principles of social interaction and development remain relatively unmarred by the excessive complexity and the rampant individualism of modern civilization. The economist may find in ethnological material a valuable counterpoise to that narrowness of outlook and one-sidedness of interpretation which almost inevitably result from his concentration on the modern world with its temporarily inflated economic determinants. For the curious lay reader, finally, the panorama of ethnology is rich with suggestions of the variety of man's achievement and of the fundamental psychic unity of mankind.

THE HISTORICAL METHOD IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

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ABSTRACT

The Historical Method in the Analysis of Social Phenomena.—The historical method varies in meaning according to the different problems of the various sciences. One meaning has great vitality where the problem is to differentiate and ascertain the cultural and the psychological factors present in all social phenomena. The first step is to determine the cultural factor which is done by the historical method. Only after the cultural factor is known can the psychological factor be understood. The inadequate exposition of the cultural factor is the great weakness of social evolution, biological sociology, and climatic and psychological explanations. *Culture and psychology.* The relationship between culture and psychology is quite complex; and although determining the psychological factor is the last rather than the first step, nevertheless a knowledge of psychology is of great importance and may indeed help in tracing the history. In modern social problems the historical method is as important as in ethnology, although in the former field it tends to become highly statistical and analytical.

The historical method and science.—There are of course many different kinds of methods used in sociology, as indicated in the terms deductive, inductive, objective, classificatory, descriptive, historical, experimental, analytical, statistical, etc., methods, of course, overlapping somewhat and more or less interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly only one of these methods, the historical. I shall not, in reviewing this method, be interested in presenting merely the formal relationships of the historical method to the different types of sociological problems nor to the various other scientific methods; but I shall be concerned in discussing this particular method, if not comprehensively, at least in those relationships where it has greatest vitality.

There are several different meanings to the word historical. In the branch of study known as *history*, we think of the historical method as the description of events by the use of documents, records, and authorities. In *anthropology*, the historical method means the collection and use of cultural facts to explain ethnological phenomena; and it is contrasted with the earlier speculative

methods on the one hand and with the psychological or racial explanations of cultural phenomena on the other. In *economics*, however the historical method is largely descriptive and is contrasted with the analytical. Thus the German historical school is interested in describing the historical development of economic institutions while the English classical economists are primarily concerned with analyzing the economic life into the different economic factors and their various interactions. In *sociology* historical is the term used to characterize the procedure of the historical sociologists, more particularly the method used in studying the history of society, the development of culture, and the evolution of social institutions. In all these fields, then, the historical method has one common element, namely, the collection of cultural facts leading up to the phenomena. In some cases getting the facts means written documents, in other cases it means digging in the soil. Sometimes the method is simply descriptive. In other cases considerable analysis is involved leading to inquiries into causes.

In the usual discussions of history and sociology, the central theme is the merits and possibilities of description on the one hand and law and cause on the other. History is frequently seen as a purely descriptive study while the mission of sociology is said to be the formulation of processes, causes, and laws. This controversy has been ably treated by many writers and it is not proposed to discuss here this important phase of the relationships. We are here primarily concerned with the historical method as it relates to the psychological explanations of social phenomena.

Causes versus historical description.—In that part of sociology that is concerned with the history of social institutions, there has been and is emphasis on recording historical facts. But the collecting of historical data soon led to an inquiry into causes. It is probable that this search for origins and causes was greatly stimulated by Darwin's success in finding the causes of the origins of species as contrasted with the purely descriptive work of earlier biologists. Whatever may have been the reason, the search for causes in sociology seemed to be more pressing or more highly appreciated than mere description and the collecting of facts.

Since frequently the facts and descriptions did not exist, the inquiry into causes became at times speculation about causes.

Interpretations other than historical.—It so happened that explanations of social origins were not sought so much in history as in climate, race and human nature. There was particularly a tendency to account for culture and social institutions in terms of biology and psychology. So historical sociology yielded ground to biological sociology and psychological sociology. The following illustrations are instances of these types of explanations. Climate is said to explain certain differences between the cultures of the Eskimo and of the Pueblo Indians. Buckle tried to show the influence of the aspects of nature upon religion and art. Teggart, following the lead of others, traced the origin of the state in the migrations to the terminals of the river valleys. Race as a cause of culture is as far removed from the historical method as climatic interpretations, as we see in the racial theories from Gobineau to Madison Grant. The Greek culture is due to the genius of the Greek people and the negro culture is low because of the inferiority of the African race. An illustration of the psychological interpretation is Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of religion, which he attributes to the experiences of early man with dream phenomena. Bachhofen, McLennan, and others seek the origin of the clan in the sex instinct. All these foregoing examples of the climatic, racial, and psychological causes of cultural changes are illustrations of interpretations other than historical.

The inadequacy of race and climate as explanations.—As time went on the collection of additional data by the historical method showed many of these racial, climatic, and psychological explanations to be fallacious. Thus researches of field workers have disproved the inevitable priority of the clan over the civil type of organization and the necessary precedence of the matrilineal form of tracing descent. Then followed a development of the critical attitude; and its continued application has resulted in a healthy skepticism of such explanation and a greater appreciation of the historical method. Climatic explanations have been pointed out by Goldenweiser to be quite generally an inadequate explanation of culture; and climate is shown to possess chiefly a limiting

value. Thus the culture on Manhattan Island has undergone the greatest changes within five hundred years. Climate could not account for such changes as the climate is substantially constant over this period. So similarly is race inadequate to account for culture. For instance, there have been great changes in culture in England in the past three hundred years but there could not have been any significant racial change in that time. And in Europe at the present time there are wide divergences in cultural status within areas occupied by the same racial stocks. Culture varies with race constant. Such cases illustrate the inadequacy of race and climate as explanations and suggest the importance of history and culture.

A methodological principle—The value of the historical method is seen most frequently and appears most convincingly in contrast to psychological analyses. The relationships of these two factors have been the theme of discussion in several very able papers, by Kroeber,[1] Lowie,[2] Goldenweiser,[3] Wissler,[4] Rivers,[5] Haeberlin,[6] Ellwood,[7] Hocart.[8]

There are undoubtedly many intricate and complicated relationships between psychology and history. But it seems to me that one conclusion can be drawn that is of the utmost significance and the greatest vitality, despite the fact that the formulation of it seems very simple. This conclusion, which is a methodological rule of guidance, is the principal idea of this paper. It is

[1] A. L. Kroeber, "The Superorganic," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 163–213; "The Eighteen Professions," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 283–89; "The Possibility of a Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIII, 633–51.

[2] Robert H. Lowie, "Psychology and Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 217–29; *Culture and Ethnology*.

[3] A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology, and Culture," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, Vol. XV, Nos. 21, 22; "The Superorganic; a Rejoinder," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 447–49.

[4] Clark Wissler, "Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture," *Science*, XLIII, 193–201.

[5] W. H. R. Rivers, "Sociology and Psychology," *Sociological Review*, IX, 1–13.

[6] H. K. Haeberlin, "The Anti-Professions," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 756–59.

[7] Charles A. Ellwood, "Theories of Cultural Evolution," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIII, 779–801.

[8] Hocart, "Ethnology and Psychology," *Folk Lore*, LXXV, 115–38.

as follows: In segregating and measuring the two factors, the cultural and the psychological, that are present in all social phenomena, the first step is to determine the cultural factor, which is commonly done by the historical method. The psychological factor can only be seen clearly after the cultural factor is known and the historical setting is understood. If the attempt is made to determine the psychological factor before the cultural factor is known, the probability of error is generally so great as to make it untrustworthy.

The value of the historical method in ascertaining the psychological factors.—The point is very clearly shown in the article by Rivers, previously referred to. Westermarck in discussing the institution of blood feud, common among primitive peoples, had attributed it to the motive of revenge. This was a psychological explanation. Rivers, who had done a great deal of field work in Melanesia where the blood feud exists, showed as a result of careful historical work that in many parts of the world and particularly in Melanesia, the blood feud is not accompanied at all by the motive and feeling of revenge. In some cases the practice was largely ceremonial and in others the motives were essentially religious. Whatever the psychological element in a particular instance may have been, the point is, that it could only be revealed after the historical method has shown the cultural factors.

Psychology and history in mother-in-law avoidance.—The mistake of trying to explain a social phenomenon psychologically before a historical account is given is shown by Lowie[1] in discussing Freud's[2] psychological explanation of mother-in-law and son-in-law avoidance rules, a custom widely spread among primitive cultures. Freud's explanation is partly on the basis of conflicts in the proprietary interests in the woman on the part of mother and of husband, and also partly on the *Oedipus complex* motive of the husband and the motive of identification of the mother with the daughter. But Lowie claims this psychological explanation to be inadequate and erroneous, for the reason that in two groups living side by side, the mother-in-law avoidance will be a custom with one group and

[1] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 84–97.

[2] S. Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 19–29.

not with the other. Such is the case, for instance, with the Hopi and the Navaho. The Navaho man avoids his mother-in-law but the Hopi man does not. On what grounds can we credit one set of psychological motives to the Hopi and a different set to the Navaho? We do not know what causes these peculiar rules, but the actual historical investigations in ethnology show that Freud's psychological explanation is, at least, inadequate.

The foregoing illustration of parent-in-law avoidance introduces some interesting points regarding the relations of the cultural and the psychological factors in social phenomena. Lowie's test is a very severe one and needs some examination, for, at first glance, it would seem that the psychological factor cannot help to explain social phenomena except in a relatively small number of instances. His test is that unless the social phenomenon is found in all cultures, it cannot be psychologically determined, for aside from race differences we cannot assume that the peoples with one culture possess one set of psychological factors and that peoples with another culture possess a different set. Only a few such universal social phenomena are found in all cultures, such as marriage, the family, leadership, co-operation, etc. These phenomena are surely psychologically determined because people could not live without them in any culture. But because the foregoing is true we are not justified in saying that, in other social phenomena less universal, psychological influences are not causative factors. Indeed there are two factors, the cultural and the psychological, in all social phenomena, as illustrated by the relationship $x+y=z$ (assuming the proper constants and the relationship to be linear). Now if no matter how we vary x, the culture, we always get some z represensenting the family, then the family is psychologically determined.

Let us consider, however, another relationship. Suppose that whenever we have a culture with matri-local residence we always have mother-in-law avoidance and that whenever we have a culture without matri-local residence we do not find mother-in-law avoidance, then we may say that rules of residence determine the avoidance rules, that is, the social phenomenon is culturally determined. With a variation in x we find always a variation in z. But it must not be forgotten that this is also a psychological cause;

y is still in the equation. Freud's *Oedipus complex* and identification may still be the psychological factor that is a cause of mother-in-law avoidance, which may not be effective except in matri-local residence.

It is important to know, say, that out of many cultural situations only a particular one, matri-local residence, will occasion these avoidance rules. Such information may indeed satisfy the interest of the culture historian. But such a fact, important though it is, may not satisfy the sociologist or the psychologist. It is an incomplete account because it does not tell us about the psychological factor, y, in the equation. It should be remembered that not only is the cultural situation, x, a variable, but the psychological factor, y, is also a variable. Lowie seems to imply that there is only one type of variability in the psychological factor, y, that interests us, namely, the variability by groups. If this variation from one group to another were the only variability of the psychological factor, then we would be right in assuming it a constant except for possible racial differences. But the psychological factor varies in two other regards. It varies by individuals within the group, as, for instance, from mental defect to genius. This type of variation does not apply in the case of mother-in-law avoidance; but it is a very important type of variability in modern social problems. Also the psychological factor varies within a particular individual (and hence in groups of individuals). For instance, each individual possesses a great variety of psychological mechanisms. His psychological equipment consists of many different reflexes, instincts, capacities, etc. And it is interesting to the sociologist, for instance, to know what part of the psychological equipment is a factor in such a strange custom, say, as *couvade*, just as it is important for the sociologist to know what are the motives involved in crime. So we are interested in knowing what particular psychological factors, of the many possible ones, are active in producing parent-in-law avoidances. Is it the *Oedipus complex*, proprietorship, or the identification motive? It is important to point out again that the historical method resulting in a detailed description of the cultural situation would help greatly in ascertaining the particular psychological factors involved. This Freud has not done.

I have dwelt unusually long on the analysis of the avoidance problem, not of course because of the intrinsic importance of the problem itself, but because it seemed to be an illustrative type. The relationships between the cultural factors and the psychological factors in parent-in-law avoidance illustrate the relationships existing in general in problems involving psychology and the historical method. While both the cultural factor and the psychological factor are present in all social phenomena, there are some problems where we are probably much more interested in the historical factors than in the psychological; but there are also some problems where we are greatly interested in the psychological factors.

Our interest in culture is usually great where the psychological factor is least particularistic in its cultural expression. Anger may be expressed in many different ways, such as brawls, games, arguments, dueling, and war. To find the factor of anger in war may not impress us as so important as the discovery of the economic factor. So also with inventiveness, which is apparently not particularistic in its cultural expression. At one age, with steam engine and boat, inventive ability will produce the steamboat. At another age with different cultural elements the same inventiveness will produce, say, paper, gunpowder, or the wireless telegraph. The same inventive ability will not everywhere and at all times produce the same invention; the particular invention will be determined by the status of the existing culture at the time. So there are phenomena where our interest is largely in the historical; other illustrations are, for instance, the rise of capitalism, or the origin of constitutional government, or changes in the modern family.

But there are other problems where we have considerable curiosity in regard to the psychological factor. We may wish not only to know that exogamy had its origins in residence rules and property rights, but we may wish to know more about the psychological factors involved. Similarly, animism is perhaps a result of the cultural development of religion and science, but our understanding is also helped by knowing that the animistic world is the result of the operation of the psychological mechanism of projection.

We must conclude, therefore, that the cultural factor and the psychological factor are both important. Our interest may at one time lie more in ascertaining the cultural factor and at another time more in ascertaining the psychological factor. Our thesis is, however, that the historical method helps us to ascertain both factors. We can seldom be certain about the psychological factor until we know the cultural conditions and the history, and indeed unless we know them we are very likely to go wrong with our psychology. It thus comes about that the historical method is not only the correct procedure for determining the cultural factor but also for ascertaining the psychology of the phenomenon.

Psychology as an aid to the historical method.—Knowledge of the psychological factor, of course, depends also upon a knowledge of psychology. For if we did not know psychology we would not recognize the psychological factor when a historical analysis uncovered it. Thus, a cultural analysis of certain taboos regarding the dead might not reveal to us the true psychological factor unless we had knowledge regarding the ambivalence of the emotions. Indeed it is quite possible that a knowledge of psychology may help us to get the history of the phenomenon. The helpfulness of such a knowledge is certainly true in criminal procedure. A crime is committed and we wish to know who is guilty. In getting the facts and the history of the crime, every detective and criminal lawyer knows the value of motives as guides in the search for facts. But an acquaintance with historical sociology and anthropology led me to think that a great number of mistakes have been made through too much leaning on psychology and too little on history, and that a too facile use of speculative, popular psychologizing is dangerous. It is, apparently, easier to impute motives than to go through the hard work of getting facts.

The historical method and social evolution.—To what fields of sociology is the historical method most applicable? It has already been implied that the historical method is particularly useful where it is desirable to know both the cultural and the psychological factors. It seems to me to be especially valuable in the field of social evolution and in the explanation of the changes in social institutions and their development. Let us look briefly at

the study of social evolution. Most of the unsatisfactory early work on social evolution was defective because the attempt was made to determine causes of development before the facts of development were known. In other words the history was not known. Further pursuit of history naturally tends to remedy such defects.

Furthermore, most of the writers on social evolution seem to assume that culture has evolved because man has evolved, if not in bodily form certainly in mind, that is, mind in its biological aspects. This is a biological interpretation, not a historical interpretation, and it seems to me that biological facts to substantiate the theory are not yet positively known to exist. I do not consider it as proved that there has been any evolution of man or his mind since the last ice age. If this biological stability of man should be true, then we should have to abandon a biological interpretation of social evolution, and fall back on a historical explanation. It is indeed quite conceivable that if the cave men of the last ice age had had as much native mental ability as modern men, then the development of social institutions and the evolution of society would have gone forward very much as it has and no more rapidly. In other words, it is quite conceivable that social evolution can be explained on historical grounds alone. And certainly before accepting the biological account of social evolution, in lieu of lack of biological proof, I should want to know first the historical factors.

Such a position is justified by a consideration of the work done on the evolution of one social institution, namely, the family. Early writers on the family seemed to have assumed that a development from promiscuity through group marriage, the clan, exogamy and pologamy to monogamy, was due to an evolution in stability of the sex instinct. But later historical work shows that no such evolution has taken place. The development of the family need not imply a biological change in the nature of the sex instinct. Certainly the need in social evolution is more history and less biology.

The historical method and race.—Another proper field for the application of the historical method, it seems to me, is the prob-

lems of race and culture. To attribute cultural differences to race is a very common practice. From the point of view of methodology it is immensely difficult to get a technique which will show conclusively and in detail how race is responsible for cultural differences. It is very easy to say that race accounts for cultural differences (much easier than to work out the cultural facts); but to attribute these differences to race is not to prove the proposition. On the other hand, the historical method has frequently shown that differing cultures are due to cultural causes and not racial factors. The point may be illustrated by a consideration of French and American traits. The French are said to be thrifty while Americans are said to be extravagant and wasteful. These traits are sometimes explained as racial traits. It is, of course, very difficult to trace out the psychological mechanisms that made for thrift and extravagance and measure them, whether they be an instinct of accumulation, or self-display, or repression devices. On the other hand the historical factors are very convincing, particularly when we know that Americans and French are not widely differing racial types. The Americans have natural resources abundant in proportion to population and a high development of the industrial revolution, which the French have not. Both these two factors, natural resources and the factory system, lead to the rapid accumulation of much wealth. One would expect, I think, in such different cultural situations that the same people would in one case be thrifty and in another extravagant. In other words, history would seem to account for the phenomenon. Similarly, other problems of race and culture can best be approached by first seeking out the historical facts.

The historical method and modern social problems.—It is not necessary to give further illustrations to show that the historical method is peculiarly applicable to the history of society. To what extent, we may ask, is the historical method applicable to that field of sociology which we designate as modern social problems. There are certainly many social problems to which the historical method is applicable. As illustrative we choose the phenomenon of the I.W.W. The peculiar activities of the members of the Industrial Workers of the World, called sometimes I.W.W.-ism,

have been explained psychologically. Life for those casual laborers who became I.W.W., life without women, without children, without church, without community life, and without organized recreation, is said to lead to a repression of instincts that breaks out in unrest and turmoil so characteristic of the I.W.W. This may be true, but it certainly is not the whole story of the I.W.W. for the casual laborers had been living this sort of life for decades in the logging camps before the Industrial Workers of the World were ever heard of. Why did a psychological situation lead to the I.W.W. after 1905, the date of the origin of the I.W.W., but not before. Evidently some further historical factor must be known before the phenomenon is explained.

Or consider certain questions raised regarding the position of women in society. Are the differences between men and women biological or cultural? There certainly are biological differences but very probably many of the apparent differences are due to cultural factors. Thomas,[1] Coolidge,[2] and others have shown that some of these differences, for instance, are due to man's economic position as holder of the purse strings. Whatever the result may be, it seems the most fruitful procedure first to show historically the cultural factor.

There are, however, in our modern social problems a great many instances where the psychological factor is most important as a methodological guide. Crime is sometimes of this type. Some individuals commit crime because they are psycho-pathological. Their psycho-pathological condition is the cause of the crime, and the particular psychological condition can only be understood from a knowledge of abnormal psychology. In such cases, we have the cultural factor very nearly constant, and the variability lies in the psychological equipment of differing individuals. That is, a large number of individuals will live in the same cultural environment, say the slums, but of those living thus only a certain number will be criminals, and these may be at the lower end of the curve of distribution of psychological traits, which deviations we call psycho-pathological. It is true that in another environment they may

[1] W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society.*

[2] Mary R. Coolidge, *Why Women Are So.*

not have become criminals, but it is also true that in the same environmental situation not all individuals become criminals, but certain psycho-pathological types.

So also with the phenomenon of radicalism, there are psychological factors as well as cultural. The cultural situation of the proletariat tends to produce radicals; but so, also, often does an inner mental conflict, even in individuals who are economically well off. But even in all these cases where the importance of the psychological factors is great we are largely aided in ascertaining the psychological factors by a prior determination of the cultural facts. Consider, for instance, strikes of the modern industrial world. What are the psychological factors that produce strikes? We surely cannot tell without history. Strikes may occur for a great variety of motives; but the particular motives of a particular strike can only be known from a history of the strike.

The historical method as related to the statistical and analytical methods.—In some social problems, the historical method is resolved into other techniques which it is convenient to call by different names, such as the statistical or the analytical. For instance, in studying the business cycle, the problem is not so much to determine whether it is psychologically or culturally determined, nor what the psychological or the cultural factor is; but the problem is to find which of several possible cultural factors are effective and the degrees of their effectiveness. For instance, is the business cycle due to fluctuations in the quantity of money and credit, to overproduction, to fluctuations of crops, or to climatic changes? Such inquiries become highly analytical and when refined become largely statistical. There are many such problems where we are not particularly concerned with the psychological factors, although of course they are present; but the real problem is to measure the relationships of several different cultural factors. Of course, a *history* of business cycles is of great help in tracing the particular economic factors; but history is of most value when it has become analytical and statistical. Thus the historical method tends to grow into statistics and analysis.

Conclusion.—In conclusion, then, the historical method is particularly fruitful in the study of the history of society and is

also valuable in the analysis of social phenomena when we are trying to ascertain the cultural, psychological, biological, and climatic factors. The historical method is usually not only the best first procedure in such analysis, but is a remarkable safeguard against mistakes in diagnosing for the other factors. The historical method, in its extreme simplification, means getting the cultural facts. But such undue simplification does injustice, for instance, to the method as it bears on the complicated relationships of sociology and psychology. The historical method has wide applicability not only to social evolution but to modern social problems. In the latter fields it tends strongly to develop into analytical and statistical methods, with the purpose of discovering causes and laws.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENVIRONMENT AS A SOCIAL FACTOR

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ABSTRACT

The Significance of Environment as a Social Concept.—A thoroughly scientific theory of environmental influences could be developed only after the modern scientific theories of inheritance had rendered confusion of environmental and hereditary determination of conduct and disposition impossible and when an analysis of the psycho-social environment had been made possible by the development of social psychology. The influence of environmental factors falls into three fairly distinct periods of development of the individual, the preconceptual, the prenatal, and the postnatal. *Civilization and character products of environment.* The psycho-social environment exerts its influence primarily in the postnatal stage of development. This type of environmental influence makes itself felt directly through the sense perceptions and indirectly through the process of rational interpretation, and because of its volume and its extensive differentiation, it has come to correct and dominate the instinctive controls. Thus modern social life and personal character are the product primarily of the psycho-social environment. In this way civilization outgrows the dominance of instinct and sets up social norms of its own of an environmental origin.

Before the nineteenth century the inheritance and the environmental methods of the transmission of human and other animal characteristics were not carefully distinguished, even by the most effective thinkers. It is true that the term instinct, or its equivalent, was in use among the Greek philosophic writers, and we find it appearing intermittently in the writings of the metaphysicians and theologians of the Middle Ages. It is to be met with occasionally in Shakespeare's plays and in the philosophic treatises of the English and the continental writers before the nineteenth century, and especially in the books of the Scottish school of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There is a chapter on instinct in one of the compilations of Goldsmith on natural history and another in Herder's masterpiece, and some of the French writers of the Enlightenment make frequent use of the term. The philosophers with a Calvinistic bent appear to have had an especial proclivity for the instinct interpretation of character, along with their more general doctrine of predestination. But the

conception of instinct, as a sort of mental aspect of the general doctrine of heredity, was vague and relatively undefined. Hume, for example, one of the more critical and concrete philosophers of the time, with a decided psychological interest, invokes the term, but he rarely gets down to the use of specific instincts. The conspicuous lack of the earlier ages is a critical definition ofthe term and a classification of instincts which would permit of constructive organization of character and the manipulation of the instincts for the ends of effective social organization and control.

Such concrete and functional thinking had to await the future development of biology. An adequate theory of heredity could not be produced before the appearance of the science of the cell. Following the work on the cell came the rapidly constructive thinking of Darwin in connection with the theory of pangenesis, the vastly richer hypotheses of Weismann and the transforming discoveries of the Mendelians. Hitherto heredity was conceived of merely as a method of transmitting accumulated traits, however these traits may have been obtained; and after the decay of the theological endowment theory and the metaphysical essence theory, so closely allied respectively with the doctrines of a special creator and the hypothesis of natural law, the more common assumption was that the traits came immediately or originally from the environment.

Various theories to account for the storing of these environmentally originated traits for future transmission were worked out. Lamarck's hypothesis now seems crude to us, but it was probably as penetrating as was possible without some detailed knowledge of the structure and functioning of the reproductive cells. Darwin's theory of pangenesis must be considered apart from his earlier gross environmental studies of evolution on the basis of geographic distribution, as an attempt to use the new knowledge of the cell as a basis for the explanation of the assumptions regarding transmission to which his general geographical studies had led him. It was the most complete attempt so far to account for the assumed storing in the reproductive cells of the environmental accumulations known as acquired characters. More recently the mnemic theory and revisions of the Darwinian theory of pangenesis have

aimed at the same lines of explanation. But further developments in the understanding of the cell have led to the rejection of the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters and have substituted the theory of the essential continuity of the germ plasm enunciated by Weismann and the differentiation and specialization of inheritance according to definite ratios of occurrence set forth by Mendel and the Mendelians. Accordingly we cannot account for the environment's influence upon human character and social organization in this simple and direct manner. Any effective explanation must fall back either upon a theory of environmental domination of selection for inheritance on a Mendelian basis, or upon some adequate account of the direct effects of environment upon individual traits and social organization, which results are to be explained as transmitted socially rather than biologically.

It was to be expected that the earlier theories of the transmission of character traits would assume that this transmission was internal or hereditary rather than external or environmental. Such a doctrine found its theoretical justification in the old metaphysical doctrine of natural law, which accounted for things on the assumption of essences or essential principles dwelling within them. On the concrete practical side it had the weight of long observation back of it, the empirical experiences of the stock breeder and the agriculturist who had observed that like produces like. Since the days of the myths it had not been believed, except possibly among the unlearned who gathered their wisdom from the folk traditions, that transformations of type took place in the process of reproduction. What was observed to be true in certain definite processes of inheritance for the plants and lower animals was assumed by analogy to be true for man, even in his mental life and with respect to his moral and social qualities. Because these were observed to follow the principle of "like father, like son," it was assumed that such characteristics were inherited. When the actual mechanism of the process of inheritance was not known, such an assumption could not easily be disputed. The coming of Mendelism, however, has made necessary a far-reaching revision of the old traditions regarding the easy inheritance of all sorts of characteristics, especially of those which are dependent, on the one hand,

upon the external transmission of some ponderable body foreign to the chromosomes, such as a toxin, or hormone, or a bacillus or a bacterium, and, on the other hand, of those traits which are defined in terms of moral and social or other abstract values, instead of in terms of their concrete biological structural organization. With the elimination of these two large classes of traits from the possibility of inheritance under the Mendelian conception of heredity, inheritance as a biological and a psycho-social concept is greatly diminished and that of environment is of necessity correspondingly increased.

The theory of environmental controls in the transmission of traits has developed much more slowly than that of inheritance controls. This is particularly true of the large group of controls lying within the psycho-social environment. The chief reason for this is the greater degree of abstraction which is necessary to perceive the functioning of the environmental controls. The similarity of parent and offspring is easily perceived and since the attention in connection with the explanation of this similarity is directed primarily to the process of reproduction, and since inheritance itself is a concept derived at first empirically from the concept of reproduction, this similarity has been attributed universally to inheritance. But the day of the crude reproduction correlation concept of inheritance has passed, and not even a professor of biology in a reputable university can any longer define heredity as the degree of resemblance between parent and offspring.[1] Inherited traits are something more than those characteristics which come from parents; they are those traits which come from parents in certain ways, that is, through the chromosomes of their reproductive cells.

It has been difficult to concentrate upon the apparent process by which biological traits are produced in the organism by the environment because, frequently, nothing identical or closely similar to the resulting trait is to be found in the environment. Consequently the connection cannot be naïvely assumed, on the basis of likeness, as in the case of the older reproductive concept of inheritance. The connection in such cases can be discovered only by a process of analysis and synthesis, which is often highly

[1] Gamble, *Animal Life*, p. 230.

abstract, and is therefore, in its higher forms, dependent upon the development of the sciences, whose formulas and principles must be employed in the process of abstraction. A large part of the work of modern science, both in its development and in its applications, is concerned with the working out of mechanisms and hypotheses of mechanisms for the production of organic character by dissimilar environmental factors. A science of environmental transmission, therefore, had to await the development of abstract science in general. Even the old empirical theories of environmental influence tend toward the assumption of similarities, on the analogy of inheritance through reproduction, as witness the popular beliefs (once accepted by the learned) regarding pre-natal influence and the doctrine of signaturism in medical magic, as for instance the treatment of smallpox with an infusion of the scarred leaves of liverwort, and the slightly more abstract and sophisticated belief that the loftiness of mountains reproduces itself in a loftiness of the human spirit.

Much more difficult is it to discover environmental causation in the psycho-social environment when the apparently more obvious explanation of inheritance transmission is at hand. The external transmission of mental, moral, and social traits from parent to offspring is much more diffcult to explain to the relatively uninformed in science than is the crude inheritance theory based on the simple reproduction concept. It is a much more abstract concept, the putative relationship is much less direct and much more detailed in content. But with the modern sciences of the cell and Mendelian inheritance and of psychology and sociology before us, both processes become highly abstracted and we can no longer make our choices between the two explanations on the easy basis of naïve probability, but we must choose the more difficult, and the more accurate, course of relative critical demonstrability. The demonstration of the environmental transmission and production of psycho-social traits is only now in process. It has lagged somewhat behind the development of the Mendelian theory of inheritance and is a necessary correlate to it; for the theory of environmental transmission must take care of what the Mendelian hypothesis cannot cover.

In a large sense the concept of environment is more inclusive than that of heredity, for after all it is the organization of the environment which selects the so-called successful variation or mutation for survival instead of extinction. Whatever may account for the change in the chromosome which gives rise to the new trait—and there is no reason to suppose that this producing condition or cause is not environmental, where it is not produced by fertilization—all traits that would survive must demonstrate their capacity to aid the containing organism in a successful adjustment to whatever environment exists for it. Heredity does not create its environment, although it helps to modify the future environment. In fact, whole races or species are eliminated in short order when cataclysmic changes occur in the environment, simply because the mechanism of inheritance cannot change rapidly enough to cause the type to conform to the new environmental demands. Consequently, heredity may be said to have developed in the service of the environment as a method of stabilizing the type of organisms to a certain mean adjustment to the environment, in order that it may not fluctuate to the point of self-extinction through radical and random responses to untypical phases of the environment, while at the same time it maintains such continuity of existence as to preserve past selected accretions of value to the type and retains sufficient flexibility through environmental selection of variations that the type will not perish because of divergence from the main line of environmental development. Thus the type is able to become much richer in content or complexity and specialization of function without undergoing extinction, because its life-history has been transferred from the individual exclusively, to the race. It is possible that it was because of such a situation and need that reproduction came to be mediated through the specialized reproductive cells rather than through fission or budding, thus giving a greater weight to the race life as against the individual's life-history in determining the character or capacity for adjustment of the offspring, while at the same time providing, through pairing and fertilization, for a greater degree of stable variability within the category of heredity than could be secured through fission. However that may be, heredity

cannot set environment aside; it can only stabilize its fluctuations, eliminate or repress the minor and short-time ones, and correlate them into longtime pressure processes, corresponding to the type history, while adjustments within the heredity are made to the fluctuating environment with such a degree of resistance as to preserve the functional continuity of the type without destroying its existence altogether from rigidity.

Recent biological, psychological, and sociological studies bearing on the question of environment have acquainted us with certain facts which can be summarized here only in the briefest manner. In those fields where the environmental controls are purely physical or biological, we must be especially brief. First, we may consider an example of the influence of the physical environment. "The French botanist Bonnier divided a common dandelion (*Taraxacum vulgare*), and grew one half in the lowlands and the other half in the mountains. While the former grew into a tall and slender plant, the half raised in the Alpine heights grew into a plant of very different appearance, with longer roots, much shorter stems, smaller and more hairy leaves, larger and brighter flowers. Each variety will produce its like in its own locality; but seeds of the Alpine plant will produce only the lowland form if sown there, and vice versa, the seeds of the lowland form will grow into the Alpine form in the mountains. Moreover, if either form be transplanted into the other region, it will soon grow into the variety characteristic of its new habitat."[1] If the variety of *Primula sinensis* with red flowers "be grown in a hothouse at a temperature of between 15 degrees and 20 degrees centegrade, it will yield white flowers. Brought back to a normal temperature it will again bring forth red flowers. Which modification appears depends on the stimulus."[2] The differential influence of feeding, a biological environmental control, upon the development of the organism can be equally strikingly illustrated. "The egg from which the queen [bee] is produced is the same as the other eggs, but the worker nurses, by feeding the larva only the highly nutritious bee-jelly, make it certain that the new bee shall become a

[1] E. S. Goodrich, *Evolution*, p. 36.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

queen instead of a worker."[1] It is claimed by some physiologists that the feeding of thyroid to animals during pregnancy will cause them to give birth to young with a very large thymus gland.[2] Whether this be true or not, it is a matter of observation that the mother's diet influences the development of the child. Of a similar influence upon offspring and upon the generating organisms themselves are the numerous toxins, drugs and narcotics, and hormones from the ductless glands, the supply of which depends so largely upon the character and regulation of the biological, or even physical, environmental controls. To be sure the inheritance factor is not absent from such developmental processes. It exists as the long-time correlation or standardization of environmental values referred to above. But the differential characteristics, those which give definition and character to these types in distinction from other types, are due to differential environments. Such differential characterization is as much as can be claimed for any set of factors. Both heredity and environment are always present in the shaping of every higher organism.

With respect to the psycho-social environmental controls, recent abstract analysis of social processes has uncovered much material illustrative of the working of these factors upon the individual character and the social organization. The whole subject of the physiology, the neurology, the psychology, and the sociology of habit formation is pertinent here. The analysis of the mechanics of suggestion imitation, rational imitation, and original rational adaptation, begun about half a century ago, and the newer data of the psychoanalysts and Freudians, have given us the external and much of the neuro-psychic mechanisms for the transmission of traits from one person to another and the development of consequent differential traits in any individual as the result of definite psycho-social environmental pressures. When we come to realize the significance of these factors for environmental control we shall attribute a new significance to the social psychology of the Tarde-Rossian type, the reputation of which has recently suffered somewhat from the biological preoccupation which has dominated even

[1] Jordan and Kellogg, *Animal Life*, p. 153.

[2] L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, p. 281.

the minds of the sociologists during the last ten or twenty years. These data have already been applied very successfully to practical ends in connection with education, politics, business, and literature. Advertising and propaganda have become largely phases of social psychology, as indeed has the writing of successful scenarios and novels. Extension work, political campaigns, the dissemination of culture and the encouragement of the fine arts can be carried on with a maximum of success and economy only when these factors are duly recognized and utilized. Special sciences, such as educational psychology, the psychology of advertising, the psychology of politics, are growing up around the principles of social psychology, which is itself fundamentally the science of social control through the organization and manipulation of the psycho-social environment.

Such, in the most general terms, being the significance of environment for the developmental process, we may now turn to a somewhat schematic analysis of the types and incidents of environmental influences, that is, to the mechanics of environmental transmission at the various stages of individual development. Obviously we shall not have occasion in this paper to offer an account of the mechanics of hereditary transmission.

For convenience, the individual developmental process may be divided into three stages, which we may call respectively the preconceptual, the prenatal, and the postnatal, corresponding specifically to (1) the history of the parent reproductive cells before the point of conception or fertilization, (2) the period of the development of the organism from the point of fertilization to the point of birth, approximately nine months later, and (3) the development and history of the organism from the point of birth to the point of dissolution or death, when it ceases to function as living organisms function. Until fairly recently whatever happened to the organism in either of the first two of these stages was attributed to inheritance and the developments in the third stage were assigned sometimes to inheritance and sometimes to environmental influence. Gradually, however, the reputed importance of environment in the third stage has increased at the expense of inheritance. We have also come to recognize that environmental pressures are

frequently exerted long before birth, in fact, in some instances, before conception, and inheritance is fixed, not all along the line from the point of conception to that of birth, but at one point only, that of the fertilization of the ovum by the sperm. Whatever the newly formed organism, which begins life as a single cell, receives from the parents through their fertilized reproductive cells by way of inheritance, is fixed and determined when the chromosomes of the one parent cell unite with those of the other parent cell. These inheritance determiners thus formed will control the inherited organization of the offspring's organism throughout the remainder of its life and will determine its development. But no new determination of character can come from inheritance channels, for the parent cells have acted once for all. All new and additional traits must come from the environment, either the prenatal or the postnatal, as modifications of the predisposed line of hereditary development; and these modifications are legion. They begin to occur immediately after fertilization and increase in volume and importance until anywhere from the twentieth to the fortieth year, or later, of postnatal life, for persons of normal intelligence, and for a shorter period for the feeble-minded, depending on the degree of their defect.

If we consider the sources from which these environmental forces or pressures arise we may designate them as three. First, the physical environment, such as objects which act upon the organism directly, producing traumatisms, modifications of structure, or displacements of the position of the organism as a whole, and also those forces which act in the main indirectly upon the organism, usually by conditioning its development and its functioning, including temperature, humidity, altitude, contour, soil and mineral resources, electrical condition of the atmosphere, and the like. Secondly are to be mentioned the factors of the biological environment, which are difficult to distinguish functionally from those of the physical environment, and which often operate in the two ways above described. In addition, they may operate much more intimately upon the organism, because they, in certain of their forms, constitute the food supply and thus operate directly and indirectly from within the organism as conditioners of its

development and functioning. Also, certain other forms of the biological environment enter the organism as guests and perform radical functions of transformation of either a normal or a pathological character. Thus the great host of germ diseases, not to stress the disorders caused by parasites or the beneficial functionings of certain bacilli, constitute no inconsiderable portion of man's biological environment, in this case operating within the organism itself. Furthermore, both the biological and the physical environments—and even the psycho-social environment, which we have not yet discussed—may set up certain functional and structural dispositions or slants of the organsim, more or less permanent in character, which inevitably condition further biological functioning and, more important still, help to form its spiritual life, that is, the organism's functioning through mental, moral, and social adjustments, or the attitudinal and valuational adjustments which it makes to the outside world. Thus a personality may be rendered sensitive, irritable, egotistical, altruistic, self-depreciative, constant, or fickle, and a host of other things which may be fairly adequately expressed in the everyday language of men. Such relatively constant slants or dispositions of the organism, centering more often, perhaps, in the nervous system than in the gross physiological organization, may properly be regarded as a third type of biological environment, in this case residing wholly within the organism and affecting primarily, although not wholly, the personality as such.

Finally, we may mention the factors of the psycho-social environment, which condition the development and functioning of the organism, in addition to the two types of environmental factors mentioned above. The psycho-social environment consists of all those associated activites of men, in actual process or hypothecated in fiction or theory, which are apprehended in the consciousness or the subsconsciousness of people and which are products of the psychical processes of the actors. Under this environmental category must be included, among other things, all the traditions of men coming down even from the most primitive times, the myths and folk tales, superstitions, the beliefs in religion and aesthetics, in morals and in the practical and political conduct

of life; the written creeds, the constitutions, statutory enactments, administrative rules and diplomatic formulaes and interchanges; the daily newspaper, literature of all the manifold kinds and voluminous extent; the speeches of agitators and the partisan plea of the trusted representative of the sovereign people, the resolutions of committees of protest and the prayers of mincrities and majorities to their governments, of the devout and the wicked to their divinities; the voice and aims of assemblies, of crowds and other temporary organizations, of publics, and of institutions. In fact, all the multitudinous sources of mental stimulation which in our civilization are available for the organization and the direction of thought, in particular the printed sources, which have so multiplied in recent times as to surpass by far in volume and influence all other sources put together, except daily talk and random interchange of opinions, and which constitute a vast magazine from which men extract their opinions, imbibe their attitudes and draw the data for their constructive thinking, in so far as they are trained for this process, go to make up the surpassing richness of the psycho-social environment.

This environment has become so rich and varied in content and so strategically powerful that it dominates and transforms the instinctive nature of man in the early years of his individual development. For the early savage, who possessed a comparatively insignificant psycho-social environment, instinct was very largely in the saddle. What meager technique, traditions, and beliefs had been handed down to him from the past by way of halting oral language held powerful sway over his imagination, but the volume of these was not sufficient to modify greatly the operation of his instinctive urges. But the history of men has been the story of the growth of institutions, with their rich content of tradition and customs, belief and ritual, suggestion and rational interpretation. which have now come to have an immense volume and which are clamped down upon the developing child from the cradle and mold him after their own images, for good or evil. The instinct is but the beginning of his mental life, and even this has been largely selected into a vestigial character by the social institution of post-natal care, so that it does not function even in the earliest infancy

unmodified by environmental pressures. The delayed instincts never are able to appear in their native simplicity and operate uncontrolled by the conventions and other social valuations and standardizations which take hold of and dominate the fields of social action in which they are to function. For example, the sexual instincts and the maternal instincts find socially evaluated and prescribed grooves ready made for them when they appear and here they must be kept, or the organism will pay the penalty of conflict or disorganization. The fields of activity in which they function socially—reproduction and child care—are now standardized and controlled, as far as the minds of rational and socialized individuals are concerned, long before these delayed instincts appear. In fact, the psycho-social environment embodies a great mass of tradition, public opinion, propaganda, and literature, scientific and other, prescribing how these activity complexes must function. Mere instincts cannot be permitted to overturn this laboriously, often carefully, built-up system of psycho-social environmental controls. Not even the purely vegetative instincts connected with food and respiration are permitted to retain their pristine simplicity, but are disturbed and modified or suppressed by modern cookery and the other arts and mutilations of life. The psycho-social environment masters us all; perhaps not as the philosopher would desire, but certainly in ways which tax the imagination of the ordinary man.

The results of this discussion of the sources of environmental pressures may be stated graphically in the following partial and incomplete classification.

I. Subjective Environmental Factors (those operating from within the organism or from the parent organism in close contact, operating directly upon the individual)
   1. Impacts and traumatisms
   2. Drugs and Narcotics
   3. Germ infections
   4. Toxins
   5. Hormones and vitamines

II. Objective Environmental Factors (those operating from sources outside the organism and in the main indirectly through the conditioning of the life processes, but sometimes directly)

6. Physico-geographic environment
   1) Contour and surface: (*a*) Rivers, (*b*) Seas, (*c*) Mountains, (*d*) Mountain passes, (*e*) Deserts, (*f*) Plains, (*g*) Plateaus, (*h*) Swamps, (*i*) Forests (*j*) Distance
   2) Altitude
   3) Light
   4) Temperature
   5) Humidity
   6) Electrical conditions
   7) Succession of seasons
   8) Inorganic resources: (*a*) Iron and other metals, (*b*) Coal and other fuel minerals, (*c*) Water, (*d*) Plant foods, especially nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus
7. Organic factors—fauna and flora
   1) Animals for food
   2) Animals for power
   3) Plants for food and healing
   4) Plants for clothing and shelter
   5) Parasites
   6) Germ life
8. Psycho-social Factors
   1) Psychic organizations
      (*a*) Traditions, (*b*) Conventions, (*c*) Beliefs, (*d*) Creeds, (*e*) Dogmas, (*f*) Prayers and spells, (*g*) Folk superstitions, (*h*) Myths, (*i*) Theologies, (*j*) Cultural ideals, (*k*) Artistic and aesthetic principles, (*l*) Codes, (*m*) Constitutions, (*n*) Proverbs and folk wisdom, (*o*) Scientific hypotheses, (*p*) Scientific experimental data and laws, (*q*) Propaganda
   2) Social activity organizations: (*a*) Language, (*b*) Customs, (*c*) Rituals, (*d*) Institutions: (domestic, economic and industrial, religious, moral, aesthetic, political, legal, cultural, educational, military) (*e*) Business enterprises and corporations, (*f*) Cultural clubs and organizations, (*g*) Religious bodies and denominations, (*h*) Military organizations, (*i*) Political parties and clubs, (*j*) Administrative and executive organizations, (*k*) Educational activities and organizations, (*l*) Art organizations and activities, (*m*) Domestic activities, (*n*) Reform associations, (*o*) Criminal and vicious activities and organizations

It will be noted that the items or factors here emumerated are classified under two general headings, according as they are primarily subjectively placed and act in the main directly upon the organism and as they are objectively placed and act primarily and

for the most part indirectly upon the organism. This twofold division is not altogether mutually exclusive in its arrangement, for the classification is a two-dimensional one. It seeks to list the factors according to developmental traits as well as the types of environmental influence operating upon the organism in each of those stages. Thus, generally speaking, Part I is intended to cover the preconceptual and the prenatal stages, while Part II covers the postnatal stage of development. Even within each general group there is some slight overlapping of the terms of the classification, but this overlapping has been avoided in so far as was possible. No claim is made as to completeness of classification, although it is hoped that it approaches fairly well toward completeness of outline. Any one of the terms might be expanded into numerous subdivisions and in the subdivisions themselves a great many co-ordinate terms might be added. Its purpose is primarily to illustrate the range of the sources and the extent of the environmental influences of a definite sort which operate upon man and his institutions.

We may now take up a concrete application of this classification to the different stages of development, with a view to determining at least a rough approximation of the environmental factors at work upon the organism in each stage. For purposes of clearness we may profitably start with the pre-natal stage. The environmental factors which may be assumed to be at work in this stage are, in part at least, as follows:

I. General Physical
   1. Impacts
   2. Muscular strains
   3. Traumatisms
   4. Temperature
   5. Nutritional elements

II. Special Physical
   1. Poisons, such as lead, arsenic, strychnine, etc.
   2. Drugs and narcotics, such as alcohol, morphine, etc.

III. Biological—of external origin
   1. The acute infectious diseases, such as syphilis, tuberculosis, typhus, and typhoid

IV. Biological—from the mother
   1. Toxins arising from: (*a*) Germ infections, (*b*) Drugs and narcotics. (*c*) Fatigue in extreme cases, (*d*) Undernutrition in extreme cases (*e*) Malnutrition in extreme cases, (*f*) Shock and strain in extreme cases
   2. Effects from the above in shortening the period of gestation and bringing on premature labor.

V. Biological—from the mother
   1. Normal or abnormal vital functioning of the mother
   2. Hormones from the ductless glands
   3. Vitamines from the bloodstream (possibly)

Under the first of these groups belong the various injuries done to the child while in utero. These may occur as the result of falls, attempts at abortion through the use of physical methods or drugs, or various accidents due to improper eating or drinking, excitement, shock or illness of the mother, where the cause is purely physical and does not fall under one of the other headings. Whether such poisons as arsenic, lead and other chemicals (second group), some of which may be taken into the mother's system from her contact with the industrial arts, act directly upon the child from the blood stream or indirectly through the abnormal stimulation of the mother's muscular system, glands, and secretions, they may have very marked effects upon the unborn child. Some pathologists deny that drugs may be carried from the mother to the child through the blood stream in such quantities as to produce an addiction in the nerve tissues of the child, while others cite cases of such supposed occurrence. In one such case the child is supposed to have been born with a morphine addiction taken over from its drug-using mother and was successfully treated for this addiction. If such effects are possible from drugs and narcotics, the way is opened up for the explanation, purely in terms of prenatal pressures, of what was formerly regarded, even among pathologists, as inherited alcoholism, tolerance for nicotine, etc., but which we now recognize, in the clearer light of the Mendelian theory, could not be such. In any case, the indirect effects of these poisons upon the child through the organism of the mother is sufficiently marked.

That a few of the germinal infections may penetrate from the mother to the relatively protected child is well enough known to

medical science and the social worker concerned with child welfare. The more conspicuous cases have brought this fact to the attention, although study of it has only begun in interest. The most dangerous of these germ infections, and the one most studied in its effect upon the unborn child, is syphilis, more than one-half of the stillbirths being currently attributed to this single cause. The child may be infected with such a disease, the infection run its course, and the child die before its birth; or it may reach the end of term, or it may be prematurely born, leaving the disease to run its course afterward. Even in the case of comparative recovery from a severe prenatal infection the delicate and incompletely developed tissues of the child, especially those of the nervous system, are likely to be permanently injured, with the result that the child is handicapped for life by some special organic weakness, mental defect, or glandular derangement which makes its organism unduly susceptible to attacks from disease germs, toxins, shock, or other depressive influences in the postnatal period of development. It is this third group of prenatal factors which is responsible for most of the degenerative influences upon the child in utero, unless possibly we should except the toxins arising from this and other sources. The effect of the other factors is primarily to shorten the term of embryonic growth with all the consequences for the postnatal development of the child which this involves.

Doubtless one of the most prolific sources or forms of prenatal pressures from the environment is that of the toxins generated in the mother's organism and transmitted to the child. Such toxins may arise from germ infections, from the operation of poisons, drugs and narcotics upon the mother's tissues, and possibly from excessive fatigue, undernutrition, malnutrition, and shock and strain. Such toxins have been produced experimentally in at least the cases of undernutrition and malnutrition, and it is very possible that they are produced under ordinary conditions of organic growth in certain cases. These toxins may operate directly upon the child's tissues, producing degenerative conditions, or they may operate in some indirect manner, such as by influencing the secretions of the ductless and other glands. I have attempted to arrange the sources of these toxins in something like the order of

their frequency and importance. Some of the more conservative physiologists and pathologists might even deny that some of the conditions placed toward the end of this list could produce toxins which would affect the child. The possibility of adverse effect upon the child from all of these sources included under Group IV is very great and constitutes a strong argument for the careful hygienic regimen to which thoughtful mothers subject themselves during pregnancy and especially for the protection of working women against the adverse effects of industrial occupation. The effect of the last four of these factors listed under Group IV is more frequently to bring on labor prematurely than to produce a pathological condition of the embryo's tissues or directly to disarrange the process of its development. So far we have spoken only of the pathological prenatal environmental effects. Another group of prenatal environmental influences, in the main normal and helpful to the development of the foetus, deserve mention. These are the hormones developed from the mother's ductless glands and the vitamines which may possibly be taken from her blood stream. In a general way, also, the normal functioning of the mother with respect to her digestion, circulation, glands, mental condition, emotional poise, and the like, constitutes at least an indirect if not a direct physiological environmental condition for the proper development of the child. This important group of environmental influences ordinarily escapes our attention because it is the more usual condition. It will be segregated into its several aspects and measured quantitatively only as science advances to a completer analysis of the physiology, psychology, and sociology of reproduction as they pertain to the maternal organism as a whole, rather than as they pertain merely to the processes of copulation, fertilization, embryonic development and parturition, on which processes it has been largely concentrated up to the present. Physiology has already discovered the hormones and the vitamines and has developed theories regarding their origin and functioning. Some beginnings have been made in the application of this knowledge to the study of the prenatal environmental controls of the child. An instance has already been mentioned in the case of the supposed influence of thyroid feeding to the mother upon the size of the

thymus gland in the child. Definite observations have shown enlargement of the thyroid in the child as a result of the maternal secretion. Also the relative enlargement of the foetal uterus and the occasional secretion of milk in the infant's breasts at the time of birth indicate that the maternal hormones under the stress of great activity have had their effect upon the glands and organs of the child. Is it not reasonable to suppose that, even though the foetus normally manufactures its own hormones, it is not unaffected by the general state of the maternal secretions and its development is somewhat conditoned thereby? As yet accurate methods of measuring such effects have not been worked out, nor has the subject itself been adequately studied. Also, we may suppose that without a proper supply of vitamines, which can come only through the nourishment supplied by the mother, the child cannot develop the proper neural and muscular tone and will be deficient in resistance to infections and incapable of making normal advances in growth. But at the present time this effect is impossible to demonstrate because of the lack of a method by which the actual operation of the vitamines upon the foetus can be detected and measured.

The factors affecting the unborn child, according to Professor Richard E. Scammon, of the University of Minnesota Medical School, may be classified and characterized as follows:

1. *Sex.*—This is the largest factor affecting weight and differential development.

2. *The activity of the mother during pregnancy.*—The greater the activity of the mother the less the weight of the child.

3. *The age of the mother.*—The older the mother the larger the child until the mother has attained the age of thirty-five.

4. *The number of previous pregnancies.*—The number of pregnancies increases the weight of the child until the third or fifth pregnancy, independently of the age of the mother.

5. *The germ infections, such as syphilis, tuberculosis, typhus, and possibly typhoid.*—These infections affect not only the weight of the child but also the normality of its development in other ways, as explained above.

6. *Race.*—The peoples of northwestern Europe are heaviest at birth, and the weight decreases the farther south and east, generally speaking.

7. *Social condition of the mother.*—This and the next two factors are deceptive. The real factor here is probably the greater activity of the mother, more mothers having to work at exhausting tasks the poorer their social condition.

8. *Illegitimacy.*—Illegitimate children are lighter than those born in wedlock. This factor, however, reduces to the younger age of the mother, the fact that the child is usually the first born, and the fact that the mother is ordinarily a working girl.

9. *The seasonal incidence.*—Although season is supposed to have a weight correlation, none was found in the study of 1,900 cases in Minneapolis by Professor Scammon and Miss Brinton.

10. *Length of period between pregnancies.*—It is possible, although it is not definitely confirmed, that the longer the period between pregnancies the heaveier is the weight of the new borm.

All of these factors except the first and the sixth, sex and race, are clearly environmental rather than hereditary. This classification, it will be noted, is of a general statistical character, stating results merely. It does not attempt to arrive at the physiological and other internal environmental conditions which produce the results listed under the several categories; such was roughly attempted in the preceding classification and analysis of prenatal environmental factors. However, it presents a striking argument for the importance of the environmental conditions of the prenatal development of the child. According to Professor Scammon these factors carry over in their effect on development for a longer or shorter time in the postnatal period.

The preconceptual environmental factors need retain us very briefly. Strictly speaking, the child does not exist before the point of conception, but the material out of which it is to be formed by the union of the two parental reproductive cells does exist and is subject to environmental influences. It must be remembered that the reproductive cell consists of two parts, the cytoplasm or outer part, and the nucleus or inner part, which carries the chromosomes. According to the Mendelians, whom we must

accept as authoritative at the present moment, the inheritance of the offspring is determined in the chromosomes which unite, after a process of division and elimination, and enter into the new one-celled organism which is the beginning of the child. But this new being does not start life with merely nucleus and chromosomes; it has body also, so to speak. That is, the new cell, being made up of both cytoplasm and nucleus, receives cytoplasm from both parent cells, although, because of the greater supply available, it receives more cytoplasm from the mother's cell. Whatever may have happened in an environmental way to this cytoplasm now becomes a part of the body endowment of the new individual. Whatever is thus transmitted from parent to offspring through the cytoplasm of the reproductive cell obviously is not inherited, for it is not carried in the chromosomes.

What environmental factors may operate between parent and offspring in this way? The most general answer would be that anything which can be transferred from the somatic to the reproductive cells through general and ordinary physiological processes may be thus transmitted to the child environmentally. It must not be forgotten that the reproductive cells, although they are self-generative through fission, must draw their nutriment from the somatic secretions and fluids; that is, they ingest the substance of somatic cells. They are also subject to the general temperature conditions of the somatic portions of the organism and they are to a certain extent subject to contact with wandering foreign bodies coming from the somatic organism. May we not safely say, therefore, that the parental reproductive cells may possibly be affected by nutritional elements, hormones, vitamines, temperature, occasional infecting germs, toxins generated within the parental organism, and possibly by drugs and poisons taken into the parent's organism from without? If we grant this conclusion it is obvious that the range of the environmental influence in the preconceptual period upon the future offspring is very considerable, although it is markedly less in the number of items and generally in the influence of each item than in the prenatal period of development, because of the more effective isolation of the reproductive cells.

The question may arise—I have met it frequently—as to how we can distinguish this imputed preconceptual environmental influence from heredity. May not, after all, so far as we know, these factors which are supposed to have been carried in the cytoplasm or in its environment have entered the nucleus and have affected the chromosome determiners and thus have produced a hereditary effect? There are tests for this supposition. In the first place, mere entrance of one of the factors into the nucleus, supposing that it could be transmitted from this point, would not render it hereditary. It would have to become an integral part of some chromosome to influence the heredity in the Mendelian sense. It is not likely that a disease germ or a toxin would be incorporated into a chromosome and thus reproduce itself continuously in future generations. Also it would be necessary for such a trait to reappear according to some definite ratio in future generations to be regarded as hereditary. More important still is the fact that the introduction of a disease germ into the nucleus would in all probability destroy the whole nuclear content and thus render reproduction from that cell impossible. The introduction of toxins in large quantities would probably have the same effect. But the toxins could scarcely reproduce themselves in the nucleus, even if they could be incorporated into the chromosomes without destroying the latter; for the supply would soon disappear and this source of inheritance of toxins would prove ineffectual. Finally, it must be remembered that for any such factors to be inherited they themselves, and not their products or results, would have to be transmitted through the chromosomes. If we admit, as seems possible, that some or all of these factors, especially the nutritional elements, temperature, toxins, and hormones, might, under some conditions, so influence the chromosomes as to change their nature and thus modify the inheritance, still it would not result that these factors would thereby come to be inherited. Only their effects would be inherited. For example, Professor Tower's experiments with potato beetles seem to show that the permanent mutations which he produced did not involve the transmission of the agent with which he produced them.

The major purpose of this tentative analysis of the environmental factors at work in the prenatal and the preconceptual

stages of development has been to show how large a range of traits appearing in the new-born child, which were formerly attributed to inheritance, must be explained in terms of environmental causation. The old notion, still popularly current, that inheritance covers everything received in the organism up to the point of birth, must go by the board, while room is made for the operation of environmental forces throughout the period of the development of the organism and even before that development begins as a new entity. A few of the traits which may now be attributed, in part at least, to these early environmental influences, which formerly were assigned exclusively to inheritance under the older theories, are feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, cretinism, and various other psychopathic and neuropathic conditions, rickets, syphilis (still called hereditary in many serious works by biologists and pathologists), malformations, including such characteristics as acephaly and the cyclopean eye, nervous lesions, digestive and nutritional derangements of early infancy and childhood, glandular derangements, the so-called diatheses, and the like.

Turning now from the prenatal and the preconceptual periods of development to the postnatal period, we find that all these factors are at work here also. But they operate in somewhat different ways, because the sources of infection and contact are no longer through the prenatal reproductive cells and the organism of the mother. In fact each of the categories of factors outlined under the discussion of prenatal environmental influences finds itself greatly expanded to include numerous other sources and types of influence and infection not here listed. For example, the number of germ diseases to which one is liable in the postnatal period is vastly multiplied. The same is true of the chances for toxic influence; for each organism, taking its own food and drink and coming in contact with various substances which may be taken into the body in a variety of ways, is able to manufacture toxins on a large scale. The liability to drug addictions and to poisons from without is also greatly increased. Impacts, muscular strains, the variety of nutritional modifications, temperature modifications, increase almost without limit. Likewise the self-acting organism manufactures its own hormones and the function-

ing of its ductless glands is conditioned largely by the strains imposed upon them from the organism's activities and the toxins and foreign bodies introduced into it. Vitamines are taken directly into the organism through its food supply, and the organism's general condition has a more direct effect upon the development of functional and structural traits. In addition to this increased operation of the same factors found in the two earlier periods of development, are many additional ones which act indirectly and often at long range, but nevertheless act very effectively. These we have classified generally as physico-geographic, climatic, organic, and psycho-social. We need not, at this point, expand these general rubrics into their subdivisions, nor is there space for an analysis of their effects upon individual character and social organization. Besides, this aspect of environment has been recognized in the more recent textbooks on sociology and is beginning to receive fairly adequate treatment there. The space given to it here must not be held to indicate its relative importance.

The most significant type of environmental factors operating upon man in the postnatal period of development is the psycho-social, consisting of all the psycho-physical contact and cultural content phenomena of modern society. The psycho-social environment operates with any degree of directness only in the post-natal period of development, because only here are the senses which can mediate it at the service of the child. This type of environment is not limited to the institutions, although they constitute the larger part of it; it embraces in addition all those less well-organized and less permanent forms of social organization and social value foci which influence human conduct and thinking. To name these institutional and non-institutional environmental controls in detail would require more space than this paper occupies. Nor is it necessary to name them, since they are generally familiar in outline to everyone interested in the structure of society. To describe their working in detail would, obviously, involve the writing of a treatise on social psychology. We may therefore content ourselves for present purposes with the omission of the same sort of semi-detailed analysis of the psycho-social environmental factors as was made of those environmental factors operating in the preconceptual

and the prenatal stages of development, and devote our time to an account of the methods by which the psycho-social environment can operate in the building up of individual attitudes and social traits.

Before the development of Mendelism, with its specific definition of inheritance traits and the reduction of them to unit characters, the concept of the instincts was for the most part relatively vague and writers on the subject had more to say about the working of "instinct" than about the operation of the specific "instincts." But the concrete turn given to the whole question of inheritance by the propagation of the Mendelian laws stimulated the psychologists to work out unit psychic characters on the analogy of unit anatomical characters, and there have appeared as a consequence numerous classifications of instincts within the last twenty years or less. One may get the full force of this contrast in the methods of attacking the problem of psychic inheritance by comparing Henry Rutgers Marshall's *Instinct and Reason*, published in 1895, with McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, or Thorndike's *Original Nature of Man*, published in 1908 and 1913 respectively. The attempt to reduce the concept of instinct to a concrete working basis was wholly praiseworthy, but the method of doing it was not very scientific, when viewed from the standpoint of a biological definition of instinct. Writers of the McDougall type, who still represent the prevailing method, made the mistake of defining instinct in terms of the functional value of the activity for society instead of in terms of its structure. Now any biologist would know that it is structure which is inherited. It is not possible to inherit a social or moral value, because it is not possible to inherit an abstraction. The result of the McDougall method of isolating instincts was to bring together the most dissimilar and constantly changing types of activities under one general heading and give them a common name because they possessed a common social or moral value. In this way groups of acts which had no internal structural unity were spoken of as unit characters, and the same act might be included in a number of activity complexes of different social values and functions and, therefore, be regarded as different instincts. The fact is that not instincts, but acquired habit com-

plexes, were being isolated, and even these were not constant in their structural organization, but only in their social value and functioning. Psychologists of the type of Thorndike have realized this and have attempted to break up the habit complexes named after their functional social values into the concrete structural original activity processes which constitute them and name them accordingly. This has been successful in part only, but the results so far have uncovered two facts of value to the social psychologist. One is to the effect that the preponderant portion of the great activity complexes, formerly misnamed instincts, are acquired elements received from the psycho-social environment, and the other fact is that the psycho-social environment is more powerful in forming the character and attitudes of the individual than is man's original inherited nature.[1] In primitive society and the early life of the infant, instinct may have been more powerful than habit, although this assumption may be questioned in the case of the infant of today, because another animal with well-developed habits of child-care—its mother—makes good its lack of instinctive adjustment to the life-processes. As pointed out above, the volume of environmental controls has now become so great that the instincts which remain complete in the heredity of the human child rarely have an opportunity to function unmodified in social situations, but are made to conform in a super-organized expression to social standards and values. This process of transformation of the instincts under environmental control has gone so far that the psychoanalysts have sounded a warning to the effect that dangerous conflicts between the original and the acquired nature of man have become manifest in modern life. However, it is likely that some of the most stressful conflicts exist between values set by opposing habit activity complexes.

The dominance of character formation by the psycho-social environment comes about in this way. The dynamic factors in human society, such as the increase of population and its consequent pressure upon the industrial arts, the growth of knowledge and technique, and the utilization of the natural resources and

[1] L. L. Bernard, "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences," *Psy. Rev.*, March, 1921.

inventive processes in general make necessary new adjustments in society. These new alignments call forth a new set of inventions, including institutional and other more temporary group organization, directed at first to the satisfaction of man's instinctive needs, but in the course of time becoming ends in themselves. Thus there arise, in the process of adjustment to the dynamic factors in society—which multiply so rapidly in modern civilization that the slow process of biological selection cannot produce new instincts to take care of the adjustments to these factors—at first a set of secondary wants or desires or interests, which are embodied in the institutional or other psycho-social content. In time these are overlaid and modified by further derived values or ends, until the instinctive element no longer dominates in them, and in many cases the socially imposed value is in contradiction to the suppressed or transformed instinctive one. In this way modern man has come to be largely an artificial, clothes-wearing, idea-imitating, convention-copying, even at times a thinking, animal who turns his instincts to the service of artificially conceived ends in an artificial, but much improved, society. The original ends set by his selected instinctive food and sex, fear and associational, needs and interests no longer dominate his life, but they become incidents to the main current of a competitive and co-operative socialized existence.

It is possible to impose these environmentally determined values upon man because, due to his higher brain organization, including the hundreds of millions of incompleted neurones with which he begins postnatal life and his consequent power of habit formation, he has learned to mediate abstractly his action in adjustment to the outside world, either by means of his own previous abstracted experience adjustments or, more frequently, by copying those already worked out and stored in the psycho-social environment, that is, in institutions, in funds of scientific knowledge, in literature, and the like. Thus civilized adult man is able to reverse the process of individual adjustment to a very considerable extent. Instead of always acting first and thinking afterward, as the child at first tends to do, he develops environmentally derived inhibitions upon action, as well as abstracted thinking symbols, which

enable him to work out abstractly a course of conduct (it may be done either consciously or subconsciously), often even in contradiction to his instinctive or more naïve habit impulses and to put it into overt action from within outward. Thus the cerebral neurones, directly and indirectly, have become the chief distributors of adult human action. Language, with its powers of abstract symbolization, has enabled man to transform the perceptions of the senses of sight and hearing—which in civilized society become adapted to types of environmental stimuli unknown to the instinctive nature of man—into activity values for which his instincts do not equip him. His mind, through the aid of artificially and environmentally organized sensory perceptions, and language, which represents compressed abstracted symbolizations of meaning, becomes a great abstracting and distributing apparatus for the transmission of the psycho-social environment. In this way the artificial or derived psycho-social environmental processes and values are able to transmit themselves largely intact.

In this respect psycho-social environmental transmission is perhaps as independent of the instinctive organization of man—although not wholly independent of it—as is the hereditary transmission of biological traits through the segregated reproductive cells independent of the somatic cells. The analogy is not complete, because each individual develops his power of abstraction originally from an inherited basis of neural response. But, as pointed out above, the abstracting power once developed with appropriate acquired symbols mediating the process, the seat of control of the neural adjustment or thinking process tends to be shifted, through revised and analytical perception processes, from the internal control of instinct and previously formed habit organization to newly apprehended psycho-social environmental control factors. The act now begins in the cerebral cortex and may be extended to muscular response, if conditions are favorable, or it may never get beyond the initial stage of neural cerebral organization. Where we have a succession of such incompleted activity processes, one neural adjustment running over into the other, without eventuating in overt muscular activity, we have what we call thinking, or a preliminary adjustment of the organism on the basis of intellectual

processes. These may take place either consciously or subconsciously, and thus the adjustment may be either consciously or subconsciously made. It may also remain permanently incompleted, as most of our thought adjustments do.

In this way most of the activities not of a reflex or purely habitual character are dominated by the psycho-social environment, and practically all of the content of our evaluational thinking—that which does not go over into immediate muscular response—is so dominated. Thus it is seen that the instincts do not control habit formations, except among primitive men and possibly the younger children. The older we grow, if at the same time we become wiser, that is, acquire more abstract symbolical thinking content, the farther away we get from instinctive domination and the more we come under the control of the values and processes of the psycho-social environment. For most men these values and processes are imposed without much reflection or abstract valuation on their part; they are merely copied. But the more thoughtful, the better-informed, types of men take them over reflectively, that is, they in some measure consciously transform their environment as well as adapt to it.

Such, in brief, is the method by which we obtain our higher habits or psycho-social environmentally controlled activities and attitudes and ideal values. The most important, the major, controls, in civilized society come in this way. We are just beginning to develop a science of environmental transmission comparable to that of biological transmission and to differentiate the two in our thinking, and rationally to plan and organize the environmental psycho-social ones. This is the chief, but not the only, task of social control. At a day when the more timid sociologists are almost ready to surrender to their aggressive competitors in biology we need to realize that our problem of environmental controls is at least as important and certainly as complicated and absorbingly interesting as that of the biologists. Furthermore, we should recognize that both the biologists and the sociologists work toward the same general end of social and racial betterment and should co-operate instead of compete.

ETHNOLOGICAL LIGHT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

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ABSTRACT

Ethnological Light on Psychological Problems.—Many important practical problems are at the same time important theoretically, which is both fortunate and unfortunate, for while interest is lent, prejudice is aroused. Sociology has at times wrongfully assumed that general psychology can determine in advance the nature of the persons who constitute groups. *Social origins*, which is the comparative study of ethnological material, offers an indispensable method in this field. The current psychological methods often err in abstracting the person and assuming as innate that which is social in origin and nature. This is in line with a very ancient and widespread tendency which identifies the natural with the familiar. Nature is often only the older and more venerable convention. Specific instincts which are so often assumed as innate cannot be identified as innate when the infinite variety of customs is studied. Ethnological material offers a neglected field for the study of psychology, for the human personality is created in a social situation and can be found only in some concrete set of social relations.

It is at once fortunate and unfortunate when the important practical problems are also the problems of greatest interest to the theorist. It is fortunate, for it gives a sense of reality and vitality to the work of the theorist which is a distinct advantage: it is unfortunate in so far as it tends to becloud the issue with prejudices and interests which even the scientist may vainly strive to escape. These prejudices and interests not only confuse the mind of the investigator, hindering his method and warping his conclusions, but condition the reception of his work by his critics and his public to the lasting detriment to the cause of truth.

There are many questions which are of concern to the social psychologist which fall within this category and which clearly show the effect of preconception and bias. I have in mind such questions as the relation of nature to nurture, the relation of original nature to the modifications effected by social experience, including the origin of the differences between the several racial and national groups. Of most emotional interest is the problem of the capacity and possibilities of the colored races, and the effects of miscegena-

tion. Less important but still within the list would come such questions as the nature of religion and of superstition, the differences between the sexes, the problem of the nature and number of the human instincts or whether there should be any such instincts assumed, the relation of the individual to the group, and such like.

The greater part of these questions are rightly regarded as psychological, and the sociologist usually assumes that their solution must come from individual psychology and that groups cannot be understood without the possession of these solutions from the laboratory. Now the ethnologist has a similar problem, and he has decided that he does not need to wait for the results of psychology. At least Lowie has so argued in his *Ethnology and Culture*. Of course the ethnologist is chiefly interested in setting forth the objective cultures and as his material is objective, his ideal is to form hypotheses without assumptions concerning the mental processes of the people whom he studies.

It is the object of this paper to call attention to the attitude toward social origins which the sociologist can take and which has been so much neglected. If we assume that personality is a group resultant, that human nature is inconceivable apart from language, then it is clear, since there is no such thing as a language in general, that personality will develop in a concrete local situation. If we assume that human nature cannot be conceived apart from wishes, and if we agree that ideals and life-organizations can only exist in a society, then the study of social origins ought to throw much light upon human nature. Each group develops its own type of leadership, and its own brand of human nature, and the study and comparison of widely separated groups is therefore one method of studying psychology.

The psychological methods are familiar, being matters of common knowledge. Introspection has never been wholly discredited, but its limitations have been increasingly recognized of late, for introspection is always memory, and memories, alas, are influenced by our wishes and greatly modified by them. And the wishes of the individual are always related to the wishes of the group, the purposes of the individual to the purposes of the group, so that

introspection reveals human nature as modified and fashioned in social life.

Experiments in laboratories have clarified many difficult questions, but the results have, on the whole, been of most value, when the problems have been most simple. Experiments on sensations have yielded the largest results, and in these cases it is not always easy to distinguish psychology from physiology.

A distinctly newer method is that of abnormal psychology. The recent and well-known attempts of Freud and others to apply the concepts used in their work with neurotic patients to normal psychology are not so helpful as was at first hoped. And when the writers go farther afield and explain social origins by psychological principles, it is no longer acceptable. The explanation of totem and taboo by Freud which enables him to explain the culture of African natives on the basis of the dreams of neurotic Austrian women is as simple and naïve as it is unsound. A recent explanation of this method recites the story of a Fuegian who related that the first man climbed down out of heaven on to earth by a grape-vine. The psychiatric ethnologist writes that this is frankly a sex myth, the inverted bowl of the sky being the uterus, and the grape-vine being the umbilical cord!

Still another type of genetic explanation has arisen from a study of the war neuroses of soldiers. Now soldiers who break down with so-called shell shock are for the most part suffering from fear. The abnormalities of sex observed among them are most apt to take the form of homosexual practices. And it was to be expected that the writers on these cases should attempt to apply the conclusion to social origins and the mind of primitive man. The influence of this can be seen in *Psycho-therapy* by Kempf.

All that needs to be pointed out in this connection is that psychiatric theories of primitive man assume a sort of recapitulation and vestigial reversion which does not stand the test of objective field investigation. Primitive man is not to be understood nor most clearly viewed from the consulting-room of the neurologist in our great cities.

Quite another method of studying human nature is that of animal psychology. Unfortunately, this is chiefly anecdotal in

character, and uncritical in the highest degree. It can hardly be called a method of explaining instinct. It is rather a custom. Most of the discussion of curiosity, constructiveness, fear, anger, and such like has leaned chiefly on the dog, the wolf, the ant, and the bee. An Englishman recently wrote a book on human instincts, the greater part of which is taken up with the opinion of former writers of books, but when one comes toward the middle of the volume upon the first discussion of an instinct, it is concerned with the wild ox of Demaraland.[1]

None of these methods should be minimized. In their own field they stand independently and even outside it they sometimes suggest analogies and insights that are of great value, but they do not get to the real data of their problem. If we are to understand human nature, we must study human nature; and if we study human nature, we must not study some unreal and deceptive abstraction of it. Individual or differential psychology is a very fruitful field. But its data are partly social.

In one sense it is true that the views of human nature which we now hold to be erroneous have a common error. They all tend to identify the natural with the familiar. They failed to take account of the larger human group. Savages they did not have access to, and babies were not considered of sufficient importance. The philosopher who believed in God thought of his belief as natural. He who believed in a king held that the rule was by divine right and in accordance with the very nature of the universe. Those who opposed a doctrine did so from the belief that their own introspections were a revelation of nature itself. Descartes taught that ideas were inborn, and the inborn ideas of Descartes were those current in the Europe of his day. Locke taught that the mind was a blank and the slate wiped clean, but he made no study of children, nor did he have any real method of assembling facts.

The confusion of nature with the customary still exists as a heritage from the Greeks themselves. They indeed made a distinction between nature and convention, but the nature which they described seems to us to be merely an older convention. Aristotle taught that it was natural for a negro to be a slave, but

[1] Of course this does not refer to experimental animal psychology, which is not a study of human nature at all, but exists quite independently.

not for a Greek. In the stoic worship of nature, the wrongs and ills to which men were accustomed were inflicted on the sufferer by nature. Said Marcus Aurelius, "When you kiss your child, say to him, 'Perhaps you will be dead tomorrow.'" Mr. Strachey records of Doctor Arnold that when he lay in pain upon a couch he asked his son to go thank God for this pain which had been sent to him. Many who read this passage feel that somehow the poor are the naturally unfit. McDougall records in his book on *Is America Safe for Democracy?* that the negro race is very strong in the instinct of submission.

The point of all of this is that men have generalized broadly upon a fractional experience, in realizing the extent to which plastic human nature can be made to assume definite forms. Instincts asserted of human beings have been created by psychologists, and sociologists alike to "explain" any given phenomena, whether war, pioneering, or vagabondage. Biologists may doubt the Darwinian formula of survival and natural selection as applied to individuals, but psychologists have kept the faith when considering instincts. We have plenty of trouble now, but in the Golden Age nature was always right and every instinct was brought in on account of its survival value. The implications of the current doctrine are three in number:

1. Instincts are the same in man and animals.
2. Instincts exist because they were first useful.
3. Instincts can be observed in their activity by anyone who will make himself familiar with human conduct.

A corollary of these beliefs is that individual psychology formulated according to this method is a prerequisite to the question of group life.

It seems necessary to question all these assumptions. There is probably a real difference between man and the animals. A study of cultural groups does not wait for the psychology of the individual. On the contrary, the individual can only be known fully by means of the methods of social investigation. The group will help illuminate the nature of this process.

And here comes in the task of the sociologist, for it is he who is chiefly interested in the processes of human nature which are involved in culture and which the ethnologist notices only inciden-

tally. If the problem of instincts cannot be solved by a study of primitive peoples, at least the problem could be greatly illuminated. One writer asserts that hunting and fighting alone interested primitive man. Therefore, all work is drudgery and no one ever really likes it. The student of primitive life might investigate further instances of the building of houses, clearing of land, child-caring, and other forms of group life which bear no relation to hunting or fighting, and which are intensely interesting. The findings on this subject would throw much light on the theoretical question involved. Graham Wallas insists that the human race inherits an instinct for irregularity in work, and since primitive man did no regular work, modern man finds it irksome. The response of primitive people to regular work like their response to regular meals could be noted, and the facts ought to throw some light on the problem.

The burden which primitive man has to bear is very heavy at the present time, particularly the moral burden. Primitive man is blamed for juvenile delinquency, marital infidelity, family desertion, dislike of work, crime, and war. The thin veneer of civilization is a metaphor from the furniture factories at Grand Rapids, but it implies an unjustifiably uncharitable view toward the poor savage. Anyone who has carefully studied the literature of primitive peoples, and has given due weight to the absence of punishment of their children, and who has considered the relative completeness of the social control which they have developed, will look for another explanation of our adolescent rebellion. It is entirely possible that we ourselves have invented many original sins and that there are new and modern ways of acting the fool. Certainly, the question of a native tendency to storm-and-stress on the part of the adolescent can be illuminated by a study of primitive peoples. On this, as on many psychological problems, it is possible to shed much light from ethnology.

Many other questions, such as that of the culture epochs on which hangs the question of recapitulation, the question of sex differences, and the relation of the individual to the group, are all capable of illumination by methods which include the comparison of cultures.

For example, the theory of culture epochs is passing in ethnology. Polyandry was supposed to be a phase of culture having a definite

relation to a specific form of economic organization. When, however, it is found that polyandry exists in Tibet where there is agriculture, among the Todas who are pastoral, and among certain Eskimo tribes who are still hunters, the conclusion which the social psychologist is led to make is fairly obvious.

Another instance of the value of this method is in the names of relationship which the ethnologists are now studying with great zeal and promise of interesting results. When we find that among many peoples there is no word for father or mother, but only a word denoting parent; when in other societies there appears no distinction between child and grandchild, or between mother and aunt—when these and a score of other similar facts are noted, the conclusion is inevitable that the psychological basis of the family is a more variable phenomenon than is usually assumed. On this psychological problem there remains yet much light to be shed from the study of primitives.

The study of words is in itself very instructive, and the structure of the grammar of primitive people which is as yet so imperfectly known, will in future lend much real aid to the study of human nature.

The sex differences are still highly important to us and form a problem as yet quite unsolved. Schurz in a classic utterance has explained the outstanding facts of primitive life to be the well-known psychological fact that women are not gregarious. Mrs. Talbert, however, in her work among the Ibibios describes a most elaborate system of secret societies, thus discrediting the explanation by objective citation of new facts.

The question of diffusion as against independent origin, which is now a storm center of ethnological debate, must be settled by the ethnologists and anthropologists among themselves. The argument is now often so heated that epithets and names fly very freely. The sociologist should and will wait for the experts to agree, but the point here is that when they shall have agreed we shall be able to know much more than we now know about the relations of the individual to the group.

The social psychologist must no longer assume that he cannot attack the problem of collective behavior or understand cultural groups without a working theory of individual psychology. Social

psychology was at one time proposed as the science of the individual as modified by the social processes of the group. We must take seriously the statement that no such pre-existing individual is discoverable.

Primitive man has been very frequently invoked as an explanation of some social phenomenon of modern life. He has oftener been coerced into justifying a political interest or buttressing an established practice. He has at times helped a devoted reformer in his effort to uproot established institutions that have cumbered the ground. He has done much service in furnishing the human element in mythologies and cosmologies. Sociologists have used him to furnish concrete confirmation of their deductive conclusions. Herbert Spencer used him to show that evolution demanded a halfway stage between animal and man. Sumner brought him in to prove that man is an irrational and helpless creature, too plastic and too helpless to boast. Westermarck employs him to illustrate his own doctrine of instincts and the emotional doctrine of morality. McDougall makes use of him, as do most psychologists, to illustrate and confirm the doctrines of the instincts.

Few of us have, however, studied him. Here lies a vast treasure of psychological knowledge for the most part untouched. Primitive man who is really primitive is gone and gone forever. None of us ever saw him alive. Contemporary uncivilized peoples exist, and the careful, objective, scientific study of their manners, customs, ritual, speech, and other behavior is destined richly to reward those who are able to study them. We may indeed hope to solve some of our theoretical problems here.

The social psychologist must no longer assume that collective behavior can only be studied after we have in hand a complete statement of the nature of the individual. Social psychology is not merely a study of the modification of the individual that occurs in social situations. It is time to realize that these facts are ready to hand, and that the individual which psychology was supposed to study does not exist and never did. And, since he does not exist, he cannot be modified in a social group. On the contrary, he is created in a social group. He can be found only by looking there.

SLOGANS AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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ABSTRACT

Slogans as a Means of Social Control.—Some devices kindred to the slogan are the watchword, catchword, and motto. The slogan comes to us from the Scotch and originated in the wars of the clans. Its purpose was control. It has spread to other areas such as politics, religion, and business. *Social control through slogan.* Sources of strength are found in such features as antithesis, alliteration, euphoniousness, punning, apparent obviousness, brevity. The use of slogans may be questioned in so far as they perpetuate undeliberative responses.

In discussing the subject "Slogans as a Means of Social Control" I shall consider (1) some kindred devices and their meanings, (2) the origin and definition of the term slogan, (3) the fields in which this device is most used, (4) some reasons for its effectiveness, and (5) some evils of its promiscuous use.

1. Among the countless devices employed by those who aspire to master the human herd, one finds "watchwords," "catchwords," "mottoes," "shibboleths," and "slogans." The "watchword" was originally a password or countersign employed by guards and scouts in times of hostility. It served to distinguish friends from foes. The medieval castles were guarded by the ward by day and the watch by night. Thus the watch was the one to be especially careful, for some means of recognition had to be used instead of sight. The watchword was distinctively a declarative night word.

Later usage is broader. The watchword is now a rallying-cry or signal for action and, as such, is indistinguishable from the slogan. Sumner tells us that "a watchword sums up one policy or doctrine, view or phase of the subject. It may be legitimate and useful, but a watchword easily changes its meaning and takes up foreign connotations or fallacious suggestions. Critical analysis is always required to detect and exclude the fallacy."[1] Thus the watchword retains some of the obscurity of its original circumstance,

[1] *Folkways*, p. 177.

although in changed form. As a nightword it was clear-cut and unequivocal, but as a day word it has assimilated questionable and obscure features.

The "catchword" was originally the last word spoken by one actor as a cue for the next speaker. It was also the first word of any printed page reproduced at the end of the previous page as an aid to the memory. But while the actor still has his cue, the printed page no longer has its catchword. The device has been caught up into the realm of larger social activities and additional meanings have been incorporated. The aim everywhere is to make sure that the attention does not wander, the memory does not become listless, and the loyalties do not stray. It is thus in the same category as the catchword and functions as a means of social control.

The "motto" embodies a similar notion. The etymology of the term discloses its imitative origin. Probably it was once just any word that was muttered or repeated to fix attention, arouse the feelings, and exclude distractions, and thereby become declarative. In modern use it is any brief, pithy saying, a *multum in parvo*, offered as a standard or objective for popular action. It can hardly be distinguished from the war cry.

It is of interest to note that newspaper editors have been fond of mottoes. The *New York Chronicle* in 1842 put its energies back of this noble sentiment: "God and the elevation of the people." *Bartram's Cheek*—a Michigan paper—in 1869 was whole-souled for "Beauty and Business." *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly* in 1870 favored: "Progress; Free Thought; Untrammeled Lives."[1] Other journalistic mottoes are bombastic, grandiose, or smart, as the case may be. But they purport to epitomize a program and dazzle the eyes with an urgent objective. They are thus closely related functionally to the slogan.

The "shibboleth" is almost an exact synonym of the watchword. It is a Hebrew term signifying an ear of corn or a stream. But what interests us is the *use* rather than the meaning. The story is that one of the Judges employed this word as a means of distinguishing the fleeing Ephraimites from his own followers, the

[1] Hudson, *Journalism in U.S.*, 1690–1872, p. 738.

Gileadites. It seems that the former were unable to pronounce the "sh" sound in the word shibboleth and thereby disclosed themselves as enemies.[1]

Originally, therefore, the shibboleth was employed to elicit a reaffirmation of a loyalty already declared. It was a purely arbitrary method of obtaining information as to mental attitude in a crisis. One who could and would speak the accepted watchword or pronounce the shibboleth was regarded as a friend and supporter, a member of the we-group. In the case of the latter term one trembles to think of what must have happened to those who were tonguetied or otherwise crippled vocally. But in times of stress and popular realignment one must shout the proper word without quibbling or take the consequences. A critical attitude is no more tolerated than was lisping to that brave chieftain Jephthah.

2. Turning now to the "slogan" we may note first of all that it comes to us from the Gaelic and appears to be a contraction of two words, "slaugh," meaning an army or fighting group, and "ghairm," meaning a call or calling. Among the Highlanders the "slaugh-ghairm" was the rallying-cry or gathering-call to assemble and unify in times of clan danger or aggression. It was variously the name of the clan and often the name of the place of meeting. The people, separated in space and thought, were suddenly lifted out of themselves and swept into a social movement by "the slogan's deadly yell," as Sir Walter Scott has it.

But while the Scotch may have given us the term, the idea and the practice of using some powerful word stimulus or other kind of stimulus to fuse and fortify defensive or aggressive bands are ancient and world-wide. This device may be found among all peoples in one form or another. It is as essential to strife as any weapon used.

Hence, however different their origin, the devices enumerated above have evolved to practically the same point. They were and are instruments of the agitator and the conscriptor. And they are piercing and ruthless instruments. If any differences remain they may be found in this, that watchwords and shibboleths serve to cut sharply into the miscellaneous moods and interests of the common life and secure attention. The mottoes, catchwords, and

[1] Judges 12:4–6.

slogans indicate some desirable objective and secure active participation in its attainment. After one is *in* and approved by means of the former, one must follow the slogan and "put it across."

By way of definition, therefore, it may be said that a slogan is any brief, popularly reiterated challenge to immediate participation in competitive or conflicting interactions. It is not found in the field of scientific investigation for there is no desire to gain adherents. In this area, the truth is wanted, not numbers.

3. This last point introduces the question of those areas within the larger field of competition and conflict where the slogan operates with unmeasured virility. Further analysis reveals its employment in the propagandist and aggressive departments of war, business, politics, religion, and education. Individuals and families set up standards of this sort to which they make efforts, more or less heroic, to adhere.

Originating in the brazen throat of war, the slogan has not ceased to be an effectual war-instrument. It is still impossible to war successfully without it. A returned soldier wrote me last summer that the outstanding, ever-reiterated, clarion challenge to American soldiers—the slogan that helped the soldiers to associate readily and agreeably with all sorts and conditions of men, endure and even enjoy the otherwise deadening routine of military drill, master those weakening waves of homesickness that attacked their muscles at the most inopportune times, become knit up into an invincible and terrific engine of destruction, recover almost miraculously from serious wounds and illnesses, and to finally "put it across" while they were "over there"—that slogan was "Get Germany." That was the central theme to which studying, traveling, drilling, charging, and all other military operations were but minor variations. And "Get Germany" brought forth its brood of subsidiary slogans such as, "Put it across," "Over the top," "They shall not pass," and others.

Not less spectacular and powerful was the influence of this device upon the populace at home. The thinking and unthinking alike were gathered into a tidal wave to "make the world safe for democracy." The political, social, and religious idealists were captured by the term "democracy." The dull and meticulous

were awakened and set at work by the term "safe." That famous sloganizer, Benjamin Franklin, was unceremoniously resurrected and riveted to the game of selling War Saving Stamps. His manly voice, quit of its sepulchral accents, sounded forth, vigorous and clear, in the mottoes, "Thrift is Power" and "Save and Succeed." These words gathered in the close-fisted.

And in a campaign to "Make the world safe for Democracy" what could be more adroit than to print and sell "Liberty Bonds"? For this is a most contradictory phrase in any other connection. And so it remains that Americans of the twentieth century, no more than Highlanders of the fifteenth, can successfully prosecute a war without the ubiquitous slogan. War without slogans? One can as readily think of trains without engines or barrels without hoops.

We are all familiar with the use of slogans in political campaigns. Every election brings out a new set, some of them local and some national in popularity. Notable examples are, "Less government in business; more business in government," "Remember the Maine," "The full dinner pail," "No taxation without representation," and countless others, some of which I will mention in an examination of the effective features of the slogan.

In business the vigorous intention everywhere is to overwhelm the buying public and gain support. The bombardment is spectacular, voluminous, continuous, and relentless. *Printer's Ink* recently compiled something over three hundred and fifty slogans that are *nationally* known. Those of merely local circulation must number up in the thousands. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the above-mentioned periodical states that: "The slogan was coined as a means of stressing trade-mark significance in the advertising appeal." This may be true as an account of the introduction of this device into selling campaigns, but the slogan was coined, that is to say, was originated, in a very different manner, as I have shown.

The athletic fans are well acquainted with the power of this instrument. It has often made a winning team. Large-scale and small-scale religious enterprise would be seriously crippled without it. And America has throbbed more to this type of appeal, perhaps,

than other nations because of the numerous sects and their former bitternesses. For example, one denomination uses "Our Plea" with much unction. It also proposes to "Speak where the Scriptures speak, and remain silent where the Scriptures are silent,"—an undertaking of such considerable proportions that, of course, it has not lived up to it. "The Evangelization of the world in this generation" became the zealous cry of the hosts of young people who gathered in Toronto twenty years ago. "Men and Millions" was the rallying call of a denominational campaign several years ago—but the millions smothered the men.

The history of education is liberally besprinkled with slogans betokening the influence of the propagandists. Few of us are unacquainted with "Education according to Nature," "Social efficiency," and "The project method."

The numerous campaign drives for money to support various worthy enterprises have flung showers of watchwords about our ears and before our eyes. The Red Cross challenges respect and support by declaring itself "The Greatest Mother in the World." The Y.M.C.A. has insisted and demanded that "The Y stands for you; You stand for the Y."

And every party revolt within any larger whole has been unified and spurred on by some unforgettable slogan. The restless poor foregather to the strain of "Unreasonable profits," "A fair day's wage," "The emancipation of labor," while the contented rich patriotically cry back, "America for the Americans," "Law and Order," and others.

I suppose it will never be possible to accurately enumerate the realignments effected by this visual and vocal lassoing. Certain weaknesses of the popular mind, combined with certain excellencies of the slogan, make us reasonably assured that much more is accomplished in this manner than might at first be suspected. Many of the thoughtful and self-controlled are gathered in because this type of infection operates in defiance of man's sound intelligence. On the other hand, if every movement attracts its "lunatic fringe," as Roosevelt spoke of it, there can be no question of the mighty influence of the slogan on this wing of the populace. Between these groups one finds the masses who evidently thrill and yield to new phrases and terms.

In the field of social suggestion, as in archery, it is still true that

> . . . . many a shaft at random sent
> Finds mark the archer little meant.

But it is equally true that this type of shaft is well aimed and finds the mark selected. What the projectors of slogans wish is numbers. They aim to touch the multitudes and there can be no reasonable doubt of great success.

4. The features which make the slogan so effective are too numerous even to mention, let alone delineate, in this paper. I shall have time to point out only a few. In a lecture several years ago the "vagabond" poet, Vachel Lindsay, stated that he was out to bring poetry to the attention of the people. And in order to do this he had to surpass the electric sign. What he meant was that the popular mind is so distracted and surfeited by countless appeals that any new one had to be more incisive and spectacular than the best to be heeded.

But the popular mind is, at the same time, so superficial and unguarded that such an appeal is captivating. If there were prolonged concentration and rigid absorption, this instrument would not work. Moreover, if people were universally satisfied and not everlastingly craving some new thing, slogans would fall harmless, as darts against a battleship. And some have thought that Americans are peculiarily susceptible. But however that may be, it is probably true that this device has reached its greatest perfection in this country.

I am endeavoring to say that, if the soil is excellent, the seed is unsurpassed. The qualities now to be enumerated are not found in every slogan, to be sure, but most of them are strengthened by several.

a) A frequent characteristic is rhythm. The words "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" make pleasant music in the ears of multitudes. A large number of phrases and sentences are metrical in form and can be scanned. Examples are, "Proven by the test of time," "Quickest way to duplicate," "The interest of one is the interest of all," "Woven where the wool is grown," "Handle it mechanically." Henry van Dyke is reported to have said that the phrase, "The skin you love to touch," is highly poetical. The

words "Americanism," "Democracy," and many others, are repeated as much for their euphoniousness as for anything else. Certainly clear ideas about their essential meanings do not warrant such frequent employment. The masses are always ready for a war dance if some clique or leader will only suggest the measure and beat time.

b) The alliterative quality is very often found. We have "Foods of the finest flavor" and we have them "From contented cows." We have the "Eight with eighty less parts," "Land to the landless," "Politics for the people," "Men and Millions," "Mine to the miner," and many others.

c) The appeal is much strengthened by the combination of alliteration and antithesis. "The golden rule against the rule of gold" has played its part as has "Sink or swim." During the silver issue some opponents of the proposition were captivated by the proposition, "The white man with the yellow metal is beaten by the yellow man with the white metal." In 1844 the watchword, "Fifty-four forty or fight" almost provoked war. No such excitement could have been produced by shouting "twenty-one sixteen or fight."

d) Besides the recurrence of letters there is the ringing repetition of sounds. "An apple a day keeps the doctor away," "Cheaper to 'dye' than to buy," "A Kalamazoo—direct to you," "The handy candy," "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," are familiar illustrations of this feature.

e) Le Bon says:

> Affirmation pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and proof, is one of the surest means of making any idea enter the minds of crowds. The conciser an affirmation is the more destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration, the more weight it carries. The religious books and legal codes of all ages have always resorted to simple affirmation. Statesmen called upon to defend a political issue, and commercial men pushing the sale of their products by means of advertising, are acquainted with the value of affirmation.

We have already noted examples of affirmation combined with repetition of letters and sounds. Le Bon further says:

> Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it is constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I believe, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious importance, namely, repetition.[1]

[1] *The Crowd*, pp. 141–42.

So we are faced at every angle with unabashed pronouncements such as, "If it isn't an Eastman, it isn't a kodak," "The standard of the world," "The utmost in clothespins," and "Eventually—why not now?" In such cases the facts are all in, the argument is done, it is just a question of time until you are led away to be milked by these enterprising firms. The doctrine of predestination has hardly more finality.

And when the auditory appeal is enforced by the visual on every hand and everyday, for weeks and months and years, there are few minds strong enough not to be affected.

f) Brevity has its part in making the slogan effective. After some examination and comparison it was found that slogans average about four words. Thus they are like coins, condensed and economical. But they are different in that they always pass above their value. This brevity is suggestive with reference to the receptiveness and retentiveness of the popular mind.

g) The appeal to curiosity is not infrequent. For example: "Have you tried one lately?" and "There's a reason." Or again: "Ask Dad—he knows," and "Ask the man who owns one." In these also one may note a quiet confidence that any examination undertaken will reveal only the merits of the case. There is also a subtle suggestion of flattery, for the final decision seems to rest with the investigator.

h) Sloganizers are fond of punning. This equivocal play on words is found particularly in advertising. Examples are: "Hasn't *scratched* yet," "A *case* of good judgment," "Time to *re-tire*," "The *makings* of a nation," "When it rains—*It* pours," "All they're *cracked* up to be," "Have you a little *fairy* in your home?"

i) Of course the sentiment of patriotism is not neglected. There are those saviors of our country who propose "The national drink," "The national joy smoke," and offer themselves as "Home-builders to the nation." Politicians sometimes assure us that "Trade follows the Flag." Occasionally this feature takes the form of unrelieved boasting, but this increases the attraction for certain people.

j) The propagandists, out of the extremely high purposes by which they are moved, do not hesitate to enter, all unbidden, the inner sanctuary of one's private life. Their breezy assurances of

disinterestedness and commanding joviality are quite irresistible. They greet total strangers with a cheerful "Good Morning" and then, having observed some suspicious stains on your chin, casually inquire if you "have used our soap yet." This is an illustration of the fact that slogans are no respectors of those protecting formalities that have been preserved through the centuries. Personal privacy and isolation are wiped away by slogans. There are no longer any areas inaccessible to this penetrating device.

k) Certain slogans appear to be meaty and unavoidable conclusions of profound thought. To illustrate, we might mention, "Safety first," "He kept us out of war," "Make the world safe for democracy," "Open covenants openly arrived at," "The dictates of right reason," "Too proud to fight," and many others. These phrases have every appearance of representing solid realities. As phrases they are inimitable. As capsular philosophies they are unsurpassed. But who can say what they mean? The average man certainly cannot say what they involve and where they lead. Therefore they are a trap for the unwary.

l) An authoritative note is sounded by some slogans in addition to the affirmation already pointed out. Many of them are hortatory in character. Some power, it seems, has the right to tell us to do this and that without end. "Do your bit," "Go to church Sunday," "Restore the land to the landless," "Vote for Mr. So-and-so." These commands gain ascendancy by reason of the popular tendency to mythologize. They create a psychic strain and this allows the old habits of servility to reassert themselves.

m) Many slogans are strictly class-appeals. Emotions are aroused over old antagonisms. "The demand for labor," "Down with the capitalists," "Just distribution," "Change the system," "Anarchists," "Bolsheviks," and the like thrust into the center of consciousness pet ideas and feelings of disgust or loathing. They are calculated to hold up impossible dream-objectives or awaken a basic human fear.

n) The apparent obviousness of meaning is an effective feature. But it is full of snares. What could be more simple and attainable than to be "True to the faith"? In America who could raise any objections against "Make the world safe for democracy"? Any-

body ought to favor "America for the Americans" or leave the country. So would the average man reason. But thoughtful people know that these terms have meanings which are too deep for utterance. When widely used, therefore, the appeal is to popular credulity.

o) Obscurity of origin, combined with euphoniousness, timeliness, and other features, adds greatly to the strength of the slogan. It is then that the popular imagination tends to invest them with extraordinary powers. On the other hand, if the originator is known and happens to be in a position of prominence, his sayings are taken at more than face value.

Many other features of this device might be indicated but these will serve our purpose here. By way of summary Professor Sumner says of watchwords and other verbal coinage:

> They are familiar, unquestioned and popular, and they are always current above their value. They always reveal the invincible tendency of the masses to mythologize. They are personified and superhuman energy is attributed to them. "Democracy" is not treated as a parallel word to aristocracy, theocracy, autocracy, etc., but as a Power from some outside origin, which brings into human affairs an inspiration and energy of its own. The "People" is not the population but a creation of mythology, to which inherent faculties and capacities are ascribed beyond what can be verified within experience . . . . In all these cases there is a tyranny in the term.[1]

In his essay on "War" Professor Sumner further says: "If you allow a political catchword to go on and grow, you will awaken some day to find it standing over you, the arbiter of your destiny, against which you are powerless, as men are powerless against delusions." He might have said this of religious, educational, industrial, and all other catchwords and phrases. Passing unchallenged, they become the arbiters of the people's destinies. They are significant factors in social control.

It may be objected that business slogans are in a different category, and such is the case. Certain fundamental differences are revealed by study. But these differences are in qualifying features rather than in effects. They all accomplish control although they do it in different ways. A very summary statement of this differ-

[1] *Folkways*, p. 176.

ence must be included. In general, religious, poliitcal, and educational slogans are characterized by a cloudy profundity, by what the Greeks called "pathos," by a virile historical relevance, and they usually refer to persons, principles, and situations. On the other hand, modern business slogans are clever, sprightly, open-faced, and friendly; they center about things and are, like Topsy, historically unattached.

It is to be observed further that, while many slogans are complete sentences and therefore propositional statements, others are just subjects flung out, like wandering stars, for reception and elaboration by the popular mind; they are left to weave what halos and spin out what filaments of light they can. No trouble arises relative to these detached subjects until one attempts to connect the qualifying predicates. Then the snares appear in troops.

5. Coming now to the last consideration, namely, some evils of the indiscriminate use of the slogan, it may be noted, first of all, that hosts of people allow themselves to be ruled by unquestionable and undiscoverable authorities which "to doubt would be disloyalty; to question would be sin." The coiners of slogans may work in the dark without fear of exposure and work quite ruthlessly. This may be necessary but it is a costly phase of our democratic progress.

Possibly the most unfortunate feature of the slogan is its ambiguity. This point has already been noted but it needs emphasis. A little reflection, instead of opening wide the highway of thought, always plunges one into the morass of tangled and contradictory meanings. Take the phrase "Back to normalcy." It sounds good. It appears to represent something desirable. But what does it mean? Was the president philosophizing when he put this verbal token into circulation, or was he playing to the crowd? "Back" to something always sounds good to the routineer; it sounded good to the war-weary. "Normalcy" suggested—well, what it suggested. Anything. Everything. Nothing. The phrase caught the attention of the people and lined them up. But where did it take them?

What does it mean to be "True to the faith"? This is a phrase eloquent of vagueness. It is a saint-seducing phrase. It has

awakened more animosities and precipitated more strife than it has ever allayed. Each individual is more or less true to some faith. But it is rarely expressible in satisfactory terms.

The term "democracy" is almost as inclusive as the sky in its ability to shelter diverse beliefs and opinions. Everybody vocalizes energetically in favor of "Americanism" but nobody can give a consistent interpretation of it. Thus the method of control by slogans is dubious because it depends upon over-simplification.

This type of control is objectionable because it perpetuates undeliberative responses. The people are rallied suddenly and hurriedly. The coiners of slogans and the users of them do not present challenges to thought but to action. They desire numbers not critics. They are adherents to the "do-something" philosophy. And so the slogan might be described as an effective device for the prevention of thought.

Great quanities of slogans being presented for appropriate responses, it might be supposed that the necessity of selection from among them would occasion some careful scrutiny and a deliberate choice. But it is probable that the one that touches the most agreeable feelings gets the attention and support and all others are simply ignored. Thus any sort of analysis of possibilities is avoided.

As an unchivalrous invasion of one's private life, slogans are of questionable moral value. Even if they came as disinterested messengers, the objection would still be valid. But when they come heavily charged with a pestiferous bias and have no purpose other than to precipitate conduct favorable to the propagandists no matter how oblique their intentions, the objection is greatly augmented.

The slogan is strong just in proportion to the weakness of individuals in capacity for guarding the portals of the mind. Drunkards, opium fiends, and other perverts have been made by outsiders taking possession of their thought processes at the critical moment. Suggestions, neatly built into and heading up the half-formed wishes, have produced criminals and other types of the anti-social. But the slightly opened door is no hint to the sloganizer. He bursts in and takes possession of the house, expelling complacency and turning order into restless irritation. When one

has been afflicted with tuberculosis, one's life is never the same; a dangerous weakness always remains. When one has been assaulted by a slogan a weakened condition abides. In a Western city an enterprising firm—to speak politely—makes business by smiting the senses of the people with this: "When you think of victrolas, think of ——'s." Here is a pair of ideas tied together inseparably. And repeated enough it would take a very determined person to break the chain. When one idea appears in consciousness, it is not one idea but twins. When thirsty, think of Old Scotch. When you have a headache, think of some nostrum to cure it. Do not say "dye," say the name of some particular brand. Do not say newspaper, say *Star* or *Journal*.

You cannot argue with disease germs. You cannot argue with slogans. Both are in the system and rooted before one knows it. The emotional life of man assumes and supports the absoluteness of its objects. Since slogans touch the emotional life mainly, they tend to become absolute. Only reflective thought qualifies and limits and so escapes the tyrant. Since habit is largely the arbiter of our daily choices, those who help to make our habits exercise control over us. Sloganizers and their instruments accomplish this end with multitudes. They secure actions first and then possibly some thought. And they secure actions favorable to others than the actors, quite largely.

Therefore the only safeguard that can be suggested is another habit, namely, that of rigid criticism. Sumner says:

> It is by criticism that the person is protected against credulity, emotion, and fallacy. Suggestion is a legitimate device, if it is honestly used, for inculcating knowledge of principles of conduct; that is for education in the broadest sense. An educated man ought to be beyond the reach of suggestion from advertisements, newspapers, speeches, and stories.

And of course he should not be trapped by slogans.

PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

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ABSTRACT

Patriotism and Internationalism.—Patriotism is an inheritance from primitive group life and is non-moral and irrational as applied to present nationalism. In groups that have suffered oppression it is pathological and must be dealt with patiently. *Perversion of patriotism.* Patriotism is stimulated artificially and immorally. It aims to be absolute. There is great value in loyalty, but it should be pluralistic rather than absolute. Ten per cent to 25 per cent patriotism would be about normal, and the rest of loyalty should go to communities of interest already international. The separation of church and state showed the possibility of divided sovereignty. This would be extended to include economic, culture, sport, and many other interests. If we were aware of the interests which are significant in our lives instead of focusing on perverted patriotism, we should find that we are already internationally organized.

As preliminary definitions we may consider patriotism as the emotion of loyalty for whatever one considers as his fatherland, whether nation or state. Internationalism, on the other hand, assumes a loyalty to some form of organization among nations, and involves an intellectual element lacking in patriotism.

As a matter of fact, the nation is a growth from innumerable simpler social forms, and the growth to internationalism is relatively but little more complex than has been the growth to nationalism.

First let us consider briefly the origin and nature of patriotism. The origin of patriotism is as humble as that of all of our inheritances. It comes from the dim past in which the human species was formed. The necessities for biological survival both for the young and for the adult demanded an immediate response to the needs of the group. Thus the impulse of group defense and mutual aid early identified the individual with the group. The emotion which accompanied the recognition of this identity is the beginning of loyalty and of patriotism. It is a biological inheritance no more moral in its beginning than hunger, since like hunger it was necessary for survival.

As the individual evolves, survival becomes more complex, and the group in which survival is posited is determined by the aspect of the self which is considered significant at the moment. At one time it may be the physical self, at another the economic, and at another the spiritual. In other words the whole variety of complexes by which the self is measured determines the particular direction of the struggle to survive. Because this impulse makes the individual lose a smaller self in a larger one, loyalty to the group has come to be esteemed as the highest virtue, though as an impulse it is totally blind and undiscriminating.

It is as impossible for patriotism, as such, to rationally estimate social values as it is for hunger to select food in terms of calories. Both hunger and group loyalty are essential assets to life but they are ill adapted to absolute unquestioned control of life, and yet that is what patriotism has demanded. In the "secondary groups" or the "Great Society" all native predispositions need to be constantly subjected to reanalysis.

One aspect of patriotism is nationalism. This is a very modern phenomenon. It must be distinguished from mere state organization with which it is sometimes identical and sometimes in opposition. The principle of "self-determination of nations" indicates the popular acceptance of the difference of interest between the state and the nation. Ireland and Korea are examples of national patriotism in opposition to their sovereign states.

Nationalism is not uniform and simple; it results from various conditions and has characteristic reactions.[1] In certain respects the psychology of the individual and of the group are parallel. This may be seen especially in inferiority and superiority complexes. The patriotism of an oppressed nation is full of pathological elements akin to inferiority complexes in individuals. The survival sought is "national self-respect." The symptoms are constant, the most characteristic is hypersensitiveness. Anyone at all familiar with the Irish can vouch for this. There is a disregard for personal survival that is quite abnormal. This form of nationalism tends to become chauvinistic, that is, attention is focused on

[1] See "The Sentiment of Nationalism," by Max Handman in the *Political Science Quarterly*, for an illuminating discussion of various types of nationalism.

nationality to the exclusion of everything else. It is a result of injustice in which the personality of a nation is felt to be disgraced. There is no more hope that a nation suffering from this oppression will make more than the meagerest advances in the direction of internationalism, than that a sick man will take up the full activities of health. A very large portion of the peoples of the world are still suffering from present or past experiences of oppression and they cannot be expected to act as normal groups. Even if the Irish Free State is well set going it will require a long period of convalescence. Germany suffered injustice from the France of Napoleon, and France was dominated by the Germany of Bismarck, and the Succession States of Austria-Hungary are full of psychoses And there are India, China, Korea, Egypt, Pan Africa—more than half of the human race—still in national relationships in which national self-respect is demanding satisfaction. In Mexico, Santo Domingo and Haiti, all of whose economic advantage would be greatly enhanced by acquiescing in the domination by America, the patriots are utterly indifferent to material advantage in their desire to have self-respecting freedom. Just as Ireland, Poland, and Czecho-slovakia care nothing for the economic advantage of relationship with the dominant nations, so Asia and Africa are entering into a state of mind which has all the earmarks of nationalistic patriotism, and which will make the problems of Europe look like child's play by comparison.

In spite of all this there are gleams of hope. Statesmen, publicists, and the common people are being awakened to a new idea of statescraft. Political practice and political science are about where pedagogy was when it began to change from discipline of fear to discipline of freedom and attraction. Bad as Europe now is it is immeasurably more likely to succeed, if it can make economic recovery, than under the old system in which the system itself went to smash. The example of England's finally yielding something to Ireland is a precedent for herself in other relations, which will affect India and China, and is a demonstration to all the world that the domination of empire can be yielded.

We also have patriotism of the aggression type in which the motive is glory or prestige rather than "self-respect." This has

not the same sort of pathological elements. America, England, and Germany are outstanding examples.

But whatever the nature and object of patriotism it is always artificially stimulated. The individual is not born into any groups except the immediately personal ones to which he will adhere patriotically without artificial stimulation. The technique for arousing patriotism has become highly specialized. Appeals to hate, fear, glory, and honor are always used along with the magnification of the history and heroes of the country. Leadership is taken by intellectuals, because of their knowledge of history and principles. It is well said that if it were not for the few agitators the people would never think of their plight as being undesirable.

It can be said categorically that patriotism is always aroused by immoral means. The greatest perversion has been in the teaching of history from the national point of view. The children are nurtured on history out of focus. In individuals manifestations of egotism are considered a vice, but in nations egotism is practiced as a virtue. The resultant self-complacency is both tragic and absurd. We admit that in wartime the propaganda for patriotism transgresses truth in its appeal to hate and vainglory, but it differs in degree only from that of peace time. Hatred of other nations is emphasized much more than love of one's fellow-nationals, thus the blind impulse of hate is used to enhance the blind impulse of patriotism and we supinely call the result moral.

The most false thing of all about patriotism is its demand that it be unqualified and absolute. The scope of any state or nation is so accidental and temporary that there can be no proper rational basis for unreasoned and undivided loyalty to it.

Pope Gregory the Seventh describes the origin of nations in the following picturesque words:

> Who is ignorant that our existing dynasties all derive their origin from such men, from the proud, from the impious, from perjurers, murderers, and robbers, from men stained with every crime that can debase human nature; and whose blind cupidity and intolerable insolence inspired them with the only motive they ever had in governing, namely, a tyrannical wish to domineer over their fellow creatures?[1]

[1] 53d Epistle.

It would be difficult to overestimate the moral and practical value of loyalty. I agree with Professor Royce that it is the prime virtue; but I insist that, like love, it may often be blind. As it manifests itself in patriotism it merges the individual into larger interests, and identifies him with a complex of groups which breaks down the hostility which tended to keep them apart. Sight of the flag or singing the national anthem will make a crowd of cosmopolitan boys thrill with common purpose. But when the boys thrill at one song and their parents at another, we see that what is the content of patriotism is entirely an accident. The trouble is that we limit our patriotism, by hard and fast boundaries, as though our survival were all within those boundaries. We all have many interests necessary for our full existence which have no more relation to frontiers than the area on which the sun's rays fall.

My second point is that the way out is by the substitution of pluralism of sovereignty for the monistic absolutism of patriotism. Laski has brilliantly and exhaustively shown in the history of the struggle between the church and the state that an actual division of sovereignty has been established in principle. This struggle was a long and hard one, and I hope that the establishment of other loyalties just as significant as these may have an easier career.

The preaching of 100 per cent patriotism is one of the greatest obstacles to clear vision and progress. It is a doctrine of absolutism which has no basis in fact. My thesis in this paper is that the facts demand the substitution of 10 to 25 per cent patriotism for 100 per cent patriotism. This proportion will account for the peculiarly provincial values that our particular fatherland has contributed to our development, and signifies for our survival. No one can be normal who has no sentiment of loyalty to that which is intimately related to him. Our geographical environment, local history, language, and mores contribute to our unique individuality and deserve their proper proportion of allegiance. I spent part of my early life a few miles from Plymouth Rock and part of it among the mountains of New Hampshire. I glory in the Pilgrim traditions, and the sight of mountains always gives me joy. When I am in a foreign country I always thrill at the sight of an American flag. America means something real to me, but not all of reality.

The 75 to 90 per cent of loyalty that is left belongs to values in our lives that are international rather than national. If history could be taught as Mr. Wells urges that it should be taught we might soon all learn that even in the most different of us there is more that is common to all than is peculiar to any. And if we go back of history to biology we can see that while races may differ from one another by a fraction of a per cent the rest is common heritage. While I was inspired by sentiments gathering about Plymouth history I also owe much to the Roman Forum and Magna Carta and, Protestant that I am, to the Roman Catholic church and to the faith of Israel.

Mr. L. P. Jacks[1] urges that in behalf of internationalism we should develop various "communities of interest." It is my claim that we already have enough communities of interest to change the whole nature of social organization if we could only become aware of them. I agree fully with Mr. Jacks that there is no hope in immediate political internationalism. That will come last and only after there has been a complete reorganization of political concepts in terms of economic and social values.

When we get this awareness of vital international interest it will be as easy to enlarge the emotion of patriotism from its present artificial limits as it was to get it to its present national character from the tribal and feudal groups which preceded the present stage. A direct attack on the fallacy of the inherent validity of the present objects of patriotism will be ineffective, but if we can stop the immoral and untrue area of its cultivation we shall eventually find ourselves loyal to international interests which are vital in national life in the same way that we have found national values significant in community life.

The most obvious and perhaps the most important present international organization is the economic. Both capitalism and proletarianism have discovered their wider interests, the former more in practice, and the latter more in program. International trade is old but the complex economic organization of the present is too modern for us to have adjusted our sentiments and loyalty to it. It applies to banking, production, and commerce. When

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1920.

I was in Russia, just before the war, I took my letters of introduction in Moscow to the building of the International Harvester Company whose headquarters are in Chicago, but whose name nevertheless indicates its scope. I also saw all over Russia the products of the National Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, and in St. Petersburg, as it was then called, I visited the American Consul in the Singer Building. While the Rothschilds symbolize international banking, they merely set the pace. Wall Street almost means international finance. A year ago I met in Bucharest, Sophia, and Belgrade the same representative of the Guaranty Trust Company, who had just come from Warsaw and whose headquarters are in London. The publication everyday in papers throughout the world of the foreign exchange values of money indicates how closely all are involved.

The international nature of communication emphasizes the absurdity of national limitations by the feeling of annoyance every time its free passage is obstructed, and with the coming of the airship and wireless, customs officials and censors at frontiers will become as obsolete as communication by beacon fires.

It is still possible to play upon the tremendous prejudice of patriotism for partisan and political purposes. Capital uses it most effectively for throwing sand in the eyes of the public in its own behalf in the class struggle. Much popular support was gained by the United States Steel Company by implying that there was something alien about the strikers and something peculiarly American about the company. Judge Gary told the Interchurch Committee that it was a conflict between "Americanism and bolshevism." In the light of the well-known international connections of the Steel Company it sounded like an effort to divert attention for special advantage.

Of course prejudice is largely unconscious and unintentioned, but much of the present anti-Semitism is due to the wave of local patriotisms which follow every war and which sees in the Jew, who is a member of many nations and who does business across boundaries, an aggravating antithesis to their own emotions. It is difficult to hate a principle, and the Jew serves as the personal symbol. But commerce needs to go on. There is no greater

chauvinistic bitterness than existed among the Succession States of Austria-Hungary a year ago, and yet in the course of the summer there was much evidence of increasing exchange of commodities. The process by which it was brought about I saw illustrated on the top of the Carpathian Mountains at the frontier between Poland and Czecho-slovakia. At the time, the hostility between the two states was exceedingly bitter. There were barbed wire and armed guards, but at the otherwise deserted station there were three Jews, one from Czecho-slovakia and two from Poland arranging for the exchange of manufactured goods from the former, for petroleum from the latter. This exchange satisfied imperative needs and the Jews performed a necessary service, but at the same time gave the anti-Semites another point of attack. The Little Entente was formed primarily for economic advantage and is the beginning of some sort of Danubian confederation among nations all of which are chauvinistic.

It is obvious to me that we must soon recognize that plural sovereignity applies as clearly to economics as to religion. Economists have taught the principles of free-trade for a generation, but at the same time they have not objected to the teaching of absolute patriotism, with the result that there has been no diminution of the tendency of patriotic politicians to raise protective tariffs.

The success of socialism as compared to Christianity in riveting attention on the international ideal has been quite remarkable. Patriotism has given us tribal gods, while Socialism has made the international interests of the proletariat surprisingly clear. Whatever objections one may have to other aspects of socialism it has accelerated our thinking on the vital character of international interest.

The Roman Catholic church has claimed and held loyalty without conflict with the essential patriotic interest, and while less articulate the same thing is true of other religions and even of sects. Judaism, Greek Orthodoxy, and Mohammedanism do not know national limitations, but Quakerism, Methodism, and Bahaism also go about their business without political consideration, though the struggle to attain this freedom has been hard and there are many scars and cripples.

If we take culture in general we see that there is much more that is internationally common than that is peculiar. It would be difficult to have imagined such irrational and accidental divisions of loyalty as developed in Europe. There is not a single natural line that has been followed. The linguistic divisions of Slavic, Teutonic, and Celtic bear only the vaguest relation to the highly esteemed Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean, and these even less to the political units. The potential differences among the people of China and of India are as great as those that have developed in Europe, but we assume an ultimate unity in China in spite of the division into North and South and the conflicts of provinces; and in India we see a merging of what seemed to be insuperably antagonistic. The point in this is that it is entirely accidental whether we have a large or small object for our loyalty. Either China or India will make a unity of at least twice as many people as all of Europe.

Science is admittedly international, but so is sympathy. We feel no shock in giving help to starving children even in Germany. There are many other dominant interests that are more or less international and they are increasing in number very rapidily, and we might much better give our attention to discovering them than in perpetuating a patriotism that is no longer true. We are all now a bit ashamed that we carried our hostility to Germans, to German music, and even to the German language. In the early years of the war the common soldiers insisted that the Christmas spirit was international.

I do not undervalue the emotion of patriotism. In fact I would agree with John Morley, "to deride patriotism is the mark of impoverished blood, but to extol it as an ideal or an impulse above truth and the general interest of humanity is far worse." But it is my claim that already more than half of the values that give reality to our lives are internationally in existence, and that the possibilities of pluralistic sovereignty make it entirely possible to be loyal to them. Most specific patriotic claims are anachronous.

Both decentralization and pluralism of patriotism are even now taking place within the British Empire. The prime ministers of the colonies have met on the level of equality with Lloyd George, and the degree of loyalty asked of Ireland is as slight as the actual

authority of the king. We are already beginning to put into practice a national tolerance exactly like religious tolerance. In the constitutions of the new states of Europe provision is made for the guaranteeing of rights to religious and national minorities This is a new thing in sovereign states, and enlarges the range of pluralism. In America we had recognized the principle of tolerance until the absurd concepts of "hyphenated American" and "America first" were exploited. Then we lost it, but in spite of our retrogression we still have pro-English, pro-Irish, and even pro-Japanese citizens, as well as the various oppression loyalties of our immigrants.

To be loyal is necessary to the nature of normal man, but to have a perverted patriotism is inconsistent with the new groupings essential for his survival. It is our duty as teachers and seekers of reality to resist the claims of an absolutism which can no longer find any rational justification.

HEREDITARY HUMAN GROUPS IN THEIR RELATION TO DISTINCTIVE CULTURES

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ABSTRACT

Hereditary Human Groups in Their Relation to Distinctive Cultures.—The amount of time necessary to establish a biologically hereditary group of plants, animals, or men is short by the process of mutation; it is longer, but is often surprisingly short by the process of deliberate hybridization. Biologically hereditary human groups have the tendency to produce distinctive cultures as part of their group protective and defensive devices. Special study should be given to hereditary human groups because they have perfected distinctive cultures. *Immigration and nationality.* Those interested in the building of modern immigrant nations should heed the apparent truth that only those nations will long survive which follow the age-long law that distinctive and natural cultures are protective devices.

Four factors play the chief rôles in determining the distinguishing characteristics of human groups, namely, those of heredity, environment, daily history, and ideals.

On the subject of the hereditary group, I shall attempt to suggest three points: First, the shortness of time necessary for the development of some hereditary groups in familiar forms of life, including the human; second, that distinctive cultures developed by hereditary human groups become protective and defensive devices in the preservation of those groups; and, third, that more commonly in all phases of life we should turn our attention to hereditary groups of peoples, already made or in the making, as the originators and carriers of distinctive cultural contributions to the world.

So frequently has it been said that there are no pure so-called races or groups of mankind that we should first note some illuminating truths brought to light by recent studies in heredity. They show the falsity of the common idea that a long lapse of time is necessary to establish or "fix" the characteristics of a pure breed among plants, animals, and men—all of which are governed by the same laws of heredity. Today we know that certain individual

plants. animals. and men differing markedly from all their ancestors are as "pure-bred" gametically as though they and their ancestors had been quite indistinguishable for 100 or 1.000 years. Such individuals are scientifically called "mutants" or "sports."

No matter what may be the causes of variations resulting in mutations, it is thoroughly established that when "mutants" or "sports" are bred *inter se* they produce new hereditary groups which are as "pure-bred" as are the members of any old-line group. Further, so prepotent is the mutant that the careful and intelligent breeder time and again has had the good fortune to establish a new hereditary group from a single original mutant. Genetically speaking, mutants are potential ancestors; they are not descendants. Classically speaking, mutants spring full-fledged from the head of Zeus; speaking United States, mutants are like Topsy—they "just growed." The facts are that mutants are equipped to start new hereditary groups. But new hereditary groups are also quickly produced by the selective breeding of individuals showing slighter variations, and also by the process of the hybridization of typical members of two or more distinctive breeds. A few illustrations showing use of mutations, and others of hybridization, in producing hereditary groups will make my meaning clear.

In the plant world there is the pink-fleshed grapefruit mutant of Florida scientifically reported in May, 1921, but discovered during the season of 1906–7 by Mr. R. B. Foster. One limb of a Walters' grapefruit tree bore the new pink-fleshed fruit. Since 1914 trees of this unusual variety have been catalogued and distributed by a nursery under the name of the "Foster," the discoverer.[1] Those trees are "pure-bred"; they resulted from one original bud mutant on a Walters' grapefruit tree.

East and Jones reported in February, 1921, a new "pure-bred" round-tip tobacco which in Connecticut they "made to order from specifications drawn by manufacturers and consumers of cigars, and the growers of tobacco." It required only the fourth generation of hybrids before the new tobacco was secured, but now after

[1] T. Ralph Robinson, "The Bud-Sport Origin of a New Pink-Fleshed Grapefruit in Florida," *Journal of Heredity* (May, 1921), pp. 194–98.

a three years' test "it is as uniform in type as any of the older varieties," and, besides, it possesses superior original qualities.[1]

In the animal world the recent American product, the Polled Hereford cattle, is a good illustration of the mutant among animals establishing a hereditary group. In 1901 the first herd of Polled or hornless Hereford cattle was made in Iowa. In less than twenty years there were 6,911 herds headed by Polled Hereford bulls; they were scattered in forty-four states, as well as in Mexico, various South American countries, Canada, Hawaii, the Philippines and Australia.[2] The story in brief is as follows: In 1901 a circular letter was sent to all members of the American Hereford Cattle Breeders' Association inquiring for hornless "freaks" among pure-bred and registered Hereford cattle. Four male and ten female hornless mutants were thus located. The four males and seven of the females were purchased, and brought together to make a herd in Iowa. Thus was set up the foundation herd to breed a new pure-bred beef cattle. The Polled Herefords are a pure hereditary group, varying from the ancestral stock in at least three distinctive characteristics, namely, hornlessness, early maturity, and thriftiness. As has been noted, Polled Herefords have greatly increased in numbers since those first calves were dropped in 1902, but they are no more "pure-bred" than were the calves then born for the first time to a polled mutant sire and a polled mutant dam of the Hereford breed.

A new heredity group of animals has been fixed by the process of hybridization since the year 1912. I refer to the "Lamona," a new general purpose breed of poultry made by Harry M. Lamon. He used three established breeds of poultry to produce the new breed. Dr. George M. Rommel, secretary of the American Genetic Association and also Chief of the Animal Husbandry Division of the United States Department of Agriculture, says this about the new hereditary group: "The breed has progressed far enough so that type and various characters, such as color, the red earlobe

[1] E. M. East and D. F. Jones, "Round-Tip Tobacco—A Plant "Made to Order," *Journal of Heredity* (February, 1921), pp. 50–56.

[2] *Polled Herefords*, issued by B. O. Gammon, secretary of The American Polled Hereford Breeders' Association, Des Moines, Iowa, 1920.

and the white-shelled egg. have been fixed."[1] So sure are the genetic experts and scientific breeders in the Department of Agriculture that the new breed is made. that April 23. 1921. the Secretary of Agriculture approved, naming it "Lamona" after its maker.

In the world of men some few new or recently reported mutants which are pure-bred are the following:

There are the "slit-eyed people" of northeastern Georgia. Four generations of them were reported by Mr. H. P. Stuckey in 1916. The appearance of the eye is entirely unlike the slit eye seen so frequently in the Orient as an extreme case of the typical hereditary Mongolian eyelid. In the Georgia cases clear or unobstructed vision is possible only when the face is elevated by "throwing back" the head.[2]

We have the group with short fingers and toes. due to absence of one phalanx from each digit, except the thumb and great toe. Dr. Farabee published this case in 1905. He presents the heredity of five succeeding generations with several collateral lines of descendants.[3]

There is the group of piebald persons reported by the writer in 1914. This group was studied through three successive generations.[4]

A most peculiar mutant has just been reported. It is the toothless mutant, also without head-hair, reported in a preliminary paper February, 1921, by K. I. Thadani, among the Hindu Amil community in India. Those people are locally known as "Bhudas." This toothless and hairless character is also sex-linked—only the males being affected, though born of normal appearing mothers who are the daughters of other Bhuda or affected men. Though no case of intermarriage between the

[1] Harry M. Lamon, "Lamona—a New Breed of Poultry," *Journal of Heredity* (January, 1921), pp. 2–29.

[2] H. P. Stuckey, "The Slit-Eyed People," *Journal of Heredity* (April, 1916), p. 147.

[3] William C. Farabee, "Inheritance of Digital Malformations in Man," *Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University*, III, No. 3 (March, 1905), pp. 65–87.

[4] Albert Ernest Jenks, "A Piebald Family of White Americans," *American Anthropologist* (New Series), (April–June, 1914), pp. 221–37.

toothless and hairless males and the females who carry and transmit the character to their sons is known to Mr. Thadani, there is, of course, good reason to expect that toothless and hairless females as well as males would result in certain proportion of the offspring of such marriages; a pure-bred group with all offspring affected could be made by deliberately breeding animals so characterized.[1]

There are the three families of pure albinos consisting of albino husband and wife, each family having pure albino offspring, reported by Davenport in 1910.[2] It recalls to mind the Minnesota albino herd of Holstein cattle.[3]

I have brought these facts of plant, animal, and human hereditary groups—some from mutants, and others as the result of hybridization—in order to make clear that hereditary groups are being established at the present; and, further, because the laws of heredity are old and not new, to show that hereditary groups have always been forming. These extreme cases of human hereditary groups are brought to illustrate beyond dispute the working of the laws of heredity in producing hereditary human groups. In the same way groups varying advantageously for survival and cultural advancement have been formed.

Many hereditary human groups have perished. Many others have persisted and are with us today. The field anthropologist is familiar with distinctive hereditary groups of peoples in isolated islands, in numerous mountain pockets, in areas segregated by commanding physiographic barriers, and even in villages scattered over areas of uniform environment. Many groups with distinctive cultures are older than their own historic records. Some, however, are recent, such as the Englishman's group, the result of hybridization, which is only 855 years from the date of its last ethnic and cultural contributor. Another one is forming now by hybridization in Pitcairn Island, bred up of Polynesian and

[1] K. I. Thadani, "A Toothless Type of Man" (a preliminary paper), *Journal of Heredity* (February, 1921), pp. 87–88.

[2] C. B. Davenport, "Hereditary Albinism," *Journal of Heredity* (May, 1916), pp. 221–23.

[3] See article by J. A. Detlepsen, "A Herd of Albino Cattle" (with illustrations), *Journal of Heredity* (November–December, 1920), pp. 378–79.

British ancestors. Another is unquestionably forming by hybridization in our own Appalachian Mountains where the recurrent physical type greets the observant visitor in every cove in which he loiters—yet I failed to find there adults of more than four generations of known American birth and hybridization.

The weaknesses and limitations of the body of early man compelled him to cultural activities, if he would survive; his fortunate variations toward intelligence superior to his competitive animal neighbors enabled him to begin lowly cultural activities. In time, man intensified those distinctive cultures which protected and defended him. So, again, in time, certain hereditary groups have specialized in those cultures which were particularly protective in preserving their integrity. Thus guarded and defended by distinctive cultures strong, intelligent, and self-conscious hereditary groups have preserved themselves even without the sustaining help of the old home environment. Even scattered about the earth some of those hereditary groups have survived primarily because of their distinctive cultures. It is probable that many of the groups which have perished did not succeed in developing strong distinctive culture.

This brings me to the second point of this paper—that distinctive cultures developed by hereditary human groups become protective and defensive devices. I shall suggest a hereditary group known by all to be so old, so pure-bred, and so distinctive in physical, psychic, and cultural aspects that no one can seriously question the case.

Because of the ease with which cultures travel from one advanced cultural group to another today, because also there are such persistent efforts to put the culture of one group over on another (seen especially in missionary endeavors in religion, education, medicine, sanitation, etc.), and, further, because developing "wants" invite the distinctive culture of one group into the very heart of another group (as seen in modern commerce, and in scientific agricultural and zoöcultural importations from foreign lands), my second point can be made clearer with fewer facts by the use of such an old and well-known group as the one I propose to use, though similar truths could be brought almost endlessly from other hereditary groups of people.

The Jewish people are before us as a hereditary group freed from the influence of stable or uniform physical environment. This is one of the most pure-bred groups in modern civilization. Intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews has much more commonly removed the Jew from his group than it has added non-Jews to the Jewish group. There have probably been one hundred "emancipated Jews" to one person converted to the Jews. Throughout the diaspore the emancipated Jew has been a cause of deep sorrow to the Jewish people. Some modern authors say 10 per cent are or will be emancipated; Zangwill puts it at about one-third. Leaving aside the emancipated Jew, one cannot deny that the Jewish group is a decidedly pure-bred hereditary group.

Others besides, and since, Frederick Adams Woods, have proved that man inherits mental as well as physical characteristics. I shall use a few recent and readily accessible quotations, all from Jewish authors, to show that the Jews believe they have preserved from the time of their racial inception the same characteristic reactions to the problems of life.

Untermeyer, writing of contemporary Jewish poetry in America, says:

> I shall, however, mention certain outstanding racial characteristics and illustrate how strikingly these qualities are being evoked in the literature—and particularly the poetry—of contemporary America. Even the lightest sketching of our literary backgrounds reveals that troubled energy, that probing dissatisfaction, that intent and almost too intense introspection which is so eternally Semitic. The exponents of this spirit revivify their ancient inheritance.[1]

Again, a Jewish intellectual leader in America writing over the pen name of "S. Baruch," says:

> In the dim dawn of our history, on the plains of Chaldaea, our father Abraham (whether a historical person or a figment of tradition does not matter) began the process of weeding out from our hearts and minds certain legends; he demolished the idols of his tribe. Generation upon generation of our ancestors have diligently labored at this weeding-out process; with the result that to break idols has become Judaism's mission.[2]

[1] Louis Untermeyer, "The Jewish Spirit in Modern American Poetry," *Menorah Journal*, VII (August, 1921), 121.

[2] S. Baruch, "Whither?" *Menorah Journal*, V (June, 1919), 125.

What is truer? I leave you to supply the long list of names from the days of Old Testament history down to yesterday's new from Russia.

Against racial and cultural disintegration the Jewish group has ceaselessly struggled. Properly to witness this struggle for race preservation it must be realized that, in the words of Simon. "The nationality of the Jew is inseparable from his national God."[1]

We cannot deny that the Jews in their religious beliefs and practices have developed a decidedly distinctive culture. This culture they have used, and have been driven to use, toward protective and defensive ends.

Simon says:

> What in fact the Jewish nation has been doing during the last two thousand years is only a continuation, under different conditions, of what it was doing before the Exile. It has been preserving its identity as a nation, which no merely physical weapon could have secured, by means of spiritual defences—that is, by turning its national-religous idea to that use which circumstances dictated, ever adapting and developing that idea and its consequences under the stress of changing conditions, to the end that it might live.[2]

Again, the same author says:

> It is in response to the national instinct of self-preservation that we Jews in exile have woven around our belief in a universal God an all-embracing web of ceremonial practice, which for the best part of two thousand years has been at least as essential to Judaism as any particular religious belief. For the salvation of the individual soul a set of dogmas and moral rules may be enough; but if a nation wishes to preserve itself after it has lost the ordinary attributes of nationhood, it must have a distinctive mode of life. It goes without saying that the characteristic Jewish mode of life has come down to the present day as something specifically religious. For the Jew took with him into exile nothing but his God and his Law, and the development of his national life had to proceed in a single channel. With parliaments and armies and navies, with the making of roads and railways, with the development of styles of art and architecture, with the devising of improved mechanical means for the satisfaction of human wants—with all these things the Jewish nation as such has had nothing to do since the dispersion. The national energies had to find their outlet in the working out of a scheme of life which should preserve the identity of a nation without a territory or a parliament or a gun or a ship to call its own.[3]

[1] Leon Simon, "Religion and Nationality," *Menorah Journal*, V (August, 1919), 231.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 231. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

Enough has been said, I believe, strongly to suggest that a hereditary human group, as it develops the cultures necessary for its continuance, tends to intensify and thus to make distinctive that particular culture which best preserves the purity of the group. Remember it is at all times dominated by the biological urge to survive and replenish the earth. It seems to be true that dominant and distinctive cultures so far in history—or up to the time of the making of immigrant nations—have commonly come from strong hereditary human groups. The two have been quite inseparable.

The third point I desire to suggest in this paper is that, more commonly than we have, we should turn our attention to the study of hereditary groups of people as the originators and carriers of distinctive cultures for the enrichment of civilization. We should do this in all phases of cultural life—in the social, economic, political, educational, moral, and aesthetic fields. It appears true that the hereditary group, carrying no foreign cultural burdens, bears the load of its own cultural activities with least friction, because those activities are of its own development. They are necessary and they have been made to fit. Thus each group, on its then level of development, tends to perfect its distinctive cultures. Its cultural devices tend to become really cultural art, due to harmonious practices stripped of superfluities.

As the educated man today reaches for and prizes the pure-bred plants and animals to enrich his economic world through their perfection and prepotency, so I am certain we should go to pure-bred and distinctive cultures to enrich and make more varied the present and future fruitage of civilization.

There is a powerful and meaningful message in this whole subject for modern nation builders. Evidently the nations which will long survive will breed their own and highly develop their distinctive cultures.

INFLUENCE OF HEREDITARY TRAITS ON HUMAN PROGRESS

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ABSTRACT

Hereditary Traits as Factors in Human Progress.—A rather neglected factor in the recent development of sociology is the importance of hereditary traits of the individual as the starting-point of human progress. If there can be no progress without the social environment and the social heredity it is evident that nothing can be done without the individual human traits or natural inheritance. Progress is determined by the extent to which superior hereditary traits are put in touch with opportunity. The foundations of association are found in the primary human instincts. They are modified by the physical and social environment. Together with the emotions they represent the driving power of human association. *Control of hereditary traits by intelligence.* Human progress demands that instincts and emotions should be placed more fully in control of intelligence. The program of society is to discover and utilize these superior individual traits by giving them the right training and the right environment. Differences of individual traits should be recognized and superior traits put in touch with opportunities; thus individual responsibility will not be lost and group activity will be made effective. *Tradition and progress.* All progress occurs through the breaking away from tradition. The social heritage may be for or against human progress. Great inventors, great religious leaders, great statesmen and great educators are those that have the courage to break with convention and thus cause a mutation which lifts society to a higher plane. Progress of today is a call to the superior. We may not be spending too much time on the mediocre and the inferior, but we do not fully recognize that all progress depends upon utilization of superior individual traits.

The great complexity and tremendous activity of modern social life are overpowering. Organization and super-organization from the local group to the international combination present such a network of interlacing forms and overlapping agencies that the intelligence of man seems unable to direct them. The dominance of group activity makes a machine-made world with mass play in industry, education, religion, politics, and social order. The individual seems overwhelmed in the social plexus and appears insignificant in comparison with social functions. As major problems of life are involved in the interrelationships of groups the sociologist turns his attention to the function of the group. He faces the tide of oncoming events, observes the mass play of civilization, studies society in its social complexes and concludes that the hope of human progress is wrapped up in process of the group.

No doubt the influences of group activity in building personality and furnishing opportunity to the individual are normal processes of development, but the recent importance attached by philosophers to the activities of the group would lead one to infer that in the beginning society created man, generated his instincts, and endowed him with reason, in short that man was "pre-formed" in the womb of the social group. Yet it is well to remember that society is not born and the individual is; that the first creation was not a swarm but an individual; that the stream of life in the germ plasm passing from individual to individual makes society possible. While the importance of society in shaping personality is freely admitted and group activity as a center of dynamic achievement is evident, the hereditary traits of the individual are the points of departure for all human progress. Moreover, the individual becomes a permanent, persistent factor in the whole process of social life. Though society furnishes the means of growth of the completed personality and demonstrates that man cannot develop without the interaction of members of the group, he is the original material out of which society builds itself. Hence it is that in the consideration of human progress or social progress as one of its phases, hereditary traits of the individual should receive full consideration. At least the individual is not a myth, nor a hypothesis, but a living reality in the evolution of sentient beings, and especially to be accounted for in all social processes.

The characters of the physical individual are determined by factors or potencies in the germ plasm of the parents. They are expressed in the body forms and body functions of the offspring. The perpetuation of individual traits and their variation through the union of the sexes produce qualities which determine the individual differences. This gives an opportunity for progress through individual variation. This process of evolution, however, is not a creation but a transformation, progress being determined through variation and mutation. The development of the body and of the brain of the individual has probably reached its climax so far as physical power is concerned. There is not likely to appear a physical superman on account of the limitations of differentiation and wherever we have highly specialized physical development as

in the nervous system it is offset by decline in other physical functions; at least the size and the power of the brain seem not to have changed in many centuries. This is true of other organs of the body. The hope of progress consists so far as the body is concerned in developing what nature has provided by natural and successful combinations. The direction of human heredity in the future may yield large returns by giving nature an opportunity to select superior qualities and giving opportunity for the development of those physical hereditary traits. In this the direction of the intelligence might do a great deal while nature makes her selection in her own workshop. From the very beginning of the life in the germ cell, through the embryonic period, after birth, and to the end of individual life, the environment modifies the development of the individual. The hereditary traits are thus vitalized intrinsically and modified extrinsically through the process of life-development.

But primarily these traits are not determined by the environment of the body cells but by factors and potencies originally existing in the germ plasm. Following the same law after birth, these traits may be modified and given opportunity for development by social environment. The individual dies at maturity and passes on the hereditary characters. All that he has acquired during his individual life does not visibly affect the offspring. The latter begins not where the parent left off, but just where he began, and must live over the life of experience, of trial and error, in developing the individual body. But he has inherited from his ancestry the accumulation of social heredity out of which comes the second possibility of progress. Unit characters are handed on from generation to generation, and these are sometimes superior and sometimes inferior, but are unchanged in their fundamental characters by environment and education.

In making this statement the writer is approaching very close to the long controversy over the relative value of heredity and environment which he does not expect to enter at this time except to say that one is as important as the other and both are necessary. For progress cannot be made without improvement along both lines. While biologists are very strong in

their assertions that acquired characters cannot be transmitted there is no lack of argument that environmental conditions may modify and slowly influence through the long generations the qualities of hereditary traits. Darwin asserted that progress was not possible without this. Subsequent biologists have entirely discarded the idea but now a new class of scientists are experimenting under the hypothesis that there is a possible middle ground of slowly changing hereditary traits due to environmental influences. If permanent characteristics are transmitted and acquired characteristics are not, improvement in the racial stock may take place only in the variation of the germ cells. However, it is possible improvement of stock may take place through the modification of the germ plasm by the body cells by slow degrees through long spaces of time. It is possible that the influence of nourishment of the germ cell may cause the determiners certain variations in selection. The experiments are largely based upon principles worked out in immunity. It is certain that there are various bodily unit characters which are transmitted from parent to offspring. Progress is determined by not only the kind and quality of these hereditary traits that are transmitted but especially in the variations which permit new combinations through blending or through accentuation of some qualities and the recession of others, and finally as has been stated in the slow modification of the hereditary selection from generation to generation.

The hereditary mental unit traits are more difficult to discover than the physical, but enough investigation has been carried on to show that the same law controlling physical heredity controls the mental and that the hereditary mental traits or strains are inherited in the same way as the physical. The factors or potencies in the germ plasm determine the character of the mental traits appearing in the offspring. Here as in the physical no traits are inherited directly but only the power exists in the germ plasm to create traits in the offspring similar to those in the original parent. So the child at birth is endowed with hereditary strains which determine his possibilities of development. At birth it begins its life by sensation and reflex action but soon is influenced in its development by its environment both physical and social. At

first he has no power to choose his environment but as his body and mind develop he has within him more or less power to select his environment. Thus the individual heredity comes early in contact with social heredity but the law of selection continues and whether we consider the child biologically or psychologically we find in the very beginning the germ of individual life with its chemical, physical, and vital reactions. Through the embryonic period it draws its very being from the life of the individual who gave it birth, but the development of that life is determined by the stimuli given by physical and social environment. The germ plasm which represents the point of life-departure of the individual has power to determine the possibilities of future development but it does not control the development except in the selective power of the individual. The germ plasm cannot be a social mother originally, nor can society be the mother of the germ plasm; nevertheless hereditary traits are to a certain extent the social determiners because of the element of selection that enters into social heredity.

Thus if heredity can do nothing without environment likewise environment can do nothing without heredity. The social contact is stronger in building up the personality of the child; it brings out and makes possible the potentialities of heredity but environment, social or physical, cannot lay the foundations of life, it can only modify character and make opportunity for development. Granted that no person can be created a full-functioned human person without the social environment the group must first have individual traits before it is formed.

So we find that the individual may be modified during the succeeding generations biologically and psychologically, first through the laws of selection and differentiation determined in the germ plasm and then by adaptation to environment. But adaptation is determined by the quality of hereditary traits combined with the influence of the social group. The environmental influences act in accordance with the law of selection because the social heritage handed down from generation to generation of acquired characters gives him variety of activities out of which he may select those which best advance his development. As the traits that occur in the individual may reappear in the offspring of the next genera-

tion and in the process of inheritance as well as in the process of development, there is no distinct line of demarcation between physical and mental evolution; they necessarily go together so that the potentiality of hereditary traits reveals itself in the psychical as well as in the biological world.

Thus the primary instincts which appear at birth and in the subsequent years immediately following birth are fundamental human traits. These instincts may be modified by habits and environment through the long generations. Primarily the instincts act independently of intelligence but in the course of development of the individual they may become subordinate to the intelligence and are directed by it.

Psychologists have never reached an agreement as to the nature of the human instinct, its time of inception, and its subsequent modifications. The confusion arises largely because investigators have approached the subject from various points of view and because the relation of instinct to intelligence has not been clearly determined. The instinct is a universal quality of sentient beings and is of greater variation and extent in man than in any other animal. In the procession of the species instinct has been discovered in some of the very lowest animals. It expresses itself in different ways in different animals but is an ever constant factor in the process of evolution. Another reason why investigators are confused regarding the nature of the instinct is because they fail to recognize the laws of differentiation involved in its development. Instincts appear in different ways in genetic development. Variation is a constant process and as mind and body of the individual have the same origin they develop in accordance with the same law. Under similar stimuli instincts give similar reactions in the attempt to satisfy biological and psychological purposes and finally in the reaction of the social heredity and social environment there comes an idealism which can find expression only in social activity. Individuals must have a larger expression of their lives in social co-operation. This co-operation may be approached along the lines of instinct but reaches its most fruitful results by direction of intelligence. Hence instincts, emotions, and reason act by differential processes and seldom express themselves in exactly the same way.

Because of the very nature of instinct and its mode of action it is quite normal that investigators approaching the subject from different points of view and from different fields of investigation should have widely different conceptions of instinct and hence make widely different definitions of it. The error comes in trying to reduce a changeable function of life permitting great variation to a fixed formula. One might as well say that there is no such thing as a mind, or indeed no such thing as consciousness because of the excessive variability of those two definite phenomena as to say there are no such things as instincts. There is something which is not reason nor intelligence, nor physical nor chemical force which appears and reappears in each successive generation without habit, without instruction, without imitation. One may as well call it instinct as to call it the "great indefinable." Birds, ants, and bees exhibit actions coming from inherent qualities of their life. They do not come from intelligence, nor reason, nor emotion; they are simply instincts as real as any other quality discovered in sentient beings.

Man as we know him has developed more or less intelligence although his motives are derived from the instincts and emotions. Social heredity gives the infant protection and has given him habits and environmental influences from the very beginning of his life of sensation and reflex action. Yet the same law of instinct that moves in the lives of lower animals is applied to him. He performs certain functions not determined by intelligence or reason, similar to those of all animal life. Call them instincts. It does not matter that these are more or less influenced by environment, especially social environment, or directed by intelligence. The law is there and because of the complex organization of man these instincts operate in a great many diversified ways and because of the influence of the complex environment their expression must be more or less irregular. The instincts are really the sources of human association. These accompanied by the emotions are more powerful in human action than all of the direction of reason and intelligence. They represent the urge of association and the foundation of mutual attraction.

One of the most confusing things regarding the interpretation of the instinct is the fact revealed by observation and experimenta-

tion that instincts do not all appear at the birth of the child but appear as needed. Thus all the instincts that pertain to self-preservation and defense occur early in the child, later comes the sex instinct, and subsequently the maternal instinct which appears after the more complete development of the individual. Religion comes still later, which represents an expression of many instincts and emotions. All the way along, in the development of the individual, habit interferes with instinct, giving it a deflected action from its hereditary impulse. Environment suppresses or accentuates it or causes it to act in certain ways. The social organization also influences its mode of expression and the intelligence seeks to guide and modify it in various ways, but with all of these modifications the large part of the actions of human beings is determined by the instincts and the emotions. It is only in the very recent history of the human being that the intelligence has attained the ascendancy and so limited is its power and so irregularly imperfect is its rule that the instincts and emotions still represent the dominant forces of individual and social life. Human progress will be measured in the future just to the extent which intelligence becomes a guide and a director of these forces.

Society as an entity could not write a book of merit, compose a symphony or invent a machine; but individuals with superior hereditary traits may do these things. Society through education and accumulation of wealth makes it possible to protect these hereditary traits and to utilize these products and assist the inventor in accomplishing his purpose. Social heredity which represents the traditional accumulation of knowledge and skill of the past handed down from generation to generation gives the individual his workshop. The influence of this social heritage in shaping the life of the individual increases as society becomes more complex. If the hereditary traits determine the possibilities of development the social heredity furnishes the opportunity. The influence of social environment on the personality will bring to light the modification of social selection, for the social selection modifies the individual in his choices. Whether the hereditary trait will find opportunity for full development and full achievement will be determined by genealogical, physical, and mental characters and the selective training and selective environ-

ment given respectively to the superior, the mediocre, and the inferior.

For progress is dependent upon hereditary traits on one hand and environmental conditions and processes on the other. It is difficult to determine what constitutes progress. Among philosophers happiness is more frequently set up as the ideal of human life than any other. This largely comes from moralists, while biologists hold that the perpetuation of the species is the great aim of life. Perhaps both are right but the question cannot be settled in the case of the former without determining the ideal or in the case of the latter without determining what the species will do after perpetuation.

Much confusion of thought arises from failure to draw a clear line between influences arising from individual hereditary traits and social heredity. This is indeed difficult because in development the two work co-operatively and simultaneously. The inheritance of former generations not only provided the tools of workmanship but knowledge, through experience, of how to modify environment. The child is born into a status of language, of law and social organization, of religion and education, with an accumulation of the vast material products of the previous ages. As an individual he cannot inherit the experience of his parents but must begin where they began, but social heritage surrounds him and envelops him with a multitude of opportunities to build his personality. It provides the means and shapes the course of his development. But social heritage in itself does not insure progress because there is good and bad social heritage just as there are strong and weak individual hereditary traits. The binding influences of tradition in religion, language, and social customs frequently paralyze effort and keep the group or race from going forward. How often has religious taboo or religious sanction kept the intelligence from laying hold of better things and starting the race on a new line of development. Likewise traditions and customs of government have kept people from liberty, which otherwise would have been their rightful heritage. The traditions of royalty, nobility, and autocracy in Europe, long binding in their influence, are the real causes of the present devastation. War was a cruel and barbarous method of revealing inherent weakness.

Social heredity like individual heredity may be either good or bad. It frequently happens that the binding influences of tradition and custom of former generations and indeed the environment caused by social heredity may prevent variations in human society and retard progress. For most frequently is progress initiated by breaking with tradition, habit of thought or custom. Invention of a new form of government, a new law, or the discovery of a new application of physical force to environment brings about a change which may make for human betterment. It is merely the breaking away from customary usages of society but the change is started by an individual of vision. It is the man with superior traits that becomes the leader. True it is that society has furnished him opportunity, given him an accumulated mass of knowledge, possibly an education and a workshop, but society as a whole originates nothing, it merely adapts and uses the product of the inventive mind. At best there are few great leaders of human progress; few inventors in the industrial arts or in education, few great artists who have lifted art to a higher plane, few great seers who have given the world a new religious impulse, few statesmen who have caused a mutation in government and few great reformers who have lifted social action to a higher plane. The combination of characters through variation in the individual causes these superior hereditary traits which make possible the initiative of social progress. A more careful study of these traits and their adaptation to a social environment might lead us to a social process which would bring superiors into leadership. The potential genius must be put in contact with opportunity.

Social organization is not too complex, not too great and overpowering, to be wisely directed by the genius of man when brought into direct action. But the present social order is too large for the average brain of man. The average brain may turn the wheels of the machine but cannot direct it to a higher plane of utility. The superiors should be called to the front. In our universal education, with the popular notion of equality of inherited powers, too much dependence is placed on mediocrity. Not less attention to the education of the masses but more attention to the superiors would help solve the problem.

The work of the National Research Council to devise means of determining superior brain qualities of undergraduates, and to furnish impetus and opportunty to lead such superiors to devote their lives to higher education and scientific research is a step in the right direction. The examination of students by mental tests to discover their individual variation in capacity and traits, though incomplete in its methods and results, will have a tendency to utilize the inherent qualities in social adaptation or accommodation. These and other movements to bring to the front a neglected factor in human evolution will make efficient the intensive study of group activity so persistently and ably followed by recent sociologists.

There are not many ways in which society may direct the processes of human evolution so far as the improvement of the hereditary traits is concerned. The establishment of an environment which would induce the mating of superiors and protect against the mating of inferiors would gradually lead to a better racial stock. The arguments for and against the intermarriage of races and birth control hinge altogether upon the laws of natural inheritance. If too widely differentiated races intermarry the result is an offspring consisting of widely differentiated types of individuals ranging from high superiors to low inferiors but the larger number will be of the latter class. On the other hand if two races of superior type intermingle the result is a large number of superiors and a small number of inferiors. Yet if too close integration of similar stocks continues for a long time the danger is in highly specialized offspring which are unfitted to adapt themselves or accommodate themselves to a highly complex environment. Hence progress may decline. Finally if two inferior stocks intermarry the presumption is an occasional superior and a large mass of offspring whose tendency is downward because of lack of superior leadership. Thus racial heredity like individual, and indeed like social, heredity may be good or bad and in either case the rational selection that social heritage and nature give is the key to human progress.

SUMMARY

Granting the importance of social organization and group activity better results would be attained if more attention were

paid to the hereditary traits of the individual for these traits are the points of departure for all human progress. The individual is a real entity out of which the completed personality is created through social environment. The primary human instincts represent the foundation of human association; they are modified by the stimuli of physical and social environment; they are interfered with by habits induced by the same causes; they are controlled to a limited extent by intelligence. Human progress demands a larger control of intelligence over instincts and emotions. The program of society is to discover and utilize these superior individual traits by giving the right kind of environment. This may be done by selecting out of the great social heritage the special environment that will best develop the individual traits and by putting individuals of superior traits in touch with the opportunities of the right kind of environment. Finally, the co-operation of individuals thus effected will establish the proper directive agency of the group. Thus individual responsibility will not be lost and group activity will be made effective.

EUGENIC ASPECTS OF HEALTH

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ABSTRACT

Eugenic Aspects of Health.—Health means an abundance or at least a fair amount of vitality. It has been one of the principal factors in human progress. Eugenics means the improvement of a species by the mating of the best. This means little improvement of the specimens are generally of poor vitality, and healthy human beings are rare, as the draft records and other findings prove. Improvement of the race must come through eugenics based on greater vitality. The leaders of men have been healthy. Education must be modified so as to make health the central feature. In this way only will it be possible to reduce crime, increase vitality, and raise the ratio of men of talent and genius.

1. *Meaning of health.*—Health means freedom of action because it implies only a slight consciousness concerning the body; such consciousness is a feeling of diffused well-being owing to surplus energy. Somewhat more broadly, health means the state of the body which enables it to perform every function that can reasonably be expected of it, to accomodate itself to each ordinary task, and to be equal to some exertion without painful sense of fatigue. This implies as external signs erectness and firmness; as internal requisites, good construction, ability to adapt itself to widely divergent conditions of life or of climate without deterioration of energy; endurance, and resistance to morbific influences; and finally, it means self-control—mental, emotional, and sexual; briefly, a balance between organs and organism, so as to produce a co-ordinated whole, well equipped for action.

2. *Health as a factor in progress.*—There are, roughly speaking, six factors which have influenced the progress of mankind—food, geographic and climatic conditions, race characteristics, social heredity, physical heredity or eugenics, and health.

In the course of history each of these factors has had its influence and it is not necessary to evaluate its importance here. We may freely admit that in some countries and in some periods one factor predominated over the others; but an ultimate analysis would

prove that all factors had a bearing on the making of human history, and that they are interdependent. Favorable geographical conditions, for instance, will be accompanied by a larger food supply, and this would normally assure better health and a better physical heredity. There is a give-and-take between the factors, because life is a bundle of facts, not an abstract theory.

3. *Meaning of eugenics.*—Eugenics aims at the improvement of the human stock by the mating of the best individuals. The term "best" is, however, purely relative. The best man in a gang of thieves is still bad; the healthiest man in a malaria-stricken area is still far from well. The very finest specimen of a crab apple is still greatly inferior to a mediocre pippin or Baldwin. Mating the best specimens of a generally poor species will result in some improvement; it will, however, be neither far reaching nor rapid, because physical heredity moves within the narrow lines of direct descent, and there very slowly. We must, consequently, resort to the other aspects of eugenics if larger results are to be attained, e.g., the improvement of housing and diet, the better regulation of work, and the more equitable distribution of play and leisure.

Health is, however, the most important of these auxiliaries of eugenics.

4. *The health situation.*—Looking at the world's population as a whole, we find that a very large part of it is in poor health. In the tropics and subtropics from 60 to 75 per cent of the people suffer from one or two diseases, chiefly malaria and hookworm, either successively or simultaneously. These two diseases are often supplemented by others, epidemic, endemic, and chronic. This low state of health is indicated by the small working power of the natives in those countries. In higher latitudes the situation is somewhat better, because climate is more favorable, and medical and sanitary science is of a higher order. There are however, other conditions, e.g., factory work, crowding in tenements, contamination of the air, which counteract to a certain extent the beneficial factors created by science.

England may be said to have been the best-fed nation in Europe during the nineteenth century; but she had a rude awakening in

the Boer War. The percentage of those unfit for military duty was so large that Parliament ordered a special investigation with a view of finding some remedy. Our population is undoubtedly the best fed in the world, but we, too, had a rude awakening in 1917. Of the 1,300,000 volunteers examined in 1917 for the Army and Navy, only 448,859 were physically qualified, the rejections being 66 per cent. During the draft of 1917 and 1918 about 3,208,000 men were examined, of whom 521,606, or 16.25 per cent were utterly unfit for any military duty whatsoever. A comparison of the age groups of registrants showed that 76.89 per cent of those aged twenty-one were physically fit, and of the age group 21–30 only 69.17 per cent were fit. Of such a select group of men as college students are supposed to be, one in every four was physically disqualified for full military duty.

Among our school children health is not particularly good, according to Dr. S. Josephine Baker. About 15,000,000 of the 20,000,000 school children in this country are in need of attention today for physical defects which are partially or completely remediable. A special investigation of 247,735 children in New York in 1917 proved a total of 190,898 to suffer from some defect. Similar figures could be given concerning other classes of the population, but they would simply give us the same picture.

Of greater importance are the mental effects of poor health. The examination for hookworm disease made among United States soldiers confirmed in a striking way what the International Health Board had found elsewhere previous to 1917, and demonstrated that even light infections of hookworm are of great importance. Judged by the Binet-Simon and other tests, many full-grown soldiers who harbored comparatively few hookworms had the mentality of persons only twelve years of age. The mentality of 10,000 white men at Camp Travis who harbored the disease was about 33 per cent below normal. It is not necessary to speak of the retardation of school children who have been underfed or are suffering from even slight illness. No one can tell what the mental effects are upon the 15,000,000 children who suffer from a remediable disease. Mental tests of the Binet-Simon system among 340 school children in Queensland, Australia, showed that there was

an average retardation of approximately two years among children heavily infected with hookworm. The longer the infection persisted, the greater was the retardation. Even among lightly infected children it was nine months.

These boys and girls will grow up some day; they will be the fathers and mothers of tomorrow. What kind of parents will they make? The fathers will be limited in their mental outlook; they will be exhausted after a normal day's work; they will come home in an irritable frame of mind to meet more irritable wives and fretful children. Formerly mothers raised fairly large families without becoming exhausted or neurasthenic. Nowadays one child, if they have any at all, will suffice to drive many mothers into invalidism or make them nervous wrecks. What kind of children will there be from such parents? Plenty of crabapples but mighty few pippins. The children will be loathe to spend more time than necessary in the home with such nervous parents; they will seek excitement, because they do not know the boon of good health; they will "fight shy" of normal work since that taxes their limited physical strength too heavily; they will join gangs, vicious or criminal. It would take the pen of a Dostoyevsky to portray the married life of such a family; but meanwhile the divorce courts furnish ample evidence of the misery which some people find unendurable, while those of firmer moral and physical texture "grin and bear it." I am convinced that a larger percentage of divorces is ultimately reducible to poor health than to any other reason, although it is not a legal cause of divorce except in the veiled form of incompatibility of temperament or disposition. The balance and buoyancy which good health insures are lacking in these cases, and the only remedy is found in separation or resignation. The effect upon the children can more easily be imagined than described.

We know, though, what these children will do when they grow up. Regular exertion in systematic work is out of the question for them; those of lower mentality become paupers, gangsters, or criminals; those of higher mentality turn into revolutionaries, embrace spurious occupations, or take to some other form of parasitism. Since they have never become accustomed to regular mental or physical work, any promise of an easy life under a new

system of society seems attractive, and any form of activity which yields a living is readily resorted to. A physically poor specimen of man is apt to breed revolutionary ideas or accept them without much examination, because the capacity for doing so is lacking, and the absence of health with its balance inclines the individual to innovations merely for the sake of excitement.

5. *Eugenics based on health.*—It is beyond any doubt that society has progressed owing to the achievements of its talented men and women. The leaders have shown the way, and have often lost their lives in trying to overcome the passive or active resistance of the masses. We must have more leaders today and in the future than ever before; and they must be of a higher grade, because our civilization is more complex than that of the past. How can we get them? Only by cultivating health. Without health eugenics will always remain a utopian dream of the immature or a *pium desideratum* of the academicians. They may work out the technique of how long-haired and short-haired, or black-haired and white-haired rabbits hand down these characteristics in a straight line or by crossing; little good will be accomplished thereby, at least in the human realm, although breeders of animals may profit greatly from such experiments. Eugenists must make it one of their chief concerns to join physicians, sanitarians, hygienists, sociologists, and others, in improving the health of the community, because only in that way can a proper basis be laid for eugenics.

6. *Leaders are healthy men.*—A distinction should be made between subjective geniuses who, like "the heathen rage and imagine vain things," and the objective geniuses who work hard with the material at hand and succeed in improving the world along some specific line. Concerning the former, we may willingly grant Lombroso's contention that they were often degenerates, or Nisbet's that they were frequently insane. But even among the subjective geniuses the highest types were healthy. A few men only need to be mentioned. Socrates served as a hoplite, or among the shock-troops as we would say, and was put to death at the age of seventy. Measured both by length and breadth of life, most geniuses of modern times were men of good vitality. Sir Isaac

Newton died in his eighty-fifth year, and was, except during the last few years of his long life, not only a very busy man but a healthy man. Darwin was born with a good constitution which he unfortunately ruined, perhaps during the five years' journey on the "Beagle"; it stood him, however, in good stead as soon as he gave it a chance; and he not only accomplished a remarkable amount of work of the highest order, but lived to the age of seventy-three. Herbert Spencer is another man born with a good constitution which he ruined by overwork. Only a boy with first-class vitality could, at the age of thirteen, walk forty-eight miles in one day, forty-seven the second, and twenty the third with very little food during the three days. He lived to the age of eighty-three and accomplished a remarkable amount of work in both quantity and quality. The other member of this trio, Alfred Russell Wallace, passed the age of ninety, and kept vigorous in both mind and body till near his death. Among modern philosophers Kant and Hegel are, perhaps, unexcelled; they enjoyed good health, and Kant died at the age of eighty, while Hegel died of cholera at sixty-one—a disease which almost invariably proved fatal in those days. Among modern poets Shakespeare and Goethe easily take the lead. The great bard of Avon was only fifty-two when he died; this is a good age considering his many activities as actor, dramatist, manager, and above all, boon companion in "merrie England." He was able, notwithstanding the small compensation which actors and writers commanded in those days, to buy two houses in London, and another in Stratford. Of Goethe we know that he was an exceedingly busy man and that he enjoyed good health during his eighty-three years of life. He retained his vitality till death, and his mental vigor until within a year before when he finished his greatest work, the second part of *Faust*. Among the famous Italians four stand out foremost—Dante, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Galileo. Dante was only fifty-six when he died; this was, however, a good age when we consider the many vicissitudes and the arduous labors of his life, which only a man of good health could have endured. Leonardo da Vinci was a person of splendid physique, outstripping younger men in feats of strength, and zealous in his multitudinous activities; he lived

to be nearly sixty-seven years. Michelangelo worked with furious intensity up to his seventieth year, and then had enough energy left to plan and complete great architectural works like St. Peter's in Rome. He was poet, painter, sculptor, architect, excelling in at least three lines. He retained full possession of his faculties until his death at ninety. Galileo was active along many lines in science, enjoyed good health and made a name for himself by working almost to his death at seventy-eight.

The list of great men who had good health could easily be extended, but the cases given will suffice to prove that men of genius have been healthy men.

7. *Results expected.*—If health should be improved more generally, we may look at least for three results: (*a*) Even eugenists have given up the idea of mating for specific qualities, e.g., musical, philosophical, or scientific ability, because, as Galton pointed out long ago, the genius is a rare combination of qualities. But, as he endeavored to prove, the unique experience of Athens from 500–400 B.C. in producing a large number of men of talent may be repeated by improving the health of the community. If, as Ward maintained, genius is fairly generally distributed; and if, as I have tried to prove, the man of genius is usually a healthy specimen; the mathematical ratio for increasing the number of men of high caliber would be greatly raised. (*b*) A healthy community will more readily adopt a eugenic program than one in which illness is taken as a normal occurrence. Many persons would prefer to marry healthy mates, but if they cannot get their first choice, they will be satisfied with second. This is a matter of statistics, not of pious wishes. Only the improvement of health will remedy the situation and increase the opportunities for a larger number of eugenic marriages. (*c*) The improvement of health will most probably assist in diminishing the number of criminals. The consensus of opinion among criminologists is now fairly agreed on the proposition that the criminal is below normal in health and structure. Making a suitable living is no easy task even for healthy persons; those below normal must find it much more difficult, and will resort to supposedly less strenuous methods to get their daily bread. And they will mate with those who are likewise inferior in

health; the breed of criminals is thus continued and is, perhaps, increasing in number and in boldness.

8. *What can be done?*—Scrap 50 per cent of our Navy, improve our system of education, and pay more attention to health. The cost of one battleship, about $40,000,000, if applied to health, would produce results of permanent value. We have proceeded on the theory that the mind has nothing to do with the body. Whatever men of talent have arisen in our midst we have accepted as a gift from the gods. When we enjoyed good health, we sometimes thanked the Lord for the boon, but more frequently we wasted our substance in riotous living. Disease and illness we took either as an inevitable natural event or as a visitation from divine providence for the good of our soul. Our attitude has been that of the pious Yankee about whom his wife said: "Men are funny creatures; the very best of them do not know the difference between their souls and their stomachs. Now take Bateman himself, a kinder husband and a better Methodist never drew breath. Yet as sure as he touches a bit of pork he begins to worry himself about the doctrine of election, until there is no living with him. He'll sit in the front parlor and engage in prayer for hours at a time, till I say to him: 'I'd be ashamed to trouble the Lord with prayer when a pinch o' bicarbonate of soda would set things straight again.'" We have not made the connection between the physical and the mental, when we should have learned that lesson long ago from the Greeks. When we paid attention to the body it was as a thing apart from the mind. Usually, not even that was done.

The British government has spent many millions of dollars on education in the colonies. In many schools colored children are suffering from malarial enlargement of the spleen and nothing is done for their health; they are, however, taught the succession of the Plantagenet kings. In England the children learn a great many other and equally useless things, but little is done for their health, although a recent investigation showed 80 per cent of the children in some board schools to be afflicted with rickets. America is a little more alert to the danger of ill health. Yet even New York City spent only forty-two cents on health out of a total of forty dollars per child in 1915. The Smith-Sterling bill, now before

Congress, appropriates a total of $200,000,000 to the different states on certain conditions, but only $20,000,000 for the improvement of health. What is that among so many? One battleship costs twice as much, only to be sold as junk in a dozen years.

The question may be asked, What profit is there in making people well when they are not wise? The reply is, that a healthy man is a greater asset to society than a learned man who abhors and plans the overthrow of society, because he can never think clearly when his body is racked by almost constant pain and he has never felt the boon of buoyant and overflowing health. A well man may acquire wisdom; an undervitalized man never can, although he may cram his memory with knowledge. If eugenists take their task seriously they must begin with the improvement of the health of the many, not with the selection of the few for marriage. And education must pay more attention to health and less to the dead knowledge of the past.

Our fate is either in our own hands, or it is not. People in the past believed that various deities ruled everything from the cradle to the grave. In more recent times this determinism has been translated into terms of natural law, and we have been caught in another net of external causation. We have come to realize at last that our own actions have a goodly share in the making of our lives. We cannot do much in changing our climate or our physical heredity. But we can within reasonable limits improve our health by controlling our diet, housing, work, and mental attitude. We may be unable to produce leaders to order, but we can increase the chances for producing them by raising our standards of health. As modern men we must recognize that the responsibility for success or failure is our own. And education has a rôle to play in this matter.

There is much discussion at the present about vocational education, very little about the improvement of health. Yet, that should be the central feature of a rational system of education with the social sciences grouped around it. If it be granted that we need better men and women, more capable leaders, and a larger number of geniuses, we must begin by formulating new canons of education. It is within our power to do so, and

it must be done, lest we perish. The incapables, chiefly of a physical kind, had but a few years to live in the past, because the struggle for existence weeded them out. These people are now kept alive, thanks to our humanitarianism. It has, however, been pointed out by Herbert Spencer and others, that a great danger is lurking here for the capables, and various proposals have been made for averting it. These measures are in many cases excellent and should be enforced. The least objectionable and the most generally beneficial measure is, however, that for the improvement of health. And teaching along this line must be made in the schools, not in a perfunctory but in a real way. The whole future of society is dependent on a more capable class of men and women. The best way to produce them is by laying the strongest possible stress on the improvement of health. This is not a matter of a year or two, not even of a generation or two, but of many generations. The beginning must, however, be made now. It is for eugenists and sociologists to insist on the making of such a program, and for educators and physicians to work it out. For health and eugenics are interdependent, and in them lies the hope for the future.

THE NECESSITY OF AN ADAPTIVE FECUNDITY

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ABSTRACT

The Necessity of an Adaptive Fecundity.—Contrary to the general impression the death rate is falling faster than the birth rate in the advanced peoples; so that their natural increase is greater than a generation ago. In the last twenty to twenty-five years science and sanitation have reduced mortality about a fourth. Throughout history population has been perishing from two to four times as fast as in the United States today. *Family limitation.* Therefore we do not dare use all our fecundity; in fact we do not dare use half of it. The practice of family limitations is therefore unavoidable. Without it there would be *from one to three billions* of population in the United States by the end of this century.

Not long ago President Harding noticed in the photogravure section of a Sunday newspaper a picture of Mr. and Mrs. Domenico Zaccahea, of New York City, and their sixteen children; whereupon he wrote Mrs. Zaccahea congratulating her upon being the mother of such a spendid brood. The gesture won the President friends, no doubt, but did it strike a note which needs to be struck? The father of this family is a porter at twenty dollars a week. There is no evidence that he has unusual gifts to endow his children with. By complimenting him the President of the United States encourages our millions of commonplace citizens to court the gratitude of their country by begetting families of sixteen children. Is the country in need of them?

I

The other day I greeted a former student of mine who was born in 1830 when the world had had but half as many inhabitants as today. In her lifetime she has seen 850 millions of persons added to the human race!

The divine command, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," was uttered to seven people, who were all that remained of mankind. There are now a quarter of a billion times

as many people as there were then. One can but wonder how much longer this emergency mandate is going to be considered as still in force.

Race suicide?

Since this phrase was launched twenty years ago, portentous big-wigs have been wont to send a chill down the spine of their hearers by picturing the enlightened stocks and peoples as headed for extinction because the full quivers of olden time are becoming rare. The clergyman with few children or none at all has felt entitled to thunder like a Hebrew prophet at couples who stop at three or four children whereas their grandparents gave the world ten or a dozen. Family restriction which first showed itself in the vital statistics of France about the middle of the last century, became visible in England in 1878, began leaving its mark on Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Australia in the eighties, attracted notice in Italy, Hungary, and Finland just before the close of the century, and appeared in Germany and Austria in the last decade before the war—has been pointed to as if it were a spreading leprosy. No one stops to consider where these peoples would find themselves today if they had gone on having progeny in the old happy-go-lucky fashion.

Because it affords such a splendid text for Jeremiads and because a hot controversy has raged about the morality of certain restrictive practices, the shrinkage in the size of families has attracted an enormous amount of attention. Every thoughtful person has heard of it, has been urged to confront it as "a grave problem." On the other hand, few but statisticians, life insurance actuaries, and public health officers have noticed the extraordinary lowering of the death-rate which has been brought about in the last forty years. No one has viewed it "with alarm" or lifted a trumpet against it. It has stolen upon us quietly like a genial south wind in February, like a night drizzle after an August drouth. And yet in most countries, so far as population growth is concerned, it quite balances and neutralizes that shortage of the baby crop which has inspired so many gloomy prophecies.

The thing is as plain as the black and white squares on a chessboard. Take the fourteen European countries which have

worth-while vital statistics running back for forty years or more. Compare their records for the half-decade 1881–85, with those of the last half-decade before the war, viz., 1906–10. You will find that in *nine* of them the death-rate fell farther than the birth-rate; so that in 1910 their natural increase was actually *greater* than it had been a quarter of a century earlier before forethought and prudence in the matter of family had given much evidence of its presence among the masses. Taking the average for the fourteen peoples, it appears that while the number of annual *births* per thousand of the general population was *five* less at the end of the period, the number of annual *deaths* per thousand was *five and one-half* less.

Impatient with the limitations of ink-on-paper, a certain yellow-journalist used to wish, when he had something of great moment to communicate to the public, that he could "make a noise resembling thunder." The statistician laments that he cannot thunder to a public which admires families of the Zaccahea type that in the last quarter-century for which we have complete statistics (1881–85 to 1906–10) the death-rate of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Scotland declined about a *fifth*. That of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and Wales, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland was lowered about a *fourth*. While that of Australia, Bulgaria, and Holland was reduced about a *third*. In the same period the mortality of the dozen chief cities of the world was reduced by *more* than a third.

Our own country has been tardy in collecting vital statistics. However, we have this most significant fact. In 1900 the death rate in our "registration area"—which then included two-fifths of the American people—was 17.6 per thousand of the population. In 1919 in a registration area which had expanded until it included three-fourths of us, the rate was 13—a reduction of *a fourth* in nineteen years!

II

Save our ingenuity in devising contrivances for blotting out human life, nothing in our time is so sensational as our success in vanquishing certain diseases. For example, in 1911 in the United States the deaths per 100,000 population from the fevers, including typhoid, typhus, and malaria, were only *one seventy-third* as numer-

ous as the deaths from these causes in British India. These fevers are not tropical maladies and there is no climatic or geographic reason for the great prevalence in India. Old records show that these diseases played havoc in this country a century ago. The reason why they scourge us so little today is that public authority has stepped in and applied the discoveries of preventive medicine.

It is this agency that has chased from us those grisly servitors of Azrael, bubonic plague, cholera, yellow fever, and smallpox. Moreover, thanks to increasing personal and social appropriation of the fruits of medical advance, another four of his reapers, viz., typhoid, diphtheria and croup, tuberculosis, and pneumonia have had their sickles dulled. Even at our present stage of knowledge, did the public but will it, they would have no more power over us than cholera has.

The progress of child-saving alone suffices to offset a large part of the fall in the birth-rate. Peeps into the infant mortality of the less-advanced peoples suggest that right down through history from a third to two-thirds of those born have perished in the cradle. A decade ago a quarter of the babies born in Hungary and Russia failed to live a year. In Chile in 1913 I found the loss to be a third, in some cities 47 per cent! Not long ago Moscow parents were losing half their infants within a twelve-month. As for the Orient, the fate of its innocents is horrifying. In 1910 in the innermost province of China an American medical missionary with twenty years of practice gave me his opinion that from 75 to 85 per cent of the children born in his district die before the end of the second year. The first census the Japanese took in Formosa showed that half of the babies born to the great Chinese population there do not live as long as six months.

On the other hand, where the lessons of modern hygiene and medicine have been well learned, infants are saved with a success that our forefathers would have attributed to magic. Already there are perhaps a dozen peoples that are getting more than nine-tenths of their children through the first year of life. Our country is near the foot of this enviable class but, nevertheless, there are twenty-five American cities which save nineteen babies out of twenty. It is in New Zealand, however, that the wee ones bear a

charmed life. In that happy land there are good-sized cities that lose the first year only *one infant in twenty-seven.*

III

That in our huge composite American population clogged with some extremely backward elements Death should take, year after year, but one in seventy or one in seventy-five is an utterly new thing in the experience of peoples. Even if we were a stationary people and not an expanding people, I suppose that only one in fifty or one in fifty-five would die in a twelve month. In all the life of our race extending over a thousand centuries and more the like of this has never been known. It behooves us to *adapt* our behavior to it as we adapt our behavior to artificial light or power machinery or the automobile. But we *see* these things, so we recognize at once the necessity of conforming our conduct to them. On the other hand, most of us *do not see* this latter-day crippling of Azrael and therefore do not realize that any change in our standards of judgment is called for.

For example, through its first millennium and a half—during which its doctrines crystallized—the Christian church was in the presence of a human mortality which must have been from two to four times that which we experience today. Naturally the church became fixed in the idea that overpopulation is nothing to worry about and in her inspired wisdom she branded as a sin the deliberate curtailment of conjugal fecundity. Can this position be maintained indefinitely into the future in view of the astounding success of modern medical science and sanitation in enabling people to live out a normal life-term?

IV

If only the good men who are so dogmatic in this matter would condescend to apply the test of arithmetic!

Conceive that as a people we came under the conviction of sin with respect to our current widespread practice of restricting the size of the family. Suppose that while keeping mortality down to thirteen per thousand, our women would feel it their duty to emulate the prolificacy of the *hausfraus* of Prussia during the decade before the war when the Kaiser constantly incited them to produce what turned out to be "cannon-fodder." Ignore migration into

or out of this country. Well, then, by the end of this century the United States would contain more people than all Europe does today.

Suppose again that while preserving human life with our present success we should for the next seventy-eight years have children at the present rate of the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the Italians. In that case, the year 2000 would see the population of our country more than 500 millions.

However, the Teutons taught us to stigmatize the Latins as "decadent," and there is, indeed, reason for suspecting that in these peoples a great many couples have no more children than they think they can provide for. Their upper class and *intelligentsia* are by no means careless multipliers. Let us turn, then, to the simple and unspoiled peoples of the Balkans. If American women should give themselves to child-bearing with the whole-heartedness of the women of Bulgaria and Roumania, by the close of this century our country, if it kept its present mortality, would boast as many human beings as there are now in all Asia and Africa!

Go a bit farther. Suppose that American womanhood rose still more nobly to the demands of their Heaven-ordained destiny. Imagine that they bore children as freely as the secluded wives of British India or the women of Russia under Nicholas II. Of course, with so many babies in the population it would be hard to keep our low death-rate. Then too, low mortality and big families simply do not go together. Various studies show that families of more than nine are two or three times as likely to perish in their infancy as those born into families of less than five. Moreover, many women would have their lives cut short by excessive child-bearing. There are settlements of the foreign-born in our Middle West in which the typical woman dies trying to bring into the world a twelfth, fifteenth, or twentieth baby.

Nevertheless, imagine that with the aid of more skill and science we could hold our death-rate down to thirteen while the birth-rate swelled to forty-eight per thousand. In that case our country at the end of this century would have a population equal to that of the entire globe at the outbreak of the World War!

Let us venture on another hypothesis. More than any people in the world the French Canadians realize what we are authoritatively assured is the Christian ideal in this matter of reproduction.

Nowhere are women so submissive to the admonitions of their spiritual director, so resigned to the burden of children that is laid upon them. Hence a fecundity in certain parts of the province of Quebec which is not matched in any other part of the world where there is such a thing as vital statistics. In a year fifty-five babies are born per thousand of population—nearly two and a half times as many as in our "registration area."

To be sure, it is the graveyard rather than the nursery that is populated by these heroic sacrifices. Students of the Loyola School of Sociology and Social Service in Montreal have established that a baby born in that city is twice as likely to die in infancy as a Toronto baby, more than twice as likely to die as a New York baby and four times as likely not to survive the first year as a baby born in Brookline, Massachusetts. This, however, has really nothing to do with the matter of fulfilling one's duty in respect to reproduction.

Now if our people came to be as docile and devout as these *habitans* of French Canada, every couple willing to have "as many children as God sends," why then about three thousand of those born among us this year would as octogenarians see our country peopled by *three billions* of human beings, that is, by thrice the population of Asia and Africa today with seventy million folks thrown in for good measure. Of course no such numbers could be maintained here, but the calculation shows what we let ourselves in for if we take the Zaccahea family as our ideal.

Suppose that, instead of looking at the performance of other peoples, we should go to our ancestors for a standard. We do not know the birth-rate or death-rate of our great-grand-parents, but we do know that through the forty years intervening between the inauguration of George Washington and that of Andrew Jackson the natural growth of our population averaged 3 per cent a year. Should we equal their record for the remainder of this century the American people would then be two-thirds as numerous as the present inhabitants of the globe!

V

With such Matterhorns of prolificacy in full view, how mortifying appears the actual performance of American mothers. Even with the aid of the millions of big-family foreign-born in our midst,

their fruitfulness is only about a third of that of the French Canadians in the good old days and a mere half of what you find among the Slavic peoples. Our excess of births over deaths is only 70 per cent. Our natural growth of population is a little less than 1 per cent a year. Keeping this up for seventy-eight years and ignoring immigration, we should come to the year 2000 A.D. with only two hundred and twenty-two millions of population.

It is evident then that millions upon millions of American married couples—perhaps the majority of those of native stock—are in some degree slackers. They are regulating the size of their families and this by other means than marital abstinence. Nor is there any prospect that the situation will improve. For the death-rate of our people will be brought still lower. In twenty years the experimenters, the doctors, the public health agencies, and the social workers have pulled it down more than a quarter. Perhaps they can pare it down another quarter in the next twenty years. Why even if there were no fresh conquests of disease, the mere putting into effect *everywhere* among us of measures which are now operating with success *somewhere* would reduce our death-rate to one in a hundred each year. So one need not strain his imagination in forecasting an annual mortality of nine in a thousand or even eight. But as more parents and grandparents round out their lives and death is well-nigh banished from the nursery, there will be fewer gaps in families to be filled and we shall see the annual baby crop shrink to 19 or even 18. Even then, however, our population will be growing as fast as it now is and certainly as fast as it is possible for it to grow without lowering our standard of living.

There is, then, ahead of us an endless vista of restriction of the size of families. We shall leave unused an increasing portion of that fertility which became established in our species long ago in order to meet a rate of wastage which no longer presents itself in civilized life. In China about all of human natural fertility is needed in order to balance deaths, particularly the excessive mortality of infants. In Southern and Eastern Europe about half of this fertility is now required to maintain numbers. In Central Europe a third. In Scandinavia, Great Britain, Australasia and the United States a fourth or less. Some of us will live to a time

when a fifth or even a sixth of human reproductive power will suffice to keep up our population. To be sure, after several decades a stationary population would include such heavy contingents of the later age-classes that the annual death-rate would hover in the neighborhood of fifteen and perhaps 30 per cent of human fertility would be required if numbers were to be maintained. Even then, however, the calling into operation of as much as half of the reproductive power of our race would be sheer madness.

Fewer births in sympathy with fewer deaths, in order that human increase shall not outrun wealth production, signifies that a new thing has come into the life of mankind, viz., a fecundity that *adapts* itself to the economic prospect. In view of their miraculous victories over disease *adaptive fecundity* is, indeed, the only safeguard of the enlightened peoples against the dismal fate of overcrowded China. If such deliberate limitation of family size is a sin, then what an appalling prospect of Divine displeasure opens up! For with further reductions in the mortality rate an increasing proportion of American parents, an increasing proportion of the members of the white race, an increasing number of the peoples of the globe, will either have to violate what they are assured is God's law or else multiply until it will be necessary to hang out on our planet the "Standing Room Only" sign!

VI

If we have no cause to fear lest the advanced peoples grow too slowly it does not follow that all is well. Curtailment of fecundity is most practiced by the capable and ambitious and least by the inert and commonplace. Hence our people grows faster at the bottom than at the top. While the general American birth-rate is quite reasonable under the circumstances, there ought to be bigger families among the rising and smaller families among the stagnating, more progeny left by the gifted and fewer by the dull, less prudence in the good homes and less recklessness in the hovels and tenements.

But that, as Kipling would say, is another story.

ROUND TABLE

THE DELINQUENT GIRL

Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Chicago, Presiding

INTRODUCTION

MRS. W. F. DUMMER, CHICAGO

During the war a group of women were asked to co-operate with the government for the protection of girls about camps. Very shortly the work was changed, becoming part of a law-enforcement department, and these women were faced with a problem they had all too long ignored, that of prostitution. Any girl or woman suspected of venereal disease could be arrested and placed in a special hospital. That reports frequently showed 50 per cent of women so arrested to be free from infection made the justice of this procedure questionable, but it was an emergency health measure and it gave opportunity for the gathering of data, for new protective and preventive efforts, and for constructive work of rehabilitation.

The women made a new line of approach to the study of prostitution, that of modern psychiatry, which finds in each human being a problem for personality analysis and re-education. In his *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*, Dr. William Healy had delved deep into the causes of asocial behavior, psychologists were finding close relation between emotional depression and intellectual performance, and cures were being effected both of nervous disease and delinquency.

Reviewing the monthly reports from Washington, the weekly reports of district supervisors, and following numerous case histories in detail, these women found their minds challenging traditional opinion both legal and scientific, concerning the delinquent girl. (The average age of the prostitute in a large western area was under seventeen years.) In an article in a medical journal, on the "Psychology of the Prostitute," Major Karpas had agreed with German criminologists that the prostitute was a type. The data gathered by the committee showed wide variety of type. Also, as some of these young girls were of superior intelligence, there came a doubt concerning the high percentages of feeble-mindedness hitherto given for delinquent women. If fear in soldiers could produce pathological symptoms both mental and physical, curable by psychiatry, might not some of this apparent feeble-mindedness be a hysteria, the result of shock? Most case histories showed early sex experience, treated, especially when pregnancy resulted, with utmost scorn, contempt, and condemnation. Surely the world offers to these little unmarried mothers as menacing a front as was faced by the soldiers in France. For girls passing through Juvenile Hall in Los Angeles, right environment is provided

where they receive friendly care and encouragement. As a psychologist said of the soldiers, "Morale is pumped into them." The fact that they have shown during pregnancy an advance in intelligence quotient amounting in some cases to ten points demands a reconsideration of opinion till further data give scientific basis for judgment.

In the introduction to Kammerer's study of *The Unmarried Mother*, Dr. Healy questions whether such a constructive act as bringing a child into the world should ever be classed as a crime. In work with juvenile delinquents it had been found that a girl may come through a sexual experience psychically unharmed whereas another, lacking such physical experience, may be so obsessed with thoughts of sex that she is far more difficult of rehabilitation

One of the surprises of the war work was the definite number of married women carrying on, not commercial prostitution, but clandestine relationships. They were not vicious but childlike. Their husbands being away, they were unable, even with children, to get on without the aid of a friendly man. The need seemed, not money, but affectionate companionship. In some cases women seemed glad to escape from degrading conditions of marital cruelty, yet they were so simple minded as to accept instead a most casual relationship.

It is not in classified statistics that the value of this study made by women lies but in its effort to discover the psychology of rehabilitation. This new line of approach to the study of the delinquent girl is that of mental hygiene. As Freud cures nervous disease by releasing blocked emotion, so is delinquency curable. Whether or no we accept Freud's theory of sublimation — that the physical manifestation of life-force may be transmuted into psychical and social expression—certain it is that modern methods of correctional education are converting girls thought incorrigible and even psychopathic into efficient young women contributing constructively to the life about them. The first step toward the elimination of prostitution is a changed attitude toward the unmarried mother and her child.[1]

SOME PROBLEMS IN DELINQUENCY—WHERE DO THEY BELONG?

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ABSTRACT

Some Problems in Delinquency.—This paper presents in detail two case problems in delinquency in which the social worker was obliged to seek some vital psychological interpretation in order to carry out social treatment and asks whether such problems and the kind of individual and social psychology which they require for their solution

[1] Obtainable from Miss Jessie Binford, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, are the following pamphlets offered through the Intercity Conference on Illegitimacy: "The Prostitute and the Mother Imago," by Wilfrid Lay; "Mental Hygiene Aspects of Illegitimacy," Marion Kenworthy; "Mental Hygiene Problems of Normal Adolescence," Jessie Taft.

belong legitimately to any science taught in college or university or whether psychiatry is the only source to which the case worker can go. *Value of Psychology and Psychiatry.* The intimate psychological or psychiatric interpretation, the individual intensive treatment, are fundamental for solving the problems of delinquency. No matter how ideal the social conditions, no matter how farsighted the laws, there will always be compensatory behavior in the lives of individuals, and some of this behavior is bound to be unwholesome and socially undesirable. Instinctive protective reactions on the part of society, even the more enlightened mass treatment in institution, will bring results only by accident. *The Scientific Treatment of Behavior.* What we need is a treatment of behavior so scientific that results instead of being accidental will be subject to intention and prediction. Biology studies the life-history of individual forms and explains any particular details of their behavior in the light of the life of the organism as a whole from birth to death. Where does a similar case study of human beings belong? Without it there can be no scientific solution of the problems of delinquency.

Delinquency is one of those blanket terms like insanity which has had reference more to the protective reaction of society toward it than to any specific content of its own. It is that which society is afraid of and punishes in a more or less instinctive way. Insanity, so called, has until comparatively recently been treated in the same external way in terms of fear and defense reactions. The labels "insane" and "delinquent" have been used like danger signals to block further advance and prevent scientific investigation of the manifold forms of human behavior which they conceal.

The necessity for getting away from such labels and treating the behavior underneath like any other manifestation of human instincts and impulses has been felt most keenly and consciously by two professional groups, the psychiatrists and the social case-workers. They have been under the pressure of immediate and practical need. The modern psychiatrist who has ceased to take refuge under the diagnosis must face the problem of bringing about radical changes in the behavior of a particular individual. The social case-worker too has discovered that her task of social adjustment of families and individuals depends upon a practical understanding of the way people behave and a technique for altering that behavior. No mere label or diagnosis is of any avail as long as Mrs. Jones remains on her doorstep an unsolved problem. The psychiatrist with his scientific training and approach has worked out theories for his practice. He has made hypotheses and tried them out in real situations. He has used the check of success or failure of an experimental method although laboratory control has been impossible. The case-worker, with much less scientific and technical training is compelled to work day in and day out in a more or less blind, instinctive fashion on problems of behavior that require a conscious technique and psychology no less than those which the psychiatrist handles.

Unless the rapid multiplication of psychiatrists combined with an equally rapid decrease in their fees enables them to take charge of all of the problems of human behavior now being treated by the case-worker we shall have to face the question of how the social case-worker is to be trained for her job. Where can she acquire the tools which will fit her for this supremely difficult task?

To what science may she apply for assistance? Has academic psychology or academic sociology any interest in this material? Are they concerned with the practical problems of human behavior and should they legitimately furnish scientific hypotheses arising from and tested out in the problems of everyday life? We should not expect the commercial chemist to use formulas which had been elaborated without reference to real elements and without experimentation. Can we expect the case-worker to go for her interpretations to any science which has few direct and intentional contacts with life as she meets it? The biologist and the physiologist make basic contributions but the case-worker, to be able to use them uninterpreted, has to have a scientific equipment which is rare indeed. The clinical psychologist is most helpful as long as the emotional and instinctive life is kept out of the situation. But he tends not to be interested in anything that cannot at once be reduced to quantitative terms and Mrs. Jones, emotional and irrational, resists such exact measurement. As a matter of fact, the case-worker, in desperation, has turned to the psychiatrist who alone, as far as she can see, is working with an effort at scientific interpretation and control in the very material and problems with which she struggles.

May I present to this conference in some detail two practical situations, problems in delinquency in which the social worker was obliged to seek some vital psychological interpretation in order to treat the case and ask whether such problems and the kind of individual and social psychology which is necessary for their solution belongs legitimately to the field of any science which is to be found in the college curriculum? Could the case-worker obtain the necessary insight and training from any source other than psychiatry?

Ruth, fourteen, Irish, pink-cheeked and blue-eyed, in her first year of high school, the picture of attractive innocent girlhood, had been taken to the house of detention for stealing a diamond pin and taking money from a teacher's desk. When her denials were finally broken down by proof, she confessed to a long history of petty thieving, hitherto unpunished and for the most part undiscovered. The facts in Ruth's history are as follows: Her mother, to whom she had a deep attachment, died when she was eight. The father married again very soon a nervous, irritable, nagging woman who never liked Ruth and whose presence was deeply resented by her. There was continual strife in which each struggled for the backing of the father, who in desperation, finally put Ruth and her sister in an orphanage. He failed to pay their board promptly and when the matron threw this up to Ruth in a quarrel, she ran away and took refuge with an old friend of her mother who had promised to stand by her in case of need. Her father, quite willing to keep the peace and escape financial responsibility, allowed her to stay on with these people for a year or two. In this family Ruth was under the authority of the only daughter, a young woman in her twenties, who had theories about bringing up children. She was inclined to be rather strict and allow little freedom in the matter of recreation or spending money. But when she was away, Ruth was allowed

generous spending money and a great deal of entertainment by the easy-going mother. She was never compelled to work as a return for her board.

It was in this situation that Ruth's stealing became a court affair. She had always taken change from her stepmother, she had taken food and anything she could pick up at the orphanage. She had ended by taking money at school, money from her foster parents, and the diamond pin from their guest. She had always lied successfully when accused and admitted the truth only when cornered in the affair of the diamond. Once this was out she told the rest of her misdeeds quite freely. She seemed to feel shame but very little repentance. She expressed contempt for her foster home and criticized each member of the family with clever, stinging sarcasm. She flayed her father and stepmother with her sharp tongue and her keen mind enabled her to see the weak points in those around her quickly and surely. She displayed a cynical attitude about everything and everybody. The only thing worth while was money but she admitted that stealing was a poor method of getting it. Education she wanted, not that she enjoyed studying but that she could not hope to make money without it. She took criticism badly and could always turn it off with a counter-criticism. She seemed lazy and unclean about her personal habits. She refused to bathe, or wash her clothes, and instead of studying at night sat up until all hours reading fiction. She declined to talk about sex, claimed not to be interested and to have no use for boys. Thought it too rotten to discuss. She had tested out various forms of religion, was skeptical of the church devotee because her father and stepmother came in that class. She was inclined to boast of her experience in the house of detention and talked freely of her family hatreds to everyone. She openly avowed her intention to work her father for money by coaxing, although she really despised him. On the whole, she presented a most unlovely picture, a personality not likely to arouse sympathy, approval, or affection from those around her. A psychometric test showed her to be distinctly superior intellectually, but inclined to react impulsively and carelessly. There is only one way in which the worker can get a sympathetic attitude toward such a make-up and that is to undertsand it, to see the human mechanisms'back of it and the possibility of modifying them.

The interpretation which was used as a basis for treatment is as follows: Ruth was an intensely egoistic person, desirous of social recognition, approval, personal success, but due to lack of training, unfavorable conditions, and an impulsive, impatient make-up had never learned to work for her satisfactions or make her impression on society in constructive ways. She was quickly discouraged and resentful in the face of failure or hardship and at once turned to some pleasure experience as a compensation, something which would be obtained immediately and easily. She used boastful stories and even her misdeeds to heighten the impression of her own importance. Such behavior patterns are common enough in childhood, where there is so little direct control of environment and immediate gratification can be obtained through crying, tantrums, daydreams, or other indirect methods, but they are not appropriate

to a developing organism and must be abandoned for a direct objective dealing with the facts of life.

All of Ruth's normal cravings had been thwarted by her environment. She had lost her love object in the death of her mother. Her family ideals had been shattered. Her father had been exposed as unfaithful to her mother, and a weakling in the battle between the stepmother and Ruth. He was a failure as a provider and did not pay his debts. Ruth was forced to live in a home situation which had for her none of the elements of a home, nothing to be proud of, no loving approval and overlooking of faults, no faith, no support, and no assurance of safety. She was forced not only to give up her love object but to see it supplanted by an enemy, who also usurped her place and influence with the father. Undoubtedly her sex ideals also met with shock. She was convinced that her father had been interested in the stepmother before the death of the mother. Father and stepmother quarreled and made up, separated and came together repeatedly. Ruth saw marriage as a series of endless petty conflicts. Yet both parents were church goers, given to religious interests. Ruth's disillusionment with life was complete. There was nothing genuine, no real satisfaction. The father and mother who constitute the bridges over which the emotional life of the child may cross to a more and more social development had blocked normal growth and thrown the child back upon subjective or anti-social satisfactions.

One of the many defense reactions to such a thwarting of fundamental needs is that taken by Ruth, a cynical, suspicious, critical attitude toward everything and everybody. To want and never get satisfaction is too painful a state to keep up so the individual criticizes every possible love object that he may make himself and others believe he would not have it if he could. The reason he has no love object is that none are worth having, thus he defends his inferiority. Also he undermines any criticism from others by showing up the inferiority of the source. He is protected by having already discredited the other person. Moreover, there is a sense of power and superiority in being able to criticize everything, so it offers a natural compensation for the inferiority from which the critical or cynical person suffers. Not having admirable loving parents is a source of tremendous inferiority. A child of eight has no intelligent weapons with which to combat a hostile family situation. It has no chance against the egoism of the adults around it. All it can do is to react blindly in ways that offer some temporary solace. Stealing from the stepmother is a way of satisfying the need to fight with or injure or destroy the pain-giving stimulus. It gives the child a tremendous sense of power and victory. Here is something which he can do secretly and effectively. It really hurts the hateful object and it supplies pleasure-giving stimuli, such as candy, which are otherwise denied.

This vicious process is further strengthened by the fact that the continued thwarting of really fundamental needs and the checking of this normal growth makes the organism put undue stress on its compensatory auto-erotic satisfac-

tions which are obtained with little effort, such as eating, day dreaming, lying in bed, bed-wetting, masturbation, and the like. The subjective pleasure experiences are overemphasized while the objective play and work interests are not developed being overshadowed by the intensity of the conflicts in the love life of the child. If there is no intelligent effort on the part of adults to see that the child gets creative expression, genuine outlet for its energies in school and work and play, he easily learns to avoid work, to have no conception of work that is really an expression of his own interests, and to fall back on infantile or childish methods of controlling the environment almost entirely.

This was the course Ruth had followed and it made it almost impossible to bring about changes in her behavior. She was so absorbed in the injuries done her by life that she thought of nothing but pleasure compensations. She would face nothing that demanded effort or any unpleasantness. She had a right to take things because life owed her reparation. She saw nothing in school or work, or the ordinary habits of daily hygiene but hardship to be evaded if possible. She wanted nice clothes and felt she had a right to take them, but she saw no reason why she should take any responsibility for them. If a garment is torn or dirty, get a new one. She thought she ought to be placed where there were servants so she would have no housework and no laundry to attend to. She had no loyalty to anyone. She played one person against another and used everything to her own advantage as she saw it. As soon as an effort was made to give her insight she reacted to protect herself from the painful revelations by criticizing the worker and taking the attitude that there was a game going on between her and the worker in which each was trying to get ahead of the other. She could not believe in disinterested effort on her behalf.

Ruth was turned over to a child-placing agency with the foregoing interpretation of her behavior and suggestions for working on the problem, but with grave doubt as to the outcome. She was to be given as much gratification of her pleasure wants as possible in order to reduce the struggle to satisfy them and leave some of her energy and interest free to be developed along other lines. She was to be placed with a really superior person whom she might finally come to respect as genuine and her best chance would be to find some one person, the worker or the foster mother, who had real faith in her possibilities.

The social worker who took her over was young and enthusiastic, undaunted by the impossible and full of faith in her own ability to get results. She transferred this faith to Ruth. She never wavered in her belief that Ruth could change her ways. She lived through stealing episodes, truancy periods, every kind of discouragement and finally found a home which did some of the things we had hoped for. Ruth's first experience in this home was a summer trip and a glorious good time. When she came back there was little housework and a doctor's important business to help with after school. There was social prestige in this home. The mother was a good disciplinarian and insisted

on the formation of certain daily habits of living, but she took Ruth in as a member of the family and had, like the worker, supreme faith in her own ability to make Ruth go to school every day, study her lessons and keep going in the path of righteousness.

Ruth responded surprisingly and for six months all went well. Then she began to be unhappy and asked to be removed, saying that she would make removal necessary if something were not done. Finally she had her way. It seemed evident that this home while successful in many ways had lacked the throughly admirable personality which we thought Ruth needed. The woman was hard, opinionated, and self-centered. Another home was found in which there proved to be serious marital conflicts in which Ruth was forced to be a party. Here the stealing broke out again. Then a high-school teacher became interested in the girl and invited her to her summer home for vacation. This was the great turning-point in Ruth's life. Here her desires for social superiority and pleasure were satisfied, and she was surrounded by real people for whom she felt at last the whole-souled, genuine devotion and admiration which was essential for her socialization.

From that moment there has been no trouble with Ruth, no more stealing, no more truancy, no shirking of lessons. She has gone to live with another teacher for whom she keeps house. Six months have passed and there has been no complaint. To complete this treatment and make it permanent, Ruth ought to be given insight into her own behavior and understand just what has happened to her. Then she would be armed against the accident of circumstance.

Contrast this with the apparently far more serious social problem presented by Mary, an alert, boyish, attractive girl of eighteen, the product of careless placements by a children's agency, at work in a department store after having reached first year in high school and reported to have been living with her weak, immoral mother, sharing the mother's young paramour, a boy only a little older than herself. The mother had been pregnant at the time and this situation had continued within the confines of one room, in the presence of a young brother who knew the relationships existing among the three. The mother was jealous of her daughter but when the baby came, all three were united in a common interest. Mary had finally broken away and come to the city to work but was about to return to her mother on a visit. Commitment would seem to be the natural solution, not only for the sake of society, but to save the girl from herself. It appeared almost self-evident that no girl except one needing institutional supervision and discipline would be guilty of such low-grade behavior.

However, if one goes at delinquency never from the point of view of the offense but always with the purpose of understanding the meaning of the behavior in terms of the individual's entire life history, there are no assumptions and no short cuts. The following case history was obtained. Because of the mother's promiscuity, Mary's paternity was uncertain. As a child in her

mother's home she had known only loose living, good-hearted, easy-going neglect and poverty. Illegitimate births were common in the family. There seems to have been complete lack of ordinary sex morality and social standards. The family lived a roving, hand-to-mouth existence. When Mary was ten, the court removed her and gave her to a child-placing agency. She was tried out unsuccessfully in several homes and finally made a good adjustment in a country home where she had good school opportunities, finishing the grammar grades at the head of her class. She entered high school with a continuing interest in school, accompanied by an increasing interest in boys. Her late hours, love for good times, and her rebellion against restraint worried the foster parents so that they gave her up. She was accepted by a city institution of excellent character and non-correctional where she was under strict supervision and was sent for the first time to a city school. She tried to enter the second year of high school with inadequate preparation, failing quite completely in every subject. Accident entered at this point in the shape of a new matron at the institution. The girls were trying her out and in her effort to control the situation she threatened to expel the next girl guilty of insubordination. Mary happened to be the victim. She was returned to the court and discharged to a married and apparently respectable sister. The sister, unequal to disciplining Mary, allowed her to go to her mother, then living in a wretched little house in another town with a young man by whom she was pregnant. There was only one bedroom containing a bed and cot. Mary shared the cot with the younger brother, a boy of fifteen. For about a year this situation continued. Mary broke away once only to return again. The mother finally went out to work with the new baby leaving Mary to keep house for her brother and the man. Finally Mary came to the city a second time and got a job. She wandered from one position to another and came in contact with a social agency just as she was about to give up and go home again because she saw no work ahead and was unable to support herself on what she was earning.

The social worker took the matter up as a vocational guidance problem and her first step was to find a girl's boarding-home where a decent social background could be obtained at a reasonable rate. Mary was distinctly worried about her lack of ability to make good wages and completely at sea as to what she wanted to do. She feared to give up the job she had to look for a better one and was ready to take anything that would permit her to settle into a comfortable routine. She was interested enough in her own problem to be willing to take a psychometric test to find out what her abilities really were.

The social worker and the psychologist between them worked out the following picture of Mary: In earliest childhood she had known little or no restraint and had been familiar with the freest sex life and complete absence of ordinary social standards as regards sex. But there had been affection, easy-going, good-natured attitudes, and a great deal of freedom. The loose living, the roving, unsettled existence had made it fairly easy for Mary to accept and

adjust to varying conditions so that foster-home placement was not the agonizing experience to her that it is to some children. Moreover, she seems to have been from the first an objective, eager, alert, social youngster who most fortunately compensated for her family inferiorities by a complete going over into school life and active energetic expression in work and play. Perhaps the fact that the teacher of the country school was a splendid fellow, just out of college who was like an elder brother to his pupils helped her to transfer her energies so happily and thoroughly in that direction. She hated housework, particularly because she had not only the foster mother, but the grandmother to please and directions were often conflicting. But she escaped this frequently by working with the man of the family on the farm all day long. This she recalls with real joy, because of all she learned about how things grow.

The dark side of her life here was her introduction to sex experience through the foster father. These experiences, shocking at first, were finally accepted as a matter of course and sank into the background of an existence in which objective interest, school, companions, good times, and farm work held first place. There seems never to have been any deep conflict nor any marked feeling of shame or inferiority. It was taken as part of the day's work, something which went along with living in this foster home which for the most part was desirable. She wanted to keep on with her school. She was afraid to tell the wife. She had none of the ordinary sex morality which most of us have absorbed from infancy. The easiest way was to keep still and adjust. When Mary was asked how she felt about sex, she replied characteristically and cheerfully "Well, the world is made that way, you just have to accept it. It isn't any use to worry about it, you might as well take people as they are." Although these years in Mary's life apparently left no scar, they did break down completely any sex inhibitions she might have had, aroused sex needs, and accustomed her to the habit of sex expression. It meant that when she went to live with her mother, she experienced no particular shock and was illy prepared to offer resistance to the advances of the mother's paramour who found her so much more attractive than her mother and with whom she was thoroughly infatuated.

The dismissal from her foster home seems to have been caused by behavior which was natural enough on the part of a developing adolescent girl. She merely carried over too much of her superabundant energy into parties and good times with boys. School, however, still held her. The really critical experience was the transfer to the city institution and the city high school. In neither situation was she at home and for the first time in her life she experienced failure and disgrace in her studies. She now had a genuine inferiority, a discouragement which undoubtedly reacted on her behavior at home. She grew indifferent and reckless, would not respond to scolding or appeal. The objective work and play expression, as well as the customary sex life, were cut off. There was nothing left but breaking rules to get a good time.

Expulsion from the institution meant the final break with school and she thinks it was then that her ambition died. She had no technical training,

she could get only underpaid, uninteresting jobs. Where was she to find an outlet for her young energy? The sister, less intelligent than Mary, had no influence and was only a source of irritation. Then in a restless seeking for something more satisfactory she went to her mother. There she was disturbed chiefly by the mother's jealousy and feeling she was doing her wrong, also by the presence of the younger brother. Finally the glamour wore off and she began to see the man in his true character. He was lazy, unreliable, disloyal, weak. He had none of the straightforward, eager active attitude of Mary toward life. Gradually she turned against the kind of person he was and after many struggles, finally broke away. It was at this point that she was found by the case-worker.

It seemed to the psychological examiner that the problem here was not the so obviously indicated sex situation, but the blocking of Mary's work and play interests and the complete quenching of her egoistic ambitions. The psychometric tests showed her to be well up to average if not above in intelligence. She was as interested in taking the test as the examiner was in giving it. Her intellectual curiosity was a delight. In the course of the interview she brought out a slip of paper with two long words on it which she had been treasuring, waiting for an opportunity to look them up in a dictionary. Throughout she exhibited a frank, straightforward attitude, an honest, unsentimental facing of facts, a complete freedom from cynicism or critical reactions. She put no blame on other people and used no evasive mechanisms. She had a certain pride and independence. When consoling herself for her lack of good clothes, she remarked, "My clothes aren't much but no man is paying for them and at least I have a contented mind." There seemed to be every basis for a satisfactory adjustment to life if the environmental opportunities could be provided so that her work and social interests would have a chance to develop and help to organize a more socialized sex expression.

The social worker was reassured and determined by this analysis of the problem. Mary herself was allowed to go over every detail of the intelligence tests and was told that ability like hers had a right to a better training. She faced what lack of education would mean in underpaid, uninteresting work. Her faith in her own power and ability was restored and her ambition revived. Her former failure in high school was explained and she became convinced that it was not too late even now to achieve success in school work. Meantime the case-worker built up the social background, finally raised scholarship money, and Mary went into the second year of the commercial course in a good high school.

There was never any attempt to deal with the sex side by repressive methods, never any interference with her social life, or any form of restraint. When she wanted to go to visit her mother, the whole situation was talked out with her and she was given the worker's attitude frankly and honestly but decision was left to her. She did not go. She has continued to associate with boys on an unusually free basis. She will go to see a boy friend at his home exactly as she would visit a girl. She could not be made to see why she should

not accept a boy's invitation to go to New York City for a sightseeing excursion. She was willing to stay at home to please the worker but was told she must decide on another basis. Only accident in the shape of the boy's illness prevented that escapade. Everything she does is talked over with the worker with the utmost freedom. Her standards are changing rapidly with her developing tastes and interests. She has made good in her school work consistently. She has been rash and unconventional in the extreme but has never, apparently, overstepped the boundaries of morality on the sex side. For a year and a half she has made steady progress and there is no indication that she will ever again become delinquent.

Ruth's case gives an illustration of delinquent behavior arising as an undesirable, unwholesome form of compensation for unsatisfied cravings for a normal family life, personal achievement, and social standing. Her emotional development had been checked and her behavior followed childish patterns. Both interests and methods of satisfying them were subjective. There was no active self-expression along legitimate objective lines.

Mary, on the other hand, had experienced a comparatively normal emotional and instinctive development with a wholesome, compensatory reaction in energetic work and play life. She had learned to meet life squarely and to pursue her own interests actively and persistently. Her sex life suffered from her social inheritance and a lack of socialization and idealization of expression but it was not auto-erotic or perverse nor was it a source of conflict.

The solution of Mary's problem depended on not mistaking it for something other than it was, and being content to provide the opportunity for the ongoing of her already well-developed objective interests with the faith that in the end they would provide the necessary inhibitory power for the control of her sex life.

The intimate psychological or psychiatric interpretation, the individual intensive treatment, are fundamental for solving the problems of delinquency. No matter how ideal the social conditions, no matter now farsighted the laws, there will always be compensatory behavior in the lives of individuals, and some of this behavior is bound to be unwholesome and socially undesirable. Instinctive protective reactions on the part of society, even the more enlightened mass treatment in institutions, will bring results only by accident.

What we need is a treatment of behavior so scientific that results instead of being accidental will be subject to intention and prediction. Biology studies the life-history of individual forms and explains any particular details of their behavior in the light of the life of the organism as a whole from birth to death. Where does a similar case study of human beings belong? Without it there can be no scientific solution of the problems of delinquency.

THE LOGIC OF DELINQUENCY

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ABSTRACT

The Logic of Delinquency.—The instinctive forces underlying the adaptation of the individual to life are (1) the drive toward self-maintenance and (2) the drive toward self-advancement. Analysis of the behavior of the delinquent reveals the blocking or thwarting of these forces and the development of a sense of inferiority. Consciousness of inferiority may arise (*a*) through discrepancy between the original equipment of the individual and the aspirations of his family; (*b*) through a false sense of superiority in childhood which unfits individuals for competitive struggle in adult life; (*c*) through fervid attempts at self-maximation; (*d*) through unfavorable comparison with others in the family circle. *The Mechanism of Compensation.* In this situation of pressure and unrest caused by childish desires, the emotional instability of adolescence may cause the girl to look upon sex as a means of putting herself across. Childhood is the period in which foresight and guidance by parents, teachers, sociologists, social workers, and physicians may most effectively direct the human forces of personality toward a higher plane of successful adjustment.

Recent progress in the understanding of delinquency has been largely due to the more complete and careful studies made of the economy of the personality of these so-called delinquents. In our present discussion we shall exclude for the sake of brevity those individuals who are suffering from a fundamental lack in their intellectual organization. Unfortunates of this group have long been recognized as social problems and of late years we have ceased to consider these individuals as socially responsible people, but we have learned to recognize that they are deserving of thoughtful guidance and control under the direction of organized social or community resources rather than to expose them to censure and punishment alloted to the so-called normal delinquents. From actual experience we have found that the most satisfactory means of adjusting members of this group is to furnish them with simple uncomplicated environments where they can be protected from the destructive influences of those who might find it profitable to use these simple minds as tools in their asocial trades.

The group with whom we shall concern ourselves is made up of those individuals who possess an essentially normal intellectual endowment. They belong to the class of average citizens endowed with the same capacity for work, play, growth, and adaptation as other members of society, but who for some reason have failed to make satisfactory adjustments and have accepted asocial measures as a means of putting themselves across. It is our task, then, to determine the "logic of their delinquency."

In the course of these studies we have been forced to ask ourselves what it is in the make-up of these individuals which has led them to accept this particular means of finding expression for certain of their inherent urges and cravings; that is to say, why have they reacted to a situation in a way which is unacceptable to society as a whole? In these studies of the economy of the personality we are forced to consider the human organism as a whole in order

that we may learn what forces from within the individual himself have influenced the growth of his personality and to determine to what extent the forces arising from without have contributed to create this complex personality as we find it.

In order that we may have a clearer concept and may better understand the conative forces at work in the economy of the individual it is pertinent that we should recognize the nature of these complex human strivings which tend toward the integration of this human personality. It is necessary that we consider the underlying instinctive forces which tend to drive this human unit in his attempts at adaptation to life. It is unnecessary in this presentation to occupy ourselves with a lengthy discussion of instincts but it is important that we recall the powerful conative forces exerted through the ego drive of every individual from the earliest inception of life as a unit.

Tansley divides these forces into two groups: first, the drive toward self-maintenance, or the will to live; second, the drive to self-advancement—toward the magnification of the individual. We are forced to recognize that satisfaction of these ego cravings is essential to the economy of the personality of everyone. Accepting this as a premise, we are led to appreciate the destructive possibilities which may result from the blocking or thwarting of these ego conations, and it is easy to see why it is that, given an individual who is frequently exposed to situations in which he fails to gain this necessary satisfaction of his ego strivings, the natural result will be the gradual development of a very definite feeling of inadequacy, or in more familiar terms, the development of a sense of inferiority.

We know from our observations of normal well-adjusted individuals that in their efforts to seek self-expression they are able to find satisfaction for their ego strivings along socially acceptable channels. The average man seeks a job, works regularly, does as good a piece of work as he is capable of doing, thereby gaining a sense of satisfaction from a job well done, draws his weekly pay, supplies his family with as many comforts as lie within his means, gains a real sense of gratification from the happy unit of his household, enjoys the simple entertainments available to a man of his social standing, and prides himself on being an honest God-fearing citizen. In other words, he represents the type of a successfully adjusted citizen (a normal man). We might give many other examples of normal men in other social settings, but since our concept of normality must at best be a relative one in which we recognize many possible variations in adaptation among any group of individuals, further illustration is unnecessary. It is, then, our task to determine how well an individual has acquitted himself of the necessity for making social adaptations, and in our study of the so-called delinquent it is our first concern to discover toward what goal the individual has directed his efforts at self-expression; second, to discover mechanisms utilized by him in his attempts at adaptation and to ascertain the relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness of his methods; third, to learn the motive or urge behind the act which is represented by his

asocial behavior remembering at the same time that he is blindly seeking a means of self-expression—in other words, a fulfilment of his ego drive.

In this group of so-called delinquents, we early discover elements in the personality make-up of the individual which point more or less directly to the blocking or thwarting of this ego urge and we are led to recognize the destructive forces at work in the personality of the individual which tend to create within him a definite sense of inferiority.

To be more specific, let us consider some of the possible sources through which this sense of inferiority may develop. On analysis of various situations we discover as one of the stumbling-blocks to success the very evident discrepancy between the original equipment of the individual and his aspirations or, in some cases it would be fairer to say, the aspirations of his family. What mechanism may the individual employ which will tend to alleviate the emotional conflict and very real distress which is bound to result from the recognition of his own personal discrepancies? Is it not possible that an individual forced to face a painful recognition of his own limitations may be unable through his own conscious efforts to make a satisfactory adjustment, and, at the bidding of this ever-present urge for self-maximation, may he not attempt to compensate for his inferiority through a behavior reaction which is of an asocial nature? Consider for a moment the child reared in a home where the parents in their youth were unable to obtain educational opportunities accorded the children of this generation. Through certain misguided conceptions they may have been led to place a higher premium on the values of education, believing that their particular economic and social lack would never have existed given a different educational background; impelled by this idea they seek to furnish their child with every educational opportunity to compensate for their own incapacities. But suppose that this child has an intellectual endowment of a low average caliber, that he is capable of making a good showing in grammar school work, but because of his intellectual limitations higher educational training is precluded, unwilling to recognize this inherent limitation, he is forced to continue the educative process beyond his capacity. He is bound, therefore, to meet with an ever-increasing opportunity for failure and through this painful experience of failure an ever-increasing sense of personal inadequacy will tend to develop. He is furnished with an emotional conflict between his personal and family aspirations and his individual capacity. Through wise guidance this child may be furnished with a satisfactory means of emotional adjustment through the simple evaluation of his innate capacities and through the medium of this understanding a constructive program can be devised in which cognizance of his limitations has been taken; that is to say, through wise handling he may be furnished a medium of expression through which he may find an opportunity for achieving satisfaction and success through the simplifying and reconditioning of his original desires. Should he continue to create intellectual goals beyond his reach, he will sooner or later be overwhelmed by this ever-increasing recognition of his inferiority and will tend to become more

unhappy, subjective, and maladjusted through the machinations of this vicious circle created by the persistent thwarting of his ego strivings. Is it not easy to see, then, why it is that certain of these individuals, seeking a means of compensation, may select a medium for gaining self-expression which is unacceptable to the social herd? Many examples of this are found in the runaways, truancies, thefts, lies, etc., found among the behavior reactions of this so-called delinquent group.

A simple illustration of this is furnished in the case of a girl of fourteen and a half whose family were of the uneducated but law-abiding peasant type. The aspirations of this family were such that they were not content unless their oldest child should receive every educational advantage in order that she might obtain a recognized place in the world. School progress during the grammar grades was satisfactory but the girl had the capacity of a low-average normal, that is, she was endowed with a mental capacity of approximately twelve years. She was quite able to do grammar-school work, but forced to take on high-school work she experienced ever-increasing difficulty. Unable to recognize her failure at school as due to her own inadequacies, she began to project her irritation and discontent resulting from the conflict of continuous failure upon members of the teaching staff and school authorities. As a result of this bitter antagonism of months' duration, she was finally led to seek compensation for her believed mistreatment. In the company of another girl she visited the desk of one of the teachers and managed to destroy papers and personal data belonging to the teacher against whom she held a particular spite. She failed absolutely to take into consideration the effect of this act either upon the teacher or upon herself, but blindly sought a means of compensation for her discomfort. Through an evaluation of her capacities and the understanding and acceptance of her particular limitations, it was possible to furnish the girl with an opportunity for adequate social adjustments through the medium of a job in which she might succeed and through supplying club and reading interests where opportunities for making comfortable and satisfactory social contacts were found. Many illustrations which are explainable on a basis as simple as this one are found in actual practice, and the recognition of this ought to force us to study each case of maladjustment with a kind of open-mindedness which will assure the individual of a better social understanding.

Another basis for the development of this sense of inferiority finds its early roots in the experiences of the child who perchance progresses through school in a grade below his individual capacity. Through this he is permitted to achieve recognition of his success, and, conditioned by this false sense of security, he may develop a belief in his superior capacity, for is he not looked upon as a veritable genius by his family, paraded before all of the admiring friends and permitted to demonstrate his particular prowess in reciting a piece, or singing a song? Through the experiences of his early years of success he fails to properly evaluate his actual capacity, and, influenced by this false sense of security, he is quite unfitted to meet with conditions in later life outside the

immediate family circle, especially those which may tend to demonstrate his particular inadequacies. Take, for example, the boy going away from home to college or into business, forced for the first time in his experience to measure himself by the standards of others. He may refuse or may be incapable because of the implications of failure to adequately adjust himself to reality as he finds it, and may either tend to regress—preferring to avoid responsibility through some imagined physical incapacity—or, urged on by a sense of dissatisfaction, he may blindly seek a means of expression through which he may bolster up his waning sense of superiority.

Problems of allied nature may be found among the adult group. Consider the reactions of a man who habitually sets a standard of achievement beyond the limits of human scope. Success, social approbation, power through achievement only serve to heighten his fervid attempts at self-maximation. Goaded on by this intense drive, he tends to lose his sense of proportions and may be led to accept as a means of ego expression methods in business or professional life which do not conform to ethical standards, but furnish him a means of gaining power even though they are not acceptable to society as such. An all too common example of this is the man in financial circles who is ever seeking greater power, having exhausted the opportunities presented through acceptable social channels, he many persuade himself that the use of methods judged unfitting by the social group may serve his purpose best. In his attempts to maximate his ego he accepts methods which are illegal or at best asocial, failing to understand the true motive for his desires or to consider the possible destructive results upon others, so well protected has he become through his processes of rationalization.

Another and very important phase of this problem of delinquency results from the reaction of environmental influences as they play upon the individual through the contacts of the home. An example of this may be found in the experiences furnished the girl reared in a family setting in which from her earliest recollections she has been adjured to mold her thoughts, acts, and desires after the pattern furnished by an older sister, who perchance, has assumed the position of a paragon in the household. It is difficult to conceive the possible sources of emotional conflict, jealousy, antagonism, envy, and so on up and down the scale of emotional affective reactions that may arise during the long years of growth of this individual's personality, when the girl is never absolutely free from the irritations resulting from the attitude of the family. Picture the possible phases of adjustment to this situation on the part of the child spurred on by an inherent desire for self-expression along lines of development which would tend to furnish real satisfaction. It is possible under certain conditions for the child to make fairly satisfactory adjustments through channels of achievements other than that of the older sister or brother, and in actual experience many examples of this happy adjustment are found such as the development of a recognized capacity in the fields of art, music, scholarship, athletics, and so on through the many possible activities open to every-

one. But let us now consider the possible reactions of those individuals who for some reason, personal or environmental, do not seem to find a comfortable means of attaining recognition and gratification for their ego strivings. It is this type of person that we may expect to find included in the group of our so-called delinquents.

Add to this situation of pressure and unrest resulting from the thwartings of childish desires, the emotional instability which occurs at the adolescent period, aggravated by the new and startling physiological demands, is it not possible that the girl may be led to look upon sex as a means of putting herself across, for the very popularity and acclaim accorded her by her clientèle may furnish her with a very real sense of achievement, never before felt by her. This is well illustrated by a case of a girl of twenty who accepted sex promiscuity although devoid of the usual physiological attraction, for through the popularity and very evident appreciation of the men of her acquaintance she experienced a very real sense of satisfaction, which was no doubt, considerably heightened by her refusal to accept fees of any kind.

Many other possible determinants in the field of sex delinquency might be discussed but if in our consideration of cases of these so-called sex delinquents we can help the individual to understand herself, and assist her to make constructive adjustments which will furnish her with real satisfaction, we then can feel that we are at least attacking this problem of sex delinquency through a method of approach which may be expected to produce permanent results.

In our study of the behavior patterns of individuals coming under observation we find another mechanism employed equally as forceful in its effects as that of compensation. Through the medium of this mechanism of substitution the individual is aided in gaining very definite satisfaction for his urge to power by the substitution of one type of behavior reaction for another which is unacceptable because of the restraints and barriers created by society; through this behavior he obtains a vicarious satisfaction for his desires through the creating of symbolic substitutions.

A simple example of this may be found among the individuals who tend to enlarge the ranks of so-called radicals and agitators. In our study of the development of the personality of some of these men, we find a common childhood experience. The boy during his early years was often reared under the imperious rule of a father who stands in that boy's life as the origin of all suppression and domination. Is it not easy to conceive the opportunities for conflicts which may arise between this growing boy's aspirations for power and the oppressive domination by the master of the household? Resulting from these ever increasing conflicts of the growing adolescent can we not conceive a desire on the part of this boy to throw off the yoke of control and as he progresses in his process of emancipation from the home ties may he not carry over the same antagonistic attitude due to his earlier experiences, and through this medium of his former experiences project his antagonism onto all authority

as created by society through its codes and civil laws? And is it not possible to go a step farther and look upon his refusal to conform to the dictates of the social herd as due to an unconscious attempt to permanently rid himself of the burden of authority other than his own?

In this same connection we are led to believe that some of the cases of petty thieving and shoplifting are explainable on a mechanistic basis of substitution. In our study of members of this group we discover individuals who to all intents and purposes commit these asocial acts without any apparent motive, for they are neither in need of the article taken nor do they use the stolen goods to gain financial profits. We find girls of this class who come from good homes, surrounded by all the luxuries that might be desired. We are then led to ask ourselves, why should a girl of this class accept the rôle of a petty thief with all its implications and evident possibilities of social ostracism? As the result of our analysis of the existing conditions we are led to recognize that this behavior on the part of the girl is a very evident protest against that authority as defined by the social codes and ethics established by the herd, and that through the medium of this asocial behavior the girl finds a vicarious expression for deeper, more fundamental desires. Through the medium of symbolization, the petty asocial act furnishes her a vicarious means of obtaining a very definite sense of satisfaction. We are sometimes led in this connection to question whether moral values as placed upon the individual by society may not be considered as a possible determinant in the production of so-called delinquency.

If time permitted it might be well to continue this discussion in more detail for at many points it has not been possible to more than hint at the psychological implications of any given case. Furthermore there might be real worth in the presentation of possible methods which might be employed to further our efforts to control this problem of so-called delinquency, but for the purposes of this discussion to briefly outline the aims will suffice. We must consider as our primal aim the furthering of our study of the underlying factors in the personality of the individual which have tended to influence him in his reactions and adjustments to life: through this broader knowledge we will be better able to give actual help to the individual through furnishing him with an understanding of the true basis for his strivings. Through the medium of this new self-knowledge we may assist him in the necessary process of the modification of his instinctive cravings and desires in order that he may be better able to adjust himself to life along socially acceptable channels. Further, we will be led to recognize the necessity for early healthy adjustments on the part of the child to prevent possible fixations of these urges in a manner that precludes possible socially acceptable reactions. We must recognize that childhood is that golden period in which wise foresight and adequate guidance on the part of those parents, teachers, sociologists, social workers, and physicians who meet these problems will furnish a medium through which the children of today may make satisfactory adjustments to life as they start it, in order that

they as citizens of the morrow may meet the issues of reality in a normal, healthy manner. It is through the furthering of this concept and the application of the knowledge which we possess, that we may hope to conserve and direct the human forces of personality toward a higher plane of successful adjustment and by so doing we will exert a powerful influence against the further development of the so-called delinquent class.

THE ILLEGITIMATE MOTHER AS A DELINQUENCY PROBLEM

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ABSTRACT

The Illegitimate Mother as a Delinquency Problem.—Types of unmarried mothers include (*a*) the mentally subnormal; (*b*) the young, unprotected girl; (*c*) the more mature woman of good character led by false promises or weakly following instinct; (*d*) the really delinquent. Preventive social measures include proper care of the mentally subnormal; education in sex hygiene; safeguarding recreation; providing wholesome activities; re-education accompanied by the necessary restraint. Each case represents a variety of conditions and must be dealt with individually. *Age.* Unmarried mothers for the most part are young; one-sixth of a group studied were under 18. *Mentality.* Inferior mentality and psychopathic traits are important as predisposing factors. The need is urgent for protecting young girls mentally below normal. *Previous character.* Illegitimate maternity in at least half the cases reported on had followed other delinquencies. *Occupational status.* A large proportion of unmarried mothers have been gainfully employed before the child's birth, for the most part in the less skilled occupations. *Broken homes.* Abnormal home conditions, and low standards of family life are probably the most fundamental of the underlying cause of illegitimate maternity. Children born out of wedlock represent a disadvantaged group more likely than the average to suffer from bad heredity, unstable character, and harmful environment.

Delinquency, as the term is generally used, implies atypical conduct that brings a person into conflict with accepted community standards of action. Strictly speaking, all illegitimate maternity and paternity are antisocial, and it is essential that they shall be so considered, both for the protection of society against an undue burden and of the child against deprivation of his natural rights. Church and state, and in the main, public opinion, all hold the preservation of the family and the right of every child to parental care and support as fundamentally necessary to a stable and wholesome society.

In considering the delinquency aspects of illegitimate maternity from the point of view of reduction of the problem, it is necessary to analyze the factors that lead to the condition. Girls and women who become mothers out of wedlock may be divided into the following types: (*a*) The mentally subnormal girl who lacks controlling inhibitory instincts and is an easy victim because of helplessness. (*b*) The young, susceptible girl, unprotected from dangers, who gets into trouble because of lack of understanding, or through force. (*c*) The more mature young woman of good character who is led by false promises, or who weakly or rashly follows an instinct that under other conditions

would have been normal and social. (*d*) The really delinquent girl or woman, who knowingly chooses antisocial conduct, her illegitimate maternity being only an incidental evidence of repeated immorality. This type is undoubtedly to a considerable extent recruited from the preceding ones.

Preventive social measures are indicated: (*a*) proper care and protection of the mentally subnormal; (*b*) education in sex hygiene; (*c*) safeguarding the recreation of youth; (*d*) providing wholesome activities into which dangerous instincts may be diverted; (*e*) safeguarding society and the individual through re-education accompanied by the necessary restraint.

First in interest from a social point of view is the composition of the group of illegitimate mothers as compared with other mothers in respect to age, mentality, home conditions, and conduct. Preventive and reconstructive measures must be based on knowledge of how the individuals composing the antisocial group deviate—inherently or accidentally—from the average (that for want of a better measure is considered the normal). How much of the illegitimate parenthood represented by the more than thirty thousand white births annually in the United States may be properly attributed to delinquency, and what measures can be undertaken to lessen the problem? There can be no general rule for handling this most complex problem of human conduct. Each case represents a variety of conditions, and must be dealt with individually. But in this, as in other individual social problems, certain general facts emerge from study of the background of illegitimate parenthood, and these indicate underlying conditions that should be recognized and dealt with.

Age.—Undoubtedly, the individual and social maladjustments frequently accompanying adolescence are significant factors in illegitimate maternity. Unmarried mothers are for the most part young mothers, and a considerable proportion are girls in their 'teens. In order to secure a fair comparison of the ages of unmarried and married mothers, we have analyzed data secured from field studies in four cities, care being taken that each of the two groups represented similar distribution of nativity. Ages are given for first births to white mothers, in order that the two groups may be comparable. The comparative percentage distribution for the age groups follows:

Age	Percentage Distribution	
	Married Mothers (4116)	Unmarried Mothers (1486)
Under 18	5	17
18–20	27	30
21–24	39	39
25–29	21	10
30–34	6	3
35 and over	2	1

It is seen that slightly more than one-sixth of the mothers out of wedlock were under eighteen years of age. Of the group that may be considered

"normal," as conforming to law and custom, only one-twentieth were under this age. In the next age group there is very little difference—the proportion of unmarried mothers eighteen to twenty years of age being only 3 per cent higher; the proportions in the twenty-one- to twenty-four- year groups are the same. It must be remembered that we are considering here only first births, for both groups. With the exception of the earliest age group, there is a much closer approximation to the normal age distribution than might have been expected.

These age figures show the importance of preventive and protective work which will safeguard young girls from undesirable influences, and develop in them judgment and stability of character. Herein lies the most hopeful possibility for the reduction of illegitimacy and the delinquencies with which it is allied.

Mentality.—It is not difficult to demonstrate the importance of inferior mentality and psychopathic traits as predisposing factors. They are, in fact if not in theory, the most baffling difficulties confronted in efforts at prevention. It is obviously impossible to secure comparable figures as to mentality for the group conforming to social customs—the married mothers. But the rate for unmarried mothers is without question abnormally high. In several cities in which studies were made, 11 per cent, 9 per cent, and 8 per cent, respectively, of the unmarried mothers coming to the attention of agencies were known to be feeble-minded, subnormal mentally, or deranged. A still larger percentage were thought to be subnormal, though they had not been examined. In two rural sections in which similar studies were made, 13 per cent and 16 per cent of the mothers had been diagnosed as feeble-minded, subnormal, or insane.

Emphasis has often been placed on the possibility of preventing a part of this problem through adequate provision for the mentally subnormal. Analysis of data concerning child-mothers shows that the large proportion of more than one-fifth were known to be not normal mentally. Of the girls fifteen years of age and under, 30 per cent were so reported. The need is urgent for protecting these young girls, especially defenseless because lacking in intelligence. It has been shown, for four large cities, that one-sixth of all unmarried mothers were under eighteen years of age; the significance of the proportion of low mentality among them is obvious.

Previous character.—Often the birth of a child out of wedlock is only an incident in a career of immorality and other delinquencies induced by bad environment, absence of healthful forms of recreation, and unprotected youth. In a group of 320 girls under the age of eighteen years for whom there was information as to character, almost half were known to have been delinquent previous to this experience, and one-third of the whole number were known to have been immoral previously, twelve of them having engaged in prostitution—nine of the twelve were seventeen years old, two were sixteen, and one was fifteen years of age. Apparently the difficulty began in early ado-

lescence in a large proportion of cases. It is evident that illegitimate maternity, in half the cases at least, had followed other delinquencies.

Occupational status.—A comparison was made for Boston of the occupations of unmarried mothers previous to the birth of the child and of all gainfully employed women. Of almost seven hundred unmarried mothers, 86 per cent had been gainfully employed before the child's birth. Of the unmarried mothers sixteen to twenty years of age at the time of the child's birth, 83 per cent were engaged in gainful occupations; only 60 per cent of the same age group in the general population were gainfully employed.

The figures as to occupational status show that unmarried mothers are for the most part young wage-earners in the less skilled occupations. Almost a third of all gainfully employed women in Boston were classed as semi-skilled workers; the percentage among the unmarried mothers was the same. But 16 per cent of all wage-earning women were factory operatives—an occupation within the semi-skilled group—as against 27 per cent of the mothers. The most striking discrepancy is found in the percentages in the domestic and personal service group—25 per cent of all working women as against 55 per cent of the unmarried mothers.

Home conditions.—The incidence of broken homes or abnormal home conditions is an important causative factor in all forms of delinquency. In Boston, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia, where analyses were made of the history of unmarried mothers coming to the attention of social agencies, 32 per cent, 49 per cent, and 71 per cent, respectively, came from homes broken through the death of one or both parents, or through divorce, separation, or desertion. In a group of rural New York counties, 56 per cent of the mothers were from broken homes.

The close relation between home conditions and delinquency is brought out in analysis of the histories of 320 unmarried mothers under eighteen years of age. In almost half the cases in which the girls had been immoral, otherwise delinquent, or of poor character, the parents were delinquent or of poor character, or had been dependent upon charity. Where both parents were living and were present in the home, 55 per cent of the girls were of good character and 45 per cent of bad character. Where conditions were abnormal, 42 per cent of the girls were of good character and 58 per cent bad. These figures point to what is probably the most fundamental of the underlying causes—low standards of family life and the absence of wholesome home influences. Even before the special need for care occasioned by illegitimate maternity, a large number of these child-mothers had required care and protection outside their own homes. Forty of the 320 girls had been in correctional institutions or before courts; forty-three had been wards of child-caring agencies; and ten had been under care both as delinquents and as dependent children.

In this paper an effort has been made to show the status of unmarried mothers, in comparison with other groups, and to indicate thereby the need

for certain preventive or reconstructive measures. Another phase of the relation between delinquency and illegitimacy concerns the children born out of wedlock as representing a disadvantaged group more likely than the average to suffer from bad heredity, unstable character, and harmful environment. The following case illustrates in a striking way the various factors—hereditary, temperamental, and environmental—that frequently operate to bring a repetition of delinquency history in succeeding generations.

Twin sisters, seventeen years of age, were committed within a few months of each other to the same reformatory. The girls had different surnames—their given names happened to be the same—and they knew nothing about each other, but the close resemblance of the two led the superintendent to search out their histories. It developed that they were of illegitimate birth, and had been removed in infancy from their mother, an irresponsible almshouse inmate. They were adopted by families in different parts of the state. Both foster homes were supposedly good. After some years the foster parents of one of the girls found her difficult to control, and placed her in an institution from which she ran away after six years. She had had poor educational advantages, never going beyond the fourth grade in school. The other girl remained with her adopted parents until shortly before she was committed to the reformatory. She was troublesome and untruthful, and gave much difficulty at home and in school. At the age of 14 years she had attained the ninth grade. After this she worked in a laundry and did kitchen work in an institution, but was found unsatisfactory in both places. She finally ran away from home.

Both girls were committed for the same offense—vagrancy. Both had been seriously immoral; both were classed as mentally subnormal; both were epileptic, and both, when arrested, were afflicted with gonorrhea. Their early experiences had been much the same, and the same inherent traits developed in a strikingly similar manner.

Throughout the studies of the child-welfare aspects of illegitimacy, we have come upon records indicating that psychological factors tending toward delinquency may be in many cases concomitants of illegitimate birth. The natural instinct of pride in family, however humble, the feeling of security and responsibility that comes from belonging in a definite group, in the case of children deprived of normal family relationship are likely to become perverted into mental conflict when the child learns or begins to speculate upon the circumstances of his birth and the character of his parents. The result may be a feeling of inferiority, carelessness, and antisocial attitude based either on the idea that the weaknesses imputed to the mother may be inherited (it is doubtful if thought of the father's character enters), or a desire to "get even" for having been cheated out of natural rights to family and home. Very many of these children also suffer serious injury through being shifted about, subject to frequent changes that have not made for stability of character or adjustment to society.

JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURE AS A FACTOR IN DIAGNOSIS

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ABSTRACT

Juvenile Court Procedure as a Factor in Diagnosis.—The Juvenile Court is not a new idea in the history of law, but is based on ancient Anglo-Saxon chancery jurisprudence, its basic legal concept being the theory of *parens patriae*, or parenthood of the state in behalf of neglected and handicapped children. *Child-study as the basis for treatment.* Procedure is now socialized in the spirit of the modern clinic, which gives all the evidence concerning the child and full facilities for examination and treatment. Behavior-difficulties involve change in social status. The offender who is capable of citizenship, or partial citizenship, should be brought into normal relation with social groups. This is accomplished in Los Angeles by an experimental school known as "El Retiro" and a club sponsored by the women of the community.

In this discussion the phrase, juvenile court procedure, is understood to include the entire organization of a socialized court. This paper will try to trace the analogies of the court to the clinic and to indicate its power as a factor in the diagnosis and treatment of behavior-difficulties. That a court should be a clinic is not an entirely new idea in the history of law, in fact the basic ideas of the clinic, (1) full and flexible methods of examination which will obtain all the facts, (2) the power to remedy, are rooted deep in our Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and organized in the courts of equity. The modern juvenile court is organized to deal with the handicapped child. Its meaning for social and legal theory has been largely overlooked and attention has been fastened on its sentimental, or its practical aspects.

The socialized juvenile court for the analysis preceding a diagnosis should be equipped with case-work investigations, full clinical facilities for the diagnosis of physical disease, competent health examinations, a psychological laboratory, and a detention home, capable of giving to the child normal conditions of life and regimen and a wide range of outlets through work, study, play, and expression, and to the court a picture of the whole child, accurately observed under these conditions and in these activities. For the second stage the court should possess a legal procedure which is socialized, that is to say, equipped for service as a human institution. The chief elements in the socialization of juvenile court procedure may briefly be summed up as follows: (1) Jurisdiction by means of a petition, praying the court that something be done to safeguard the welfare of the child, rather than a complaint alleging that the child is guilty of an offense. (2) All the evidence, a court procedure which elicits the whole truth concerning the child, its parents, and social background, not merely those fragments of evidence which some lawyers may regard as competent, material, and relevant. The test of the truth received should be as rigidly accurate as in any other legal proceeding. (3) The principle of co-operation should be established between child and court, the family and the community and the court, as between patient and clinic. (4) Parental care—the California juvenile law states that the "care, custody, and discipline of a ward of the juvenile court . . . . shall approximate as nearly as may be that

which should be given by his parents."[1] To secure the welfare of the child the court should possess access to a wide range of possibilities for the work of reconstruction: skilled programs of probation, the use of boarding homes, small specialized institutions, clubs, schools, camps, community-service enterprises of all sorts. (5) An essential element in socialization is that the court be dynamic. This is secured in California by statute that any order in the juvenile court may be modified.[2] Life and youth are in flux, endlessly adapting, so too should be the legal recognition of these modified conditions.

With this equipment, secured partly by statute, partly by administration and an enlightened public opinion the juvenile court can serve as an important factor in the diagnosis and treatment of behavior-difficulties and social handicaps.

We have stated that too little attention has been given the legal and social significance of the juvenile court. From a legal point of view the juvenile court marks the discovery by America of the ancient Anglo-Saxon theory of *parens patriae*, or power of parenthood that exists in the state. It is necessary to explain this origin for the benefit of certain critics who think, or appear to think, that the juvenile court is passing, like a kind of benevolent mushroom, foisted on the body of the law by social uplifters and which will be no longer needed when society, like Alice in Wonderland, attains full stature.

The juvenile court is a court of equity or chancery with a long and highly interesting history. The chief business of the Court of Chancery was "to mitigate the rigor of the common law." This was a fundamental court, as ancient as the kingdom itself, declares Lord Hobart.[3] For centuries among Anglo-Saxons the king, with quasi-parental, quasi-priestly function has represented the source of all legislative and judicial power. When courts of common law were established and precedents hardened the tissue of judicial procedure so that it could no longer adapt itself to the grievances of simple folk, there remained the appeal to the original source of judicial power for redress, that is to say, equity jurisdiction, which consisted in that part of the king's judicial prerogative in civil cases which he had retained in his own hands. Grievances were subject to petition to the king and the king turned over the matter in dispute to his deputy, the chancellor, who ordered the matter heard by a master, or referee, as the custom is today in some juvenile courts. The earliest applications for relief were from those who suffered by violence and the combinations of great men, against which they were unable to gain redress by the ordinary process of law.

Thus Aubyn de Clynton in 1321 complaining of a gross and outrageous trespass petition for a suit in equity on the ground that the "said Johan and Phillip hold their heads so high and are so threatening that the said Aubyn does

[1] Section 24, Juvenile Court Law. California Statutes, pp. 1002, 1022.

[2] *Op. cit.*, section 9.

[3] John G. Henderson, *Chancery Practice*, p. 62, Chicago, 1904.

not dare contest with them at the common law."[1] Frequently petitions were addressed to the king in his chancery, founded upon the poverty and defenselessness of the plaintiff and upon the force and power of the defendant. Thus matters of poverty, guardianship, witchcraft, custody, and estates of minors and those of unsound mind, matters of the protection of the weak and helpless against the strong, came to be heard in a separate court. How like the problems of the juvenile court and the domestic relations courts of today!

And procedure was elastic. So it is in modern chancery matters. The most noted American case referred to a master was that of the *Charter Oak Life Insurance Company* vs. *Cook County National Bank.* We quote Judge Drummond's injunction to the master to whom the case was referred: "Go to the bottom of the case, employ your own methods of investigation, arrive at your conclusions uninfluenced by what any other court may have done or said. In a case involving so many complicated issues as this, the responsibility for a just decision must rest upon the master; he alone can devote the time and study necessary to a thorough understanding of the whole case." It is a surprise to many to learn that the juvenile court has the fullest authority in time-worn usage for its procedure.

Anciently too did the forces and combinations that oppose the protection of the weak and helpless by the strong arm of the law voice their indignation—in 1377 the lawyers among the Commons petitioned the king "that the common laws . . . . may be observed, and may not be defaced with masterships and other singularities." We do not hear, however, any complaints from those who were not lawyers, and matters continued to be referred, as Henry V said, in order "that ye make suche an ende in this matter that we be no more vexe hereafter with thaire complaints and God have you in his keeping."[2]

From a legal point of view the juvenile court created nothing new in 1898 when the Illinois legislature awoke to the horror of treating children as criminals. It merely defined offending children as handicapped and helpless children, included them in the provision which the law had already made for dependents, said explicitly that they could not be regarded as committing crimes, and threw around them the protection of the most ancient court in the history of our jurisprudence. Once more to quote a famous legal historian on this point: "The protection of the weak against the powerful, no matter whether the strength of the latter is the result of superior intellectual endowment, or of cunning, or of both, is yet one of the favorite sources of equity jurisdiction."[3]

With very little modification these old descriptions may be with equal truth applied to the children who come before the modern juvenile court. Neglect, ignorance, exploitation, cruelty, greed, may take their place before the bar of equity, formerly occupied by the haughty barons and sheriffs against whom the simple folk petitioned the king.

We have shown that the legal root from which the juvenile court sprang already possessed the principle of equity, or remedy, which is indeed the essen-

[1] Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 121. [2] *Op. cit.*, 77. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

tial element of the clinic, and the second element, that of examination, or the application of scientific observation to the mental and physical condition of the ward has become an inseparable part of juvenile court procedure following the establishment by Mrs. William F. Dummer in 1908 of the first juvenile medical and psychological clinic in America, organized by Dr. W. Healy in Chicago.

There remains to indicate the sociological significance of the juvenile court. Considered from this point of view a judgment declaring a child a ward of the court is the declaration of a change in social status. The state has found him disabled and handicapped by lack of proper parental control, by neglect, defect, or unsatisfactory social conditions. He is therefore in need of reconstructive discipline, or re-education, and the state assumes guardianship of him temporarily or until his minority is ended. Accurately speaking the child has been subjected to stigma in this proceeding no more than would be involved in a change of guardianship. In public opinion however, the child, particularly the girl, has undergone a radical change in status, and has become by popular definition, a juvenile delinquent.

This handicap, however, is one usually accruing to conditions where accurate knowledge because of the complexity of the facts has been long delayed or withheld. Just as it has been necessary to loose the public mind from the concept of devils as the cause of insanity or yellow fever, so in the field of human behavior is it necessary to banish the concept of morality and immorality from the study of juvenile delinquency.

In modern times when a child violates the social code it is frequently because of lack of a uniform, authoritative definition of the social code. His idea of it is warped or confused. The various groups with which the child has come in contact, the family, the neighborhood, school, church, industry, and the recreational groups have not defined this code in a single voice, authoritatively and simply. The organs of expression of public opinion concerning the social code, the newspapers, the funny papers, the moving pictures, and street talk are still more confusing. If the modern young girl practices virtue she may not believe in it.

There are, of course, neurological, physiological, and mental elements in the girl's departure from the social code, but an important thing to reckon with is that after she has violated the social code and has undergone a change in social status, involving inferiority and guilt, not visited, as far as her observation goes, upon others who have held like views and been guilty of similar violations, there is need for the most tactful social treatment and the most radical and sympathetic recognition of her needs.

Precisely here, at this crisis, can the clinical factor of the juvenile court do the most good. Crises are not many in the life of the young person, that is to say, situations in which the need of the individual is the chief theme. Van Gennep, a French anthropologist, published a book in Paris in 1909, *Les Rites de Passage*, wherein the major and minor rites of primitive peoples in their sociological significance are surveyed. He finds that all have a certain

function, that of aiding in the passage from group to group, from one social status to another. Thus the situation at birth, baptism, entrance to school, puberty, the choosing of occupation, the initiation into fraternities, professions, and the like, the entrance upon marriage, parenthood, and death all have an analogy to a crisis. These situations may be called the crises of the threshold, and the ceremonies which surround them among primitive peoples are the rites of the passage of these thresholds.

For example, among the primitive Yaos, an African people, after the girl is initiated in honor of her attaining physical puberty, she and her companions carry on their heads with great ceremony and honor a miniature house built of logs, in order that they may be recognized symbolically by the whole tribe as the foundation of the home. How profoundly do we modern ones neglect the "puberty of the mind" is illustrated by the stories of the juvenile court girls!

The appearance in court may be likened to a crisis of the threshold. Here there is a summing up of assets and liabilities, issues are clearly defined, there is the dignity and importance of special treatment, and if there is a need of change of status, the legal nature of this change, rather than the popular one, should be pointed out, that is to say, that there has been assumption of guardianship on the part of the state because modern society has placed value on the safeguarding of its youth.

Court procedure then has a double rôle to play in its analogy to the clinic; not only must it diagnose the disability, but it must create in the mind of the child the consciousness of his need of treatment. This should be the only use of force in the situation, the same sort of force which brings the patient to the clinic and induces him to follow the prescribed course of treatment. A court procedure which is dignified, forceful, and flexible can accomplish this without charging the child with guilt.

When treatment begins the individual must be placed as promptly as possible in a situation that will develop a sense of the worth of personality, and emphasize the points held in common with other groups in the community. The problem is much the same as that of the immigrant, who in coming to America from Poland, as noted by W. I. Thomas, may have passed from the group where his status was that of the learned, respected scholar, to the status of the peddler. His gray beard, stooped shoulders, near eyesight, there being marks for honorable distinction, but here marks of difference and ridicule. So with the girl, on the "outside" her status connoted by a sleek coiffure, quick repartee, radiant cheeks, nerves and muscles attuned to the mysteries of jazz, these were her assets; when she comes under the court, they may all count against her in that bewildering process of "making good."

It is essential that some mechanism may be devised whereby the passage is possible without loss of self-esteem, and where the rewards are sufficient to impel the girl to pass the threshold from ward of the state to the threshold of normal citizenship. To create a situation where an individual *must* "make

good," where social forces make it practically inevitable, is a task requiring supreme genius for the "specialist in human relations." Often the necessity of responsibility starts the relearning process.

The creations of situation where "making good" is a necessity has been cleverly set forth in the moving pictures, as illustrated in the type dubbed the "Unwilling Hero" by Will Rogers. Often the dynamic force is mistaken identity. For example, Charles Ray portrays a shy, speech-defective clerk suffering from an inferiority complex. By accident he is mistaken for a brilliant, accomplished young salesagent. He is forced painfully, from point to point, along the path of success by the force of public opinion that insists in envisaging him under the species of successful and confident and refuses to permit him to take refuge in his own diffident and defective personality. Before he is able to unmask the new role has set, the needed adjustment completed.

In the treatment of juvenile delinquency that comes before the court and involves change in status there should be an integration of the forces that seek to establish new social relationships. Some mechanism of passing the threshold from status to status should be devised with sufficient strength to endure over the period of crisis.

An attempt to meet the problem of socialization has recently been begun in behalf of the juvenile court of Los Angeles County. For the girl whose normal relation to the family group has been severed by reason of the permanently broken home, parents dead, imprisoned, incurably ill, or defective, and the like, a girl whose behavior-difficulties make it impossible for her to be absorbed in the neighborhood group, there is usually no provision but the reformatory institution. A place of adjustment, a link between the court, the detention home, and the community is an important phase of diagnosis and treatment. El Retiro, a school for girls of Los Angeles County, is an experiment toward such solution.

The method of adjustment is as follows: Preliminary tests and examinations are made in the detention home and a more or less homogeneous group of girls in their teens are selected for El Retiro. An intensive program of work, study, play, and expression has been provided. Student government, that is to say, student participation in the conduct of affairs of group life, not a formal organization based on the least satisfactory elements of our government, the municipality and the police court, but rather a flexible, clublike organization of team work and community responsibility is maintained. After another period of observation at El Retiro a conference is held concerning the girl. At this conference all available sources of information are brought together. The referee of the court, the probation officer, physician, psychologist, superintendent of El Retiro, the principal of the El Retiro school, the recreation director (who later directs the program of the girl and directs the accomplishment of her project), and one of the girls chosen from the student body to represent the student-body knowledge and opinion—all these persons with specialized information meet to form a many-angled diagnosis. Traits of personality and

the reaction to group life are stressed especially. In this field of research no opinion is more competent than that of the girl who represents the student-body point of view, a mine of information hardly as yet touched by social research. The objective of the conference is the formation of a project or activity-goal for the new student, a task suited to her strength and personality and for which she will be responsible and receive the reward of recognition. On the completion of this project, usually from eight to ten months the girl is ready to leave El Retiro, that is to say, she has succeeded in some phase of group life and important clues for the adjustment of her personality in the larger community outside have been formed.

Since these results have been attained largely as the result of social relationships formed within the group at El Retiro, and by the use of the project method and student government, the girl is likely to have developed both self-confidence and group loyalty. The next essential was to form some social relationship for the complete passage of the girl into the community.

A girls' club was organized and a clubhouse secured in the city for about eighteen girls and their field secretary. The girls pay their board and work in stores, industries, etc. The housework is done by one girl who is paid by the others to act as homemaker. It is called the Los Angeles Business Girls' Club and is sponsored by the Los Angeles Business Women's Club, not as a charity but as an act of co-operation on the part of the business women with the younger and handicapped working girls of the city. Not all the residents are wards of the court, the chief requirement being that the girl be under twenty-one years of age and receiving the minimum wage. The club serves as meeting place for organizations of young people, business girls, college girls, etc. Thus any element of isolation, or unlikeness, is at an end for the girl who may be a ward of the court and she is brought into relationship with the normal forces of the community.

The following four cases, selected because they serve to illustrate the integrating processes at work in a socialized court procedure may be presented.

Evelyn is one. She is an orphan of Canadian extraction. Placed by a children's aid society in some six temporary homes she readily drifted into delinquency. For two years for her it was a succession of institutions, tempered by probation, after she came under the court. Then El Retiro was established. Her health was so delicate that she was sent there for observation for anaemia. There her central ability was discovered—leadership, and her chief interest—the design and manufacture of clothing. On graduation she became president of the alumnae group of girls and went to live at the clubhouse. She began earning $22.00 per week as designer and shortly plans to open a shop of her own. As president of the alumnae organization she has succeeded in doing what no probation officer has done, the voluntary reporting of each girl's change of work, address, and new friends. If they are out of work through indifference or indolence her fluent scorn and her own stylish

costumes act on them as a spur. Her activity has two major outlets, leadership and craftsmanship.

Margaret is another. She was the oldest in a large family headed by a dissolute factory operative and a quarrelsome, complaining mother. The girl's home life was marked by coarseness and obscenity of language and her personality by alternate melancholy and violence. At El Retiro it became apparently probable that her behavior was the reaction made by her organism in seeking that for which it craved most, peace and security. She became an El Retiro homemaker. A troublesome asthma yielded to treatment based on quiet and contentment. She is now an officer of the alumnae association and she has returned to her own home which has become largely rehabilitated through her efforts. The club life apparently affords her all she needs of contact with the outside world.

Geraldine is a girl of eighteen, wrecked on the moving-picture industry. She was seduced by an under-director in attempting to sell a scenario, and was passed from hand to hand until her health broke. Her experiences were unbelievably tragic and unbelievably common. Her health, self-confidence, and charm were restored at El Retiro. On graduation she took to nursing but the key to her interest in everything was affection. A business man met her at the club and understood her genuine capacity. They were married. She has become an unusually successful wife and mother. She. too, is a club member, proud of her school and eager to assist.

Maggie was a rollicking, buxom girl of seventeen. Her parents were dead and her living relatives of doubtful reputation, indeed all the female members of her family had "gone to the bad." Maggie's own escapades were many. At El Retiro she was rough, noisy, daring, fearless, impetuous, in short filled with the spirit of adventure. She did not graduate but was returned to the custody of the probation officer. While on probation she became pregnant. In court she refused to tell who was responsible for her condition, but concocted a story of attack by a nameless man. The referee commented on her characteristics, her bravery, strength, resourcefulness, and gave her two weeks in which to find the man and bring him herself, unaided to court. Surprised but not daunted the girl succeeded. The man proved to be a soldier with a temperament much like her own. On careful examination, physical and mental, he was found to be a fit mate and was permitted to marry Maggie. This social rehabilitation has restored her to club life, much to her delight. For several months she has been happy and successful.

These four cases appear to illustrate certain varying types of human disposition and longing. W. I. Thomas has set forth four fundamental human wishes as follows: (*a*) the desire for new experience; (*b*) the desire for response (love and affection); (*c*) the desire for security; (*d*) the desire for recognition.

Somewhat from a different point of view, though allied in meaning, Graham Wallas in the *Great Society* finds that the chief human dispositions of behavior-goals are: craftsmanship, love, curiosity, and ambition.

Whichever mode we chose of envisaging the motive powers under which our young people react we should attend carefully to the need of diagnosis of the type with which we are working. How patiently and how alertly we should be on the lookout for individual differences in modes of feeling and response! How much suffering can we not avoid if we realize that human beings are not alike but infinitely and beautifully different! Our plans must fit the material if we would avoid collapse in building.

In analysis it has seemed to me that the four cases cited above illustrate certain factors of human variation, discovered late, but not too late to avoid permanent disability. Evelyn—craftsmanship and the desire for recognition; Margaret—the homemaker, the desire for security; Geraldine—the desire for response; Maggie—the desire for adventure.

Each of these girls has found social outlet in her contact with a group, similarly adjusted, with a similar relation to social status. All have experienced loyalty, that lately evolved and supreme kind of loyalty designated by Royce: "Loyalty is the devotion of the self to the community."

To sum up: the juvenile court can serve best as a factor in the diagnosis and treatment of behavior difficulties when the procedure is socialized. The initial step in this process is analysis based on examination of the physical, mental, and social factors involved; the second, an adequate mechanism for the passage of the individual from a status based on a warped view of the social code to a status in harmony with that code. The third step is the synthesis of the individual with the social forces of the community.

COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

Dwight Sanderson, Cornell University, Presiding

POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTRY

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ABSTRACT

Points of Contact between City and Country.—There is growing discussion of the relation of city and country. For our purposes, town will mean all aggregations from hamlet to city. A phase of contact between town and country is an antagonism which seems to have intensified during recent decades. Some of the more or less tangible causes of this opposition are these: (1) The historic urbanite attitude of superiority toward farmers; (2) the farmers' dawning awareness of concentration of population and wealth in cities and the belief that it is at the expense of the country; (3) the growing class-consciousness among farmers, and organization to realize class interests; (4) especially the organization of farmers to secure what they consider justice relative to marketing of their produce, and kindred matters.

Basis of Co-operation.—There appears to be no certain and speedy relief for the strained relationship between rural populations and large cities. The ultimate solution would appear to be the realization of a social order giving entire justice to farmers. Small towns and villages and nearby rural people, however, should be able to agree and co-operate, providing merchants of the former will compromise

their prices and the latter will be willing to pay somewhat higher than mail order prices for the advantages of having a nearby village. Farmers' cooperative stores may accomplish something ultimately, but the outlook is not immediately hopeful.

The frequent discussions appearing recently on the relationships between city and country are an indication that a consideration of such matters is of importance and possibly further indicate that a strain exists between the two portions of society that is worthy of study. In most discussions it is assumed that everyone knows where the city ends and the country begins but critical students of rural society are aware of the difficulty in making hard-and-fast delimitations; and are quite certain that fixing the dividing line at 10,000, 5,000, or 2,500 is purely arbitrary and superficial. Further, there is a developing opinion that the villages and smaller towns have as many or more points of similarity to large urban aggregations of population than to the open country and that some of the points of similarity are so fundamentally significant as to debar classifying such places as rural.

There are certain things in which these small aggregations resemble the country, namely, in simplicity of living, democracy in personal contacts and freedom from social stratification, large recourse to and dependence on family domesticity, high respect for and conformity to the customary moral codes due to publicity of living, homogeneity of population, and relatively simple and undifferentiated industrial life. On the other hand there are numerous ways in which these small places are similar to large places as in compactness of population, the occurrence of numerous interests and interest organizations, domestic and communal conveniences and utilities, urbanized aspirations, and outlook of inhabitants, high degree of community spirit and solidarity, manner of living, dressing, and social intercourse, distinct consciousness of kind as urbanites resulting in a patronizing and condescending attitude toward country people, and an economic life constituted of non-extractive industrial pursuits accompanied with a highly developed motive of profit-taking.

In reality the small places are a kind of halfway house between the country and city, but, on the whole, are more like the latter than the former, because even the inhabitants of all save the merest hamlets of a few inhabitants identify themselves and their communities in aspirations, mode of living, and outlook on society with cities and more especially because the economic life is so highly motivated by profit-taking and the social psychology of the group is manipulated and controlled by those who are the more immediately concerned with profits. For the purposes of this discussion, then, these villages and towns of America will be considered as urban rather than as rural.

Since our national society is made up of two great component parts, the country and the cities, it is evident that there are numerous implicit but inconspicuous points of contact between the two. They are fundamental parts of a national and world-economy and each has functions to perform which are peculiar to itself and which the other half of society as well as itself needs in order to exist. That what the country is and does has a bearing in many

subterranean ways on what the city is and does and vice versa is so obvious that no detailed discussion is required and so will be taken for granted. There are, however, certain more explicit and conspicuous contacts which deserve attention, for out of these interactions and relationships have developed attitudes and movements which are of great moment.

Let us begin with a result of contacts between country and city, namely, with the fact of widespread antagonism and then proceed to a discovery of the causes in the contact of these groups with each other.

There are some great currents in population and wealth away from the country and toward the city which must impress the minds of the leaders in rural society.

There is little room to doubt that in some particulars the cities are developing at the expense of the open country and even of smaller cities and villages. In the study of population we observe that there has been no absolute decline in the nation as a whole in rural population. Only a few states actually lost rural inhabitants in the sense of having fewer at the last census than in the preceding one. But the country loses millions of people during a decade to the cities and the rate of increase of urban population is several times (5.8 during 1900–1910) that of the open-country rural populations. We also discover that in our nation a large percentage of the village and small cities are losing inhabitants and that the smaller the urban aggregation the greater is its likelihood of declining in population. Where these people who leave the villages go we cannot ascertain from statistics, but observation in a number of them is to the effect that most of the young people migrate cityward.

That a stream of talent from country to town is the accompaniment of the flow of population is obviously inevitable. It might be thought that it is only the more discerning who become dissatisfied in the country and go elsewhere. On the other hand, it could be contended that it is the nervously unstable and easily discouraged who do so. Only a resort to facts can settle this dilemma and the facts we have, indicate that the leaders in the United States in industry, commerce, finance, engineering, newspaper publication, pulpit, and other lines overwhelmingly have been born in the country. This would indicate that not only persons of leadership capacity but of extraordinary capacity have been uprooted from rural districts. And since there is no commensurate return of population and talent from urban to rural districts, the latter are made poorer and the former richer thereby.

There is also a disproportionate concentration of the wealth of the nation in the cities. The division of the national wealth between city and country for the census dates from 1850 to 1890 has been estimated. In that period of time the proportion of urban wealth increased from 44 per cent to 75 per cent of the whole, while the proportion of rural wealth decreased from 56 per cent to 25 per cent of the total. Rural wealth increased 400 per cent, urban wealth increased 1600 per cent. In 1890 when the rural population owned but 25 per cent of the wealth about 60 per cent of the population lived in the open country.

At that time the per capita wealth of the rural population was about $423 as as compared with $1944 for inhabitants of cities and incorporated villages. We have no estimate as to how the case stands today, but probably the tendencies working to the advantage of urbanites has continued, so that the discrepancy is still greater.

The comforts and amenities of life seem to many to be located in towns. The homes have running water, inside toilets, bathing provisions, electricity for lighting and power, furnaces and equitable heating plants. The streets are paved and there are sidewalks so that in driving and walking there is no necessity to get into the mud. There are parks for outing, movies and playhouses to attend, lodges, churches, clubs, and organizations of all descriptions to belong to, frequent dancing, good schools, newspapers dropped at the door as soon as out, easily accessible stores and shops of all sorts, the stimulus of crowds in the street, parades, and pageants, and the opportunity to be clean and dressed up and frequently to stay so. In comparison with this understated array of attractions and distractions, the country appears to make a poor showing and only the decidedly rural-minded folk are content to live there. No blame can attach to cities for such concentration of appealing opportunities but the glowing contrast between town and country in this respect is none the less a fact.

Such a tremendous drift of population, talent, and wealth toward the city and such a multiplication of seductive attractions there constitute an impressive phenomenon. Statesmen the world over have pondered deeply their significance and sought to devise means of checking them. How could it be otherwise than that intelligent agrarians should envisage them as so many evidences of the encroachment of the cities on the country?

Opposition between country and city appears in a vague and hazy form out of the fact that farmers are farmers and town people are not, evidently being founded on location, mode of living, and calling. Says a recent writer:

"Urbanites have always arrogated to themselves a position of superiority relative to the agricultural classes. The city dwellers of Roman times called those on the land rustics and the literary men had much to say of the simplicity and crudeness of the rustic. Europe evolved its tillers of the soil into a distinct peasant class and its ignorance and stolidity are proverbial—the ideational product largely of white-bearded gentry delving in the field of urban literature. That the urbanites and townsmen of the United States 'look down on' the country-man is made evident in many ways. His rough dress, his tousley hair and beard, sometimes bearing chaff and straws, his lack of polish in social approach and conversation, his ignorance of city ways and manners have been mirrored in printed paragraphs and jibes of the press, playhouse, and street. The refined and superior manners of city dwellers are exhibited in the taunts the town boy hurls at the country boy when he puts his feet within the sacred precincts of the former. Conscious that he is different in clothes and calling and feeling at a great disadvantage, the country boy comes to partly

accept his assigned position to a lower class and to resent the situation and to 'want to get even.' Out of this situation that has persisted generation after generation has arisen a kind of unconscious class consciousness relative to each on the part of country and city dwellers."

When we approach the relation of antagonism between town and country from the side of economic interest we discover a perennial and world-wide source of renewal. From the time when the Roman slaves revolted against their masters down to the present, those on the soil have resented what has often been and always appeared to them to be their systematic exploitation by those in the towns. And those in towns have resented the imputations that they were exploiters, even when the accusation was true. Perhaps the data presented of the concentration of wealth in cities together with the startling fact that had it not been for the doubling of agricultural land values between 1900 and 1910, farming in the United States would have been conducted at a loss, are sufficient proofs that the farmers have been subject to exploitation. At any rate, rightly or wrongly, the agriculturists in North America, Europe, and Australia at the present time are quite generally agreed that the currents of business run against them unduly and that industrial, financial, and commercial organizations identified with cities are organized and operated to take undue profits at their expense.

Whenever a class becomes conscious of itself as a class and begins to organize as a class to rectify its real or imaginary wrongs, the opposition between itself and any other class or classes it deems to be the offender is immensely intensified. The farmers of the United States have been growing ever more class-conscious since the time of the Granger movement of last century and are organizing themselves for protection in both economic and political directions. But class-consciousness appears to be much weaker in America than in Europe. In Canada and the United States farmers are mobile, willing to leave farming for other occupations under great provocation, while the peasants of Europe are wedded to the land, and, even though resorting to the cities at times to work, continue to regard themselves as tillers of the soil. Moreover, recent events have intensified this class-consciousness in Europe. Mr. A. E. Taylor writes that "perhaps the most impressive result of the war is the destruction of feudalism. Practically every country in Europe that possessed feudal estates before the war has condemned them to division into small holdings for individual peasants. The agrarian question has been a burning problem in central Europe for a century. Most violently agitated in Russia because conditions were worst there, the problem was felt wherever large estates permitted tenants and agricultural workers to be exploited. More important than political freedom, more urgent than reform in education, more desired than change in government, more longed for even than abolition of compulsory military service was ownership of the land. . . . . Now, it is precisely out of the sense of new possession that the present conflict between city and country in Europe has assumed an exaggerated form. The city is

trying to govern the policy of the country, and one reason why the country resists is because of the new-found sense of ownership of the peasant. The governments of most of the countries of Europe are more or less anti-agrarian and the situation has in some places developed into a veritable impasse. Because the agrarians of Europe have always possest a class-consciousness they have always formed a political block. For a hundred years agrarian parties have been more or less influential in European politics and not infrequently they have held the balance of power."[1]

Speaking of the British cooperative movement Sir Horace Plunkett writes: "I was in parliament from 1892 to 1900, and I remember one incident which brought home to me the political power of the trading interest and its hostility to cooperation. A minister of education nearly got his party into serious trouble for permitting the use in schools of a book in which the cooperative system was explained." Then relative to the Irish agricultural cooperative movement he continues: "The Irish movement was bitterly opposed by the country traders, who saw that joint purchase of agricultural requirements and joint sale of agricultural products not only would deprive them of a considerable portion of their business but would throw light upon the quality of all articles of common consumption and the prices charged for them, and they had even more political influence in Ireland than their brethren possessed in England. . . . . In a backward agricultural community the political machine is generally run, not by the farming majority, but by the trading minority. . . . . The control of the political machine in advanced industrial communities by combines and trusts was never comparable to the influence upon Irish politics of the village traders. It is generally known how 'big business' has aroused the ire of progressive leaders in American politics, but the way in which little business retarded rural progress in Ireland for a quarter of a century has escaped notice."[2]

That organizations of farmers has intensified the strife between city and country is generally recognized by students of the subject. Too often the blame is attached exclusively to the farmers as if they have no rights of self-protection. It is not always perceived that the business elements of cities have been organized as a profit-getting class for a long time and that the tendency is for all these elements to present a united front when ameliorative agricultural legislation is proposed or when farmers attempt cooperative enterprises. The press of the United States has been generally quite violent and bitter against the Granger movement, the Populist movement, and the Nonpartisan League movement; and since the opinion of the press is determined by its advertisers and the advertisers are the businesses of the cities, it is evident where the source of opposition is.

[1] A. E. Taylor, "Conflict between City and Country in Europe," *Saturday Evening Post*, August 14, 1920, pp. 1 ff.

[2] *The Survey*, XLVI, 319, November 26, 1921.

It is probable that the business men of the small places have had no animosity against farmers as such but they have believed their profits threatened and have resented interference with their business. They have been strengthened in their organized opposition by the great interests in the larger centers. These larger marketing, transportation, and credit interests are prone to use their influence against movements which threaten ultimately to reach and regulate their operations. Consequently we have the exhibit of business from top to bottom being regimented for defense and offense, while on the other hand the farmers are forming in ranks, sometimes recruited by organized labor of cities, to improve their economic position. It is a menacing picture but one that appears inevitable as classes come to self-consciousness and form themselves into organizations.

The position of the business men in the villages and smaller towns is especially equivocal because of their close contact with farmers. In these smaller places the patronage is predominantly from the country. Without this trade and banking business the small businesses would fail and disappear. The merchant, bankers, and others are, therefore, under far greater dependence upon, and obligation to, agriculturists about them than to the strong interests in the large cities. Nevertheless they commonly align with the latter when farmers organize.

This attitude of the business element in small places appears all the more equivocal when it is remembered that the decrease of population in a third of the small places and the steady increase in the proportion of such places losing inhabitants during three decades indicate that the large cities are crushing them in a business way. It might be expected that the leaders in small places would have the intelligence to identify their interest with those of the agriculturists on which they immediately depend for success and so cooperate with rather than organize against them.

Although antagonisms between classes seem to be inevitable in the onward march of humanity, they are none the less deplorable because of the "bad blood" engendered between the opposing parties, the waste of effort and wealth incident to the struggle, the sacrifice of innocent bystanders, and the general resulting disorganization. The results of strife between town and country are so harrassing and deplorable, involving in the conflict all elements, institutions, and interests, at least in the smaller centers and often the large ones, that it would seem that all would welcome measures for mitigating the struggle, and, if possible, for ultimately eliminating it. But there is little hope of mitigation or elimination so long as common interests and justice in the distribution of the surplus are ignored.

Who can say what the outcome of this situation is to be or what can be done to mitigate it? We have heard voices from time to time saying that there is no class conflict, no basis for opposition between capital and labor, yet the lines are drawn there as distinctly and rigidly as ever. This other conflict between agrarians and urban businesses is almost as pronounced and clear-cut

as the other, based as it is on the distribution of the products of industry, and it is folly to shut our eyes to the truth and say that all will be well if farmers and business men will only get together.

If the farmers are right in their contentions that they receive an unduly small proportion of the proceeds from their produce, then they have a right to organize both economically and politically to protect their interests. But be it remembered that their cooperative efforts evoke about as much hostility as do their political attempts.

As between urban aggregations of all classes and the country perhaps the realization of an adequate land-settlement system will have a mitigating influence on the hostility, wherever the land question is the bone of contention, as in Europe generally. But there are also the marketing, the credit, and agrarian policy questions in Europe as in America and relative to these questions there must be recourse to both economic cooperative organizations and the exertion of political pressure. What form the political efforts shall take, whether the exercise of pressure on legislators and administrators by way of economic organizations or by the formation of distinct agrarian political parties, must be settled on the basis of expediency.

Perhaps the case is clearer concerning the relationship of the country to small towns and villages. There is a large mutuality of interests between the small town and the adjacent country. The small place has more interests in common with the country than with large cities. The business of such places is more dependent on the farmers than they on it; for easy transportation, the multiplication of trading centers, and the development of the mail-order business have made it possible for the latter to largely ignore the nearby village. But the stores, banks, and shops cannot find a substitute for the farmer's patronage.

On the other hand, a good local village is of unquestioned benefit to nearby farmers. It is a time saver in making journeys to do business. Better satisfaction is usually derived from buying goods over the counter, where their character and quality may be seen, than from the unseen purchase from mail-order houses. Local tradesmen will extend the credit that is often required by farmers. There is the advantage of the local bank for credit and deposit, of the doctor whose joke and visit are often more restorative than his medicine and whose close knowledge of the history of family ailments is a great asset; of blacksmith shop, barber shop, and of church and school. Good towns demonstrate their worth in land values, the nearer the town the higher being the value of farm land, doubtless the register of the price of convenience.

There are many directions for farmers and townsmen to take in their teamwork together. Good roads are mutually desirable. They extend the arms of trade into the country and make marketing centers more accessible to the farmers. Both sides have a common interest in promoting local industries. They make nearby markets for certain kinds of farm produce and serve as the basis of diversified farming. They increase the population of the town

and so create a larger trade basis for local firms. It has been demonstrated that larger schools and churches are advantageous; so here are other joint tasks for townsmen and farmers. And we must not forget the desirability of establishing county libraries with their branches in the various local communities and of joint clubs of town and country women.

Since it is chiefly over matters of trade that country and town are arrayed against each other, the question arises as to how they can compromise their differences. The local merchant insists that farmers and other consumers should patronize home industries and grow quite bitter over buying from mail-order houses. The farmer, in turn, insists that local prices of the things he buys are too high and for things he sells, too low. Are there any compromises or alternatives?

If both sides are sensible and fair, there is a basis of compromise between small places and the surrounding agricultural producers; but both sides must put themselves in the attitude of making concessions. The farmers, for example, should not be expected to sacrifice all they might gain as a result from purchasing goods away from home, nor should they expect small merchants to entirely meet the prices of huge and efficient urban establishments. But while the farmer should be willing to pay a percentage for the convenience of trading at home and having a nearby village, the merchants, in turn, should meet him halfway and make substantial price concessions. Thus, good sense and a desire for fairness on both sides will do much to make a completely cooperative town-country community.

A possible alternative has been sometimes suggested as a solution of this problem. The suggestion is to the effect that the development of cooperative stores by farmers might ultimately eliminate the small local middlemen, there being then nothing to quarrel over. It is further suggested that the present middlemen might then become managers and salesmen in these cooperative establishments. Now it is true that such cooperative stores have had a large growth in Ireland and some European countries and that they are being established in this country. It is also true that they might accomplish much in the direction of reducing prices to consumers at large and in securing better prices to farmers on their produce. But so far, American cooperative farmers' stores have not been a distinct success. They have ordinarily failed because of inadequate management, and we cannot hope much from them until individuals and associations establishing them learn that running a mercantile establishment is an enterprise requiring special training and ability.

Since much of the conflict between town and country centers in the farm marketing process, it may be well to say a word in that connection. As a result of my own search for light on the marketing situation, I have reached the conclusion that, as yet, we are largely in the dark concerning whether or not the markets are systematically loaded against the farmer. So far as I can see, no one has proved, beyond a shadow of a doubt, a conclusion either way. It is a strange fact that, in view of the many fine studies of the farm-marketing

question, a gap has been left here in our information. Personally, I have spent much time in an endeavor to bridge this gap by the application of scientific statistical methods and I have discovered the task more or less futile because so much needed information is unobtainable. As a consequence, the conviction comes that we are unable to justify the widespread claims so often made that the wheat market, for example, is manipulated by a small coterie of dealers against the producers. We must hope that the much-needed intensive, statistical research at this point may sooner or later enable us to pronounce an intelligent and valid judgment concerning this, and so, perhaps, contribute to the elimination of some of the strife existing between town and country.

WHAT THE RED CROSS IS DOING IN RURAL ORGANIZATION IN THE LAKE DIVISION

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ABSTRACT

What the Red Cross Is Doing in Rural Organization in the Lake Division.—In addition to regular Red Cross activities a number of chapters have undertaken home service extension. This social work has developed into four general types: case work with families; community organization; recreation; organization of existing agencies with co-ordination of their programs.

Since three-fourths of the Red Cross Chapters in America head up in towns of eight thousand population or less, it is readily seen that the Red Cross has a vital interest in the problems of rural people.

You are all acquainted with the regular Red Cross activities: such as service to soldiers and their families, public health nursing, first aid, nutrition work, instruction in home hygiene and care of the sick, and junior work in the schools. But a number of chapters have undertaken a broader social work program known as home service extension. In most cases this has consisted in family welfare work in towns. However, a few chapters in the Lake Division have employed rural workers who confine their efforts entirely to the country districts.

There are no hard and fast rules under which these workers operate and therefore the program varies in each of these counties according to the type of worker employed and the particular needs found to exist. Yet this work may be roughly grouped into four general types with certain activities like recreation and community organization common to them all. (1) The first type is characterized by case work among families. Olive Hill, Kentucky, Thorntown, Indiana, and Butler County, Ohio, are the best examples of rural case work being done in our Division. (2) The second type deals with the community as a case, and organizing community programs is the characterizing element; Scioto County, Ohio, furnished the best example of this class of work. (3) The third type uses recreation largely as the means of approach,

Covington, Ohio, and Richland County, Ohio, being examples of this type of work. (4) The fourth type seeks to organize the existing agencies and strives to co-ordinate the programs of each in a way to give the local community the maximum benefit to be derived from them. Muskingum County, Ohio, is cited for this.

Olive Hill, Kentucky.—A close examination would show that these lines of classification are but roughly drawn, since in each of the counties mentioned there is an amazing variety of things being done by the rural worker. For instance in the class of counties listed as the case work type, besides handling every conceivable kind of case, the Red Cross worker at Olive Hill finds time during the year for conducting six classes in first aid, holding numerous community meetings, organizing Girls' Camp Fire Clubs and girls' sewing clubs, a woman's club, a welfare league, and conducting a baby contest. In addition she secured and equipped a restroom for country women who come to town. She started a community library with 500 volumes, aided in two village clean-up campaigns, worked up a community Christmas tree, treating 500 poor children, supervised the playgrounds in a mission school one afternoon a week during the summer, started the modern health crusade in the schools, and put on the Red Cross Pageant of Peace.

Thorntown, Indiana.—Turning to the rural case-worker at Thorntown, Indiana, we find her indulging in conducting a class in domestic science for over-age and under-grade girls, carrying on a daily vacation Bible school, organizing Camp Fire Girls, starting playgrounds in several communities, training local volunteer play supervisors and conducting a child health conference and free clinic. In this she enlisted the co-operation of local doctors and dentists as well as that of the State Department of Health.

Butler County, Ohio.—Butler County, Ohio, was the other chapter mentioned as having undertaken the rural case-work program, but we find the worker here branching out also into other activities. She holds numerous community meetings at which local needs are discussed and plans made for meeting them. Such get-together meetings in the village of Coke Otto resulted in the formation of the Coke Otto Improvement Association which has undertaken a number of things such as repairing the roads by volunteer service, erecting a fire house and operating the fire engine by local volunteer squads. The organization is now working on securing electric lights for the village. This association repeated the kind of community Christmas celebration which they held last year under the direction of the rural worker.

The worker co-operating with the county Y.M.C.A. is rendering a distinct playground and recreation service in many places throughout the county by teaching games and recreational methods to groups of volunteer play leaders. In two communities this group was large enough to arrange a schedule providing two local supervisors for every weekly play evening.

The County Superintendent of Schools has asked the rural worker to report on families likely to have difficulty in sending children to school due

to lack of clothing or food. The County Health Commissioner requests reports on health cases and the township trustees are also using the worker's knowledge to good advantage.

Perhaps the most unique accomplishment of this worker during the year was the arranging for a rural community theatrical contest at the Butler County Fair. One community furnished a violinist, pianist, and leader for the festival. Five other rural communities staged competitive plays in the contest. Here is an incentive for community plays and pageants during the winter months.

Covington, Ohio.—Covington, Ohio, was named as one of the places where recreation characterized the work. This village organized what they insisted upon calling a Red Cross Community Council. Following this a rather careful survey was made with a number of state agencies participating. Recreation was found to be the crying need. They employed a young woman as recreational leader who was also charged with the responsibility of service to the soldiers' families.

They soon had installed a carefully supervised community picture show in the township auditorium which had been seldom used by the public. The school yards were converted into playgrounds during the summer months and a number of local leaders were trained for supervising play. The worker introduced physicial training for girls in the high school and organized a gymnasium class for the ladies of the village. This service was later extended to include the high schools in one half of the county. The principal effort of the rural worker in the schools was expended in training teachers in recreational methods.

Richland County, Ohio.—Richland County, Ohio, also conducted a county-wide study with a number of agencies co-operating. Following the recommendations made, the local Red Cross chapter employed a recreation leader for the county outside of Mansfield. The various chairmen of the eleven Red Cross branches in the county constitute the County Council. This council meets once a month and directs the rural work program. The worker has now been operating in Richland County for about sixteen months. She began by establishing a close and cordial relationship with the County Superintendent of Schools and within a short time had introduced a series of games which were being played simultaneously in practically all the country schools. Soon play days were being conducted by districts; a number of schools coming together on Saturday, all prepared to play the same games. Growing naturally out of this was a tremendous county school picnic and play day held last summer with over three thousand present. Preliminary township field meets were held to select contestants for the big county meet.

At present in this county the school boards of four villages are conducting gymnasium classes which are recognized as a part of the regular course.

In addition the rural worker has succeeded in organizing a number of community baseball teams into a county league and a number of boys' and girls' basketball teams which also play in regular series.

In one place basketball was played in an old store building where the stove had to be placed on the platform while the game was in progress. Everything else in the village closed up at night when these games started.

The worker has also organized several Boy Scout and Girl Scout units. She has started three lyceum courses which are now operating in fourteen communities. In co-operation with the Y.M.C.A. she conducted a girls' summer camp with 160 enrolled. She has organized fifteen community clubs in the county, four of which are now building community houses. The house at Shiloh will contain an auditorium and gymnasium combined, a library and restroom, and in the basement will be a kitchen, dining-room, poolroom, and bowling alley.

Scioto County, Ohio.—Scioto County, Ohio, has attracted rather unusual attention not only because of the activity of the Red Cross rural worker there but because of her methods of procedure. The success of the work to a large degree is due to the fact that a live, active, and responsible committee is organized in each township. The committees were originally composed of four men and one woman in each instance. However, at their own request some of them have been enlarged and there are now 130 committee members in the seventeen townships. These committees work in the closest harmony and co-operation with the rural worker. They can be depended upon to give their time and energies unstintingly whether it be for making a community study, looking up individual cases that need assistance, arranging for a community sing, entertainment, or other forms of community meeting, or for any other project whatever.

The worker has shown her greatest power in being able to mobilize scores of helpers. In the spring of 1920 an arrangement was made whereby any doctor or dentist in the city of Portsmouth would give free service to one person each month referred to them by the Red Cross worker. In reality many doctors give free service to a number each month. Every Tuesday is Red Cross day for country people at the city dispensary. It is there that many operations have been performed without expense to the patient. Beside the doctors and dentists a large group of other people give volunteer service. There are troups of volunteer play leaders and entertainers for the community evenings, and there is always someone who is ready to give an inspirational speech. The worker reports that more than two hundred volunteers have served in some capacity at least three times each during the past three months.

Muskingum County, Ohio.—The last county to be considered is Muskingum County, Ohio. The rural work in Muskingum County is meant to be a demonstration of approved methods of rural organization and a place where rural workers may be trained.

The organizer in this county is supplied by the Lake Division office while an assistant and all necessary expenses are furnished by the local chapter.

The worker is largely guided by a rural service council made up of representatives of twelve county-wide agencies. It might be mentioned in passing

that at the present time there are in the county twenty-seven agencies at work in the rural sections. At least twenty of these are interested in home betterment in some form or other such as health, recreation, child welfare, community organization, education, religion, etc. Beside these there are a great many local organizations doing a variety of things. In one town of 2,500 there was found to exist more than thirty organizations, no one of these being aware of the existence of so many other local agencies. The thing that has characterized the work in this county has been the splendid co-operation of all these groups and the readiness to co-ordinate their several programs so as to more adequately meet the needs of the county. As an example of this, beginning on April 1, and closing October 3, a county-wide educational campaign was carried out, using six motion picture programs on the following subjects: Boys' and girls' agricultural clubs, better schools, good roads, health, child welfare, farm and home conveniences. In this campaign active co-operation was secured of the Farm Bureau, the county schools, county health board, and Good Roads Council. Each of these organizations furnished films and a speaker to accompany the rural worker. Thirty-two communities were selected in the county and five programs were presented in each of these during the seven months. In all 68 films were presented at these meetings, 148 talks were given by the Red Cross worker, and 108 talks were given by representatives of other organizations. A total attendance of 28,880 was registered.

A mass of community activities have grown directly out of these meetings. In the same spirit the rural organizer attempted to socialize the county fair. In this project he secured the co-operation of seven agencies beside the Red Cross. They operated a lost and found booth, a restroom, a good literature table, an information stand for ex-service men, a better schools and churches booth, a first aid station, and a public health center.

The worker within the last two months arranged for forty-one addresses on sex and social hygiene to be given in rural communities by two representatives from the State Department of Health. The schools and the county health officials participated in this project.

A plan for a county library is practically completed. It was promoted by the rural worker circulating twenty state libraries from community to community, thus arousing sufficient interest to demand a county library system.

During the past year the worker, with the assistance of many other individuals has completed studies in twenty-one communities. Eight classes in home hygiene and care of the sick were conducted for country women. First aid courses are now being given to all students in the rural high schools of the county.

The worker is now busy planning some thirty community institutes to be conducted during the winter. He has already secured the pledge of co-operation on the part of all the agencies which can possibly be used in this undertaking.

It is supposed that these institutes will naturally take up the subjects for further consideration which were introduced in the educational campaign conducted during the summer.

The program in this county is in no sense superimposed but is being worked out by local community clubs, or community councils, and backed up by the existing agencies.

These are some of the outstanding activities of the Red Cross in rural work.

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

Frank D. Watson, Haverford College, Presiding

HAS SOCIOLOGY A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EQUIPMENT OF THE SOCIAL WORKER?

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ABSTRACT

Results are reported from a questionnaire sent to 463 representative social workers of which 133 replies proved enumerable. While the data are not conclusive the replies corroborate the following conclusions: (1) That training is increasing and is increasingly expected; (2) that undergraduate sociology is not markedly vocational but is decidedly prevocational; (3) that without applied sociology the other branches of sociology have less professional value; (4) that teachers of sociology have quite as much to learn from social workers as vice versa; (5) that the professional school is needed to bridge the gap; (6) that job-analysis of social work is desirable; (7) that several other subjects are equally valuable, at least for certain kinds of social work; (8) that no undergraduate curriculum should be considered as true professional training; (9) that sociology has other values beside background for social work; (10) that further similar inductive study and discussion is worth while.

It is not, I assume, the purpose here to justify or even to test the results of sociology *as a science.* The search for and presentation of truths in this field, if not an end in itself, is as independent of any and all professions or livelihoods, as it is in any other science.

Moreover, it is not purposed here that we question the practical value of sociology for citizenship, for law, medicine, politics, or business. We are to examine it as a vocational or prevocational subject in one field—a field, to be sure, with which it is too frequently exclusively identified—that of social work. As teachers we wish our researches and analyses to be in form and content such as to be of greatest utility to the student if he becomes a social worker; and we wish to know how far we have succeeded.

In the past much improvement has been secured in this matter through discussion among teachers, and through sporadic interchange of personnel between social work and teaching. Occasionally, university teachers and social workers have got together on the problem. The professional schools of social work have bridged the gap between theory and practice. There are present today representatives of the various groups involved.

It was, however, the feeling of the writer that discussion in such groups as this would be more fruitful if we were to have a few facts for inductive inference. Educators, even in the sciences, have been unduly loth to inquire, in other than a priori manner, into the results of their highly experimental efforts. As I tried to analyze the values obtained for my own field work from academic sociology, it occurred to me that it might be well to ask some others what had been the effects upon their lives as social workers, of the pabulum received by them from alma mater. Has it been medicine, food, or merely stimulant? Has it practice value, policy value, or only prestige value?

Six months ago at Milwaukee, the writer asked Mr. Allen T. Burns[1] whether academic sociology had ever consciously affected his work or methods in any way. He answered diplomatically that psychoanalysis might find such an influence in his unconscious. This, however, is not necessarily so bitter a pill as it may seem for us teachers.

When Lloyd-George is in executive action and makes a decision, does political science make a contribution to his equipment? Not consciously. His unconscious, organized and working, hands the correct decision to his consciousness for verification, and the act is done. It may be that principles of behavior serve similarly the seasoned social worker. We cannot undertake to psychoanalyze them for it, but we can make at least a beginning toward a test of our results.

The questionnaire which I sent out is a result of my curiosity. The limitations of the questionnaire method were, of course, recognized, but had to be accepted in view of the short time allowed for preparation. For a profession as yet so unstandardized it is, of course, impossible to formulate a brief schedule which would fit all cases. The result was a compromise. Every question justified itself by eliciting valuable responses, but some questions were inapplicable to certain large groups. No questionnaire can be made fool-proof, but there were remarkably few misunderstandings. The reactions varied all the way from a few undeserved praises down to two or three who merely remarked "*Gr-r-r-rrh!*" or "Me-ao-ou *psst!!*" and let it go at that.

Four hundred and sixty-three questionnaires were issued, under joint sanction of this Society and of the American Association of Social Workers. There were 162 responses, of which 133 proved enumerable. Some arrived too late and may be included in a revision.

The heavy response in numbers, in quantity and in quality, to this detailed questionnaire was, in view of the short notice given, a pleasant surprise.[2]

[1] Retiring president of the National Conference of Social Work, Director of Americanization Studies for the Carnegie Corporation, and formerly Director of the Cleveland Foundation.

[2] The most painstaking and significant replies were in most cases from the best-known and busiest social workers. The writer takes this opportunity to acknowledge, for the organizations involved, the co-operation of the respondents, and to express his personal thanks.

The many thoughtful independent responses, especially from the most experienced workers, would alone justify the questionnaire, even if not a single schedule had been fully followed. It is impossible here to quote from these letters; the writer hopes soon to prepare from them a more extensive symposium, which will be again circulated, for comment and revision, to a smaller, select list.

It was impracticable to send out an inclusive mailing list. That used was based, however, upon the choice of the profession itself, as represented by its recognized organs and organizations throughout the country. The addition of a certain number of Pacific Coast names was made in order to correct in a measure the undue weighting of the East in most national organizations. There has been less formal training for social work in the far West, and there is less emphasis on the private agency and on the case-work sector of the field.

About half of a list so selected is naturally composed of the "old guard," those pioneers for whom there was no opportunity to study sociology in college; and it inevitably excludes most of the new generation, who have had the more up-to-date work of such teachers as Dr. Todd and others whom I see here. However, the automatic elimination (for the reason indicated) of the "veterans" from many of the results of this study, compensates somewhat for the omission of the youngsters. The bulk of the full replies are, therefore, from the second generation and the unusually successful in the third. This assuredly offers a group whose mature opinions should be valuable to us, and fairly representative of the full-fledged and successful social workers. Furthermore, the answers from such a group regarding salaries and standards of employment should be particularly practical in their bearing upon the vocational value of our teaching, and of value in the placing of social workers in new positions.

Of the total enumerated, fourteen had more or less of professional school training, of whom eight are in case-work. Those who had applied sociology in professional schools only are not included in the figures as having had applied sociology, since the purpose here is to evaluate college sociology.

Through a misunderstanding of my share of the discussion, questions bearing on Dr. Todd's topic were included in my schedule. The answers have since been made available to him. It is perhaps fortunate that my topic as assigned is so similar to his, as it makes it possible for you all to discuss the same subject for the entire period. But our ground inevitably overlaps to such an extent that, had we not already been friends, we might never be able to fight it out!.

A broad distinction was attempted between types of courses, because of their probable differences in vocational effect. The distinction drawn between "theoretical," "historical," and "applied" sociology is, of course, not hard and fast. The results indicate, however, that figures based on "sociology" in general would have been comparatively valueless without some distinction based on subject-matter; and that the classification was useful wherever the answers follow it.

Because of limited time, both for analysis and for presentation, it was possible to present for discussion only a too dogmatic verdict. Coherence was probably sacrificed to brevity. The figures are available, however, for reference.[1]

The variables in such a study are numerous, and the number of cases is too small in most instances for definite conclusions to be justified. A non-statistical collation of the opinions expressed will make possible a valuation of these factors. It is thought, however, that the number of cases upon which the generalizations here offered are based, is sufficient to reduce the influence of exceptional cases.

In certain respects the results are what would be expected, but it seems worth while at least to have verified the general impression. At other points the figures are perhaps somewhat revealing.

The writer will be quite satisfied if the present experiment leads to more thorough and conclusive study of the actual results for social work to be expected of our sociological teaching.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF INQUIRY

1. *Representative data.*—The data secured are reasonably representative of the profession in distribution by areas, by scope of agencies, and by types of work. They are probably equally representative of the distribution of sexes and ages in executive positions.

2. *Training of respondents.*—Over half of our prominent social workers have had at least some college sociology; nearly half of them, more than one kind of sociology; two-fifths of them in applied sociology. Only a sixth of the total, or less than a third of those who had any sociology, had taken other sociology without having also some applied. Nearly all of the younger generation had some academic sociology.

3. *Choice of profession.*—Applied sociology influenced more social workers in their choice of profession than did other sociology, but half of those who studied any sociology in college seem to have done so with the vocation already in mind, or were not influenced by it enough to recall and record it.

4. *Prestige value.*—Applied sociology comes first, and theoretical second, in securing positions in social work. This is proved from both the employers' and the employees' answers. Only one social worker responding apparently viewed unfavorably candidates trained in undergraduate sociology, and that person is also a teacher of social economics. Of those who had either theoretical or historical sociology only a third were helped by either of them in getting positions. For those who had applied sociology in college, on the other hand, nearly half were helped by it to jobs. Again, however, over half the answers in both groups are either negative, vague, or blank.

[1] Retained in the records of the Society.—Ed.

5. *Effect upon salaries*[1].—Approximately the same statements hold true of the effects of college sociology upon the salaries of social workers; but in general the effect was slightly less than in the securing of positions. Theoretical and applied here rank almost equally. Less than half were helped by any college sociology, in respect to salaries.

6. *Contribution to point of view and technique.*—Academic sociology contributes considerably oftener to the general point of view of a social worker toward his work than it does to his technique. This was less widely true of applied sociology, where over half of those who had it recall specific effects in their work. Valuable analytic comments were received in connection with these points. Several stated that they feel their lack of academic training in sociology. Most of those, however, who registered specific value in technique, failed to give any examples of this effect. If we count blanks as negative answers, we find almost half of this group registering no specific value obtained from any college sociology for their later work; but less than a fourth deny or ignore its general professional value.

7. *Relative professional value of social sciences.*—Among workers who had all three branches of sociology, in college, those who value theoretical first as part of their equipment about equal those who value applied highest. Historical sociology ranks low throughout the study, though certain prominent individuals value it highly. As taught in the past it seems, however, to make comparatively little contribution to the equipment of social workers, except workers among foreigners. Various other subjects, chiefly other studies of human behavior, are described as of equal or greater professional value.

Ignoring the distinction between the three ways in which subjects may be of professional value, nearly half of those who had any academic sociology had found some other subject equally or more useful in some way, and very few state specifically that no subject was more professionally valuable to them.

8. *Valuation by employers.*—From the employers' point of view, applied sociology again holds first place, with theory second, both for practical value to the worker, and in the consideration of prospective employees. Many employers, however, did not answer these questions, and additional data should be secured.

Many older executives register their appreciation of social theory either explicitly, by regretting their own lack, or indirectly, by extensive voluntary reading of it. Non-academic work was, however, not counted in this study.

Several employers of case-workers spontaneously express appreciation of the special value of the professional-school training.

CONCLUSIONS

In respect to the general topic, the Relation of Sociology to Social Work, the data collected aid the writer in the following conclusions: that under-

[1] As a profession, social work should be free of financial motives, but it will not be so until salaries and training are both standardized at a professional level.

graduate sociology is not markedly vocational but is decidedly prevocational; that without applied sociology the other branches of sociology have less professional value; that teachers of sociology have quite as much to learn from social workers as vice versa, and that the professional school is needed to bridge the gap.

The contribution of undergraduate sociology to the equipment of the social worker is chiefly in the general perspective restraint, and inspiration obtained, though applied sociology sometimes has specific value for technique.[1]

The increasing proportion of leading social workers who have a sociological background, together with the attitude of employers, indicates that whatever shortcomings the courses have had or may have, they are still valued by the profession, and are expected to produce more generally the benefits they have already been striving to provide. Even where sociology has apparently lacked practice value or policy value, the fact that it has prestige value is a good sign. Even the knocks are boosts. People do not kick a dead horse.

Sociology is shown to be not the only pebble on the social workers' beach. The wide divergence in judgment evinced in regard to the value of various other sciences for different kinds of social work seems to indicate that we must not merely offer sociology *in general* as preparation for social work *in general*, but must subject social work to a process of job-analysis, to find all the specific prevocational knowledges, sociological or otherwise, most needed for specialties in the broad field of social work. Schools of social work should then require such subjects for admission to their corresponding special courses, and our colleges can then, in their prevocational work, more confidently adjust their curricula for what the economist calls "production in anticipation of demand."

Does the low percentage of specific value found in undergraduate sociology necessarily indicate that these courses are out of touch with life? Not necessarily. Judges on the bench would not expect from undergraduate political science any practice value at the bar. Biology is not practiced by doctors. It is probable that many employers of social workers are still expecting full vocational preparation from undergraduate work, whereas they should demand true professional training.

It should be understood that the writer does not consider that any undergraduate courses should be ranked as full vocational or professional preparation. Technical training should be demanded of all responsible social workers, and should be entirely postgraduate; but it should demand as prerequisites whatever undergraduate courses in social sciences are shown by inductive inquiry to have prevocational value. This is proved by the number and prestige of those workers who ascribe practical value to the undergraduate courses.

[1] That sociology adds to one's organized fund of knowledge seems obvious without inquiry.

Some of the replies contain searching criticisms of sociological pedagogy, and should lead teachers to learn more from social work in regard to their methods.

Social workers, on the other hand, must recognize that prevocational preparation for social work is not the only purpose for which academic sociology exists, and will, therefore, not expect us to dance altogether to their tune. A sociology which, being based upon the real experience of humanity, can socialize the experience of the next generation of professional and business men and women, will do greater social work than any number of social workers it might train.

Finally, the following lines of inquiry suggest themselves for later occasions of this sort: (1) A comparison of the value to social workers of college courses offered before 1900, with those offered by five- or ten-year periods since then, in order to gauge our progress and to inform employers. (2) A comparison of the value of courses offered since 1910, by institutions, each of its own graduates now in social work. (3) The same, by specific subject-matter, for different types of social work. (4) (and most important) The effects of social work upon the teaching of sociology.

WHAT TYPES OF COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY ARE MOST VALUABLE FOR THE SOCIAL WORKER AND HOW THEY MAY BEST BE PRESENTED

ARTHUR J. TODD, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

ABSTRACT

Courses in Sociology Most Valuable for Social Workers.—The content and methods of presentation of sociology courses in preparation for social work depend upon the problem fields and the methods covered by social workers. The most practicable analysis divides the field into family welfare, treatment of delinquents, treatment of defectives, child welfare, health, industrial relations, community betterment. Methods include case-work, group work, institutional work, research, social publicity. Preparation for these various types of social work should include three divisions: (1) fundamental general courses to provide the base; (2) special field information courses to give background; (3) technical courses to cover approved methods. General courses on background and methods should be paralleled and supplemented by some form of laboratory work, such as visits and observation trips to social agencies, field practice, and genuine professional field training under properly qualified trainers.

In the interests of economy of time, we shall at once waive all questions as to whether social work is a profession *sui generis* or not. Nor shall we attempt to formulate a precise definition of either the objective or the field or the methods of social work. It is safe enough to assume that organized social effort has an objective, and it is apparent that it has a technique or techniques with which it is attempting to solve its problems. It is perfectly true that these techniques are still in process, but so is the technique of medicine or any other growing art. Our ground of discussion should be chosen

primarily from the social worker's standpoint and not from the sociologist's. Our first interest is in knowing what the social worker has to meet in the course of his work, what his problems are, what his resources are, what experience has shown to be the most valuable elements in general education, and what specific training is available or may be made available with his needs in view. This is the line we shall take rather than attempt to tell social workers what they ought to be doing, what they ought to be aiming at, and how they ought to reach their goal.

The reorganization of the National Conference of Social Work provided for grouping of activities and programs of the Conference under seven general divisions, namely, Children; Delinquents and Correction; Health; Public Agencies and Institutions; the Family; Industrial and Economic Problems; the Local Community. These permanent divisions of the Conference represent roughly the fields of social interest and the natural affinities between certain groups of workers and students. They do not, however, state clearly enough the precise types of problems which are presented to the individual social worker; nor do they indicate the methods or technique involved. They do not, therefore, constitute a base specific enough for the building of a training curriculum.

The study of education and training for social work made by Professor J. H. Tufts for the Russell Sage Foundation is not yet in print but I have been given to understand that the study followed a classification of social fields not altogether unlike that of the National Conference, although its principle is different. His point of departure is the relationship between a given social field and various institutions or society as a whole. He arrives at the following fields: the family, government, economic institutions, health and hygiene, recreation, education, religion, community life.

The American Association of Social Workers analyzes the field much more satisfactorily for the curriculum builder by separating objectives from methods, but considering both. Thus the problem fields are: child welfare; the family; delinquency; medical social service; public health; housing; leisure-time activities; the settlement; the school; industry; immigration; community development. The methods fall into: case-work; group work; community organization; institutional work; social research; publicity, finance, and other specialties. It is clear that in this analysis the problem field need not be and as a matter of experience is not so highly subdivided (for example the problem of the settlement or the immigrant is included in other fields) or if such subdivision is a merit there is no reason why it could not be even more detailed to include, say, mental hygiene, the rural community, or legal aid. Therefore I am inclined to favor a somewhat more concise division of the field into family welfare; treatment of delinquents; treatment of defectives; child welfare; health; industrial relations; community betterment. Likewise as to methods I should prefer the following outline: case-work, group work, institutional work, research, social publicity. It seems

unnecessary to differentiate either methods or fields between public, governmental or quasi-governmental, and private agencies.

The placement bureau of the American Association of Social Workers lists forty-two general types of social service jobs, some with still further subdivisions. It is not to be understood that these different types of social work are mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact there are certain fundamental modes of procedure common to all. They are divided off largely because within each group there is a certain emphasis which differentiates and colors the technique. The fact of kinship is established clearly by the constant migration of social workers from one field to another. That is partly due to the generalized training which these workers have received, and partly to the fact that social technique is still malleable.

In general it may be said that the preparation for these various types of social work should include three divisions. First, fundamental general courses; second, special field information courses; third, technical courses—the first to provide the base, the second the background, and the third the approved methods. The fundamental general courses should be given to every prospective social worker and should be of such nature as to be indispensable to all. The second, and particularly the third division, should have in mind the needs of the specialized worker; for example, the juvenile probation officer, the rural public health nurse or recreation worker, the large-scale industrial relations worker.

In line with this analysis and conformable to the experience of several outstanding social workers of success and national recognition, it was my privilege to lay out the training course for social workers at the University of Minnesota. In that course we stipulated that every student should receive instruction in the introduction to sociology, which included a study of the origin and development of human society; the various agencies which have determined the types of social life; social organization, institutions, and progress. The idea in this fundamental course was to present the normal life of society in its dynamic and functional aspects on the theory that nobody should attempt to initiate new social processes and machinery without some pretty clear idea of what society is like, how it is built up, how it may be changed, how its different constituent parts affect each other, and what its general drift seems to be.

On top of this more or less theoretical basis, it was considered desirable to offer some more precise idea of the process and content of those great currents of social amelioration which propose to transform present society and make it over into something newer, if not better. Therefore a course was designed called Modern Social Reform Movements, which includes a brief history of the attempts to overcome certain social maladjustments such as slavery, intemperance, unemployment, industrial strife, child labor, poverty, degeneracy, bad housing. It includes therefore a discussion of movements for public health, industrial peace and order, social insurance, the protection of

infancy and youth, public recreation; the use of the police power of the state; the literature of social protest.

Still more precise, and leading out of the general course on social reform movements, year courses were designed on the nature and treatment of dependents, defectives, and delinquents. These included the conditions in contemporary society out of which the social problems of the defective and dependent arise, the methods used or advocated for the prevention and alleviation of poverty and defectiveness, the causes of crime, the nature of the criminal, criminal procedure, methods of treatment, including preventive methods. Manifestly this course on dependents, defectives, and delinquents falls into the second division as we analyze it, namely, field survey or information courses designed to give a background to the student; a background in perception and also a background to enable him to make a sufficiently definite vocational choice to elect his training sequence. In this same group we should place also such courses as housing and child welfare. The latter course should include not only the institutional care of children, but all private and public agencies working on behalf of the child, with due attention to the legal aspects of child welfare, that is, child protective legislation, its development and administration.

At this point our analysis seems to part company with what has been pretty generally accepted as an orderly sociological sequence. Specifically, I mean that about the end of the Junior year of training, or the beginning of the Senior year, the student should normally cover more in detail problems in social psychology and social control, the family in its evolution, its various forms, its service to social evolution; methods of social investigation and social statistics; social progress. These courses on the whole are referable to the first division of fundamental general courses, yet at the same time they bear certain marks of the second group, and some of them, particularly in the field of social statistics and social investigation, might be classified as technical courses.

The third division of training should include such distinctively technical courses as medical social service, mental case-work, the technique of family treatment; that is, an indispensable study of social case-work; also if time and training resources allow, juvenile courts and probation as an application of case-work and as a meeting ground for general case-work and child-protective legislation. I should add here also a course on charitable administration, finance and publicity, a study of organizing charitable agencies, financing them and making the public aware of their work.

These courses on the background and the methods of social work should give the history, the experimentation, and the methods of the special fields of directed social effort. They are incomplete in themselves from the standpoint of technical training. They should therefore be paralleled by some form of laboratory work, the particular form and development of such laboratory work to be determined largely by the equipment of the training institution, the

social resources of the community, and their accessibility. For certain training institutions in certain localities, visits and observation trips to social agencies, public or private institutions, or industrial plants, are about all that can be achieved. This sort of watching in or looking over is not to be considered as field practice or field work, but rather in the nature of illustrative material, of somewhat the same kind (but more vivid because alive) as photographs, charts, diagrams, lantern slides, moving pictures. Such materials should accompany normally the courses in the first and second divisions, but with the third division of training, namely, the distinctive technique, should go intensive field practice under special trainers in properly approved social agencies, the results to be checked up by frequent conference and the whole thing to be conceived either as genuine laboratory practice or as interneship.

One or two other scattering questions remain. For instance should the introductory course be specially arranged for social workers? My feeling is that any properly given course will meet their needs and that it should not be necessary to construct special courses for full-time social-worker training. There is no more reason for "social service sociology" than there is for "business sociology" or "Christian sociology" or "Baptist biology." It may be, however, that evening courses or extension courses given to social workers trained on the job should be specially arranged and constructed, since the problem in such cases is rather one of selection, elimination, and concentration of materials.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

FRANK D. WATSON, HAVERFORD COLLEGE

The Round Table at which Dr. Eliot and Dr. Todd opened up the discussion with the foregoing papers was attended by several hundred interested persons, at least a score of whom took part. The sense of the meeting was clearly that sociology does have a contribution to make to the equipment of the social worker. There were a few, however, who frankly questioned this, as for example did Dr. Thomas J. Riley, formerly director of the St. Louis School of Social Economy and now executive secretary of the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities. Others were in doubt as to this contribution, as was Mr. Frank J. Bruno, executive secretary of the Minneapolis Associated Charities and of the department of sociology of the University of Minnesota. Still others felt sure that sociology has a contribution to make but were not clear just what it is, as was Mr. Porter R. Lee, director of the New York School of Social Work.

Judging from those who took part, the contribution that sociology can make to the social worker is largely in adding to his fund of organized knowledge of the nature of social relationships in normal society and to his point of view toward social work (social philosophy) rather than to the technique of community organization or even of "getting Mrs. Jones to the clinic."

Time was limited but several speakers who had done professional social work as Dr. Arthur E. Wood, of the University of Michigan, and Mrs. Bessie Bloom Wessel, of Connecticut College for Women, indicated quite specifically how certain fundamental sociological concepts had been of great practical value to them in their work. The former stressed among other things the importance of understanding the differing mores and customs of foreign groups if one is to be a successful case-worker with the immigrant. The latter pointed out the value of the social evolutionary point of view to the social worker and the inspiration of such a concept as found in Lester F. Ward's discussion of teleology. One could not help but wish that time had permitted for the clear formulation of some dozen sociological concepts, such as: social evolution, including the evolution of social institutions, teleology, social control, the rôle of social heredity, the causal relationships of social phenomena, social solidarity, social maladjustments, the normal life, the normal family, without which no social worker dealing either with individuals or with social conditions can be said to be adequately prepared for work.

Dr. Lucile Eaves, director of the Department of Social Research of the Women's Educational and Industrial Union, Boston, pointed out that there were large sections of the country where social work had not been professionalized to the extent that it has been in the East or even along the Pacific Coast. In these other sections, sociology has played an important rôle in socializing many students and thus raising the level of intelligence of much worth-while volunteer social work. In so far as one of the objects of sociology is to make people better citizens, it is needed by social workers along with all others and is particularly of aid to the former in creating a more intelligent public opinion on which their work must ultimately rest.

Mrs. Helen Glenn Tyson, formerly head of the social service department of the University of Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia, stated that she always required her staff to take a course in sociology each year if for no other reason than as an antidote to the possible narrowing effects of the day's work. Dr. Eliot rejoined that if sociology is an antidote for social work, the latter is an excellent antidote for that type of sociology that loses the common touch and a vital contact with reality.

REPORT OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

SOME NEGLECTED FIELDS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

I. FUTILITY OF THE DEBATE ON WHETHER SOCIOLOGY IS A SCIENCE

How much has been written on this question and with how meager results! Times without number the sociologist has been "put in his place" and has refused to "stay put." Convinced that he is dealing with a field which the other social sciences have not covered he has insisted that he has a contribution to make to human knowledge. His faith has been contagious with the result that no matter with what scorn or patronizing the "hard-boiled" economist, historian, and psychologist has treated his subject, an increasing number of students have found their ways to his classroom and insisted on reading his books. Nevertheless, such treatment of sociology has brought to him a healthy humility, and has caused him to search his heart and has inspired him to carefully scrutinize his methods. Discussion up to this point has made clear what sociology is about. In a broad way we know the field—that of men's social relations to each other. What we need now is explorations of the field of social relations—a careful description of how men react to social conditions, their resulting ideals, customs, institutions; of their choices and united actions; of the principles according to which they react to given conditions. Sociology has been twitted sometimes by economics as less definite and less scientific. I wonder if both do not need a great deal more careful research before they manifest any undue superiority, the one over the other. Take, for example, the theory of value in economics. I believe economic theory has it that values are determined by the resultant of the varying choices of individuals as between certain goods. Reduce to the lowest terms it is said that each individual says to himself, "Now I can get more satisfaction out of this thing than out of that, hence I prefer this above that." I wonder whether any economist has ever carefully gathered data to ascertain whether that is just the way individuals act. Does anyone know by careful study whether individuals determine their choices in this deliberate fashion? Perhaps a careful study of economic choices, which determine demand for an article, might discover that choices are determined by impulses, by imitation of others without such careful

balancing of one thing against another. Whether they do or not is not the point: rather I am calling attention to the fact that, so far as I know, no careful statistical study has been made of economic valuation on which might be based a theory of value. In many of the practical phases of economics, such as money, transportation, labor problems, etc., however, some very good studies have been made. Sociology is tarred with the same stick. It talks blithely about principles, when most of its generalizations have been made on inductions no wider than can be made in one's study from a rather wide reading of books on history, anthropology, and ethnology. I do not decry such study, but it should be supplemented by very much more intensive and careful study of present-day society. As an example typical of much which has gone before I may refer to a very recent book on rural sociology in which there is a chapter on "A Changing Rural Psychology." Here the statement is made that "we are taking cognizance of the changing psychology of the farmer." So far as I have been able to learn there have been no careful studies made to determine scientifically what is the psychology of the farmer. It should not be impossible to determine what are the attitudes of the farmer which reflect his opinions and beliefs, and his mental processes so far as they are socially determined and result in social reactions. Neither has such a study been made of the psychology of any other group in the population.

II. SOME FIELDS IN WHICH RESEARCH IS GOING ON

While it is bewildering, it is hopeful that all kinds of facts in the field of social relations are being collected. Never in the history of mankind have so many studies of men in his relations to others been made. We are studying the cost of living, wages, hours, height and weight of children, the incidence of venereal disease, morbidity and mortality statistics, members and classes of social organizations, methods of teaching, educational standards—only a few of the almost innumerable studies which have been made and of uncounted others under way. One stands appalled before the flood of studies which come out every year. Most of these studies are made in order to find light on particular problems. Someone wishes to find out how a court is functioning as a social agency. A study is made of the action taken in the cases covering a given period. To answer the question as to what are the results of the efforts made by the overseer of the poor to relieve distress someone of an inquiring turn of mind investigates what happens in the families relieved. Family budgets are studied to ascertain how much income a family should have to main-

tain a decent standard so that the family relief agency may know how much to provide. Some critic of the school system essays to find out what becomes of the students who have gone through its courses. If possible he compares what he finds with a parallel study of the results of another kind of curriculum. As soon as a problem like Americanization rises over the horizon of public attention, we study methods of Americanization. Play is studied to learn what influence it has on conduct in order to help us determine how much we should spend on playgrounds and how. Someone discovers a lot of middle-aged spinsters and widows who are working for a living. He wonders how many of these women are making provision for old age and proceeds to find out. The practical interest dominates.

Very little use has yet been made of this mass of material in an effort to arrive at sociological principles or laws. Perhaps it is impossible, or perhaps it is too early.

In addition to such studies there has been started recently some new studies which are full of promise. The psychologists have been studying native capacities of individuals along some lines. These studies have a bearing upon social theory. For example, tests have been devised which enable the psychologists to advise a person whether he has the proper native equipment to make a success as a musician. Such pieces of research throw light upon the problems of the sociologist concerning the relation of nature and nurture.

A study of the psychology of business and social management has begun. Some approaches have been made to the problem of giving greater scientific accuracy to social or community organization. We have talked much lately about community organization. Some have attempted to teach community organization without first determining the different existing types of such organization. How can *principles* of community organization be taught until a careful study has been made of existing organizations, their morphology, the ways in which they function, their processes, the conditions—economics, pychical, and social—under which they have decayed or flourished? Such studies are now being attempted in a number of our educational institutions.

Miss Richmond has written a textbook on how to diagnose "cases" which come to social agencies. It is most hopeful that she did not deduce the principles upon which diagnosois should be made out of her own rich experience as a family case-worker, as she might have done. She studied hundreds of "case" records from dozens of social agencies and from a study of these deduced the principles of social diagnosis. In

other words, research preceded generalization. Such a method marks a new day in the formulation of social procedure.

Mrs. Sheffield, of Boston, has begun an interesting study on the psychological factors in case-work. Hitherto, case-workers have been prone to give too little attention to the psychological elements in a situation, both in diagnosis and treatment. While they were apt in ferreting out the surface conditions in a case, such as sickness, lack of employment, death, unwise expenditures and bad physical and moral conditions, often they have ignored the psychological conditions which entered into the breakdown of a family and individual, attention to which is a prime condition of successful treatment. In a study of several cases of unmarried mothers, Mrs. Sheffield found that these psychological factors, such as lack of friendly attitude of the parents toward their daughter, difference of religious beliefs between the girl and the man and wrong mental attitudes of parents and girls, played a very important part in their fall. Only as the case-worker analyzed these factors, could she adjust the difficulties and bring social order out of the chaos.[1] Mrs. Sheffield's study suggests the necessity of studying the mental and social attitudes of a large number of cases in order to arrive at further principles of social diagnosis and treatment. Here is a field for the social psychologist. What is needed here is careful research. All social work would greatly benefit from such studies. A beginning in such a study has also been made, by those interested, in the "Americanization" of our foreign population. Thomas and Park have led the way in the study. They attempted to construct a social psychology of the foreign-born which throws light not only upon Americanization but upon how to deal with the foreign-born in every relation of life. The social worker who so frequently has to deal with the foreigner will profit from such sociological research.

Professor Giddings is having his students study the social stimuli in all kinds of meetings and the resulting social activities. Such study reveals the foundations upon which rest associated activities—social motives, social reactions, and groupings.

These are only examples of many pieces of research being started by the sociologists. By-products of teaching methods, these examples indicate an earnest attempt to carefully study sociological phenomena. Nevertheless, the number of such studies are too few in number to enable us to make very rapid progress in sociological science.

[1] *The Survey* (November 12, 1921), p. 241.

III. SOME NEGLECTED FIELDS FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Sociology has been reproached with being largely speculation and social philosophy. No one knows this better than the sociologists themselves. Perhaps they are less pessimistic about it than some of their critics, because they know that no science has grown in a day. They can remember when physics was "Natural Philosophy," when botany was morphology, and when psychology was "Mental Philosophy." The time has arrived, however, when sociologists are no longer satisfied with a social philosophy based upon casual observation and the development of "systems." An increasing number are demanding that scientific methods be applied to social phenomena.

The fields where such methods can be applied are legion in number. Both sociology and social practice demand that the scientific method be applied to a study of the various aspects of our complex social life. By way of suggestion I name only two. I pass over the fields where the chief purpose of research is to get light upon practical methods of dealing with specific problems, such as the splendid studies of the Children's Bureau and state and other federal departments. Out of such studies we shall probably yet get data for sociological generalization, when once enough of them have been made and a synthetic mind like Herbert Spencer's attacks them. For the present, however, I wish to call attention to some fields in which studies are possible which will contribute to sociological theory.

One of the classes of social phenomena on which we need light in order to understand society is social organization. No such study has yet been made from the standpoint of sociological analysis. The Charities Directory in some cities does not do it. It is compiled primarily to enable social workers to know the names, addresses, and functions of other agencies in the city and state. The *Handbook of Social Resources of the United States* and the *Handbook of Social Resources, State of Alabama*, recently published by the American Red Cross, are modeled upon the Charities Directory. All of these, however, provide data for a sociological analysis of some of the social organizations. What is needed from the sociological point of view is a study of all the organizations, public and private, in an area large enough to supply a cross-section of society, an analysis of these into classes which have sociological significance and an interpretation of what the study reveals. Out of such a study one might be able to deduce some principles of social organization. By a comparison of the social organizations of one period with those

existing in a previous period it might be possible to learn scientifically how societies develop and the processes involved. What light such a study would throw upon the theory of social forces, social processes, laws of social development, and social causation only the study itself could reveal. In such a study, however, the phenomena would be objective and could be handled by the scientific method.

Another neglected field for scientific research is that of social psychology. A state of mind is hard to objectify. But the attitudes, ideals, laws, reactions to stimuli, customs, and institutions of a group are objective things which can be studied scientifically. They reveal states of mind. Those of one group can be compared with those of another. Those of the same group can be studied in different periods of time. Those of one race can be compared with those of another. Those of one social class or profession can be set alongside those of another, and likenesses and differences can be noted. No matter what the group studied, facts could be collected which on analysis and interpretation would undoubtedly yield a social psychology based upon exact scientific method. There is a world of material for such study all about. Case histories in dozens of social agencies, and in courts, furnish raw material for the social psychologist. Such a social psychology would not be remote from the interest of the social worker. It would be as vital to the social practitioner as anatomy and physiology is to the practicing physician or the nurse. It would bring order out of the present chaos in what is now poorly named "community organization." Is it too much to hope that it would supply principles which would be vital in social reform and social reconstruction; in economics and politics; in school curriculum and administration; in law-making and the administration of justice; in family rehabilitation and the treatment of the offender; in play and religion? Might it not in a thousand ways illumine our sociological darkness?

These two examples of possibilities for research are intended only to suggest fields which lie fallow for the sociologist. We have stressed the necessity of research for the development of sound sociological theory and for practical guidance in social practice. The effect of such research on methods of teaching might well be considered did time permit. That the application of scientific methods to sociological problems would also redeem sociology from the reproach of armchair philosophizing and systematizing is apparent.

J. L. GILLIN, *Chairman*

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL ABSTRACTS

At the annual meeting of the Society in December, 1920, the Committee on Abstracts outlined a program which was adopted. To carry this program into effect the committee was enlarged and continued with instructions to devise ways and means.

The program as outlined made it necessary to find funds to finance a minimum annual budget of $2,568. This would mean an increase of from $2.50 to $3.00 per year in the subscription price of the *Journal* to each of 1,000 members of the Society. It is doubtful if at that price the present membership could be maintained.

There was the alternative plan of securing an annual endowment or subsidy from one of the national foundations interested in promoting research. Upon this suggestion the committee acted. Among the organizations with which the committee communicated were: the Russell Sage Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the National Research Council.

The outcome of the committee's inquiries indicated that the foundations were interested and sympathetic but naturally cautious in committing themselves. In one case, however, the information of the committee is explicit. No financial assistance can be expected from the National Research Council since sociology does not fall, in the classification upon which the council is based, within the field of natural sciences.

In the meantime, and before it seemed practicable for the committee to formulate a statement and present its case to any of the research foundations, the situation had changed.

Beginning with the July number the editors of the *Journal* have greatly extended its abstract service. The present purpose of the editors, in so far as concerns the abstracts, is outlined in a letter of Ellsworth Faris to the committee:

1. It is a plan of the *Journal* to extend the abstract feature. Recent issues have contained a far larger number of abstracts, and these have been improved in two ways: They occur in a classified scheme, so that it is possible to find more quickly material on a given subject; also, the abstracts have been themselves analyzed, and the subheads are printed in italics, thus making a valuable cross-reference feature.

2. The *Journal* articles are now preceded by an abstract prepared by the author according to a plan. It is the purpose of the editors to recommend this procedure to other journals in the field, with the hope that it may be widely adopted. Some journals have already adopted the practice, and several others are considering it. A general conformity to this plan would greatly facilitate the publication of abstracts.

3. The reprinting of the abstracts of articles on library cards is being considered. If a sufficient number of subscribers could be interested, it would be possible to print on library cards all our abstracts, and send them out in advance of publication. It might even be possible to reprint all the abstracts in the field in this way. The details of these plans are largely matters of expense and the *Journal of Sociology* has not made a final decision.

As a matter of fact the number of abstracts published in the *Journal* has increased from 18 in July to 41 in November. The January number of the *Journal*, the committee is informed, will publish 100 abstracts, and it seems not impossible that this expansion of the services can be maintained permanently.

Volume XXVI of the *Journal*, upon which the abstract committee based its estimates last year, contained 127 abstracts occupying 54 pages. If the present expansion of the service is maintained the *Journal* of 1922 will publish 600 abstracts, occupying a space of 120 pages, and this result will have been achieved without increasing the present size of the *Journal* or cost to the Society.

In considering changes in the present methods of publishing bibliographies and abstracts it is important to understand just how the thing is now done. The following statement of the matter is made by E. W. Burgess, who is in charge of this department, in a report to the committee on abstracts:

The work of securing bibliographies of books, pamphlets, and articles, and of preparing abstracts is carried on under the supervision of the members of the department of sociology in the University of Chicago by one Fellow and seven scholars in the department. No cost of this work is borne by the *Journal;* it is a free service to the *Journal* by the department. While the supervisory service of the members of the department is without compensation, the Fellow and scholars in the department receive stipends from the University and are assigned to this work on the *Journal* for the service thereby required. It may be of interest to state that the service called for in the Fellowship and scholarships aggregates 2,460 hours in the year.

The periodicals which are examined to secure the bibliographies are enumerated in an attached list. The total number of these is 193. The periodicals are distributed as follows: English and American 121; French 30;

German 27; Italian 12; Scandinavian 3. The bibliography and abstracts of the pamphlets are secured from pamphlets received by the *Journal* and from those listed in Public Affairs Information Service.

For each issue of the *Journal* the scholars carefully examine all the current periodicals in the attached list. On the basis of this examination they prepare tentative bibliography slips indicating their judgment as to whether the article in question should be merely listed in the bibliography, or listed and abstracted. They also indicate upon the slip the tentative place of the article in system of classification adopted in July by the editors of the *Journal*. These bibliography slips with the notations upon them are then submitted to the members of the department who determine—in general by independent examination of the periodicals—the bibliography entries, the articles to be abstracted, and the length of the abstract. By the regulation of the size of the abstract from twenty-five words for the shorter or less important articles to 350 words for the longer and more important articles, the editors of the *Journal* hope to further increase the value of the analyzed abstract service to the readers of the *Journal*.

An analysis of the lists of periodicals submitted with Dr. Burgess' report shows their distribution as to subject matter to be as follows: History, 2; Zoölogy, 2; General Science, 5; Public Health and Medicine, 8; Geography, 8; Anthopology and Ethnology, 9; Philosophy, 10; Biology and Eugenics, 10; Religion, 12; Psychology, 13; Economics, 13; Political Science, 20; Education, 21; Sociology, 28; General Literature, 32; total, 193.

These figures indicate that abstracts now printed in the *Journal* cover a much wider range of literature than that proposed by the committee last year, although the list does not include all the journals recommended by the committee as likely to contain valuable sociological materials.

This raises the question whether, in view of the improvements already made, it is necessary and desirable to continue the effort to secure funds that would enable the *Journal* to still further improve its abstract service.

In reply to this question it must be said (1) that the present scheme can, and ultimately should, be greatly improved; (2) that the manner in which abstracting is at present done throws an inordinate amount of labor on the faculty and graduate students of the University of Chicago; and (3) that no formal request for funds has yet been presented to any of the foundations interested in research.

Furthermore, it is important that there should be some sort of index of the abstracts now published. At present no such index exists.

Two methods have been proposed to meet this situation: (1) The abstracts as now published might, as suggested by Dr. Faris, be printed on library cards. (2) An annual index might be published which would at the same time be a survey and review of all the important sociological literature of the year.

Definite figures as to the relative cost of these two proposals have been obtained from the University of Chicago Press. The following memorandum was prepared by Donald P. Bean, of the University of Chicago Press:

Assuming that all of the abstract cards are printed originally in the *American Journal of Sociology* and that this type is used for their later reprinting for the bibliographical card index, I have estimated the expense of such a service as follows:

No. of Cards	No. of subscribers		
	100	200	1000
150	$ 920.00	$1,225.00	$3,450.00
250	1,300.00	1,675.00	4,540.00
350	1,670.00	2,175.00	5,635.00

These figures include printing, addressing, inclosing, mailing, third-class postage, and a small allowance for the maintenance of lists and for promotion.

If the Society approves the idea of the abstract cards, I shall be glad to recommend to the Board of Trustees that the Press handle the Abstract service of (*a*) 150 cards and all expenses involved if the Society will furnish a subsidy of $500.00 and guarantee at least 100 subscribers at 2 cents per card or $3.00 per set, (*b*) 250 cards and all expenses involved if the Society will furnish a subsidy of $750.00 and guarantee at least 100 subscribers at 2 cents per card or $5.00 per set, (*c*) 350 cards and all expenses involved if the Society will furnish a subsidy of $1,000.00 and guarantee at least 100 subscribers at 2 cents per card or $7.50 per set.

These figures indicate that if all the 1,000 members of the Society wanted a card index to current literature it would cost them $5.625 cents a year at the very least for 350 cards, not including in that sum of course the cost of the *Journal*.

On the other hand the cost of the annual index would be but $1,000. This could be met by increasing the present annual dues from four dollars to five. In estimating the expense of the index it should be borne in mind that, with the present method of analyzing the abstracts, every single abstract would be indexed under three separate subject-headings.

In addition to this, on every article abstracted, there would be an author index. Every abstract would presumably, therefore, be indexed four times, so that if the *Journal* published 600 abstracts, including in that number the abstracts of its own articles, the annual subject index would contain something like 1,800 subject references and cross-references. In addition it would contain 600 references to authors, 2,400 items in all.

In addition it seems desirable that an annual index volume should contain authoritative reviews of all the literature upon certain general sociological topics. Under the arrangement outlined, of the 128 pages in the annual volume 60 would be reserved for reviews.

It is evident, from the foregoing analysis, that the Society, if it desires to do so, probably can maintain and extend out of its own resources its present abstract service.

On the other hand an index of abstracts of periodical literature is but a first step in putting sociology upon a research basis. Every year the amount of social investigation carried on by universities, by public, and by private agencies is increasing by leaps and bounds.

At the present moment business enterprises, manufacturing plants, newspapers, telephone companies, even labor organizations are beginning to maintain research departments as adjuncts of their administration.

The Ford Automobile Company and the Colorado Fuel Company maintain what they call "sociological departments." Public enterprises and social reforms are increasingly planned and executed on a basis of fact. Community trusts, like that in Cleveland and Chicago, are carrying an investigation to educate public opinion in their several communities in regard to social and civic problems. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research has been the model of other similar institutions in at least a score of cities in other parts of the country.

Finally there is a vast amount of information in the records of the courts, hospitals, and social agencies which if it could be systematically studied would throw light upon fundamental problems that academic sociologists are interested in, but which they have had to study for the most part at long range.

It is of the very first importance to sociological science that the universities should have access to existing materials, not merely in order to train students in social service and social investigation, but for the purposes of sociological research.

There is need of an organization that will do for sociology what the National Council of Research is attempting to do for the other sciences.

Any organization established to extend and improve the present bibliographical services of the Society to its members and to the public might eventually, if it was able to secure the necessary funds, undertake a wider and more important service, namely:

1. Establish itself as a clearing-house for social research and so bring about some sort of social co-ordiation of existing studies.

2. Make a survey of types of investigation now in progress with the purpose of taking an inventory and eventually devising means for organizing and founding existing social information on various problems, local and national.

3. Study research problems that arise in connection with the attempts to apply existing concepts and methods of investigation to the solution of immediate and practical problems.

With a budget of $10,000 a year a beginning could be made, and by limiting its operations largely to the task of exploration, a bureau such as has been suggested could in three years demonstrate its own usefulness, or at any rate indicate a way in which the services it sought to render could be better served by some other institution.

ROBERT E. PARK (for the Committee)
A. B. WOLFE
U. G. WEATHERLY
SUSAN M. KINGSBURY
F. STUART CHAPIN

THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TEACHING OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE GRADE AND HIGH SCHOOLS OF AMERICA

At the call of Professor Leon C. Marshall there occurred an informal meeting at the William Pitt Hotel yesterday morning of two or three representatives each from the committees on social-science teaching of the American Economics Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Society, and the Association of Collegiate Schools of Business. At that meeting it was informally agreed to recommend to those societies, and also to the American Historical Society and the National Council of Geography Teachers that a joint commission of two representatives from each Association be appointed to continue the study of the appropriate presentation of social studies in secondary schools and to take such action in co-operation with the National Council of Teachers of Social Studies as may prove appropriate.

Professor Ellwood, of your Committee, has prepared a statement of the problem of social teaching in the public schools.

Ross L. Finney, University of Minnesota, *Chairman*
E. S. Bogardus, University of Southern California
C. A. Ellwood, University of Missouri
G. R. Miller, Colorado State Teachers College.
Dwight Sanderson, Cornell University
Walter R. Smith, University of Kansas
A. J. Todd, University of Minnesota

A motion was made and carried that the Society authorize the President to appoint two members as representatives on a joint commission to continue the study of social studies in the public schools.

Ernest W. Burgess, *Secretary*

REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The American Sociological Society was represented at the Annual Meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies held in New York on January 29, 1921, by the undersigned. The routine business of reports of officers and committees was followed by a discussion of ways and means by which American Scholars could assist European Scholars to continue the publication of important humanistic untertakings of international importance which had been crippled or suspended as a result of the war. These publications were chiefly of a historical or philological character. The difficulty of raising funds for the purpose of assisting these international scholarly undertakings and collections of inscriptions was quite evident from the facts developed in discussion. The only matter of immediate interest to the Sociological Society was the proposal to establish a Bibliography of Humanistic Literature. No action was taken on this matter, however, and it developed that the proposal related to listing and not to abstracting articles. The plan thus had little significance for the Sociological Society's enterprise of social abstracts. As a member of the A.C.L.S., your representative compiled a list of sociological works for the James Jerome Hill reference library of St. Paul, Minn.

F. Stuart Chapin,
Delegate to American Council of Learned Societies

THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY—A SYMPOSIUM

EDWARD CARY HAYES, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

It seems appropriate to open the discussion of the work of the Society by giving an account of my stewardship in the office which I have held during the year now closing. The program for this year's meetings of the society has been characterized by three marked departures from our previous practice.

In the first place instead of arranging the whole program around a single topic, the afternoon and evening sessions have been divided into three "sections"—one devoted to "social evolution," one to "biological factors in social causation," one to "psychic factors in social causation." The former plan of having a single general theme for a whole series of meetings had distinct advantages. The treatment of a "live topic" is perhaps the best way to draw large local audiences, but the meetings of this society are held primarily for the benefit of the members who travel long distances to learn what progress their colleagues have been making in the specific researches in which they are engaged. Another and more important advantage of the former plan was the unity which it gave to our annual volume of proceedings. But the number of single subjects which can be profitably and scientifically treated as the theme of a three days' session is limited. Moreover such treatment of a single "live topic" tends either to make us bring in men who are not sociologists, but are actually engaged in public affairs related to the topic discussed, or to make us resort to a somewhat journalistic treatment of the theme in papers prepared for the occasion, rather than more truly scientific papers representing the prolonged, characteristic special work of the writers. This is far from meaning that all of the papers prepared by this "journalistic" method have been lacking in scientific value. On the contrary the former plan was for a time the wisest that could have been chosen. But the development of sociology in America has now reached a point at which we are justified in attempting a method more appropriate to a scientific society and specially calculated to realize the purpose for which the society is constituted.

The second departure from former practices is the inauguration of a system of committees to have charge of the various subdivisions of the program. Hitherto the president has had undivided responsibility for the program. These new committees are composed of men, each of whom is active in the particular division of the field of sociology to which he is assigned. And the business of these committee men is to act as scouts to discover the most important work being done anywhere in the country in the division of the field with which they are specially familiar, and to have this work reported at our annual meetings.

Nothing else that we can do can so stimulate actual productive research among our members. At the same time nothing else seems likely so effectively to safeguard us against the narrowing and objectionable kind of specialization, and the unbalanced teaching likely to result from that cause, as to bring together on the same program the men who are working most actively in the different divisions of our field to hear the results of each other's work. Moreover this arrangement is planned to enlist in the work of the society the participation of certain groups of scientists, especially the anthropologists and ethnologists, whose work is truly sociological, but who hitherto have been too little affiliated with this organization.

The third innovation is the institution of a series of "round tables," occupying the morning sessions and devoted to the discussion of practical applications of sociology. This has two purposes. The first is to afford more opportunity for volunteer participation. The members do not travel hundreds and even thousands of miles merely to listen to papers that they could read at home. They properly expect the stimulus of free discussion, and we want to become acquainted with members on whose participation we have not learned to count in advance. Each of these round tables should occupy an entire morning session, and this year's experience proves that two such round tables can profitably be carried on simultaneously each forenoon. The second purpose of this system of round table discussions upon practical themes is to enlist the interest and activity of groups of persons who are dealing with concrete facts and problems that are full of scientific importance and suggestiveness. Their contributions are of distinct value to those of us who are engaged in academic research, and by establishing this connection they may be led—we have had during these meetings definite ground to anticipate that they will be led—to handle the mass of facts with which they deal in such a way as to make them valuable as contributions to knowledge, and to utilize the principles of explanation which sociology is developing. This relation as well as that established by the strictly scientific sections of the afternoons and evenings, is calculated to co-ordinate the forces engaged in separate attacks upon a common objective.

As a minor incident to this year's program you will observe an effort to promote fellowship among the members by some variation from the usual social functions of our gathering.

A famous executive once said, "It is a far greater thing to set ten men to work than to do ten men's work." I have proceeded upon the theory that one way to promote the life of a society is to enlist a large number of people in its activities.

These innovations have been tentative and experimental this year. If continued they can be better carried out, partly as a result of this experience. I hope that in the discussion to follow you will freely express your criticisms and your opinions as to whether these plans should be continued in the future.

ALBION W. SMALL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

In my judgment wisdom administers that the future of the society should be shaped by due deference to it past. This does not call for recourse to a pulmotor to receive comatose opinions or programs or methods. Nor does it involve persistence in policies that have merely the sanction of precedent. It does call for preservation of the attitude which has been our strength.

At the start we were a feeble folk with widely separated viewpoints, with divergent mental tendencies, with apparently incongruous aims, with scarcely perceptible affiliations. We had in common hardly more than one feeling that the traditional social sciences had failed to explain society and that a better way is needed to search into the mystery. We pledged our mental support in trying to find that better way. This was and is the vitality of our organization. We were more sanguine at first than we are now that sociology is destined to supplant all the other social sciences. We see at present that there will be glory enough if sociology can succeed in developing a technique which must be used in completing the best work that can be done by each and all of the social sciences. We seemed for a long time to be more at odds with one another than we were with the older social sciences, as to our problems, and as to ways and means of solving them. But we endured one another's essential interest in finding a new way of approach to the social mystery. We helped one another, and we built up a common tradition by hammering out our disagreements until we are now finding ourselves in possession of a distinctive manner of approach and a distinguishing objective. We are coming to see that we have hit upon a new procedure, which finds new meaning in human experience. We are not much interested at present in speculation as to whether this new procedure is a final procedure, whether it is the last key that will be needed to unlock the inner chambers of social mysteries, whether it will admit us to all the truths about society which the older procedures had left unexplored or insufficiently explained. We are busy now applying the categories of group relationships to all sorts of social conditions, and we are telling the world that group situations are only superficially observed so long as they are not translated into terms of group reactions.

But before we have fairly formulated this methological result of the strivings of a generation, before we are generally aware of the revolutionary characters of this achievement, our centrifugal interests threaten to disrupt the unity of diversity in which we won our way out of the obscurity of our early gropings into clear vision of a task and a method. There is danger that sociologists will disperse in a dozen directions, and that they will degenerate with futility by too exclusive attention to specialties, and by failure to correct their vagaries by frequent orientation from the common center.

It would be a calamity for sociology and for social science in general if the society should cease to be the rallying-point, the clearing-house, the strategic center for all the different types of social investigations which start with the clue that men's lives cannot be understood unless their group relationships are fully

evaluated. I can see nothing but disaster for the interests now centering in the society if it should disintegrate into minor groups devoted each to a peculiar species of research and inattentive of the pursuits of the other groups. That would be merely repeating in microscopic measure, the major mistakes of the older sciences, against which sociology was a protest—the mistake of history and politics and economics each proclaiming to the other, "I have no need of thee!" The social sciences need one another, and the different specialties within the social sciences need one another, that each may not permit its blind spot to becloud its whole vision. In a word, let us afford all the latitude required for groups of specialists within our field to cultivate their particular interests; but for the safe anchoring of each of the specialties let us at the same time magnify the importances of the plenary sessions, the committee of the whole, the congress of congresses in which we preserve the habit of surveying all the special problems of society in the perspective of the largest outlook which our combined vision commands.

JAMES E. HAGERTY, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The founders of the American Sociological Society had in mind an organization which would promote research in sociological theory. Since then there has been no intention of changing the purpose of the Society. Our organization has a distinct field the same as the National Conference on Social Work has a distinct field, the development of applied sociology.

I assume that the organization of our program into group conferences which has been inaugurated this year is in line with the original purposes of the Society as these conferences serve better the needs of the various groups in our membership.

Since the Society was organized we have often discussed the promotion of sociological teaching. The time seems especially opportune now for the extension of sociological teaching. Fifteen or twenty years ago the sociologist was challenged with Is there such a subject as sociology? and Is sociology a science? Moreover sociologists took a great deal of time telling what sociology is, and justifying their existence. They have long since ceased to do this. Now the existence of sociology is not only admitted by everyone, but there is great pressure for its introduction and expansion.

Practically every university and college in the United States is now teaching sociology or wants to teach it. In universities where departments of sociology are well organized the registration in sociological courses is rapidly increasing, and sociology is one of the most popular university subjects. The demand is now on us for the teaching of sociology in the secondary schools and within the next decade I look for great progress in the introduction of sociology in the high schools of the country. The responsibility rests upon this organization in determining the character of the sociology which is to be taught, for if we fail, something may be taught in the name of sociology which will not meet with our approval.

EDWARD A. ROSS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

I had much to do with the policy followed in earlier years of our Society of focusing the annual meeting upon some social question of wide interest to our people. While this brought our young Society much attention and contributed to sell the annual volume of *Proceedings*, I am convinced that the time has come to pursue a different policy. I consider that our present meeting has been marked by papers of extraordinary merit and they possess such merit because they have not been written to order but embody the results of long reflection and investigation. Furthermore, I see clearly that the organization of committees, one for each section, to construct the best possible programs for that section brings to light more of the valuable work going on among sociologists than the construction of a program by the president or by one committee. I trust, therefore, that the innovations of our president this year will be retained and that our annual meeting will become an opportunity for submitting the results of the best work in our field that has been carried on by any Americans, whether or not they are members of our Society.

JAMES P. LICHTENBERGER, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

When Professor Hayes wrote me in regard to his proposed plan of dividing the program into sections and round table discussions it occurred to me that while it was extremely desirable to place the emphasis upon investigation and research, we should probably suffer some loss in the value of the proceedings which heretofore had presented discussions upon a general subject and had therefore made some contribution to social thinking in specific fields. I have been very much impressed by the value of the present program and of its high scientific character. I am still raising the question in my own mind, however, whether or not it might be possible to arrange the various round tables and discussions so as to contribute to the specific aspects of some general theme, thus giving a degree of unity to the meetings which would be desirable in the publications. If this could be done without sacrificing the emphasis upon original contributions it might prove valuable.

W. F. OGBURN, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

My long residence on the Pacific Coast has prevented me from having any experience with the program of the American Sociological Society. Hence my remarks on this topic are subject to a certain limitation of evidence. However, my feelings are quite positive and definite. I am opposed to having a single topic for the whole annual meeting of the Society. I think by far the better plan is to have a variety of topics on the program. This has been the procedure of the present meeting and I liked it very much. The reason for my attitude is that the meetings ought to stand for scientific research. Scientific research seems to me to be the one aim of our Society. Research is usually carried on by an investigator for a period of time extending over years on some

particular problem in which he is interested and has special qualifications. Only by a variety of topics will there be opportunity for the Society to hear the results of such investigation. I do not see how you can decide on a single topic, say in the summer preceding the December meeting, and assign some phase of this for research during the fall. There can be interesting comment under such a situation but not research, it seems to me. Imagine, for instance, in biology assigning some topic on circulation of the blood to T. H. Morgan, whose life-work has been given to the study of heredity and drocophile. I hope that the type of program inaugurated by President Hayes will be continued.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

It seems to me that it would be a great mistake to continue the former policy of the Society of selecting some question of the hour to be used as the general topic for discussion at its annual meeting. That policy was justifiable in a period of national crisis such as that through which we have just been passing. But now that peace has come, if we want ours to be a great scientific society, we must pay attention to the only way through which a great scientific society may be built up—namely, the presentation of papers embodying the results of research and critical scholarship. There would, of course, be no harm in having on the program of our Society each year one or more popular addresses on questions of the hour; but, in my opinion, it would not do to select a question of the hour as the general topic of our program and then ask persons of research ability to produce papers along that line. Worth-while research papers are not produced in that way. Such papers as we have listened to this afternoon and yesterday afternoon could not have been produced that way. They cannot be made to order. Dr. Bernard, for example, I happen to know, has worked at least a half-dozen years on his paper.

I do not believe that we shall sacrifice the non-academic constituency of our Society by putting on programs of research and critical scholarship at our annual meetings. On the contrary, I believe that the practical social workers and others who are members of our Society are members, not to get mere sensible opinions on questions of the hour, which they can get quite well in the popular magazines, nor to get the results of technical professional experiences in social work, such as are presented in the National Conference of Social Work, but rather to get the results of that broader social research and critical social scholarship which the very name "Sociology" has come rightly to suggest. I am not afraid of losing our membership if we make this a scientific society in the strict sense, provided, of course, that we present results worth while. I am, therefore, in favor of continuing the general policy begun by President Hayes of having special committees for each separate line of social research, these committees to have the responsibility of securing suitable papers for presentation in their sections of our program.

THOMAS J. RILEY, PH.D., GENERAL SECRETARY, BROOKLYN BUREAU OF CHARITIES

I find myself in accord with the plan of committees and group conferences as proposed by our chairman. I believe also that the time has come when we should change from the policy of having one general topic for the whole yearly meeting and substitute for it, in part, papers and discussion on investigations, research, and experiments carried on in the field of sociology. In other words, I believe the time has come to accumulate facts and yet more facts in the record of our proceedings and not opinions and opinions on topics that have been assigned by some outlining program committee.

To illustrate what I mean and to submit it for consideration, I venture the following suggestion: that the American Sociological Society take such steps as may be found advisable to help the agencies of social welfare to devise such records as will make the material of scientific as well as practical value. At present there is an abundance of material recorded on helping needy families, the protection of children from cruelty, placing of children—and sometimes mothers—in institutions or families, probation and parole, etc., but it has been written almost entirely from the point of view of day to day use. Even for this purpose it is often inadequate and is far from uniform as among similar agencies. It should be not less practical but more scientific and more uniform.

If the sociologist will advise with the social worker as to what material and form would be desirable in these records from the point of view of a science of society and of teaching requirements, I believe such suggestions would be most welcome and would probably add also to the practical value of the records. Perhaps a joint committee of the American Sociological Society and the National Conference of Social Work could take this up and report back to both bodies.

PROGRAM OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, DECEMBER 27–30, 1921

COMMITTEES IN CHARGE OF THE PROGRAM

Section on Social Evolution. Harry E. Barnes, Clark University; Hutton Webster, University of Nebraska; Robert E. Lowie, University of California.

Section on Biological Factors in Social Causation. Albert E. Jenks, University of Minnesota; Edward A. Ross, University of Wisconsin; Frank H. Hankins, Clark University.

Section on Psychic Factors in Social Causation. Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri; Charles H. Cooley, University of Michigan; Ellsworth Faris, University of Chicago.

Round Table on Community Problems. Dwight Sanderson, Cornell University; Everett Dix, Berea College; Walter J. Campbell, Y.M.C.A. College, Springfield, Mass.

Round Table on Sociology and Social Work. Frank D. Watson, Haverford College; Porter R. Lee, New York; James E. Hagerty, Ohio State University.

Round Table on the Delinquent Girl. Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Chicago; Robert E. Park, University of Chicago; Thomas D. Eliot, Northwestern University.

Standing Committee on Research. J. L. Gillin, Lucile Eaves, Eugene T. Lies, George B. Mangold, Robert E. Park, A. J. Todd, Howard B. Woolston.

Standing Committee on Teaching of Social Science. Ross L. Finney, E. S. Bogardus, C. A. Ellwood, Cecil C. North, John Phelan, Walter R. Smith, A. J. Todd.

Standing Committee on Social Abstracts. F. S. Chapin, Susan M. Kingsbury, Robert E. Park, U. G. Weatherly, A. B. Wolfe.

Tuesday, December 27

7:00–8:00 P.M. Informal Reception to all members of the American Sociological Society and their friends.

8:15 P.M. Joint meeting with American Political Science Association. CHANCELLOR JOHN GABBERT BOWMAN, University of Pittsburgh, presiding.
Presidential Addresses: "The Sociological Point of View." EDWARD CARY HAYES, University of Illinois. "The Development of Democracy on the American Continent." LEO STANTON ROWE, director general, Pan-American Union.

Wednesday, December 28

9:00–10:45 A.M. Round Table: "The Delinquent Girl." In charge of MRS. W. F. DUMMER, Chicago.
Discussion opened by JESSIE TAFT, Seybert Foundation, Philadelphia; MARION KENWORTHY, Vanderbilt Clinic, New York; EMMA O. LUNDBERG, Children's Bureau, Washington; MIRIAM VAN WATERS, Juvenile Court, Los Angeles.

11:00–12:45 Round Table: "Education and Research."
Report of the Committee on Research. J. L. GILLIN, University of Wisconsin, Chairman.
Report of the Committee on Social Abstracts. ROBERT E. PARK, University of Chicago.
Report of the Committee on the Teaching of Social Science in the Public and High Schools. ROSS L. FINNEY, University of Minnesota, Chairman.

Report of the Conference on Social Studies in the Public Schools. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri.

2:30 P.M. Section on Social Evolution. In charge of HARRY ELMER BARNES, Clark University.
"The Development of Historical Sociology." HARRY ELMER BARNES, Clark University.
"Anthropological Viewpoints in Sociology." ALEXANDER A. GOLDENWEISER, New School of Social Research.
"The Historical Method in the Analysis of Social Phenomena."
WILLIAM F. OGBURN, Columbia University.

5:00 P.M. Annual Meeting of the Executive Committee. Room 139, Fort Pitt Hotel.

8:15 P.M. Section on Biological Factors in Social Causation. In charge of ALBERT E. JENKS, University of Minnesota.
"Hereditary Human Groups in Their Relation to Distinctive Cultures." ALBERT E. JENKS, University of Minnesota.
"Hereditary Traits as Factors in Human Progress." FRANK W. BLACKMAR, University of Kansas.
"Eugenic Aspects of Health." RUDOLPH M. BINDER, New York University.
"Controlled Fecundity." EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Wisconsin.

Thursday, December 29

9:00–10:45 A.M. Round Table: "Community Problems." In charge of DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University.
"Points of Contact between Rural and Urban Communities." JOHN M. GILLETTE, University of North Dakota.
"What the Red Cross Is Doing in Rural Organization." Discussion opened by WILLIAM CARL HUNT, Director of Rural Organization Service, Lake Division, American Red Cross, Cleveland, Ohio.

11:00–12:45 Round Table: "Sociology and Social Work." In charge of FRANK D. WATSON, Haverford College.
"Has Sociology a Contribution to the Equipment of the Social Worker?" Discussion opened by THOMAS D. ELIOT, Northwestern University.
"What Types of Courses in Sociology Are Most Valuable for the Social Worker and How May They Best Be Presented?" Discussion opened by ARTHUR J. TODD, Chicago.

2:30 P.M. Section on Psychic Factors in Social Causation. In charge of CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri.
"The Significance of Environment as a Social Factor." L. L. BERNARD, University of Minnesota.
"Ethnological Light on Psychological Problems." ELLSWORTH FARIS, University of Chicago.
"Slogans as a Means of Social Control." F. E. LUMLEY, Ohio State University.

5:00 P.M. Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society.
Discussion of the work of the Society, introduced by FRANKLIN.

H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University; ALBION W. SMALL, University of Chicago; and JAMES E. HAGERTY, Ohio State University.

7:00 P.M. Subscription dinner.

Friday, December 30

10:00 A.M. Joint meeting of American Sociological Society, American Economic Association, and American Political Science Association. Ball Room, William Penn Hotel. JACOB H. HOLLANDER, Johns Hopkins University, President of the American Economic Association, presiding. "The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment." ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, University of Minnesota.
"The Basis of an Inter-American Policy." PETER H. GOLDSMITH, Director of the Inter-American Division of the American Association for International Conciliation.
"The Economic Basis of Federation in Central America." HARRY T. COLLINGS, University of Pennsylvania.
"Patriotism and Internationalism." HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER, Oberlin College.-

GROUP MEETING OF RURAL SOCIOLOGISTS

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 27, ROOM A, FORT PITT HOTEL

2:30–500 P.M. Round Table: "The Rural Community and the Rural Neighborhood as Social Units." DR. C. J. GALPIN, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. Discussion led by DR. C. C. TAYLOR, North Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical College; PROFESSOR J. H. KOLB, University of Wisconsin; and PROFESSOR DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University.

6:00 P.M. Subscription dinner for Rural Sociologists, Fort Pitt Hotel.

GROUP MEETING ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1921, ASSEMBLY ROOM, FORT PITT HOTEL

2:00–5:00 P.M. Reports on Social Research in Progress. (Twenty minutes to each speaker.) "Cleveland Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Cleveland." RAYMOND MOLEY, Director, The Cleveland Foundation. "Social Tests and Surveys of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station." HORNELL HART, State University of Iowa. "Research Based on Case Records." Dr. LUCILE EAVES, Director, Research Department, Women's Educational and Industrial Union.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, Fort PITT HOTEL

6:00 P.M. Subscription dinner. "Methods of Social Investigation." "Social and Economic Conditions in Relation to Child Welfare." DR. ROBERT M. WOODBURY, Director, Statistical Research, Children's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor. "Some Farm Population Studies." DR. C. J. GALPIN, Economist in Charge, Rural Life Studies, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Annual Report of the Secretary for the Fiscal Year, December 15, 1920, to December 14, 1921

Membership Statement

The total membership of the American Sociological Society for the calendar year 1921 is 923. The number of members in 1920 was 1,021. The decrease in membership may be chiefly attributed to the increase in the annual dues from $3.00 to $4.00.

Membership in 1920		1,021
Members resigning	83	
Members dropped	202	
Members deceased	6	
Total lost	291	
Members renewing ex officio	1	
Members renewing exchange	6	
Members renewing paid	723	
New members	193	
Total for 1921		923

Campaign for New Members

The membership campaign was conducted this year with little change from the established custom. The Secretary sent out 1,054 printed letters and 530 typed letters. Two hundred and fifty letters prepared and signed by Professor Dwight Sanderson and sent to a list of 250 rural sociologists supplied by Dr. C. J. Galpin contained an invitation to membership. In addition fifty teachers of sociology were asked to co-operate actively by presenting the opportunity for membership in the Society before graduate and advanced students. While all have not yet replied, the response at the present time exceeds all records in the past. Professor Edward A. Ross leads the field as usual, having sent in the applications of thirty-two of his advanced students. Others who have sent in large lists are Professor Rudolph M. Binder, Professor Charles A. Ellwood, Professor Ellsworth Faris, Professor Ernest R. Groves, Professor Edward C. Hayes, Professor Stuart A. Queen. The entire list is too long to read here. Many recommendations of persons for membership have been received from the general body of members of the Society.

Change in Secretary

As the successor of Professor Scott E. W. Bedford, for nine years secretary of the American Sociological Society, I desire to express my appreciation of his efficient organization of the details of the work of the Society. The systematic procedure which he worked out and the continuance of the devoted and effective service of Miss May G. Miller, the assistant to the secretary, facilitated the readjustment caused by the change in office.

Formation of Groups

During the last meeting of the Society two groups were informally organized. Both groups, the one on Social Research, the other on Rural Sociology, held a separate session and a subscription dinner at the present meeting. The group on Social Research reports three afternoon sessions at Milwaukee in June during the meetings of the National Conference of Social Work.

Deaths during the Year

The Secretary regrets to report the death of Professor W. H. Cheever, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Professor M. T. Merrill, Defiance, Ohio.

Respectfully submitted,

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TREASURER FOR THE FISCAL YEAR, DECEMBER 15, 1920, TO DECEMBER 14, 1921

Following the action of the Executive Committee at its meeting December 28, 1920, discontinuing the practice of employing a public auditor, an Auditing Committee was appointed by the President of the Society. In a conference between the chairman of the committee and the Treasurer the decision was reached to secure the assistance of a public accountant.

The valuable service which an Auditing Committee may render the Society is evident from its report. The Treasurer urges consideration of the recommendations and suggestions made by this committee.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Treasurer*

Report of Auditing Committee follows.

REPORT OF THE AUDITING COMMITTEE

December, 22, 1921
Chicago, Ill.

Mr. Edward Cary Hayes, President
American Sociological Society

Your Committee has, with the assistance of a public accountant, examined the financial records of the American Sociological Society for the fiscal year ending December 14, 1921.

Entries have been compared with original vouchers of expense and in a few instances these vouchers have been examined in detail. Entries of receipts

for membership have been checked and the system of verifying items and totals has been observed as being satisfactory, although we have not examined and counted the entries on receipt stubs. The balance in bank has been found to agree with the statement received from the depository, and the bond of the Northwestern Electric Company, hereinafter referred to, has been examined.

The Balance Sheet (Schedule "A") and Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Schedule "B") as drawn by the Secretary and Treasurer, are found correct:

SCHEDULE "A"

BALANCE SHEET AS AT DECEMBER 14, 1921

Assets

Cash in bank	$1,133.10
NORTHWESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY 6 per cent Gold Bond	500.00
OFFICE FURNITURE	118.65
Total assets	$1,751.75

Liabilities

Surplus as at December 15, 1920	$ 809.48	
Add excess of income over expenditure for period ending December 14, 1921	742.27	
Credit from University of Chicago Press for its share of campaign expenses per Schedule "B"	200.00	
Total liabilities		$1,751.75

SCHEDULE "B"

STATEMENT OF CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FROM DECEMBER 15, 1920, TO DECEMBER 14, 1921

Cash Receipts

Dues from members, 1921	$3,492.50		
Dues from members, 1922	1,480.00		
		$4,972.50	
Exchange with remittances		15.30	
Postage with remittances		7.09	
Interest on Bond		45.00	
Royalties		424.84	
			$5,464.73

Cash Disbursements

American Journal of Sociology	$1,853.16
Proceedings, Volume XV	1,452.30
Clerical aid, salaries	497.41
Postage and express	253.86
Printing	297.99
Secretary's expense	87.53
Carried forward	$4,442.25

Brought forward	$4,442.25	
Stationery	114.80	
Society membership, American Council	40.00	
Exchange on dues received	37.36	
Auditing	25.00	
Refunds on memberships	52.00	
Office expense	9.60	
Insurance	1.45	
		$4,722.46
Excess of receipts over disbursements		$ 742.27

Summary

Balance, cash in bank, December 15, 1920		$ 190.83
Total receipts for period ending December 14, 1921, as above		5,464.73
		$5,655.56
Total disbursements for period ending December 14, 1921, as above	$4,722.46	
Less credit from University of Chicago Press	200.00	
		4,522.46
Balance, cash in bank, December 14, 1921		$1,133.10

Attention is called to the fact that the Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Schedule "B") includes in its cash receipts "dues from members for 1922." If the receipts from this source ($1,480.00) had not been included in the statement, the apparent balance, cash in bank, December 14, 1921, $1,133.10, would have been an actual deficit of $346.90 For the information of the members of the Society, your Committee includes at this point a short table prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer to indicate the actual receipts and expenditures of the Society for the last four years:

Year	Receipts from dues	Total Receipts	Expenditures	Deficit	Cash Balance
1917	.....	.....	.....	.....	$380.65
1918	$2,415.35	$2,810.70	$2,863.87	$53.17	327.48
1919	2,598.30	2,962.79	3,196.74	233.95	93.53
1920	3,172.50	3,591.96	3,815.90	223.94	−130.41
1921	3,708.50	4,400.73	4,617.22	216.49	−346.90

It is noted that, with the increase in membership fee from $3.00 to $4.00, the income from the dues has grown from $3,172.50 for 1920 to $3,708.50 for the present year, although the number of members fell from 1,021 to 923.

It is suggested that in the future an analysis such as indicated by the foregoing table be included in the report of the Auditing Committee.

It is suggested that the present ledger account entitled "Office Equipment and Expense" be changed to read "Miscellaneous Expense."

It is suggested that an account under the heading "Investments" be opened in which will be carried the present item of "Northwestern Electric Company 6 per cent Bond" at the nominal valuation of $500.00 which, except as a memorandum, now appears only in the financial statement.

It is suggested that the item of $200.00 credit from the University of Chicago Press for "its share of campaign expenses," which now appears in the financial statement, be distributed among appropriate expense accounts in proportion to charges previously made for the campaign.

It is suggested that an annual valuation of *Proceedings* in stock be made, and this be carried in a ledger account and in the balance sheet.

It is suggested that a depreciation of 25 per cent on "Furniture and Fixtures" for the present and preceding years be written off, and that hereafter depreciation be calculated at the rate of 10 per cent annually.

Your Committee, fully appreciating the efficient service of the Secretary-Treasurer in the important task assigned to him, recommends the appointment of a Finance Committee to co-operate with him in the direction of the finances of the Society, subject to the action of the Executive Committee.

It is also recommended that the Executive Committee consider the adoption of a budget system for the expenditures of the Society. If this recommendation is accepted, it is suggested that the budget be prepared by the Finance Committee and approved by the Executive Committee.

Respectfully submitted,

Auditing Committee:

THOMAS D. ELIOT
J. M. KARPF
WM. T. CROSS, *Chairman*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGING EDITOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR, DECEMBER 15, 1920, TO DECEMBER 14, 1921

On December 15, the number of different volumes of the *Papers and Proceedings* on hand was as follows:

Vol. I	94 copies
Vol. II	16 copies
Vol. III	7 copies
Vol. IV	52 copies
Vol. V	56 copies
Vol. VI	5 copies
Vol. VII	58 copies
Vol. VIII	87 copies
Vol. IX	43 copies
Vol. X	198 copies
Vol. XI	1 copy
Vol. XII	121 copies
Vol. XIII	23 copies
Vol. XIV	73 copies
Vol. XV	412 copies

Respectfully submitted,

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Managing Editor*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA DECEMBER 28, 1921

The meeting was called to order at 5:00 P.M. by President Hayes, in Room 11, Chamber of Commerce Building. In addition to the President and Secretary, there were present Professors Bogardus, Cooley, Dealey, Lichtenberger, Ross, Weatherly, and Wolfe.

Since the minutes of the last meeting were printed in the *Proceedings*, their reading was dispensed with. The reports of the Secretary and the Treasurer were read and approved. The report of the Auditing Committee presented by Professor T. D. Eliot was accepted and a motion carried expressing appreciation for the services of its members to the Society. Moved and carried that a Finance Committee constituted by members living in and near Chicago, serving in an advisory capacity with the Treasurer in conducting the finances of the Society, be appointed by the President in consultation with the Treasurer. The other recommendations of the Auditing Committee were referred to the Treasurer and Finance Committee with power to act.

The report of the Managing Editor was made and approved.

The Secretary stated that no report had been received from the delegates of the Society to the American Council of Learned Societies. Moved and carried that a report be secured and published, if feasible, in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

Professor Dwight Sanderson as chairman of the group on Rural Sociology made a statement, outlining its history and its desire to become a section of the American Sociological Society with its meeting at a time set apart for this and other groups. The Secretary on behalf of the group on Social Research made a similar statement. Motion made and carried that an invitation be extended to the rural sociologists to become a section in the Society, and its program, after consultation with the President, to be incorporated in the general program. Moved and carried that a similar invitation be given to the group on social research. Moved and carried that the arrangement of the relation of the Society to the Association of Training Schools for Professional Social Work be referred to the President.

Invitations for the next meeting were extended by the University of Cincinnati through Professor E. E. Eubank, by the University of Illinois through President Hayes, by Indianapolis and Indiana University through Professor U. G. Weatherly.

Motion made and carried that the President and Secretary be a committee to arrange the time and the place of the next meeting in co-operation with the American Economic Association, the American Political Science Association and the American Statistical Association.

President Hayes then proposed the institution of a Sociological Summer Camp for the discussion of sociological problems. After an expression of the opinion of the members present, no action was taken, and the meeting adjourned.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA DECEMBER 29, 1921

The annual business meeting was called to order by President Hayes at 5:00 P.M. in the Auditorium of the Chamber of Commerce. Sixty-one members were present.

The report of President Hayes upon his administration and the discussion upon the "Work of the Society" are printed elsewhere in the *Proceedings*.

Moved and carried that the minutes of the last annual business meeting be not read, because they had already been printed in the *Proceedings*.

The Committee on Resolutions (J. P. Lichtenberger, A. B. Wolfe, and E. S. Bogardus) expressed appreciation to the city of Pittsburgh, the Chamber of Commerce, the Carnegie Institute of Technology, the Irene Kaufmann Settlement, and the local committee for hospitality and co-operation in promoting the conduct of the meetings.

The Committee on Nominations (E. A. Ross, chairman, C. H. Cooley, J. M. Gillette) recommended the election of the following persons for the different offices for 1922: president, James P. Lichtenberger; first vice-president, Ulysses G. Weatherly; second vice-president, Charles A. Ellwood; secretary-treasurer, Ernest W. Burgess; new members of the Executive Committee, Lucile Eaves and Charles J. Galpin. Motion made and carried that the Secretary be instructed to cast the ballot of the Society for the persons nominated.

President Hayes made a brief statement of his proposal for an Annual Summer Camp for sociological conference and discussion, suggesting that members who were interested should correspond with the Secretary.

A motion was made and carried that the President be authorized in response to an invitation from the World Friendship Bureau to prepare a message expressing the sentiment of the Society that permanent peace can be secured only through world-organization.

Moved and carried that the Executive Committee be requested to prepare and report upon a new plan for the election of the officers of the Society.

Motion made and carried that the two members representing this Society on the Joint Commission on Social Studies in Schools be authorized to confer with the National Council of Teachers of the Social Sciences with regard to its plan of organization and to report to the Executive Committee of the Society as to the desirability of affiliation with it.

Motions were made and carried that the Committee on the Teaching of Social Science in Grade and High Schools and the Committee on Social Research be continued.

Moved and carried that the question of raising the dues of the Society suggested by the Committee on Social Abstracts for the purpose of financing the publication of a sociological index be referred to the Executive Committee with power to act.

The meeting then adjourned.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1922

Alabama

Birmingham

Hickman, Thomas S., Route 8

Montgomery

Owen, Thomas H., Alabama State Department of Archives and History

Talladega

Holloway, William, Talladega College

Tuskegee

Work, Monroe N., Tuskegee Institute

University

Bidgood, Lee, P.O. Box 416

Lang, George

Arizona

Phoenix

Heard, Mrs. Dwight B., Casa Blanca

Arkansas

Arkadelphia

Johnson, Charles D., Box 262

Watters, Mary, Ouachita College

Conway

Gooden, O. T.

Little Rock

Connor, Bishop J. M., 1519 Pulaski St.

California

Berkeley

Aronovici, Carol, 1616 La Verelda

Coolidge, Mrs. Dane, Dwight End Way

Griffen, Frederick L., 902 Indian Rock Ave.

Kirk, William, University of California

Claremont

Sumner, G. S., Pomona College

Coronado

Dummer, Mrs. W. F., 1001 Adella Ave.

Covina

Fesler, Alice

Eagle Rock City

Witherspoon, J. E., 500 Stanley Ave.

Garden Grove

Magnusson, P. Magnus, R.D. Box 112

La Jolla

Harper, J. C., Corner Prospect and Torrey Sts.

Ritter, William E.

Long Beach

Grossman, Louis, P.O.

Los Angeles

Bogardus, Emory S., University of Southern California

Darsie, Marvin L., Southern Branch, University of California

Dean, Jessie E., 4912 Marathon St.

Meyers, Mrs. H. H., Alvarado Apartments, 9th and Alvarado Sts.

Rainwater, Clarence, University of Southern California

Smith, William C., University of Southern California

Stewart, Anna, 852 W. 35th Pl.

Towne, Mrs. Marie Reed, 444 S. Hope St.

Vincent, Melvin J., 1616 N. Mariposa Ave.

Pasadena

Burdette, Mrs. Robert J., Hotel Maryland

Danley, Samuel B., Jr., 502 Garfield Ave.

San Francisco
George, Julia, 1136 Eddy St.
Gray, R. S., Commonwealth Club, 153 Kearney St.
Santa Ana
Nealley, E. M., R.F.D. 1
Stanford University
Beach, Walter G.
Everett, Earl A., Box 625
Huston, Charles A., Law School
Stockton
Bonney, Ethelind M., 1213 S. California Ave.
Whittier
Nelles, Fred C., Whittier State School

Colorado

Colorado Springs
Swart, Jacob, Colorado College
Denver
Harrison, C. H., 217 Guardian Trust Bldg.
Miner, Ora, Iliff School of Theology
Fort Collins
Coen, B. F.
Corbett, Virginia H., 428 W. Laurel St.
Grand Valley
Baum, P. B.
Greeley
Baker, Herbert M., Box 727
Howerth, I. W., State Teachers College
Parker, H. Alvin, 1313 Ninth Ave.
Johnston
Tippett, Donald
Parker
Whitsitt, V. V.

Connecticut

Hartford
Capen, Edward W., 146 Sargent St.
Gillett, Arthur L., 16 Marshall St.
Godard, George S., State Library
New Haven
Angiers, Roswell P., 140 Edgehill Road
Baldwin, Simeon E.
Davie, Maurice R., Yale University
Fairchild, H. P., 185 St. Ronan St.
Farnum, H. W., 43 Hillhouse Ave.
Fisher, Irving, Yale University
Keller, A. G., 55 Huntington St.
Westerfield, R. B., Yale University
New London
Wessel, Bessie Bloom, Connecticut College
Waterbury
Davis, Edward H., P.O. Drawer 1217

Delaware

Wilmington
Burnet, Philip, Continental Life Insurance Company

District of Columbia

Takoma Park
Waters, Chester C., Three Pine Ave.
Washington
Bary, Helen V., Children's Bureau
Bixby, Brig. Gen. William H., U.S. Army, Retired; 1709 Lanier Pl., NW.
Bowerman, George F., Public Library
Chaney, Lucian W., Department of Labor
Compton, Wilson, 721 Southern Bldg.
Cromwell, Mary E., 1815 13th St., NW.
Dinwiddie, Courtney, National Child Health Council, 17th and D St., NW.
Eichelberger, Clark, 907 16th St., NW.
Fairchild, Milton, Chevy Chase
Galpin, C. A., Department of Agriculture, U.S. Office Farm Management
Gillin, J. L., American Red Cross National Headquarters
Gleim, Sophia C., 706–12 District National Bank Bldg.
Goethe, C. M., 720 Capitol National Bank Bldg.

Harper, Ernest B., care of Dr. William E. Clark, 1029 Vermont Ave.

Harriman, Edward A., 735 Southern Bldg.

Holler, H. P., 1702 Oregon Ave., NW.

Kerby, William J., Catholic University

Kern, R. R., Washington University, 2023 G St., NW.

King, Judson, 637 Munsey Bldg.

Klein, Philip, American Red Cross National Headquarters

Lathrop, Julia C., 504 The Ontario

Luce, Robert, Room 326, House Office Bldg.

Lundberg, Emma O., Apartment 703, The Woodward

Madeira, Lucy, Miss Madeira's School

Neill, Charles P., 1312 Massachusetts Ave., NW.

Nevils, W. Coleman, Georgetown University

Olmsted, Ruth H., 208 Falkstone Courts

Salter, William M., Hotel Potomac, New Jersey and C St., SE.

Štěpánek, Dr. Bedřich, 2040 S St., NW.

Stewart, Ethelbert, 1210 Delafield Pl., NW.

Sum, A., 3134 19th St., NW.

Swanton, John R., Smithsonian Institution

Van Winkle, Mrs. Mina C., 2311 Connecticut Ave.

Werber, Dr. Gustavus, 1353 Q St., NW.

Florida

Gainesville

Bristol, Lucius Moody, University of Florida

St. Augustine

Hopkins, Louis J., 34 Shenandoah St.

Georgia

Atlanta

Brown, Thomas I., Atlanta University

King, Willis J., Gammon Theological Seminary

Decatur

McCain, J. R., Agnes Scott College

Martin, Anne H., 204 Winona Drive

Macon

Daniel, J. W. W., Wesleyan College

Mounts, Lewis H., Ballard Normal School

Railey, J. L., Mercer University

Rome

Tingley, Mrs. Helen Eloise, Box 742, Shorter College

Savannah

Adams, Samuel B., 209 Gaston St., E.

Illinois

Arlington Heights

Waide, W.

Bloomington

Strow, Carl W., Illinois Wesleyan University

Carthage

Hoover, H.D.

Champaign

Garvin, Mary B., 607 E. White St.

McConagha, W. A., 501 E. Green St.

Roberts, William Everett, 305 W. Hill St.

Chicago

Abbott, Edith, University of Chicago

Addams, Jane, Hull House, 800 S. Halsted St.

Armstrong, Elsie, 6031 Woodlawn Ave.

Artman, J. M., University of Chicago

Aubrey, Edwin E., 138 South Hall, University of Chicago

Bedford, Scott E. W., University of Chicago

Beeley, Arthur L., 6007 Kimbark Ave.

Bengston, Caroline, 6547 Ellis Ave.

Brandenburg, Earl W., Room 1500 19 S. La Salle St.

Breckinridge, Sophonisba P., Green Hall, University of Chicago

Bridge, Norman, Drake Hotel

Buchan, Evelyn, 49 Green Hall, University of Chicago

Burgess, Ernest W., University of Chicago

Byron, William F., Hull House, 800 S. Halsted St.

Carpenter, Allan, Hull House, 800 S. Halsted St.

Carroll, Joseph C., 504 E. 37th St.

Case, Francis H., *The Epworth Herald*, 740 Rush St.

Dawson, C. A., University of Chicago

Day, Mrs. George W., 6040 Harper Ave.

Dieffendorfer, R. E., 740 Rush St.

Dixon, Elizabeth S., 1326 E. 58th St.

Everett, M. S., 60 Divinity Hall, University of Chicago

Faris, Ellsworth, University of Chicago

Gavin, Helena, 1128 E. 62d St.

Graves, Maud C., 9333 Escanaba St.

Greeley, Edith, 834 E. 56th St.

Hayner, Norman S., 6512 Dorchester Ave.

Hoge, Emma Walls, 125 E. 49th St.

Huff, Sara B., 5408 Kimbark Ave.

Jackson, Nancy, 5629 Blackstone Ave.

Jones, Howard A., 6058 Harper Ave.

Karpf, M. J., 1800 Selden St.

Kasak, Mrs. Marie L., 5443 Woodlawn Ave.

Kincheloe, Samuel C., 1007 E. 60th St.

Klee, Max, 1340 E. 48th St.

Krueger, E. T., 6047 Ellis Ave.

Lawson, Victor F., 1500 Lake Shore Drive

Lindsten, Esther, 5227 Kenmore Ave.

Loomis, Frank D., Room 1340 10 S. La Salle St.

McKinlock, George A., 320 S. 5th Ave.

Marshall, L. C., 1320 E. 56th St.

Meier, Norman C., 16 North Hall, University of Chicago

Miao, C. S., 128 South Hall, University of Chicago

Moore, Henry D., 35 Middle Hall, University of Chicago

Moore, Mrs. M. D., 826 Lakeside Place

Mowrer, Ernest R., 14 North Hall, University of Chicago

Neeley, Elizabeth, 5824 Woodlawn Ave.

Ochsner, A. J., 2106 Sedgwick Ave.

Park, Robert E., University of Chicago

Phillips, Dr. Herbert E., 1609 W. Garfield Blvd.

Powell, Hannah B. Clark, 5227 Blackstone Ave.

Prentiss, Marion C., 3543 Van Buren St.

Price, M. F., care of Ira M. Price, University of Chicago

Ricketts, Julia M., 1527 First National Bank Bldg.

Rosenwald, Julius, Sears Roebuck & Co.

Sell, Harry B., 16 North Hall, University of Chicago

Seman, Philip L., Chicago Hebrew Institute, 1258 W. Taylor St.

Sie, Hsuinchu, 5558 Drexel Ave.

Siedenburg, Frederic, 617 Ashland Block, Clark and Randolph Sts.

Small, Albion W., University of Chicago

Stahl, Sarah Starr, 1203 E. 60th St.

Swift, Harold H., Union Stock Yards

Talbot, Marion, University of Chicago

Tasaki, Kensaku, 5757 University Ave.

Taylor, Graham, Chicago Commons, Grand Ave. and Morgan St.

Thrasher, Frederic M., University of Chicago
Todd, A. J., 415 S. Franklin St.
Unger, Mrs. J. O., 4700 Beacon St.
Warner, Mason, 3848 Byron St.
Whiting, E. Marguerite, 3733 Lake Park Ave.
Williams, Homer L., 5710 Maryland Ave.
Wilson, J. E., 528 S. 5th Ave.
Wilson, Jean, 5735 Blackstone Ave.
Wood, L. Foster, 5829 Maryland Ave.
Young, Erle Fiske, University of Chicago
Ytrehus, Oscar B., 6140 Ellis Ave.

Coal City
Lavers, O. R.

Decatur
Smith, W. Wilberforce, 151 N. Fairview Ave.

Dolton
Harms, Mary, 322 Lincoln St.

Elgin
Rockey, Carroll J. 33 N. Chapel St.

Evanston
Chu, T. S., Foster House
Deibler, Frederick Shipp, 2119 Sherman Ave.
Eliot, Thomas D., Northwestern University
Hahne, Ernest H., 802 Colfax St.
Koch, W. T., Northwestern University
MacLean, Annie Marion, 902 Elmwood Ave.
Schaub, E. L., 2437 Sheridan Road

Galesburg
Hyde, D. Clark, Knox College

Joliet
Morrow, Verle, 304 N. Broadway

Lebanon
Brooks, Elizabeth, McKendree College

Lincoln
Rickert, H. L., Lincoln College

Macomb
Morgan, Walter P., 304 N. Ward St.

Marion
Kennedy, Elmer, 520 E. Thorne St.

Maywood
Myers, J. Ward, 1205 S. 4th Ave.

Oak Park
Egartner, Z. T., Adams St. and Scoville Ave.
Gurinian, V. G., 325 S. Scoville Ave.

Peoria
Schroeder, C. W., 2609 Western Ave.

Rockford
Moyer, Louise P., 978 Main St.

Sycamore
Peterson, O. E., 320 S. Walnut St.

Urbana
Boyer, Edward S., 1006 W. Nevada St.
Duncan, H. G., 314 Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois
Farrow, Tieras, 1106 W. Oregon St.
Hayes, E. C., 1005 W. Nevada St.
Ratcliffe, Samuel C., 309 Railroad Ave.
Sutherland, E. H., Room 314, Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois
Thompson, Mrs. Agnes L., 309 Coler St.

Westville
Irshay, Z.

Indiana

Bloomington
Bittner, W. S., 822 Hunter Ave.
Jenkins, W. E., University of Indiana Library
Weatherly, U. G., 527 E. 3d St.

Columbus
Newsom, Vida, 820 Franklin St.

Evansville
Terpenning, Walter A., Evansville College

Franklin
Shideler, Ernest H., 25 S. Hougham St.

Goshen
Snodgrass, James H., 222 S. 7th St.

Greencastle
Hudson, W. H., 613 E. Anderson St.
Hammond
Howat, William F., 832 Hohman St.
Hanover
Woodworth, A. H., Hanover College
Indiana Harbor
Simms, Stockwell, Katherine House
Indianapolis
Canis, Edward N., Route A-2, Box 373-A
Cavan, Jordan, Butler College
Gerlach, Talitha, 2251 N. New Jersey St.
Henry, Edna G., 1414 Broadway
Jenson, Howard E., Butler College
Muncie
Torrence, Mary, Muncie Public Library
North Manchester
Schultz, J. Raymond, 503 College St.
Terre Haute
Cunningham, Arthur, Indiana State Normal School Library
West Lafayette
Brandenburg, G. C., 625 Russell St.
Hall, O. F., 820 Salisbury St.
Sears, Louis M., 523 Waldron Ave.

Iowa

Ames
Hawthorn, H. B.
Thaden, J. H., 425 Welch Ave.
Von Tungeln, George H., Iowa State College
Burlington
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